BILINGUAL READING · 第01章
公元2000年的转折点
CHAPTER 1 THE TRANSITION OF THE YEAR 2000 The Fourth Stage of Human Society
桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。
导读 本章论证
- 人类将从狩猎采集、农业和工业社会进入信息社会。
- 微处理器和网络空间削弱地域的重要性,可能降低民族国家对高流动人才与资本的控制。
- 变革不会平稳发生;旧制度会反击,失去地位和收入的群体也可能形成新卢德主义反弹。
- 原书借中世纪“边区”(March)、圣殿骑士团和汉萨同盟想象主权重叠的未来:人在同一地理空间中也可能选择不同法律与保护提供者。
- “带宽超越边界”意味着共同体可能更多按兴趣、能力与契约组织,而不只按国籍组织。
- Y2K 被用作一个预测案例:中央系统的微小逻辑缺陷可能积累为系统性风险,也提示信息战可以针对控制系统而非物理领土。
01开篇Opening
感觉有大事即将发生,各种图表向我们展示了世界人口每年的增长,大气中二氧化碳的浓度、网站地址、一美元能买到的存储容量,它们都在世纪之交后飙升到一个渐进点:奇点。在那里,一切我们已知的都将结束,某些我们可能永远无法理解的将会诞生。 ——《千年时钟》丹尼·希利斯(Danny Hillis)
“It feels like something big is about to happen: graphs show us the yearly growth of populations, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, Net addresses, and Mbytes per dollar. They all soar up to an asymptote just beyond the turn of the century: The Singularity. The end of everything we know. The beginning of something we may never understand.”1 —DANNY HILLIS
02预言PREMONITIONS
在耶稣降临后的第一个千年之交,世界并未像传说的那样毁灭。其后,在过去的一千年里,公元 2000 年的到来一直困扰着西方人的想象。神学家、传教士、诗人和预言家都在张望着本世纪最后十年的结束,期待着历史性事件的发生。权威如伊萨克·牛顿,也曾经预测,整个世界将随着公元 2000 年的到来而结束1。米歇尔·德·诺斯特拉达穆斯(Michel de Nostradamus),他的预言首次出版于 1568 年,每一代人都读过。他预告,敌基督将会在 1999 年 7 月到来。瑞士心理学家卡尔·荣格, “集体无意识”理论的代表人物,预言一个新时代会在 1997 年来临。这些预言也许很可笑,但不可否认的是,当大众不确定该相信什么的时候,预言会焕发出一些病态的吸引力。
在过去的 250 年里,一种对未来的不安,给西方社会特有的乐观主义染上了阴影。各地的人们都犹豫不决,忧心忡忡。你可以从他们的脸上看到,从他们的谈话中听到;它反映在民意调查中,登记在选票箱中。就像在乌云密布、闪电到来之前,大气中看不见的离子的物理变化,已经预示了雷雨即将降临。
如今,在千禧年的黄昏,空气中弥漫着变革的预感。一个又一个人,在一种行将结束的生活方式下,感受到时间就要燃尽。随着最后十年的过去,一个肃杀的世纪,同时也是人类成就辉煌的一千年,就此告以终章。所有的一切,都将因 2000 年的到来而画上句号。
所以不要怕他们,因为被遮盖的事没有将不被显露出来的,隐秘的事也没有将不被知道的 ——《马太福音》10:26
我们相信并将论证,西方文明的现代阶段也将随之结束。像许多早期探索一样,本书尝试在黑暗之中,凝视一个模糊的玻璃杯,勾勒出它尚未成型的、未来的模样和尺寸。从这个意义上说,我们的作品,就是 Apokalypsis 这个词的希腊文原意,即末日启示录。Apokalypsis 在希腊语中的意思是“揭开面纱”。我们相信,一个新的历史阶段,即主权个人的时代,即将被揭幕。
我们正在目睹一个崭新逻辑空间的开始,一个即时的电子万物场,我们可以访问、走进和体验。 简而言之,一种新型社区在向我们走来。虚拟社区将成为世俗天国的模范;正如耶稣所说,在他父的天国里有众多华厦,因而也会有众多的虚拟社区,每一个都反映他们自己的需求和愿望。 —— 迈克尔·格鲁索(MICHAEL GRASSO)
The coming of the year 2000 has haunted the Western imagination for the past thousand years. Ever since the world failed to end at the turn of the first millennium after Christ, theologians, evangelists, poets, seers, and now, even computer programmers have looked to the end of this decade with an expectation that it would bring something momentous. No less an authority than Isaac Newton speculated that the world would end with the year 2000. Michel de Nostradamus, whose prophecies have been read by every generation since they were first published in 1568, forecast the coming of the Third Antichrist in July 1999.2 Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, connoisseur of the “collective unconscious,” envisioned the birth of a New Age in 1997. Such forecasts may easily be ridiculed. And so can the sober forecasts of economists, such as Dr. Edward Yardeni of Deutsche Bank Securities, who expects computer malfunctions on the millennial midnight to “disrupt the entire global economy.”3 But whether you view the Y2K computer problem as groundless hysteria ginned up by computer programmers and Information Technology consultants to stir up business, or as a mysterious instance of technology unfolding in concert with the prophetic imagination, there is no denying that circumstances at the eve of the millennium excite more than the usual morbid doubt about where the world is tending.
A sense of disquiet about the future has begun to color the optimism so characteristic of Western societies for the past 250 years. People everywhere are hesitant and worried. You see it in their faces. Hear it in their conversation. See it reflected in polls and registered in the ballot box. Just as an invisible, physical change of ions in the atmosphere signals that a thunderstorm is imminent even before the clouds darken and lightning strikes, so now, in the twilight of the millennium, premonitions of change are in the air. One person after another, each in his own way, senses that time is running out on a dying way of life. As the decade expires, a murderous century expires with it, and also a glorious millennium of human accomplishment. All draw to a close with the year 2000.
“For there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known.” —MATTHEW 10:26
We believe that the modern phase of Western civilization will end with it. This book tells why. Like many earlier works, it is an attempt to see into a glass darkly, to sketch out the vague shapes and dimensions of a future that is still to be. In that sense, we mean our work to be apocalyptic—in the original meaning of the word. Apokalypsis means “unveiling” in Greek. We believe that a new stage in history—the Information Age—is about to be “unveiled.”
“We are watching the beginnings of a new logical space, an instantaneous electronic everywhereness, which we may all access, enter into, and experience. We have, in short, the beginnings of a new kind of community. The virtual community becomes the model for a secular Kingdom of Heaven; as Jesus said there were many mansions in his Father’s Kingdom, so there are many virtual communities, each reflecting their own needs and desires.” —MICHAEL GRASSO4
03人类社会的第四阶段THE FOURTH STAGE OF HUMAN SOCIETY
本书的主旨是探讨一场新的权力革命,它将以 20 世纪民族国家的毁灭为代价,解放出个体。创新,以前所未有的方式改变了暴力的逻辑,并且正在革新未来的边界。如果我们的推论是正确的,你们正站在一场有史以来最宏大的革命的门槛上。微处理的速度之快,超出所有人的想象,它将颠覆和摧毁民族国家,并在此过程当中,创造出新的社会组织形式。这场变革绝非儿戏。
它所带来的挑战是前所未有的,与既往的任何事物相比,它发生的速度都难以置信。纵观历史,从最初时期到现在,人类的经济生活只经历过三个基本阶段:(1)狩猎和采集社会;(2)农业社会;(3)工业社会。现在,在地平线上若隐若现的,是一个崭新的阶段,也就是人类社会组织的第四阶段:信息社会。
前面的几个社会阶段,对应着暴力演进以及人类控制暴力的不同时期。我们将详细阐释,信息社会有望极大地减少暴力的回报,部分原因是它超越了地域性。新的千年,掌控大规模暴力的优势,可能会远远低于法国大革命之前的任何时候,这将产生深远的影响。
其中之一是犯罪率的上升。当有组织、大规模的暴力的回报率下降时,较小规模暴力的回报率则很可能会上升。暴力将变得更加随机和局部,有组织犯罪的范围会扩大。我们将就此作出解释。
从逻辑因果来看,暴力回报率的下降,将导致政治的黯淡。很多证据表明,20 世纪所支撑起来的民族国家公民神话,正在被快速地抛弃。共产主义的死亡只是一个最显著的例子。我们将详细探讨,西方政治领导人的道德败坏,以及日益严重的政治腐败,绝非偶然。它证明了民族国家的潜力已经耗尽。人们不再相信政客口中的陈词滥调,甚至连他们自己都不相信。
The theme of this book is the new revolution of power which is liberating individuals at the expense of the twentieth-century nation-state. Innovations that alter the logic of violence in unprecedented ways are transforming the boundaries within which the future must lie. If our deductions are correct, you stand at the threshold of the most sweeping revolution in history. Faster than all but a few now imagine, microprocessing will subvert and destroy the nation-state, creating new forms of social organization in the process. This will be far from an easy transformation.
The challenge it will pose will be all the greater because it will happen with incredible speed compared with anything seen in the past. Through all of human history from its earliest beginnings until now, there have been only three basic stages of economic life: (1) hunting-and-gathering societies; (2) agricultural societies; and (3) industrial societies. Now, looming over the horizon, is something entirely new, the fourth stage of social organization: information societies.
Each of the previous stages of society has corresponded with distinctly different phases in the evolution and control of violence. As we explain in detail, information societies promise to dramatically reduce the returns to violence, in part because they transcend locality. The virtual reality of cyberspace, what novelist William Gibson characterized as a “consensual hallucination,” will be as far beyond the reach of bullies as imagination can take it. In the new millennium, the advantage of controlling violence on a large scale will be far lower than it has been at any time since before the French Revolution. This will have profound consequences. One of these will be rising crime. When the payoff for organizing violence at a large scale tumbles, the payoff from violence at a smaller scale is likely to jump. Violence will become more random and localized. Organized crime will grow in scope. We explain why.
Another logical implication of falling returns to violence is the eclipse of politics, which is the stage for crime on the largest scale. There is much evidence that adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth-century nation-state is rapidly eroding. The death of Communism is merely the most striking example. As we explore in detail, the collapse of morality and growing corruption among leaders of Western governments are not random developments. They are evidence that the potential of the nation-state is exhausted. Even many of its leaders no longer believe the platitudes they mouth. Nor are they believed by others.
04历史将会重演History Repeats Itself
这种情形与过去惊人地相似。每当发生技术变革,旧的规制就会被新的经济驱动力甩脱。社会的道德标准随之改变,人们开始越来越不屑地对待旧体制的掌权者。
在新的革命意识形态达成一致之前,这种普遍的反感往往已经显露出来了。十五世纪末就是如此,当时的教会是中世纪封建主义的主导机构。尽管人们还普遍相信“教职的神圣性”,但是无论高级还是低级的神职人员,都遭到了极大的蔑视。
这与今天的人们对待政治官僚的态度并无二致。当今的世界被政治所充斥,与 15 世纪末宗教充斥一切的生活相类比,我们可以学到很多东西。15 世纪末,支撑宗教制度的成本已经到了历史的最顶点,就像今天政府的成本已经到了极限,抵达衰败的边缘。
我们都知道,在火药革命之后,有组织的宗教发生了哪些变化。技术的发展创造了强大的动力,促使宗教机构缩减规模,降低成本。在新千年的初期,一场类似的技术革命,注定将彻底缩小民族国家的规模。
今天,经过一个多世纪电力技术的发展,我们已经将自身的中枢神经系统扩展到了全球,无远弗届,就我们这个星球的范畴而言,空间和时间已经被废止。 —— 马歇尔·麦克卢汉(MARSHALL McLUHAN),1964 年
This is a situation with striking parallels in the past. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion often comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. So it was in the late fifteenth century, when the medieval Church was the predominant institution of feudalism. Notwithstanding popular belief in “the sacredness of the sacerdotal office,” both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt—not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today.5
We believe that much can be learned by analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and the situation today, when the world has become saturated with politics. The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today.
We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution. Technological developments created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. A similar technological revolution is destined to downsize radically the nation-state early in the new millennium.
“Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned”6 —MARSHALL McLUHAN, 1964
05信息革命The Information Revolution
随着大系统的加速崩溃,作为塑造经济生活和收入分配的一个因素,系统性的强制将会式微。很快,在社会机构的组织中,效率将会比权力的分配更加重要。在网络空间,一个全新的经济领域将会出现,它不受人身暴力的制约。最显著的利益将会流向“认知精英”,他们将越来越多地在政治的边界之外进行运作,他们在法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、布宜诺斯艾利斯、洛杉矶、东京和香港都有住所。国家内部的收入会更加不平等,但是在这些管辖区,收入将更加平等。
《主权个人》这本书,会探讨这场信息革命将带来的社会和金融后果。我们的愿望是,帮助你抓住新时代的机遇,并避免被它的冲击波给摧毁。如果我们预期的事情有一半会发生,你就将面临史所罕见的沧海剧变。
2000 年的变革将改变世界经济的特征,不仅翻天覆地,而且比以往任何阶段都迅猛无比。它不会像农业革命,需要几千年的时间;也不会像工业革命,蔓延几个世纪。信息革命将在一代人的时间内发生。
更重要的是,在世界各地,它几乎会同时上演。技术和经济的创新,将不再局限于一小部分地区。它对旧世界的突破,如此高远,乃至古希腊等早期农业民族所幻想的众神的仙境,都将成为现实。多数人不愿意承认,但事实将会证明,大多数当代组织,在新的千年里都将难以为继,甚至不复存在。信息社会一旦形成,它与工业社会的区别,将像埃斯库罗斯2的希腊与穴居人的世界的差别一样大。
As the breakdown of large systems accelerates, systematic compulsion will recede as a factor shaping economic life and the distribution of income. Efficiency will become more important than the dictates of power in the organization of social institutions. This means that provinces and even cities that can effectively uphold property rights and provide for the administration of justice, while consuming few resources, will be viable sovereignties in the Information Age, as they generally have not been during the last five centuries. An entirely new realm of economic activity that is not hostage to physical violence will emerge in cyberspace. The most obvious benefits will flow to the “cognitive elite,” who will increasingly operate outside political boundaries. They are already equally at home in Frankfurt, London, New York, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions and more equal between them.
The Sovereign Individual explores the social and financial consequences of this revolutionary change. Our desire is to help you to take advantage of the opportunities of the new age and avoid being destroyed by its impact. If only half of what we expect to see happens, you face change of a magnitude with few precedents in history.
The transformation of the year 2000 will not only revolutionize the character of the world economy, it will do so more rapidly than any previous phase change. Unlike the Agricultural Revolution, the Information Revolution will not take millennia to do its work. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, its impact will not be spread over centuries. The Information Revolution will happen within a lifetime.
What is more, it will happen almost everywhere at once. Technical and economic innovations will no longer be confined to small portions of the globe. The transformation will be all but universal. And it will involve a break with the past so profound that it will almost bring to life the magical domain of the gods as imagined by the early agricultural peoples like the ancient Greeks. To a greater degree than most would now be willing to concede, it will prove difficult or impossible to preserve many contemporary institutions in the new millennium. When information societies take shape they will be as different from industrial societies as the Greece of Aeschylus was from the world of the cave dwellers.
06解缚的普罗米修斯:主权个人的崛起PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: THE RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL
最令人鼓舞的事情莫过于,人类通过有意识的努力来提升自己的生活能力;而这种能力毋庸置疑。 ——亨利·戴维·梭罗(HENRY DAVID THORAU)
这场转型,带来的既有好消息,也有坏消息。好的一面,信息革命将使个人得到前所未有的解放。有能力自我教育的人,将第一次完全自由地创造自己的工作,实现自身生产力的全部利益。天才将得到释放,既不受政府的压迫,也不受种族和民族偏见的拖累。
在信息社会里,任何一个真正有能力的人,都不会被别人的错误意见所羁绊。地球上的大多数人,不管他们对你的种族、长相、年龄、性取向、发型的看法如何,都无关紧要。在网络经济中,他们永远不会看到你。丑陋的、肥胖的、年老的、残疾的,将完全匿名地,在网络空间的新疆域,与年轻漂亮的人平等竞争。
“I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man to elevate his life by conscious endeavor.” —HENRY DAVID THOREAU
The coming transformation is both good news and bad. The good news is that the Information Revolution will liberate individuals as never before. For the first time, those who can educate and motivate themselves will be almost entirely free to invent their own work and realize the full benefits of their own productivity. Genius will be unleashed, freed from both the oppression of government and the drags of racial and ethnic prejudice. In the Information Society, no one who is truly able will be detained by the ill-formed opinions of others. It will not matter what most of the people on earth might think of your race, your looks, your age, your sexual proclivities, or the way you wear your hair. In the cybereconomy, they will never see you. The ugly, the fat, the old, the disabled will vie with the young and beautiful on equal terms in utterly color-blind anonymity on the new frontiers of cyberspace.
07思想即是财富Ideas Become Wealth
在信息时代,英雄不问出处。才能,无论它在哪里出现,都将得到前所未有的回报。在这样一个环境中,财富的最大来源将是你脑子里的想法,而不仅仅是物质资本;任何一个头脑清晰的人都有可能成为富翁。信息时代将是一个向上流动的时代。世界上的很大一部分地区,有几十亿人,从来没有充分分享过工业社会的繁荣,信息时代将为他们带来更加平等的机会。那些智慧过人、能力出众、充满抱负的个体,将会作为真正的主权个人涌现出来。
主权个人处在生产力的最高峰,他们之间的竞争和互动,简直与希腊众神之间的关系遥相呼应。下一个千年,网络空间将成为神秘莫测的奥林匹亚山,它没有实体,看不见摸不着,但有望在新千年的第二个十年成为全球最大的经济体。到 2025 年,网络经济的参与者将数以百万计。他们中间将会出现很多个比尔·盖茨,每个人都身家百亿美元。那些年收入不到 20 万美元的人,将成为网络穷人。
没有网络战,没有网络税,没有网络政府。未来 30 年最伟大的经济现象,很可能是网络经济,而不是中国。好消息是,在这个新的领域,政客们要支配、压制、管理大部分商业,其难度不亚于古希腊城邦的立法者想修剪宙斯的胡须。全球经济的很大一部分,会从政治的控制中解放出来,这将迫使残余的政府组织,必须按照更贴近市场规则的方式运行。最终他们将别无选择,只能把国土内的人民当作客户去服务,而不能再像有组织的犯罪分子那样绑架勒索。
Merit, wherever it arises, will be rewarded as never before. In an environment where the greatest source of wealth will be the ideas you have in your head rather than physical capital alone, anyone who thinks clearly will potentially be rich. The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never shared fully in the prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals.
At first, only a handful will achieve full financial sovereignty. But this does not negate the advantages of financial independence. The fact that not everyone attains an equally vast fortune does not mean that it is futile or meaningless to become rich. There are 25,000 millionaires for every billionaire. If you are a millionaire and not a billionaire, that does not make you poor. Equally, in the future, one of the milestones by which you measure your financial success will be not just now many zeroes you can add to your net worth, but whether you can structure your affairs in a way that enables you to realize full individual autonomy and independence. The more clever you are, the less propulsion you will require to achieve financial escape velocity. Persons of even quite modest means will soar, as the gravitational pull of politics on the global economy weakens. Unprecedented financial independence will be a reachable goal in your lifetime or that of your children.
At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in Greek myth. The elusive Mount Olympus of the next millennium will be in cyberspace—a realm without physical existence that will nonetheless develop what promises to be the world’s largest economy by the second decade of the new millennium. By 2025, the cybereconomy will have many millions of participants. Some of them will be as rich as Bill Gates, worth tens of billions of dollars each. The cyberpoor may be those with an income of less than $200,000 a year. There will be no cyberwelfare. No cybertaxes and no cybergovernment. The cybereconomy, rather than China, could well be the greatest economic phenomenon of the next thirty years.
The good news is that politicians will no more be able to dominate, suppress, and regulate the greater part of commerce in this new realm than the legislators of the ancient Greek city-states could have trimmed the beard of Zeus. That is good news for the rich. And even better news for the not so rich. The obstacles and burdens that politics imposes are more obstacles to becoming rich than to being rich. The benefits of declining returns to violence and devolving jurisdictions will create scope for every energetic and ambitious person to benefit from the death of politics. Even the consumers of government services will benefit as entrepreneurs extend the benefits of competition. Heretofore, competition between jurisdictions has usually meant competition by means of violence to enforce the rule of a predominant group. Consequently, much of the ingenuity of interjurisdictional competition was channeled into military endeavor. But the advent of the cybereconomy will bring competition on new terms to provision of sovereignty services. A proliferation of jurisdictions will mean proliferating experimentation in new ways of enforcing contracts and otherwise securing the safety of persons and property. The liberation of a large part of the global economy from political control will oblige whatever remains of government as we have known it to operate on more nearly market terms. Governments will ultimately have little choice but to treat populations in territories they serve more like customers, and less in the way that organized criminals treat the victims of a shakedown racket.
08超越政治Beyond Politics
神话中所描述的众神的世界,将成为个人可行的选择,那就是一种国王和议会无法触及的生活。开始是几十人,然后是几百人,最终是几百万人,个体将纷纷摆脱政治的束缚。他们的成功,将改变政府的性质,缩小强权的领地,扩大私人控制资源的范围。
主权个人的出现,将再次证明神话的奇特预言力。早期的农牧民族,对自然法则几乎一无所知,在他们的想象中,“我们应该称之为超自然的力量”无处不在。
这些力量有时由人运用,有时被“神的化身”运用。在詹姆斯·乔治·弗雷泽爵士的《金枝》中,描述了一种“伟大的民主”,在那里,神的化身看上去和人一样,并且与人们互动。
当古人想象到宙斯的孩子们就生活在他们中间,这激发了他们对魔法的深刻信仰。与其他原始的农耕民族一样,他们敬畏大自然,并且迷信地认为,自然界的造化是由个人的意志和魔力所促成的。在这个意义上,他们对自然和神灵的观念,并非一种自觉式的预言。他们远没有预见到微处理技术的出现;他们无法想象到,在数千年之后,这项技术对提高个人边际生产力所产生的影响;他们当然也不可能预见,权力和效率之间的平衡将因此而被改变,创造和保护财产的方式也因此而被改写。然而,古人们在编织神话故事时所想象的,与你可能会看到的世界,将产生奇特的共鸣。
What mythology described as the province of the gods will become a viable option for the individual—a life outside the reach of kings and councils. First in scores, then in hundreds, and ultimately in the millions, individuals will escape the shackles of politics. As they do, they will transform the character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion and widening the scope of private control over resources.
The emergence of the sovereign individual will demonstrate yet again the strange prophetic power of myth. Conceiving little of the laws of nature, the early agricultural peoples imagined that “powers we should call supernatural” were widely distributed. These powers were sometimes employed by men, sometimes by “incarnate human gods” who looked like men and interacted with them in what Sir James George Frazer described in The Golden Bough as “a great democracy.”7
When the ancients imagined the children of Zeus living among them they were inspired by a deep belief in magic. They shared with other primitive agricultural peoples an awe of nature, and a superstitious conviction that nature’s works were set in motion by individual volition, by magic. In that sense, there was nothing self-consciously prophetic about their view of nature and their gods. They were far from anticipating microtechnology. They could not have imagined its impact in altering the marginal productivity of individuals thousands of years later. They certainly could not have foreseen how it would shift the balance between power and efficiency and thus revolutionize the way that assets are created and protected. Yet what they imagined as they spun their myths has a strange resonance with the world you are likely to see.
09新的 Abracadabra 咒语Alt. Abracadabra
例如,召唤魔法时念的咒语“abracadabra”,就与我们登陆计算机的密码有很奇怪的相似之处。在某些方面,高速计算已经使我们可以施展类似精灵的魔法。初代的“数字仆人”就像被封印在魔灯中的精灵一样,被封在计算机之中,听从机主的召唤,执行他的命令。信息技术的虚拟现实将拓宽人的愿景,使人类能够想象到的一切,都看上去和真的一样。远程呈现赋予人类以超自然的速度跨越距离,从万里之外监控事件的能力,就像希腊人认为的赫尔墨斯和阿波罗那样。信息时代的主权个人,犹如古代和原始神话中的神一样,在适当的时候,会享有一种“外交豁免权”,摆脱古今中外的凡人都备受困扰的政治问题。
新的主权个人,和那些受支配的普通人生活在同样的物理环境中,但在政治上,他们却处于一个独立的空间,就像神。主权个人将掌握更多的资源,并且超越于强权之外。在新的千年里,他们将重新设计政府,重新配置经济。这种变革的深远影响,难以想象。
The “abracadabra” of the magic invocation, for example, bears a curious similarity to the password employed to access a computer. In some respects, high-speed computation has already made it possible to mimic the magic of the genie. Early generations of “digital servants” already obey the commands of those who control the computers in which they are sealed much as genies were sealed in magic lamps. The virtual reality of information technology will widen the realm of human wishes to make almost anything that can be imagined seem real. Telepresence will give living individuals the same capacity to span distance at supernatural speed and monitor events from afar that the Greeks supposed was enjoyed by Hermes and Apollo. The Sovereign Individuals of the Information Age, like the gods of ancient and primitive myths, will in due course enjoy a kind of “diplomatic immunity” from most of the political woes that have beset mortal human beings in most times and places.
The new Sovereign Individual will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically. Commanding vastly greater resources and beyond the reach of many forms of compulsion, the Sovereign Individual will redesign governments and reconfigure economies in the new millennium. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable.
10天才与天惩Genius and Nemesis
对于任何一个追逐理想和成功的人来说,信息时代的回报将无与伦比。这无疑是几代人以来最好的消息,但也是一个坏消息。基于个人自治的新型社会组织,以及建立在能力之上的、真正的机会均等,会使才能出众者,得到超级的回报和个人自主性。但是,个人要对自己担负的责任,也会远远超过他们在工业时期所习惯的。此外,在整个 20 世纪,先进工业社会的居民,享受了不劳而获的优越生活,这种优势也将被削弱。在我们写这本书的时候3,世界上前 15% 的人口,人均年收入为 21000 美元;其余 85%的人,平均年收入只有 1000 美元。在信息时代的新环境下,过去囤积起来的巨大优势,必将烟消云散。
随着它的消散,民族国家大规模重新分配收入的能力将崩溃。信息技术加剧了各管辖区之间的竞争。技术是流动的,交易是在网络空间进行的。任何人只要有一台便携式电脑,和一条卫星网络,就可以在任何地方,从事几乎任何信息业务,包括世界上数以万亿美元的金融交易。当这种发展愈演愈烈,政府将无法再为它们的服务收取超出其价值的费用。
这意味着,你不再需要为了高收入,而不得不生活在高税率的国家和地区。在未来,大多数财富可以在任何地方赚取,甚至可以在任何地方消费。到那时,政府试图对它的永久居民收取高额的服务费,只会丢掉它们最好的客户。如果我们的推理是正确的,我们相信它是正确的,那么,大家所知道的民族国家,将不会再以任何类似现在的形式而存在。
For anyone who loves human aspiration and success, the Information Age will provide a bounty. That is surely the best news in many generations. But it is bad news as well. The new organization of society implied by the triumph of individual autonomy and the true equalization of opportunity based upon merit will lead to very great rewards for merit and great individual autonomy. This will leave individuals far more responsible for themselves than they have been accustomed to being during the industrial period. It will also precipitate transition crises, including a possibly severe economic depression that will reduce the unearned advantage in living standards that has been enjoyed by residents of advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. As we write, the top 15 percent of the world’s population have an average per-capita income of $21,000 annually. The remaining 85 percent of the world have an average income of just $1,000. That huge, hoarded advantage from the past is bound to dissipate under the new conditions of the Information Age.
As it does, the capacity of nation-states to redistribute income on a large scale will collapse. Information technology facilitates dramatically increased competition between jurisdictions. When technology is mobile, and transactions occur in cyberspace, as they increasingly will do, governments will no longer be able to charge more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. Anyone with a portable computer and a satellite link will be able to conduct almost any information business anywhere, and that includes almost the whole of the world’s multitrillion-dollar financial transactions.
This means that you will no longer be obliged to live in a high-tax jurisdiction in order to earn high income. In the future, when most wealth can be earned anywhere, and even spent anywhere, governments that attempt to charge too much as the price of domicile will merely drive away their best customers. If our reasoning is correct, and we believe it is, the nation-state as we know it will not endure in anything like its present form.
11国家的终结THE END OF NATIONS
技术的变革,将削弱占支配地位的机构权力,这势必会导致紊乱和危险。就像在现代社会的早期,君主、领主、教皇和权贵们,为了维护他们习惯的特权而发动残酷的战争一样,今天的政府也同样会使用暴力,以隐蔽的、武断的手段,试图推迟或阻止末日的到来。面对技术对权力的挑战,国家会像采用一系列无情的外交手段,就像以往与其他政府打交道一样,去对付主权个人,也就是它的前公民。
1998 年 8 月 20 日,美国发射了一颗价值约 2 亿美元的战斧式 BGM-109 海射巡航导弹,轰炸一个据称与流亡的沙特亿万富翁乌萨马·本·拉登4有关的目标。这一事件,为新的历史阶段的揭幕,增添了轰动效应。美国还同时摧毁了苏丹喀土穆的一家制药厂,更为本·拉登增添了荣耀。拉登成为历史上第一人,因为他的卫星电话而成为轰炸目标。
本·拉登作为美国头号敌人的出现,使战争的性质发生了重大的改变。尽管他拥有数亿美元,但是一个个人,现在居然可以被令人采信描述为对美国——这个工业时代最强大的军事力量——的巨大威胁。美国总统和他的国家安全助理,在声明中把本·拉登描绘成一个跨国恐怖分子,是美国的一大劲敌,让人联想到冷战时期对苏联的宣传。
将本·拉登提升为美国主要敌人的军事逻辑,也将体现在政府与其国民的内部关系中。越来越严厉的税收技术,必然会导致政府和个人之间出现一种新型的谈判。
技术将使个人比以往任何时候都更接近主权,而他们也会像主权组织一样被对待。有时候作为敌人被暴击,有时候是平等的谈判对手,有时候则成为了盟友。
但是,无论政府多么冷酷,对它们来说,即使与中情局和国税局的联姻,用处也都不大,特别是在过度时期。要求与主权个人谈判的呼声与日俱增,而这些人的资源可不再那么容易被控制。
信息革命不仅给政府带来巨大的危机,而且会使所有的大型机构解体。在 20 世纪,十四个帝国消失了。帝国的瓦解,是民族国家本身消亡过程的一部分。政府将不得不适应日益增长的个人自主权。税收能力将骤降 50% 至 70%,较小的管辖区可能会更加成功。制定有竞争力的条件,以吸引有能力的个人及资本,相比在各大洲,飞地更有机会赢得这个挑战。
我们相信,随着现代民族国家的解体,现代的野蛮人将会更多地在幕后行使权力。
就像俄罗斯黑手党这样的团体,包括前苏联的骨干成员,其他种族的犯罪团伙、名流、毒枭和变节的秘密机构,他们将制定自己的法律。他们现在已经这么做了。现代的野蛮人,已经侵入了民族国家的体内,只是没怎么改变它的外表;这一点,远远超出人们普遍的认知。他们是微型的寄生虫,以垂死的系统为食。就像战争中的国家一样,这些团体在更小的范围内使用国家级的技术,残暴且不择手段。微处理技术,缩小了团体必要的规模,便于更有效地使用和控制暴力。随着这一技术革命的展开,暴力掠夺会越来越多地在中央的控制之外。而遏制暴力的努力,也将更多地转移到高效率的手段上,不再取决于权力的大小。
Changes that diminish the power of predominant institutions are both unsettling and dangerous. Just as monarchs, lords, popes, and potentates fought ruthlessly to preserve their accustomed privileges in the early stages of the modern period, so today’s governments will employ violence, often of a covert and arbitrary kind, in the attempt to hold back the clock. Weakened by the challenge from technology, the state will treat increasingly autonomous individuals, its former citizens, with the same range of ruthlessness and diplomacy it has heretofore displayed in its dealing with other governments. The advent of this new stage in history was punctuated with a bang on August 20, 1998, when the United States fired about $200 million worth of Tomahawk BGM-109 sea-launched cruise missiles at targets allegedly associated with an exiled Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden became the first person in history to have his satellite phone targeted for attack by cruise missiles. Simultaneously, the United States destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, in Bin Laden’s honor. The emergence of Bin Laden as the enemy-in-chief of the United States reflects a momentous change in the nature of warfare. A single individual, albeit one with hundreds of millions of dollars, can now be depicted as a plausible threat to the greatest military power of the Industrial era. In statements reminiscent of propaganda employed during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, the United States president and his national security aides portrayed Bin Laden, a private individual, as a transnational terrorist and leading enemy of the United States.
The same military logic that has seen Osama bin Laden elevated to a position as the chief enemy of the United States will assert itself in governments’ internal relations with their subjects. Increasingly harsh techniques of exaction will be a logical corollary of the emergence of a new type of bargaining between governments and individuals. Technology will make individuals more nearly sovereign than ever before. And they will be treated that way. Sometimes violently, as enemies, sometimes as equal parties in negotiation, sometimes as allies. But however ruthlessly governments behave, particularly in the transition period, wedding the IRS with the CIA will avail them little. They will be increasingly required by the press of necessity to bargain with autonomous individuals whose resources will no longer be so easily controlled.
The changes implied by the Information Revolution will not only create a fiscal crisis for governments, they will tend to disintegrate all large structures. Fourteen empires have disappeared already in the twentieth century. The breakdown of empires is part of a process that will dissolve the nation-state itself. Government will have to adapt to the growing autonomy of the individual. Taxing capacity will plunge by 50-70 percent. This will tend to make smaller jurisdictions more successful. The challenge of setting competitive terms to attract able individuals and their capital will be more easily undertaken in enclaves than across continents.
We believe that as the modern nation-state decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise power behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiya, which picks the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas,I drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will be laws unto themselves. They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nation-state without greatly changing its appearances. They are micro-parasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power are part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.
12历史的逆转History in Reverse
民族国家在过去五个世纪的演进,在信息时代将被新的发展逻辑所颠覆。地方性的权力中心将重新确立,因为国家主权将变得支离破碎、互相重叠。有组织犯罪的与日俱增,只是这种趋势的一个反映。跨国公司已经不得不把大部分工作分包出去,除了必要的部分。一切大型的企业集团,如 AT&T、Unisys 和 ITT,为了更好地运作,已经把自己分拆成了几个公司。民族国家就像一个笨重的集团公司,将不得不下放自己的权力;但是,在发生金融危机并迫使它这么做之前,可能性不大。
不仅世界上的权力在发生变化,工作也在变。这意味着商业的运作模式也将不可避免地改写。虚拟公司证明了,随着信息和交易成本的不断下降,企业的性质正在发生全面的转变。信息革命带来的影响,不仅将使公司解体,也会使所谓的“好工作”消失。在信息时代,“工作”是指一个项目或任务,而不再是你拥有的一个“职位”。微处理技术创造了全新的经济活动领域,超越领土与边界。这种超越,也许是自亚当和夏娃被造物主从伊甸园赶出去之后,最具革命性的发展。
“你必汗流满面才得糊口”。随着技术革新人们使用的工具,法律将会过时,道德将被重塑,观念将被改写。本书会解释这种转变的发生。
快速发展的计算机和通信技术,使个人能够自由地选择工作地点。互联网上的交易可以被加密,税收部门想在很短的时间内捕捉到,几乎不可能。离岸的免税资金的复利增长,已经远远超过了在岸资产,而这些在岸的,还要遭受 20 世纪民族国家征收的高额税负。千禧年之后,世界上的大部分商业,都将迁移到网络空间。在这里,政府的统治力,并不比它们对海底和外星的统治强多少。自古以来,身体暴力一直是政治最初及最后的威胁;在网络空间,这种威胁就失灵了。在网上,温和的人和强壮的人,在同等的条件下相遇。网络空间是终极的离岸管辖区,是免税的经济体,是镶满钻石的空中百慕大。
当这个最大的免税天堂,完全对商业开发时,基本上所有的资金都将成为离岸资金,由其所有者掌控。它带来的后果,将如瀑布般倾泻而下。长期以来,国家已经养成了习惯,对待它的纳税人就像农民对待奶牛,把它们圈在农场里挤奶。但是不久之后,奶牛将长出翅膀。
The process by which the nation-state grew over the past five centuries will be put into reverse by the new logic of the Information Age. Local centers of power will reassert themselves as the state devolves into fragmented, overlapping sovereignties.8 The growing power of organized crime is merely one reflection of this tendency. Multinational companies are already having to subcontract all but essential work. Some conglomerates, such as AT&T, Unisys, and ITT, have split themselves into several firms in order to function more profitably. The nation-state will devolve like an unwieldy conglomerate, but probably not before it is forced to do so by financial crises.
Not only is power in the world changing, but the work of the world is changing as well. This means that the way business operates will inevitably change. The “virtual corporation” is evidence of a sweeping transformation in the nature of the firm, facilitated by the drop in information and transaction costs. We explore the implications of the Information Revolution for dissolving corporations and doing away with the “good job.” In the Information Age, a “job” will be a task to do, not a position you “have.” Microprocessing has created entirely new horizons of economic activity that transcend territorial boundaries. This transcendence of frontiers and territories is perhaps the most revolutionary development since Adam and Eve straggled out of paradise under the sentence of their Maker: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” As technology revolutionizes the tools we use, it also antiquates our laws, reshapes our morals, and alters our perceptions. This book explains how.
Microprocessing and rapidly improving communications already make it possible for the individual to choose where to work. Transactions on the Internet or the World Wide Web can be encrypted and will soon be almost impossible for tax collectors to capture. Tax-free money already compounds far faster offshore than onshore funds still subject to the high tax burden imposed by the twentieth-century nation-state. After the turn of the millennium, much of the world’s commerce will migrate into the new realm of cyberspace, a region where governments will have no more dominion than they exercise over the bottom of the sea or the outer planets. In cyberspace, the threats of physical violence that have been the alpha and omega of politics since time immemorial will vanish. In cyberspace, the meek and the mighty will meet on equal terms. Cyberspace is the ultimate offshore jurisdiction. An economy with no taxes. Bermuda in the sky with diamonds.
When this greatest tax haven of them all is fully open for business, all funds will essentially be offshore funds at the discretion of their owner. This will have cascading consequences. The state has grown used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings.
13国家的复仇The Revenge of Nations
就像一个绝望的农夫,国家一开始肯定会采取绝望的措施,去围堵和阻碍逃跑的牛群。它会使用隐蔽的、甚至是暴力的手段,限制人们获得和使用解放性的技术。
但是这种权宜之计根本于事无补,只能暂时奏效。20 世纪的民族国家,带着它所有的虚伪造作,将随着税收的减少而饿死。
当国家发现无法再通过增加税收来满足自己运转的支出时,它会采取更加绝望的措施;其中之一就是印钞票。所有的政府都已经习惯了对货币发行的垄断,并且可以随心所欲地贬值。这种任意而为的通货膨胀,是 20 世纪所有国家货币政策的突出特点。即使是战后最好的国家货币,德国马克,也从 1949 年 1 月 1 日到 1995 年 6 月底,贬值了 71%。美元同期则贬值了 84%。这种通胀的效果,和对所有持有货币的人征税是一样的。后文我们将会探讨,随着加密货币的出现,通货膨胀将在很大程度上被摒除。得益于新的技术,财富的持有者可以绕过发行和监管货币的现代国家的垄断机构。国家继续控制着工业时代的印钞机,但是,它们控制世界财富的重要性,将被没有实体存在的数字算法所超越。在新的千年里,由私人市场主导的网络货币,将取代政府发行的法币。只有穷人会成为通胀以及随之而来的通缩的受害者,这是不断地向经济注入法币、制造人工杠杆的必然后果。
即使传统上很文明的国家,当税收和通胀的恶化超出政府习惯的范围,也会变得恶劣不堪。随着征税越来越难,一些古老的、武断的税收方式将重现江湖。终极形式就是预扣税,它实际上是一种公开的劫持人质。当财富外流加剧,一些火烧眉毛的政府将会拿起这一武器。不幸的人会发现自己被选中,以一种近乎中世纪的手段进行敲诈勒索。向个人提供有利于实现自治能力的服务的企业,将受到渗透、破坏和干扰。任意没收财产在美国已经司空见惯,现在每周发生 5000 起,未来会更加普遍。政府将侵犯人权,审查信息的自由流动,破坏有用的技术,甚至更糟。西方政府将使用利用极权手段压制网络经济,就像已经解体的苏联,曾经出于同样的原因,试图阻挠个人使用电脑和施乐印刷机,但最终徒劳无功。
Like an angry farmer, the state will no doubt take desperate measures at first to tether and hobble its escaping herd. It will employ covert and even violent means to restrict access to liberating technologies. Such expedients will work only temporarily, if at all. The twentieth-century nation-state, with all its pretensions, will starve to death as its tax revenues decline.
When the state finds itself unable to meet its committed expenditure by raising tax revenues, it will resort to other, more desperate measures. Among them is printing money. Governments have grown used to enjoying a monopoly over currency that they could depreciate at will. This arbitrary inflation has been a prominent feature of the monetary policy of all twentieth-century states. Even the best national currency of the postwar period, the German mark, lost 71 percent of its value from January 1, 1949, through the end of June 1995. In the same period, the U.S. dollar lost 84 percent of its value.9 This inflation had the same effect as a tax on all who hold the currency. As we explore later, inflation as revenue option will be largely foreclosed by the emergence of cybermoney. New technologies will allow the holders of wealth to bypass the national monopolies that have issued and regulated money in the modern period. Indeed, the credit crises that swept through Asia, Russia, and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998 attest to the fact that national currencies and national credit ratings are anachronisms inimical to the smooth operation of the global economy. It is precisely the fact that the demands of sovereignty require all transactions within a jurisdiction to be denominated in a national currency that creates the vulnerability to mistakes by central bankers and attacks by speculators which precipitated deflationary crises in one jurisdiction after another. In the Information Age, individuals will be able to use cybercurrencies and thus declare their monetary independence. When individuals can conduct their own monetary policies over the World Wide Web it will matter less or not at all that the state continues to control the industrial-era printing presses. Their importance for controlling the world’s wealth will be transcended by mathematical algorithms that have no physical existence. In the new millennium, cybermoney controlled by private markets will supersede fiat money issued by governments. Only the poor will be victims of inflation and ensuing collapses into deflation that are consequences of the artificial leverage which fiat money injects into the economy.
Lacking their accustomed scope to tax and inflate, governments, even in traditionally civil countries, will turn nasty. As income tax becomes uncollectible, older and more arbitrary methods of exaction will resurface. The ultimate form of withholding tax—de facto or even overt hostage-taking— will be introduced by governments desperate to prevent wealth from escaping beyond their reach. Unlucky individuals will find themselves singled out and held to ransom in an almost medieval fashion. Businesses that offer services that facilitate the realization of autonomy by individuals will be subject to infiltration, sabotage, and disruption. Arbitrary forfeiture of property, already commonplace in the United States, where it occurs five thousand times a week, will become even more pervasive. Governments will violate human rights, censor the free flow of information, sabotage useful technologies, and worse. For the same reasons that the late, departed Soviet Union tried in vain to suppress access to personal computers and Xerox machines, Western governments will seek to suppress the cybereconomy by totalitarian means.
14卢德分子的归来RETURN OF THE LUDDITES
政府的强制手段,可能会得到某些人的欢迎和支持。个体解放和个人自治,虽然是好事,但是对许多被转型危机吓坏了的人来说,则是一个坏消息,他们不期望自己会成为新的社会结构中的赢家。
1998 年亚洲经济崩溃之后,马来西亚总理马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德实施了严厉的资本管制,明显很受欢迎。这说明了,对民族国家主导的、老式的、封闭型经济仍然抱有热情的,大有人在。无可逃避的转型危机将导致怨恨,而怨恨助长人们对过去的怀旧。最大的怨恨,可能主要来自于目前富裕国家的中等人才;他们会尤其觉得,信息技术对自己的生活方式构成了威胁。强权组织的受益者,包括数百万接受政府再分配的收入的人,也会对主权个人的新自由非常不满。这会很好地说明一个道理:“立场往往取决于所处的位置”。
有时候我想知道,为什么自己会为一小撮陌生人的命运,感到如此深沉的痛苦?他们在数百英里外的球场上,与另外一群陌生人比赛。答案很简单,因为我热爱我的球队。虽然有风险,但投入关心是值得的。竞技让我热血沸腾,心潮澎湃,充满自豪。我喜欢冒险,在赛场上,生命更加鲜活。 —— 克雷格·兰伯特
但是,如果把未来转型危机中产生的所有敌对情绪,都归结为以他人为代价来满足自己欲望的思想,也是一种误导。它其实涉及更多层面。人类社会的特点表明,对于即将到来的卢德式反应,必然会发生道德层面的误导。你可以把这种反应看成是,赤裸裸的欲望戴着一顶道德的假发。在激发行动方面,自以为是的愤怒,要比自觉的自私自利有力得多。20 世纪公民神话的魅力虽然正在迅速消退,但它并不缺乏真正的信徒。正如克雷格·兰伯特引用的这段话,很多人需要归属感,他们渴望成为群体中的一员。同样的认同需求,可以激励体育爱好者成立组织,也可以激励很多人成为党员。20 世纪的每个成年人,都被灌输了 20 世纪公民的责任和义务。工业社会的道德残余,至少会刺激一些新卢德分子5对信息技术发起攻击。
这些可能发生的暴力行经,在某种意义上,我们认为它属于一种“道德上的不合时宜”,也就是把一个经济阶段的道德标准,应用到另外一个阶段。每个经济阶段,都有它自己的道德准则,以便在该特定生活方式下的人们,在面临选择时,能够克服它特有的动机陷阱。就像一个农业社会的人,不会按照爱斯基摩人的道德准则去生活;信息社会的道德标准,也不会满足 20 世纪国家的需求,因为后者的道德是为了促进一种好战的工业国家的成功。我们将解释其中的原因。
在未来的若干年内,道德上的不合时宜,将在西方的核心国家出现;就像在过去的五个世纪,人们在边缘国家所看到的那样。西方的殖民者和远征军,在遇到狩猎和采集的原住民,以及那些依然为农耕社会的民族时,就激发了上述的危机。
当新技术被引入到不合时宜的环境中,势必造成社会混乱和道德危机。基督教的传教士,能够成功转化数以百万计的原住民,在很大程度上,可以归功于,外部突然强加的权力变革导致的地方危机。
从 16 世纪,到 20 世纪的上半叶,这样的遭遇一次次地发生。我们预计,在新千年的初期,随着信息社会取代那些按照工业路线组织的社会,类似的冲突也将上演。
Such methods may prove popular among some population segments. The good news about individual liberation and autonomy will seem to be bad news to many who are frightened by the transition crisis and do not expect to be winners in the new configuration of society. The apparent popularity of the draconian capital controls imposed in 1998 by Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in the wake of the Asian meltdown testifies to residual enthusiasm among many for the old-fashioned closed economy dominated by the nation-state. This nostalgia for the past will be fed by resentments inflamed by the inevitable transition crisis. The greatest resentment is likely to be centered among those of middle talent in currently rich countries. They particularly may come to feel that information technology poses a threat to their way of life. The beneficiaries of organized compulsion, including millions receiving income redistributed by governments, may resent the new freedom realized by Sovereign Individuals. Their upset will illustrate the truism that “where you stand is determined by where you sit.”
“Sometimes I wondered how I could experience such deep misery over the fate of a handful of men I did not know, playing a game against another group of strangers in a ballpark hundreds of miles away. The answer is simple. I loved my teams. Although risky, caring was worth its price. Sports fired up my blood, excited me, made my heart pound. I liked having something at stake. Life was more vivid during a contest.” —CRAIG LAMBERT
It would be misleading, however, to attribute all the bad feelings that will be generated in the coming transition crisis to the bald desire to live at someone else’s expense. More will be involved. The very character of human society suggests that there is bound to be a misguided moral dimension to the coming Luddite reaction. Think of it as a bald desire fitted with a moral toupee. We explore the moral and moralistic dimensions of the transition crisis. Self-interested grasping of a conscious kind has far less power to motivate actions than does self-righteous fury. While adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century is rapidly falling away, they are not without their true believers. Many humans, as the passage quoted from Craig Lambert attests, are belongers, who place importance on being members of a group. The same need to identify that motivates fans of organized sports makes some partisans of nations. Everyone who came of age in the twentieth century has been inculcated in the duties and obligations of the twentieth-century citizen. The residual moral imperatives from industrial society will stimulate at least some neo-Luddite attacks on information technologies.
In this sense, this violence to come will be at least partially an expression of what we call “moral anachronism,” the application of moral strictures drawn from one stage of economic life to the circumstances of another. Every stage of society requires its own moral rules to help individuals overcome incentive traps peculiar to the choices they face in that particular way of life. Just as a farming society could not live by the moral rules of a migratory Eskimo band, so the Information Society cannot satisfy moral imperatives that emerged to facilitate the success of a militant twentieth-century industrial state. We explain why.
In the next few years, moral anachronism will be in evidence at the core countries of the West in much the way that it has been witnessed at the periphery over the past five centuries. Western colonists and military expeditions stimulated such crises when they encountered indigenous hunting-and-gathering bands, as well as peoples whose societies were still organized for farming. The introduction of new technologies into anachronistic settings caused confusion and moral crises. The success of Christian missionaries in converting millions of indigenous peoples can be laid in large measure to the local crises caused by the sudden introduction of new power arrangements from the outside. Such encounters recurred over and over, from the sixteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. We expect similar clashes early in the new millennium as Information Societies supplant those organized along industrial lines.
15对强权的怀旧The Nostalgia for Compulsion
信息社会的兴起,不会受到普遍的欢迎,不会被所有人视为是一个充满希望的历史新阶段。每个人都会感到一些疑虑,即使是从中获益最多的人,也不例外。很多人会敌视破坏领土民族国家的创新。
任何形式的激进变革,都会被视为是江河日下,越来越糟,这是人类的一个本性。
五百年前,勃艮第公爵6身边的臣仆们会说,破坏封建主义的创新是邪恶的,他们认为世界正在迅速地下滑;而后来的历史学家看到的,则是人类潜力大爆发的文艺复兴。同样,有一天,从下一个千年的角度看,信息革命可能被认为是新文艺复兴式的发展;但在二十世纪疲惫者的眼睛看来,却是可怕的。在这种新的发展方式下,感到受冒犯的人,或者丧失竞争优势的人,他们的反应可能会极不友好。在这场向新型社会组织的激烈过渡中,遭遇这些新卢德分子,在某种程度上,对每个人来说,都是一个坏消息。
准备好躲避吧。因为变化的速度太快,远远超过活着的人在经济和道德上的适应能力。可以预计,尽管信息革命有解放未来的伟大使命,但它将遭到愤怒的抵制。
一系列的转型危机摆在面前,你必须理解并为敌对情绪做好准备。随着时间发展,工业时代遗留下来的过时的国家和国际组织,将被证明不足以再应对新的、分散的、跨国经济的挑战。通货紧缩的悲剧,类似 1997 年和 1998 年,席卷远东、俄罗斯,并传染了亚洲其他新兴经济体的金融危机,将会零零星星地不断爆发。
新的信息和通讯技术对现代国家的颠覆,超过自哥伦布航海时代以来,其他任何对统治地位的政治威胁。认识到这一点很重要。因为当权者对破坏其权威的发展,很少和平以待。这一次也不例外。
新旧之间的冲突,将会影响新千年的最初几年。我们预计,这将是一个充满巨大危险和回报的年代。在某些领域,文明的程度可能大大降低,而在其他方面,发展则是空前的。越来越有自治能力的个人,和破产的绝望的政府,将在一个新的文明分野中互相对峙。我们期待在这次转型结束之前,看到主权性质的彻底改组,和政治的实质性死亡。国家对资源的支配和控制将被取代,政府现在提供的几乎所有服务将注定被私有化。我们将会在书中探讨,由于无可避免的原因,信息技术将摧毁政府就其服务进行收费的能力;而这些服务,对你以及其他付费的人来说,原本就是物非所值的。
The rise of the Information Society will not be wholly welcomed as a promising new phase of history, even among those who benefit from it most. Everyone will feel some misgivings. And many will despise innovations that undermine the territorial nation-state. It is a fact of human nature that radical change of any kind is almost always seen as a dramatic turn for the worse. Five hundred years ago, the courtiers gathered around the duke of Burgundy would have said that unfolding innovations that undermined feudalism were evil. They thought the world was rapidly spiraling downhill at the very time that later historians saw an explosion of human potential in the Renaissance. Likewise, what may someday be seen as a new Renaissance from the perspective of the next millennium will look frightening to tired twentieth-century eyes.
There is a high probability that some who are offended by the new ways, as well as many who are disadvantaged by them, will react unpleasantly. Their nostalgia for compulsion will probably turn violent. Encounters with these new “Luddites” will make the transition to radical new forms of social organization at least a measure of bad news for everyone. Get ready to duck. With the speed of change outracing the moral and economic capacity of many in living generations to adapt, you can expect to see a fierce and indignant resistance to the Information Revolution, notwithstanding its great promise to liberate the future.
You must understand and prepare for such unpleasantness. A series of transition crises lies ahead. Deflationary tribulations, such as the Asian contagion that swept through the Far East to Russia and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998, will erupt sporadically as the dated national and international institutions left over from the Industrial Era prove inadequate to the challenges of the new, dispersed, transnational economy. The new information and communication technologies are more subversive of the modern state than any political threat to its predominance since Columbus sailed. This is important because those in power have seldom reacted peacefully to developments that undermined their authority. They are not likely to now.
The clash between the new and the old will shape the early years of the new millennium. We expect it to be a time of great danger and great reward, and a time of much diminished civility in some realms and unprecedented scope in others. Increasingly autonomous individuals and bankrupt, desperate governments will confront one another across a new divide. We expect to see a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty and the virtual death of politics before the transition is over. Instead of state domination and control of resources, you are destined to see the privatization of almost all services governments now provide. For inescapable reasons that we explore in this book, information technology will destroy the capacity of the state to charge more for its services than they are worth to you and other people who pay for them.
“Governments will have to deal with what sovereignty means.” —ROBERT MARTIN, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES
16通过市场实现主权Sovereignty Through Markets
仅仅在十年前,很少有人能够想象,面对领土上的民族国家,通过市场机制,个人能够实现越来越大的自主权。现在,所有的民族国家,都面临着破产和权威的迅速消解;尽管依然强大,但它们保有的是抹杀的权力,而不是令人言听计从的权威。它们的洲际导弹和航空母舰,已经变成了文物,就像封建时代的最后一匹战马,威风凛凛,但毫无用处。
通过改变资产创造和保护的方式,信息技术可以使市场急剧地扩张。这完全是革命性的。事实上,它对工业社会的革命力度,将超过火药对封建农业社会的。2000 年的变革,意味着主权的商业化和政治的死亡;就像枪支意味着基于宣誓的封建主义的消亡。公民观念也将步上骑士精神当年的命运。
我们相信,个人经济主权的时代即将到来。正如曾经被“国有化”的钢铁厂、电话公司、矿山和铁路,后来在世界各地被迅速私有化一样,很快你将看到私有化的终极形式——个人的全面去国家化。在新的千年里,主权个人不再是国家的资产,也不再只是国库资产负债表上的一个项目。在 2000 年的转折之后,完成去国家化的个人,不再是我们所熟知的公民,而是政府的客户。
To an extent that few would have imagined only a decade ago, individuals will achieve increasing autonomy over territorial nation-states through market mechanisms. All nation-states face bankruptcy and the rapid erosion of their authority. Mighty as they are, the power they retain is the power to obliterate, not to command. Their intercontinental missiles and aircraft carriers are already artifacts, as imposing and useless as the last warhorse of feudalism.
Information technology makes possible a dramatic extension of markets by altering the way that assets are created and protected. This is revolutionary. Indeed, it promises to be more revolutionary for industrial society than the advent of gunpowder proved to be for feudal agriculture. The transformation of the year 2000 implies the commercialization of sovereignty and the death of politics, no less than guns implied the demise of oath-based feudalism. Citizenship will go the way of chivalry.
We believe that the age of individual economic sovereignty is coming. Just as steel mills, telephone companies, mines, and railways that were once “nationalized” have been rapidly privatized throughout the world, you will soon see the ultimate form of privatization—the sweeping denationalization of the individual. The Sovereign Individual of the new millennium will no longer be an asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury’s balance sheet. After the transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens as we know them, but customers.
17带宽超越边界BANDWIDTH TRUMPS BORDERS
就像封建主义崩溃后骑士誓言变得过时一样,民族国家围绕公民身份设下的种种条款与条件,也会在主权商业化的时代失效。在与国家强权的关系中,21 世纪的主权个人不再只是一个被征税的公民,而是运行于一种“新型逻辑空间”中的政府客户。他们会为自己所需的、最低限度的政府服务讨价还价,并按合同付费。与几个世纪以来人们所熟悉的情形不同,信息时代的政府将按照新的原则组织起来。一些管辖区和主权服务,会建立在一种“亲和性匹配”的机制之上;在这种机制中,亲密关系乃至商业上的好感,都会成为虚拟管辖区赢得忠诚的基础。新的主权国家,还有可能是中世纪组织的延续,虽然这种情况很罕见。例如有 900 年历史的耶路撒冷、罗德岛及马耳他圣约翰主权军事医院骑士团7,更广为人知的名字是马耳他骑士团。该组织是一个富裕的天主教团体,目前有 1 万名成员,年收入达几十亿。
马耳他骑士团发行自己的护照、邮票和货币,并且与 70 个国家8建立了全面的外交关系。在我们写这篇文章的时候,它正在与马耳他共和国谈判,以重新获得圣安杰洛堡9的所有权。占有这个城堡,会使骑士团弥补他们缺少的领土要素,然后可以被承认为一个主权国家。马耳他骑士团有望再次成为一个微型的主权国家,它悠久的历史,使其能够很快被合法认可。在 1565 年的马耳他之围中,正是骑士团从安杰洛堡击退了土耳其人。事实上,在那之后,他们统治马耳他很多年,直到 1798 年被拿破仑驱逐出境。如果马耳他骑士团在未来几年内回归,那将是再清楚不过的一个证明:法国大革命之后迎来的现代民族国家体系,只是历史长河中的一段插曲。在人类历史上,多种主权形式同时共存才是一种常态。
铱星卫星电话网络10,是另外一种特殊的后现代主权模式,它也是建立在“同类聚合”的基础之上的。乍一看,你可能会觉得,把蜂窝电话服务当作一种主权很奇怪;然而,铱星公司已经被国际普遍承认为一个虚拟的主权国家。铱星是一种全球移动电话服务,通过它,在地球上的任何地方,从新西兰的费瑟斯顿到玻利维亚的查科,你都可以用一个独立的号码接听电话。考虑到全球电信的结构,为了使电话能够转接到世界各地的任何一个铱星用户,国际电信当局必须接受铱星是一个虚拟国家,有自己的国家通信代码,即8816。从一个由卫星电话用户组成的虚拟国家,到网络上跨国界的、连接更紧密的虚拟主权社区,从逻辑上说,是很短的一小步。自从晶体管被发明以来,带宽,或者说通信媒介的承载能力,相对于计算能力,一直在成倍地增长。按照设想,如果这个趋势延续下去,那么在千年之交后不久,带宽将足够强大,使“元宇宙”(metaverse)能在技术上得以实现。元宇宙是科幻小说家尼尔·斯蒂芬森11在几年前构想出来的一个网络世界,它是一个密集的虚拟社区,有着自己的法律。
我们相信,随着网络经济不断繁荣,它的参与者必将会想方设法,去规避民族国家不合时宜的法律。新的网络社区,至少会像耶路撒冷、罗德岛及马耳他圣约翰主权军事医院骑士团一样富有,并有能力争取自身利益。事实上,借助影响深远的通信和信息战技术,他们将比骑士团站得更稳。我们还将探讨其他一些分散型的主权模式。在这些模式中,小型团体可以租赁弱小民族国家的主权,经营他们自己的经济庇护所,就像今天被广泛许可的自由港和自由贸易区一样。
在未来,主权个人彼此之间,以及他们与残存政府之间的关系,或许需要一套新的道德词汇来加以描述。我们猜测,当这些描述新型关系的术语成为社会焦点时,许多来自 20 世纪民族国家“公民”时代的人都会十分愤怒。国家的终结与“个人的去国家化”,将使一些曾经被热烈拥抱的理念失去市场;比如“法律面前人人平等”,因为这些理念的前提正是即将被淘汰的权力关系。随着虚拟社区的凝聚力越来越强,他们将坚持依照自己社区的法律去承担责任,而不是某个前民族国家的法律,仅仅因为他们碰巧生活在那里。就像在古代和中世纪,同一地理区域内,多种法律体系将再次共存。
在火枪大炮面前,身穿盔甲的骑士妄图维护自己的权力,注定一败涂地;同样,现代的民族主义和公民概念,也必将被微处理技术所终结。它们会落得一个滑稽的下场,就像 15 世纪神圣的封建主义原则,在 16 世纪沦为笑柄一样。在转入 2000 年之后,20 世纪所珍视的公民观念,对新的几代人来说,显得可笑而不合时宜。21 世纪的唐吉坷德,不是为复兴封建主义而战斗的骑士,而是一个穿着棕色西装的官僚,一个满脑子想着审计公民的税吏。
The commercialization of sovereignty will make the terms and conditions of citizenship in the nation-state as dated as chivalric oaths seemed after the collapse of feudalism. Instead of relating to a powerful state as citizens to be taxed, the Sovereign Individuals of the twenty-first century will be customers of governments operating from a “new logical space.” They will bargain for whatever minimal government they need and pay for it according to contract. The governments of the Information Age will be organized along different principles than those which the world has come to expect over the past several centuries. Some jurisdictions and sovereignty services will be formed through “assortive matching,” a system by which affinities, including commercial affinities, are the basis upon which virtual jurisdictions earn allegiance. In rare cases, the new sovereignties may be holdovers of medieval organizations, like the 900-year-old Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. More commonly known as the Knights of Malta, the order is an affinity group for rich Catholics, with 10,000 current members and an annual income of several billions. The Knights of Malta issues its own passports, stamps, and money, and carries on full diplomatic relations with seventy countries. As we write it is negotiating with the Republic of Malta to reassume possession of Fort St. Angelo. Taking possession of the castle would give the Knights the missing ingredient of territoriality that will enable it to be recognized as a sovereignty. The Knights of Malta could once again become a sovereign microstate, instantly legitimized by a long history. It was from Fort St. Angelo that the Knights of Malta turned back the Turks in the Great Siege of 1565. Indeed, they ruled Malta for many years thereafter, until they were expelled by Napoleon in 1798. If the Knights of Malta were to return in the next few years, there could be no clearer evidence that the modern nation-state system, ushered in after the French Revolution, was merely an interlude in the longer sweep of history in which it has been the norm for many kinds of sovereignties to exist at the same time.
Still another and very different model for a postmodern sovereignty based on assortive matching is the Iridium satellite telephone network. At first glance, you may think it odd to treat a cellular telephone service as a kind of sovereignty. Yet Iridium has already received recognition as a virtual sovereignty by international authorities. As you may know, Iridium is a global cellular phone service that allows subscribers to receive calls on a single number, wherever they find themselves on the planet, from Featherston, New Zealand, to the Bolivian Chaco. To allow calls to be routed to Iridium subscribers anywhere on the globe, given the architecture of global telecoms, international telecom authorities had to agree to recognize Iridium as a virtual country, with its own country code: 8816. It is a short step logically from a virtual country comprising satellite telephone subscribers to sovereignty for more coherent virtual communities on the World Wide Web that span borders. Bandwidth, or the carrying capacity of a communications medium, has been expanding faster than computational capacity multiplied after the invention of transistors. If this trend to greater bandwidth continues, as we believe likely, it is only a matter of a few years, soon after the turn of the millennium, until bandwidth becomes sufficiently capacious to make technically possible the “metaverse,” the alternative, cyberspace world imagined by the science fiction novelist Neal Stephenson. Stephenson’s “metaverse” is a dense virtual community with its own laws. We believe it is inevitable that, as the cybereconomy becomes richer, its participants will seek and obtain exemption from the anachronistic laws of nation-states. The new cybercommunities will be at least as wealthy and competent at advancing their interests as the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. Indeed, they will be more capable of asserting themselves because of far-reaching communications and information warfare capabilities. We explore still other models of fragmented sovereignty in which small groups can effectively lease the sovereignty of weak nation-states, and operate their own economic havens much as free ports and free trade zones are licensed to do today.
A new moral vocabulary will be required to describe the relations of Sovereign Individuals with one another and what remains of government. We suspect that as the terms of these new relations come into focus, they will offend many people who came of age as “citizens” of twentieth-century nation-states. The end of nations and the “denationalization of the individual” will deflate some warmly held notions, such as “equal protection under the law,” that presuppose power relations that are soon to be obsolete. As virtual communities gain coherence, they will insist that their members be held accountable according to their own laws, rather than those of the former nation-states in which they happen to reside. Multiple systems of law will again coexist over the same geographic area, as they did in ancient and medieval times.
Just as attempts to preserve the power of knights in armor were doomed to fail in the face of gunpowder weapons, so the modern notions of nationalism and citizenship are destined to be short-circuited by microtechnology. Indeed, they will eventually become comic in much the way that the sacred principles of fifteenth-century feudalism fell to ridicule in the sixteenth century. The cherished civic notions of the twentieth century will be comic anachronisms to new generations after the transformation of the year 2000. The Don Quixote of the twenty-first century will not be a knight-errant struggling to revive the glories of feudalism but a bureaucrat in a brown suit, a tax collector yearning for a citizen to audit.
18边区法律的复兴REVIVING LAWS OF THE MARCH
除了在最广泛的意义上,我们很少把政府看作是一种竞争性的实体;因而,现代人对主权的范围及其可能性的直觉已经萎缩了。在过去,权力往往是分散的,管辖是重叠的,不同类型的实体行使着主权的一种或多种属性;在这种权力等式中,很难有某个集团能稳定地保持垄断地位。名誉上的最高统治者,在下面并没有多少权力,这种情况在历史上并不少见。现在,比民族国家弱小的政府,它们在地方施加权力的垄断地位,就面临着持续的竞争。这些竞争,曾经改变了控制暴力和吸引效忠的形式,而新的改变很快就会出现。
当领主和国王们的势力单薄,往往就会出现一种现象:对同一块边境地区,有一个或多个团体主张权力,而任何一方都无法占据决定性的支配地位。在中世纪,有很多的边疆或“边区”(March)。在这些地方,主权重叠,暴力丛生。边区在欧洲存在了几十年甚至几个世纪,广泛存在于凯尔特人和英特兰人控制的爱尔兰地区之间,在威尔士和英格兰、苏格兰和英格兰、意大利和法国、法国和西班牙、德国和中欧的斯拉夫人边境之间,以及在西班牙的基督教王国和格拉纳达的伊斯兰王国之间。边区形成了独特的制度和法律,在下一个千年,我们很可能会重温它们。在边区,由于存在两个相互竞争的当局,住在这里的人很少交税。更重要的是,他们往往可以选择遵循谁的法律,通过“宣誓”或“封租”等法律方式。这些法律概念和方式现在都不复存在了;我们认为,它们将会成为信息社会法律的明显特征。
We seldom think of governments as competitive entities, except in the broadest sense, so the modern intuition about the range and possibilities of sovereignty has atrophied. In the past, when the power equation made it more difficult for groups to assert a stable monopoly of coercion, power was frequently fragmented, jurisdictions overlapped, and entities of many different kinds exercised one or more of the attributes of sovereignty. Not infrequently, the nominal overlord actually enjoyed scant power on the ground. Governments weaker than the nation-states are now faced with sustained competition in their ability to impose a monopoly of coercion over a local territory. This competition gave rise to adaptations in controlling violence and attracting allegiance that will soon be new again.
When the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more groups overlapped at a frontier, it frequently happened that neither could decisively dominate the other. In the Middle Ages, there were numerous frontier or “march” regions where sovereignties blended together. These violent frontiers persisted for decades or even centuries in the border areas of Europe. There were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe, and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Such march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium. Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, residents of march regions seldom paid tax. What is more, they usually had a choice in deciding whose laws they were to obey, a choice that was exercised through such legal concepts as “avowal” and “distraint” that have now all but vanished. We expect such concepts to become a prominent feature of the law of Information Societies.
19超越国籍Transcending Nationality
在民族国家之前,要历数存在于世的主权数量,是很困难的,因为行使权力的组织多种多样,错综复杂。这种情形将会再次发生。在民族国家的体系中,领土之间的分界线往往被划定得非常清晰,并固定为边界。到了信息时代,边界将会再次模糊不清;在新的千年里,主权将再次被分割;新的实体将会出现,它们将会履行部分被我们认为专属于政府的职能。
其中一些新的组织,如圣殿骑士团和中世纪的其他宗教军团,可能会掌握庞大的财富和军事力量,但并不控制任何固定的领土。它们的组织原则,将与国籍完全无关。中世纪宗教团体的成员和领袖,他们在欧洲各地的统治权威,无论在何种意义上,都绝非来源于国籍身份。他们具有不同的种族背景,宣誓忠实于上帝,而不是同一种族成员间的亲缘关系。
Before the nation-state, it was difficult to enumerate precisely the number of sovereignties that existed in the world because they overlapped in complex ways and many varied forms of organization exercised power. They will do so again. The dividing lines between territories tended to become clearly demarcated and fixed as borders in the nation-state system. They will become hazy again in the Information Age. In the new millennium, sovereignty will be fragmented once more. New entities will emerge exercising some but not all of the characteristics we have come to associate with governments.
Some of these new entities, like the Knights Templar and other religious military orders of the Middle Ages, may control considerable wealth and military power without controlling any fixed territory. They will be organized on principles that bear no relation to nationality at all. Members and leaders of religious corporations that exercised sovereign authority in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages in no sense derived their authority from national identity. They were of all ethnic backgrounds and professed to owe their allegiance to God, and not to any affinities that members of a nationality are supposed to share in common.
20赛博空间的商业共和国Merchant Republics of Cyberspace
你还会看到,具有半主权地位的商人和富人的协会将再次出现,例如中世纪的汉萨同盟12。在法国和佛兰芒集市上经营的汉斯同盟,后来吸纳了六十多座城市的商人。汉萨同盟,在英语中是一个重复的命名,直译为“联盟式同盟”,由日耳曼商人行会组成,为其成员提供保护以及谈判贸易条约。在新的千年里,这类实体将重新兴起,取代苟延残喘的民族国家,在动荡的世界里提供保护并促成契约履行。
简而言之,那些满脑子 20 世纪工业社会公民神话的人,对未来的期望会遭到挫败。其中包括对民主社会的幻想,这些幻想,曾经让天才和智者们都心驰神往。
它们假设的前提是,社会应该以政府希望的任何方式演进,当然,最好能根据民意调查和严格统计的选票。过去的 50 年,完美正确地体现了这一点。但现在,它已经不合时宜了,就像生锈的烟囱,是工业时代的产物。公民神话不仅反映出一种思维定式,认为社会问题可以通过工程方法解决;也表现出一种错误的信心,以为在未来仍然像在 20 世纪,资源和个体在政治强权面前脆弱不堪。我们对此表示怀疑。我们相信,市场的力量,而不是政治上的多数,将推动社会进行重新的自我配置,以某些公众舆论既不理解也不欢迎的方式。到那个时候,认为历史将向人们期望的方向发展的观点,将被证明是多么地天真和充满误导性。
因此,你必须重新看待这个世界,这至关重要。由外向内看进去,重新分析你认为是理所当然的东西,从而获得新的认识。当传统思维和现实脱节的时候,如果你不能超越传统思维,那将沦为迷失方向的猎物。迷失方向是未来的流行性疾病,它导致错误的决定,进而威胁你的事业、投资和生活方式。
宇宙,当我们了解它时,就会获得奖励;当我们不了解时,就会遭到惩罚。当我们理解宇宙的规律,就能心想事成,幸福快乐;反之,如果我们跳下悬崖,试图振臂飞翔,宇宙会令我们粉身碎骨。 —— 杰克·科恩和伊恩·斯特沃特(JACK COHEN AND IAN STEWART)
You will also see the re-emergence of associations of merchants and wealthy individuals with semisovereign powers, like the Hanse (confederation of merchants) in the Middle Ages. The Hanse that operated in the French and Flemish fairs grew to encompass the merchants of sixty cities.10 The “Hanseatic League,” as it is redundantly known in English (the literal translation is “Leaguely League”), was an organization of Germanic merchant guilds that provided protection to members and negotiated trade treaties. It came to exercise semisovereign powers in a number of Northern European and Baltic cities. Such entities will re-emerge in place of the dying nation-state in the new millennium, providing protection and helping to enforce contracts in an unsafe world.
In short, the future is likely to confound the expectations of those who have absorbed the civic myths of twentieth-century industrial society. Among them are the illusions of social democracy that once thrilled and motivated the most gifted minds. They presuppose that societies evolve in whatever way governments wish them to—preferably in response to opinion polls and scrupulously counted votes. This was never as true as it seemed fifty years ago. Now it is an anachronism, as much an artifact of industrialism as a rusting smokestack. The civic myths reflect not only a mindset that sees society’s problems as susceptible to engineering solutions; they also reflect a false confidence that resources and individuals will remain as vulnerable to political compulsion in the future as they have been in the twentieth century. We doubt it. Market forces, not political majorities, will compel societies to reconfigure themselves in ways that public opinion will neither comprehend nor welcome. As they do, the naïve view that history is what people wish it to be will prove wildly misleading.
It will therefore be crucial that you see the world anew. That means looking from the outside in to reanalyze much that you have probably taken for granted. This will enable you to come to a new understanding. If you fail to transcend conventional thinking at a time when conventional thinking is losing touch with reality, then you will be more likely to fall prey to an epidemic of disorientation that lies ahead. Disorientation breeds mistakes that could threaten your business, your investments, and your way of life.
“The universe rewards us for understanding it and punishes us for not understanding it. When we understand the universe, our plans work and we feel good. Conversely, if we try to fly by jumping off a cliff and flapping our arms the universe will kill us.”11 —JACK COHEN AND IAN STEWART
21打开新视野Seeing Anew
要对即将到来的世界做好准备,你必须理解,为什么它将与大多数专家告诉你的不一样。这需要仔细研究社会变革的隐形原因。为了实现这一目标,我们尝试了一种非正统的分析方法,称之为“大政治研究”(megapolitics)。在之前出版的两本书《血流成河》(Blood in the Street)以及《大清算》(the Great Reckoning)中,我们提出来,社会变革的最重要原因,不存在于政治宣言或者已故经济学家的声明里,而是隐藏在改变权力的运行边界的要素之中。通常来说,气候、地形、微生物和技术的微妙变化,会改变暴力的逻辑;它们变革了人们组织生计及自我保护的方式。
请注意,我们理解世界变化的途径,与大多数预测型专家的都大相径庭。我们不会假装,在某个特定的“主题”上,比那些在上面投入了整个职业生涯、积累了高度专业知识的人,懂得还要多。从这个意义上说,我们不是任何方面的专家;与此相反,我们是从外面看进去,堪称门外汉。我们是在做出预测的主题的“周边”进行研究,最重要的一点是,看到必然的边界划在哪里。当边界发生变化,社会必然随之改变,无论人们是否心甘情愿。
在我们看来,理解社会演进的关键,是抓住决定是否使用暴力的成本要素和回报要素。人类社会的每一个阶段,从狩猎部落到庞大帝国,都是由大政治的各个因素相互作用所决定的,流行的说法就是“自然法则”。无论何时何地,生命都是复杂的。羔羊和狮子之间保持着微妙的平衡,在边缘展开互动。如果狮子突然更加迅猛,就能捕获现在抓不住的羊羔;如果羊羔突然长出翅膀,狮子就会饿死。
利用和抵御暴力的能力,是左右边缘地带生命体的关键变量。把暴力放到大政治理论的核心,是完全有必要的。对暴力的控制,是人类社会的每个阶段都面临的最大困境。正如我们在《大清算》中所写到的:
人们之所以诉诸暴力,是因为能够得到回报。可以说,一个人如果想要钱,最简单的办法就是拿别人的。一支军队夺取油田和一个暴徒抢夺钱包,完全是一回事。就像威廉·普莱费尔所说,权力总是寻求通往财富的最现成的道路,那就是攻击已经拥有财富的人。 繁荣富裕所面临的挑战,正是因为在某些情况下,掠夺性暴力能收获丰厚的回报。战争可以改变一切,它改变规则,改变资产和收入的分配,甚至生杀予夺。暴力确实好使,就是这一点,让它难以被遏制。
从这些角度思考,帮助我们成功预测了一系列的事态发展;而这些发展,是消息灵通的专家们认为绝不可能发生的。例如,1987 年出版的《血流成河》,是我们研究目前正在进行的大政治革命的最初尝试;当时我们认为,技术的变革正在破坏世界权力的平衡和稳定。我们的主要观点如下:
美国的优势正在下降,这将导致经济失衡和经济危机,可能再次发生 1929 年式的股灾。这个观点遭到了专家们的一致否定。然而短短 6 个月后,1987 年 10 月,全球股市迎来了本世纪内最猛烈的抛售和震荡。
我们告诉读者,等着看共产主义的崩溃吧。这一次,专家们又笑了。然而,1989 年,出人意料的事情发生了,柏林墙倒塌,从波罗的海到布加勒斯特13,共产主义政权被民主革命扫荡一空。
我们解释道,布尔什维克的领袖们从沙皇手里继承的多民族帝国,将会不可避免地分崩离析。1991 年 12 月底,锤子镰刀旗最后一次从克里姆林宫降下,苏联不复存在。
在里根政府进行军备竞赛的高峰期,我们指出,世界即将迎来全面的裁军。人们要么觉得荒谬,要么觉得不可能。然而,在随后的七年里,出现了一战结束后最大规模的裁军。
当北美和欧洲的专家都指着日本,相信政府可以成功地控制市场时,我们不以为然。我们预测,日本金融资产的繁荣将以破产而告终。柏林墙倒塌后不久,日本的股市崩溃,价值被腰斩。我们还认为,它最终的低点,可能相当于甚至超过,1929 年股灾华尔街遭受的 89%的损失。
从中产家庭到全球最大的房地产投资者,当每个人都相信房地产只涨不跌的时候,我们警告说,房地产的崩溃即将到来。四年之内,由于房地产衰退,全世界的房产投资者损失超过 1 万亿美元。
早在专家们还没意识到的时候,我们就在《血流成河》中指出,蓝领工人的收入在下降,而且肯定将长期持续下降。在我们今天写这本书的时候,差不多十年后,沉睡的世界才终于开始意识到这是真的。美国的平均时薪已经低于艾森豪威尔第二任期时的水平。1993 年,按定值美元计算,美国年平均时薪为 18808 美元;1957 年,当艾森豪威尔第二次宣誓就职时,美国的年化平均时薪为 18903 美元。
虽然事后证明,《血流成河》里的预测惊人地准确,但是仅仅在几年前,它还被那些固守传统思维的人认为是无稽之谈。1987 年,《新闻周刊》的一位评论家,把我们的分析斥为是“对理性的不假思索的攻击”,反映出工业社会后期封闭的精神氛围。
你可能会觉得,随着时间的推移,像《新闻周刊》和类似的出版物,会认识到我们的分析路线的价值,看到它揭示出一些关于世界变化的真知灼见。根本没有。
和《血流成河》一样,《大清算》的第一版也遭到敌视,被嗤之以鼻。多家类似《华尔街日报》这样的权威媒体,断然否定我们的分析,认为它们就是“你的笨阿姨”在唠叨。随他们笑吧。事实证明,《大清算》中预测的,并不像传统的卫道士所假称的那么荒谬。
我们延伸了对苏联灭亡的推论,探讨了俄罗斯及其他前苏国家面临的问题,如日益严重的内乱,恶性通货膨胀,以及生活水平的下降。
我们阐释了 1990 年代将是缩减规模的十年,其中就包括,政府及商业实体首次在全球范围缩减规模。
我们还预测,对收入再分配的条件要进行重大的调整,重新定义,福利水平将大幅降低。从加拿大到瑞典,都出现了财政危机的苗头,美国的政客们也开始谈论“结束我们所知的福利”。
我们预测并分析,“世界新秩序”将被证明是“世界新乱序”。早在波斯尼亚的暴行占据新闻头条之前,我们就警告,南斯拉夫将陷入内战。
在索马里陷入无政府状态之前,我们指出,非洲即将崩溃的政府,会导致那里的一些国家事实上被接管。
我们还预测并论述了,激进的伊斯兰教会取代马克思主义,成为与西方对抗的主要意识形态。在俄克拉荷马爆炸案14和世贸中心被炸毁的几年前,我们就点明了,为什么美国面临的恐怖袭击将会激增。
在洛杉矶、多伦多和其他城市的骚乱登上新闻头条之前,我们就预见了,城市中少数族裔的犯罪亚文化,将导致暴力犯罪四处弥漫。
《大清算》还提出了一些有争议的论点,没有得到完全证实,或者说没有达到我们预计的发展水平。例如:- 我们认为,日本的股市会沿着 1929 年后华尔街的道路走下去,导致信贷崩溃和经济大萧条。不过,虽然西班牙、芬兰和其他一些国家的失业率超过了 30 年代的水平,包括日本在内的一些国家也确实经历了局部的萧条,但是没有出现 30 年代全世界经济内爆的系统性信贷崩溃。
我们曾预测,前苏联指挥控制系统的崩溃,会导致核武器扩散到一些小国家、恐怖组织和犯罪团伙手中。令人庆幸的是,这种情况并未发生,至少没有达到我们担心的程度。不过据新闻报道,伊朗在黑市上购买了几件战术核武器。
更令人担忧的是,《伦敦时报》于 1998 年 10 月 7 日报道:“根据一家主要的阿拉伯报纸的消息,流亡的沙特亿万富翁、恐怖主义领袖乌萨马·本·拉登,已经从前苏阵营的某中亚国家获得了战术核武器”。也就是说,这些从前苏流出的核武器,目前还没有正式确认部署或使用。
我们还论述了,“禁毒战争”会反过来颠覆警察和司法系统,特别是在毒品泛滥的国家,如美国。每年收获数百亿隐形的垄断利润,使得毒贩有能力也有动力,去腐蚀表明上很稳定廉洁的政府。虽然世界上的媒体偶尔会刊登一些报道,暗示毒资对美国政治体系高层的渗透,但这远不是故事的全部。
To prepare yourself for the world that is coming you must understand why it will be different from what most experts tell you. That involves looking closely at the hidden causes of change. We have attempted to do this with an unorthodox analysis we call the study of megapolitics. In two previous volumes, Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, we argued that the most important causes of change are not to be found in political manifestos or in the pronouncements of dead economists, but in the hidden factors that alter the boundaries where power is exercised. Often, subtle changes in climate, topography, microbes, and technology alter the logic of violence. They transform the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves.
Notice that our approach to understanding how the world changes is very different from that of most forecasters. We are not experts in anything, in the sense that we pretend to know a great deal more about certain “subjects” than those who have spent their entire careers cultivating highly specialized knowledge. To the contrary, we look from the outside in. We are knowledgeable around the subjects about which we make forecasts. Most of all, this involves seeing where the boundaries of necessity are drawn. When they change, society necessarily changes, no matter what people may wish to the contrary.
In our view, the key to understanding how societies evolve is to understand factors that determine the costs and rewards of employing violence. Every human society, from the hunting band to the empire, has been informed by the interactions of megapolitical factors that set the prevailing version of the “laws of nature.” Life is always and everywhere complex. The lamb and the lion keep a delicate balance, interacting at the margin. If lions were suddenly more swift, they would catch prey that now escape. If lambs suddenly grew wings, lions would starve. The capacity to utilize and defend against violence is the crucial variable that alters life at the margin.
We put violence at the center of our theory of megapolitics for good reason. The control of violence is the most important dilemma every society faces. As we wrote in The Great Reckoning:
The reason that people resort to violence is that it often pays. In some ways, the simplest thing a man can do if he wants money is to take it. That is no less true for an army of men seizing an oil field than it is for a single thug taking a wallet. Power, as William Playfair wrote, “has always sought the readiest road to wealth, by attacking those who were in possession of it.” The challenge to prosperity is precisely that predatory violence does pay well in some circumstances. War does change things. It changes the rules. It changes the distribution of assets and income. It even determines who lives and who dies. It is precisely the fact that violence does pay that makes it hard to control.12
Thinking in these terms has helped us foresee a number of developments that better-informed experts insisted could never happen. For example, Blood in the Streets, published in early 1987, was our attempt to survey the first stages of the great megapolitical revolution now under way. We argued then that technological change was destabilizing the power equation in the world. Among our principal points:
We said that American predominance was in decline, which would lead to economic imbalances and distress, including another 1929-style stock market crash. Experts were all but unanimous in denying that such a thing could happen. Yet within six months, in October 1987, world markets were convulsed by the most violent sell-off of the century.
We told readers to expect the collapse of Communism. Again, experts laughed. Yet 1989 brought the events that “no one could have predicted.” The Berlin Wall fell, as revolutions swept away Communist regimes from the Baltic to Bucharest.
We explained why the multiethnic empire the Bolshevik nomenklatura inherited from the tsars would “inevitably crack apart.” At the end of December 1991, the hammer-and-sickle banner was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time as the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
During the height of the Reagan arms buildup, we argued that the world stood at the threshold of sweeping disarmament. This, too, was considered unlikely, if not preposterous. Yet the following seven years brought the most sweeping disarmament since the close of World War I.
At a time when experts in North America and Europe were pointing to Japan for support of the view that governments can successfully rig markets, we said otherwise. We forecast that the Japanese financial assets boom would end in a bust Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Japanese stock market crashed, losing almost half its value. We continue to believe that its ultimate low could match or exceed the 89 percent loss that Wall Street suffered at the bottom after 1929.
At a point when almost everyone, from the middle-class family to the world’s largest real estate investors, appeared to believe that property markets could only rise and not fall, we warned that a real estate bust was in the offing. Within four years, real estate investors throughout the world lost more than $1 trillion as property values dropped.
Long before it was obvious to the experts, we explained in Blood in the Streets that the income of blue-collar workers, had decreased and was destined to continue falling on a long-term basis. As we write today, almost a decade later, it has at last begun to dawn on a sleepy world that this is true. Average hourly wages in the United States have fallen below those achieved in the second Eisenhower administration. In 1993, average annualized hourly wages in constant dollars were $18,808. In 1957, when Eisenhower was sworn in for his second term, U.S. annualized average hourly wages were $18,903.
While the main themes of Blood in the Streets have proven remarkably accurate with the benefit of hindsight, only a few years ago they were considered rank nonsense by the guardians of conventional thinking. A reviewer in Newsweek in 1987 reflected the closed mental climate of late industrial society when he dismissed our analysis as “an unthinking attack on reason.”
You might imagine that Newsweek and similar publications would have recognized with the passage of time that our line of analysis had revealed something useful about the way the world was changing. Not a bit. The first edition of The Great Reckoning was greeted with the same sniggering hostility that welcomed Blood in the Streets. No less an authority than the Wall Street Journal categorically dismissed our analysis as the nattering of “your dopey aunt.”
This chuckling aside, the themes of The Great Reckoning proved less ludicrous than the guardians of orthodoxy pretended.
We extended our forecast of the death of the Soviet Union, exploring why Russia and the other former Soviet republics faced a future of growing civil disorder, hyperinflation, and falling living standards.
We explained why the 1990s would be a decade of downsizing, including for the first time a worldwide downsizing of governments as well as business entities.
We also forecast that there would be a major redefinition of terms of income redistribution, with sharp cutbacks in the level of benefits. Hints of fiscal crisis appeared from Canada to Sweden, and American politicians began to talk of “ending welfare as we know it.”
We anticipated and explained why the “new world order” would prove to be a “new world disorder.” Well before the atrocities in Bosnia engrossed the headlines, we warned that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war.
Before Somalia slid into anarchy, we explained why the pending collapse of governments in Africa would lead some countries there to be effectively placed into receivership.
We forecast and explained why militant Islam would displace Marxism as the principal ideology of confrontation with the West.
Years before the Oklahoma bombing and the attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, we explained why the United States faced an upsurge in terrorism.
Before the headlines that told of the rioting that swept Los Angeles, Toronto, and other cities, we explained why the emergence of criminal subcultures among urban minorities was setting the stage for widespread criminal violence.
We also anticipated “the final depression of the twentieth century,” which began in Asia in 1989 and has been spreading back from the periphery toward the center of the global system. We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street’s path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although massive government intervention in Japan and elsewhere temporarily prevented markets from fully reflecting the deterioration of credit conditions, this only displaced and compounded economic distress, building pressures for competitive devaluations and a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.
The Great Reckoning also spelled out a number of controversial theses that have not yet been confirmed, or have not reached the level of development that we forecast:
We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street’s path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although unemployment rates in Spain, Finland, and a few other countries exceeded those of the 1930s, and a number of countries, including Japan, did experience local depressions, there has not yet been a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.
We argued that the breakdown of the command-and-control system in the former Soviet Union would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of ministates, terrorists, and criminal gangs. To the world’s good fortune, this has not come to pass, at least not to the degree that we feared. Press reports indicate that Iran purchased several tactical nuclear weapons on the black market; more worryingly, the Times of London reported on October 7, 1998, that “Osama bin Laden, the exiled millionaire Saudi terrorist leader, has acquired tactical nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Central Asian states, according to a leading Arab newspaper.” That said, there has been no officially confirmed deployment or use of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union.
We explained why the “War on Drugs” was a recipe for subverting the police and judicial systems of countries where drug use is widespread, particularly the United States. With tens of billions of dollars in hidden monopoly profits piling up each year, drug dealers have the means as well as the incentive to corrupt even apparently stable countries. While the world media have carried occasional stories hinting at high-level penetration of the U.S. political system by drug money, the full story has not yet been told.
22见他人所不见Looking Where Others Don’t
尽管有一些错误的地方,或者根据现在已知的情况看是错误的,但我们的预测成绩甚是可观,经得起检验。1990 年代所发生的、未来的经济史要处理的很多课题,在《大清算》中都有预测或预计和解释。我们的预测,并不是对趋势的简单外推或延伸,而是认识到二战后被视为正常的东西已经发生了重大的背离。我们曾经警告过,1990 年代将与之间的 50 年迥然不同。翻阅 1991 年到 1998 年的新闻头条,不难发现,《大清算》的预测几乎每天都在得到证实。
我们所看到的,不是孤立的现象,或者一时一地的麻烦,而是来自同一条断层线的冲击和震荡。旧秩序正在一场大政治的地震上颠簸,而这场地震将颠覆原有的体制,改变有头脑的人看待世界的方式。
毫无疑问,暴力决定着世界的运行和变化,并在其中发挥着核心作用;但奇怪的是,很少有人认真思考这一点。在大多数政治分析家和经济学家看来,暴力好像只是一种轻微的刺激,就像在蛋糕周围嗡嗡作响的一只苍蝇,而不是烘焙它的厨师。
Notwithstanding the points where our forecasts were mistaken or seem mistaken in light of what is now known, the record stands to scrutiny. Much of what is likely to figure in future economic histories of the 1990s was forecast or anticipated and explained in The Great Reckoning. Many of our predictions were not simple extrapolations or extensions of trends, but forecasts of major departures from what has been considered normal since World War II. We warned that the 1990s would be dramatically different from the previous five decades. Reading the news of 1991 through 1998, we see that the themes of The Great Reckoning were borne out almost daily.
We see these developments not as examples of isolated difficulties, trouble here, trouble there, but as shocks and tremors that run along the same fault line. The old order is being toppled by a megapolitical earthquake that will revolutionize institutions and alter the way thinking people see the world.
In spite of the central role of violence in determining the way the world works, it attracts surprisingly little serious attention. Most political analysts and economists write as if violence were a minor irritant, like a fly buzzing around a cake, and not the chef who baked it.
23另外一位研究大政治的先驱Another Megapolitical Pioneer
实际上,关于暴力在历史中的作用,有清晰思考的人少之又少,以致于关于大政治分析的著作,只需一张纸就能列完。在《大清算》中,我们借鉴了一本大政治分析的经典,并详细阐述了其中的论点。
这本书是威廉·普莱费尔15(William Playfair)的《强盛国家衰落的永恒原因》16(An Enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations),出版于 1805 年,早已被世人所遗忘。另外,弗里德里克·莱恩(Frederic C. Lane)的作品,是我们的出发点之一。莱恩是一位研究中世纪的历史学家,关于暴力在历史中的作用,他在 20 世纪四五十年代,写了几篇相关文章,洞若观火,清晰透彻。其中最全面的应该是《有组织暴力的经济后果》,发表在1958年的《经济史杂志》上17。除了少数专业的经济学家和历史学家之外,鲜有人阅读,大部分看过的人好像也没有意识到它的重要性。和普莱费尔一样,莱恩的著作,也是写给当时还不存在的读者的。
In fact, there has been so little clear thinking about the role of violence in history that a bibliography of megapolitical analysis could be written on a single sheet of paper. In The Great Reckoning, we drew upon and elaborated arguments of an almost entirely forgotten classic of megapolitical analysis, William Playfair’s An Enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations, published in 1805. Here one of our departure points is the work of Frederic C. Lane. Lane was a medieval historian who wrote several penetrating essays on the role of violence in history during the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these was “Economic Consequences of Organized Violence,” which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 1958. Few people other than professional economists and historians have read it, and most of them seem not to have recognized its significance. Like Playfair, Lane wrote for an audience that did not yet exist.
24对信息时代的洞察Insights for the Information Age
早在信息时代之前,莱恩就发表了他的作品,探讨暴力和战争的经济意义。他写这些东西,并不是提前预见到了微处理技术及其他技术革新;但是,他对暴力的洞察,为我们理解信息革命下的社会重构,建立了一个框架。
莱恩为未来打开的窗口,来自于他窥视过去的窗口。他主要研究中世纪的历史,特别是威尼斯,一个在暴力的世界中崛起又沉沦的贸易城邦。在思考威尼斯兴衰成败的过程中,莱恩注意到一些东西,可以帮助你认识未来。他看到了这样的事实:在决定“如何利用稀缺资源”的问题上,怎么组织和控制暴力,发挥着至关重要的作用。
我们相信,莱恩关于对暴力的竞争的分析,会对我们理解信息时代的生活变迁有诸多启示。但是,这么抽象的不时髦的观点,不要指望大多数人能注意到,能跟得上的人就更少了。世人的注意力,都盯在充满谎言的政治辩论和刚愎浮夸的名人身上,大政治的蜿蜒迂回,依然无人理会。
普通的北美人,可能会浪费百倍的时间在辛普森和莱文斯基18身上,相比于他们对微处理技术的关注。而正是这些技术,将淘汰他们的工作,颠覆他们赖以获得失业补助的政治制度。
Lane published his work on violence and the economic meaning of war well before the advent of the Information Age. He certainly was not writing in anticipation of microprocessing or the other technological revolutions now unfolding. Yet his insights into violence established a framework for understanding how society will be reconfigured in the Information Revolution.
The window Lane opened into the future was one through which he peered into the past. He was a medieval historian, and particularly a historian of a trading city, Venice, whose fortunes surged and sagged in a violent world. In thinking about how Venice rose and fell, his attention was attracted to issues that can help you understand the future. He saw the fact that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining “what uses are made of scarce resources.”13
We believe that Lane’s analyses of the competitive uses of violence has much to tell us about how life is likely to change in the Information Age. But don’t expect most people to notice, much less follow, so unfashionably abstract an argument. While the attention of the world is riveted on dishonest debates and wayward personalities, the meanderings of megapolitics continue almost unnoted. The average North American has probably lavished one hundred times more attention on O. J. Simpson and Monica Lewinsky than he has on the new microtechnologies that are poised to antiquate his job and subvert the political system he depends on for unemployment compensation.
25期望的幻觉THE VANITY OF WISHES
并不是只有窝在沙发上看电视的人,才有这种忽视根本重点的习性。各式各样的专家并没有好到哪里去,他们看到的也只是民族国家的一个假象,认为是人们持有的观念决定了世界变化的方式。一些看上去老谋深算的分析家们,沉溺于各种解释和预测,把历史的重大变迁理解为是人们的期望推动的。就在我们写《再见,民族国家;你好……未知?》的时候,在《纽约时报》的社论版上,出现了一篇文章,很显著地反映了上述推理,作者是尼古拉斯·科尔切斯特。不只是这篇文章的主题——民族国家之死,也就是我们讨论的话题;更重要的是,科尔切斯特把他自己作为一个标杆,来反射我们的思维方式与常规之间有多么大的差距。科尔切斯特不是普通人,他也是《经济学人》情报部的编辑部主任。
如果有谁可以对这个世界形成一种现实的观点,那应该是他。而他在文章中多处明确指出,从逻辑上说,“世界政府的到来”势不可挡。
他为什么这么说呢?因为民族国家已经摇摇欲坠,没办法再控制经济的力量。在我们看来,这种假设近乎荒谬。仅仅因为一种治理方式失败了,就认为某种特定的新型治理方式必然会出现,这简直就是谬论。按照这种推理,海地和刚果早该有更好的政府了,因为他们之前的政府明显不行。
在北美和欧洲少数思考上述议题的人中间,科尔切斯特的观点得到广泛的认同。
但他完全没有考虑到,是更宽宏的大政治力量,决定了某种政治制度的实际可行性。本书的重点就在于此。把正在塑造新千年的技术纳入视野,我们看到的不是一个世界政府,而是微型政府,甚至更接近无政府的状态。
人人按规则行事,而暴力在决定规则上扮演着什么样的角色,就这一主题的严肃分析,我们看到了几十本云遮雾罩的书,里面写的都是小麦补贴;还有几百本神神道道的书,都在讲货币政策。对于真正决定历史进程的关键因素,这种思考上的不足,可能在很大程度上反映了,为什么过去几个世纪以来,权力的配置能保持相对的稳定。睡在河马背上的小鸟,不会想到失去栖息地,直到河马活动起来。
梦境、神话和幻想,在为所谓的社会科学提供信息方面发挥的作用,比我们通常认为的要大得多。
暴力的角色,在关于经济公正的大量文献中,表现得再明显不过了。关于经济的公正与不公正,已经有数以百万级的文字在述说、在描述,每一页都可以用来仔细分析,暴力如何塑造了社会,并设定了经济运行的边界。然而,现代语境下关于经济公正的表述,却预设了这样一个前提:社会是由一种强制性工具支配的,这种工具如此强大,它可以夺走生命中一切的美好,然后重新分配。而事实上,这种权力只存在于现代社会的几代人身上;现在,它正在衰退。
The tendency to overlook what is fundamentally important is not confined solely to the couch dweller watching television. Conventional thinkers of all shapes and sizes observe one of the pretenses of the democratic nation-state —that the views people hold determine the way the world changes. Apparently sophisticated analysts lapse into explanations and forecasts that interpret major historical developments as if they were determined in a wishful way. A striking example of this type of reasoning appeared on the editorial page of the New York Times just as we were writing: “Goodbye, Nation-State, Hello… What?,” by Nicholas Colchester.14 Not only was the topic, the death of the nation-state, the very topic we are addressing, but its author presents himself as an excellent marker to illustrate how far removed our way of thinking is from the norm. Colchester is no simpleton. He wrote as editorial director of the Economist Intelligence Unit. If anyone should form a realistic view of the world it should be he. Yet his article clearly indicates in several places that “the coming of international government” is “now logically unstoppable.”
Why? Because the nation-state is faltering and can no longer control economic forces.
In our view, this assumption verges on the absurd. To suppose that some specific new form of governance will emerge simply because another has failed is a fallacy. By that reasoning, Haiti and the Congo would long ago have had better government simply because what they had was so luminously inadequate.
Colchester’s point of view, widely shared among the few who think about such things in North America and Europe, utterly fails to take into account the larger megapolitical forces that determine what types of political systems are actually viable. That is the focus of this book. When the technologies that are shaping the new millennium are considered, it is far more likely that we will see not one world government, but microgovernment, or even conditions approaching anarchy.
For every serious analysis of the role of violence in determining the rules by which everyone operates, dozens of books have been written about the intricacies of wheat subsidies, and hundreds more about arcane aspects of monetary policy. Much of this shortfall in thinking about the crucial issues that actually determine the course of history probably reflects the relative stability of the power configuration over the past several centuries. The bird that falls asleep on the back of a hippopotamus does not think about losing its perch until the hippo actually moves. Dreams, myths, and fantasies play a much larger role in informing the supposed social sciences than we commonly think.
This is particularly evident in the abundant literature of economic justice. Millions of words have been uttered and written about economic justice and injustice for each page devoted to careful analysis of how violence shapes society, and thus sets the boundaries within which economies must function. Yet formulations of economic justice in the modern context presuppose that society is dominated by an instrument of compulsion so powerful that it can take away and redistribute life’s good things. Such power has existed for only a few generations of the modern period. Now it is fading away.
26社会保障的老大哥Big Brother on Social Security
在 20 世纪,工业技术的发展,使政府掌握了前所未有的控制手段。有一段时间,政府对暴力的垄断越来越高效,留给个人自主的空间越来越小,看上去已经成为历史的必然趋势。在本世界的中叶,没有人会期望主权个人的胜出。
根据当时看到的证据,20 世纪中期一些最睿智的观察家确信,民族国家权力的集中,将会导致对人们生活方方面面的极权统治。在乔治·奥威尔的《1984》(1949 年出版)中,老大哥看着每个个体徒劳地挣扎,想维持他们自主和自尊的余地。而这似乎是一场必败的抗争。弗里德里希·哈耶克的《通往奴役之路》(1944 年出版),以更学术性的视角论述了,自由在被一种新的控制经济的方式所剥夺,国家正在成为一切的主宰。
这些作品,都是在微处理技术出现之前写的。而微处理,以及它孵化的一系列其他技术,提高了小型团队乃至个人独立于中央权威运作的能力。尽管哈耶克和奥威尔这样的观察家都目光如炬,但他们过于悲观。历史已经展开了它的惊喜。共产主义极权勉强撑过了 1984 年。如果政府能够成功压制微处理技术的解放力,下一个千年,还将出现一种新型的农奴制。但更有可能的是,我们将看到前所未有的机遇,以及个人的自主和自治。我们的父辈所担心的事情,也许将被证明根本不是问题;他们认为理所当然的、永恒不变的社会特征,现在看起来注定会消失。无论必然性给人类的选择设定的边界在哪里,我们都会做出相应的调整,然后重新组织生活。
Industrial technology gave governments greater instruments of control in the twentieth century than ever before. For a time, it seemed inevitable that governments would become so effective at monopolizing violence as to leave little room for individual autonomy. Nobody at mid-century was looking forward to the triumph of the Sovereign Individual.
Some of the shrewdest observers of the mid-twentieth century became convinced on the evidence of the day that the tendency of the nation-state to centralize power would lead to totalitarian domination over all aspects of life. In George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), Big Brother was watching the individual vainly struggle to maintain a margin of autonomy and self-respect. It appeared to be a losing cause. Friedrich von Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) took a more scholarly view in arguing that freedom was being lost to a new form of economic control that left the state as the master of everything. These works were written before the advent of microprocessing, which has incubated a whole range of technologies that enhance the capacity of small groups and even individuals to function independently of central authority.
As shrewd as observers like Hayek and Orwell were, they were unduly pessimistic. History has unfolded its surprises. Totalitarian Communism barely outlasted the year 1984. A new form of serfdom may yet emerge in the next millennium if governments succeed in suppressing the liberating aspects of microtechnology. But it is far more likely that we will see unprecedented opportunity and autonomy for the individual. What our parents worried about may prove to be no problem at all. What they took for granted as fixed and permanent features of social life now seem destined to disappear. Wherever necessity sets boundaries to human choice, we adjust, and reorganize our lives accordingly.
27做预测的风险The Hazards of Forecasting
毫无疑问,就社会组织以及将组织紧密连接起来的文化,试图对它们深层次的变化做出预测和解释,会使我们小小的尊严受到威胁。人们做出的大多数预测,如果放到很长的时间范畴内,读起来都很蠢。而且他们设想的变化越剧烈,下场越难堪。世界没有终结。臭氧层没有消失。即将到来的冰河世纪,融化在全球变暖之中。与所有的警报相反,石油也没有枯竭。安特罗伯斯先生,《九死一生》19中的普通人,避开了冰冻,躲过了战争和经济崩溃的威胁,并且无视专家报告的警示,自然地老去。
大多数“揭示”未来的预言,很快都沦为了笑料。即使为了自己的面子,人们有很强的动机做出尽可能清晰的思考,但是,前瞻性的眼光也往往被证明是短视的。
1903 年,梅赛德斯公司说,“全球的汽车数量永远不会达到 100 万辆,原因很简单,全世界不可能有 100 万名技工,能够被训练成司机。”认识到这一点,我们本应该闭嘴的,但是没有。我们不害怕站在队伍中,迎接应得的嘲笑。如果我们大错特错,后人可以尽情嘲笑,假如有人记得的话。敢于表达,就甘冒犯错的风险。我们还没有僵硬无用到害怕犯错的地步,远远没有。我们宁愿冒险提出可能对你有用的想法,也不想因为事后回顾起来可能有些夸大或尴尬,而憋在心里不说出来。
正如阿瑟·克拉克(Arthur C. Clarke)睿智地指出,预测未来经常会失败,两个首要的原因是“缺乏勇气和缺乏想象力”。在这二者当中,他写到:“缺乏勇气似乎更加常见。有时候,即使给定了所有相关的事实,那些冒牌的预言家也看不出来,它们指向一个必然的结论。有些失败是如此滑稽,简直令人难以置信。”如果我们对信息革命的探索,与未来的现实在哪些方面不符,这当然不可避免,但原因更多是因为我们缺乏想象力,而不是缺乏勇气。预测未来始终是一个大胆的举动,因为它激发人们的怀疑。也许时间会证明,我们的推断谬之千里。但是,与诺斯特拉达穆斯不同,我们不会假装自己是预言家。我们不会在一碗水里搅动魔棒,或者使用占星术。我们也不会写神秘的诗句。我们的目的,是就某些对你至关重要的问题,提供一份清醒、独立的分析。
我们的观点可能被视为异端,正因为如此,我们感到有义务讲出来,不然的话,它们就没机会被听到。在工业社会晚期封闭的精神氛围中,思想已经不像它应有的那样,可以通过当前的媒体自由地传播。
本书是我们一起写的第三本,它出于建设性的精神,延续了《血流成河》与《大清算》,分析了正在发生的历史大变革的各个阶段。这是一场思维的练习。本书重点探讨工业社会必然死亡,社会将以新的形式重构。我们预期在未来的几年,会看到惊人的发展悖论。一方面,随着主权个人的崛起,我们将看到一种新式自由的实现,并有望见证生产力的彻底解放。与此同时,我们期望看到现代民族国家的死亡。20 世纪成长起来的、被西方人视为理所当然的、诸多关于平等的保障,也势必随之烟消云散。我们预计,现在人们所熟知的代议制民主,将逐渐消失;取而代之的是来自网络市场上新的民主选择。如果我们推论正确的话,下个世纪的政治,将比我们已经习惯的政治更加多样化,但重要性会大大降低。
我们相信本书的论点并不难理解,尽管它穿越的领域类似知识上的荒郊野岭和穷街陋巷。如果书中有什么地方晦涩难懂的地方,那不是因为我们在耍机灵,或者在含糊其辞,像某些所谓的预言家发表的神秘声明。我们绝不会模棱两可。如果我们的论点不够清晰明确,那是由于我们写作能力的不足,没能把引人注目的观点表达得浅显易懂。和大多数预言家不同,我们希望读者能够理解甚至复制我们的思路。它不是出于灵异的遐想或者行星的回旋,而是基于老派的、不讨人喜欢的逻辑。正是基于逻辑,我们认为微处理技术必将颠覆和摧毁民族国家,同时创造出新型的社会组织形式。一种全新的生活方式正在到来,比你想象的更早更快;但你至少可以预见到其中的一些细节,这既有必要,也是完全可能的。
No doubt we put our small measure of dignity at risk in attempting to foresee and explain profound changes in the organization of life and the culture that binds it together. Most forecasts are doomed to make silly reading in the fullness of time. And the more dramatic the change they envision, the more embarrassingly wrong they tend to be. The world doesn’t end. The ozone doesn’t vanish. The coming Ice Age dissolves into global warming. Notwithstanding all the alarms to the contrary, there is still oil in the tank. Mr. Antrobus, the everyman of The Skin of Our Teeth, avoids freezing, survives wars and threatened economic calamities, and grows old ignoring the studied alarms of experts.
Most attempts to “unveil” the future soon turn out to be comic. Even where self-interest provides a strong incentive to clear thinking, forward vision is often myopic. In 1903, the Mercedes company said that “there would never be as many as 1 million automobiles worldwide. The reason was that it was implausible that as many as 1 million artisans worldwide would be trainable as chauffeurs.”15
Recognizing this should stop our mouths. It doesn’t. We are not afraid to stand in line for a due share of ridicule. If we mistake matters greatly, future generations may laugh as heartily as they please, presuming anyone remembers what we said. To dare a thought is to risk being wrong. We are hardly so stiff and useless that we are afraid to err. Far from it. We would rather venture thoughts that might prove useful to you than suppress them out of apprehension that they might prove overblown or embarrassing in retrospect.
As Arthur C. Clarke shrewdly noted, the two overriding reasons why attempts to anticipate the future usually fall flat are “Failure of Nerve and Failure of Imagination.”16 Of the two, he wrote, “Failure of Nerve seems to be the more common; it occurs when even given all the relevant facts the would-be prophet cannot see that they point to an inescapable conclusion. Some of these failures are so ludicrous as to be almost unbelievable.”17
Where our exploration of the Information Revolution falls short, as it inevitably will, the cause will be due more to a lack of imagination than to a lack of nerve. Forecasting the future has always been a bold enterprise, one which properly excites skepticism. Perhaps time will prove that our deductions are wildly off the mark. Unlike Nostradamus, we do not pretend to be prophetic personalities. We do not foretell the future by stirring a wand in a bowl of water or by casting horoscopes. Nor do we write in cryptic verse. Our purpose is to provide you with a sober, detached analysis of issues that could prove to be of great importance to you.
We feel an obligation to set out our views, even where they seem heretical, precisely because they may not otherwise be heard. In the closed mental atmosphere of late industrial society, ideas do not traffic as freely as they should through the established media.
This book is written in a constructive spirit. It is the third we have written together, analyzing various stages of the great change now under way. Like Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, it is a thought exercise. It explores the death of industrial society and its reconfiguration in new forms. We expect to see amazing paradoxes in the years to come. On the one hand, you will witness the realization of a new form of freedom, with the emergence of the Sovereign Individual. You can expect to see almost the complete liberation of productivity. At the same time, we expect to see the death of the modern nation-state. Many of the assurances of equality that Western people have grown to take for granted in the twentieth century are destined to die with it. We expect that representative democracy as it is now known will fade away, to be replaced by the new democracy of choice in the cybermarketplace. If our deductions are correct, the politics of the next century will be much more varied and less important than that to which we have become accustomed.
We are confident that our argument will be easy to follow, notwithstanding the fact that it leads through some territory that is the intellectual equivalent of the backwoods and bad neighborhoods. If our meaning is not entirely intelligible in places, that is not because we are being cute, or using the time-honored equivocation of those who pretend to foretell the future by making cryptic pronouncements. We are not equivocators. If our arguments are unclear, it is because we have failed the task of writing in a way that makes compelling ideas accessible. Unlike many forecasters, we want you to understand and even duplicate our line of thinking. It is based not upon psychic reveries or the gyrations of planets, but upon old-fashioned, ugly logic. For quite logical reasons, we believe that microprocessing will inevitably subvert and destroy the nation-state, creating new forms of social organization in the process. It is both necessary and possible for you to foresee at least some details of the new way of life that may be here sooner than you think.
28预测未来的讽刺性Ironies of a Future Foretold
几个世纪以来,第二个千年的结束,一直被视为一个重要的历史时刻。805 年前,圣·马拉奇就把 2000 年定为最后审判的日期。美国通灵师埃德加·卡伊斯在 1934 年说,在 2000 年,地球的轴心将发生移动,加利福尼亚将裂为两半,纽约市和日本将没入大海。日本的火箭科学家板川秀夫在 1980 年宣布,1999 年 8 月 18 日,众行星将排列成“大十字”,地球将遭受大范围的环境灾害,人类生命因此终结。
这些天启式的幻觉,后来遭到无尽的羞辱和嘲笑。公元 2000 年,虽然是一个气势磅礴的整数,但也只是西方采用的基督教历法的一个随意产物。其他文化中的历法和纪年系统,计算每个世纪和千年的起点与此不同。例如,按照伊斯兰历法,公元 2000 年就是 1378 年,不过是很普通的一年。按照中国历法,每 60 年一个轮回,公元 2000 年只是另外一个龙年;它是一个连续周期的一部分,向上延伸到过去的几千年。不过,人们对 2000 年的特别关注,不仅仅因为神学。这一年之所以被看重,除了基督教传统的加持,也受到本世纪中期信息技术局限性的影响。所谓的 Y2K 问题,也就是计算机的千年虫危机,它是潜藏在数十亿行代码中的逻辑缺陷,可以在千禧年的午夜关闭工业社会的基本元素,给人类世界带来毁灭性的打击,接近于末日状态。因为大量的计算机和微处理器使用的,是早期计算机保存和回收的软件。当时每兆字节的内存空间价格达到 60 万美元,比黄金还要昂贵。为了节省宝贵的空间,早期的程序员只用一年的最后两个数字来记录日期。这种两位数日期的惯例,被广泛应用到了大型计算机的软件当中,乃至大部分的个人计算机和嵌入式芯片。微处理器几乎可以控制一切,从录像机到汽车点火系统、安全系统、电话、控制电话网络的交换系统、工厂、发电厂、石油公司、化工厂、管道等的过程和控制系统等等。因此,1999 年缩写为两位数就是 “99”。问题是,当“00”出现在 2000 年的时候,很多计算机会把它读成 1900 年。这可能导致大量没有调整过的计算机和其他数字设备,无法识别日期栏中的2000 年。
这种情况会引发大规模的数据破坏,它也意外启发了未来信息战的新潜力。在信息时代,潜在的对手可以通过引爆“逻辑炸弹”,破坏底层数据,进而瘫痪建立在该数据之上的关键系统,从而克敌制胜。比如,在一项军事演习中,如果你能攻击对飞机安全至关重要的数据,就不需要再击落它了。破坏数据,和使用物理武器一样,都能瘫痪现代社会的正常运行。认真思考一下,就很容易发觉,它潜在的影响极其深远。例如,1997 年 12 月 14 日《伦敦邮报》报道,由于担心航空运输控制系统会出事,全球的航空公司计划在 2000 年 1 月 1 日,取消数百次航班。据波音公司称,有大量飞机需要进行千年虫修复。很多设备如果在一个无效的日期记录一个事件,就会导致混乱。操作飞机的线性计算机控制系统,如果在编程运算中得出结论,飞机的最后一次关键维护是在 1900 年,就很可能会出现故障,甚至进入一个错误的死循环而崩溃。
逻辑炸弹会导致有缺陷的控制系统失灵,由此带来的致命反馈效应,可能会使很遗憾地使千年之交成为一个令人难忘的日子。要知道,即使你很幸运,没有在新千年开始的时候坐在半空中的航班里,你也会被很多进入错误循环而关闭的设备所影响。
我们建议你避免使用不符合 2000 年标准的心脏起搏器,或避开醉酒的千禧狂欢者可能引起的事故。如果心脏起搏器关停,电话系统可能也一样,所以救护车永远也不会来。如果你不是住在巴西或乌克兰,你也许习惯了拿起电话或打开车载电话,就能自动获得拨号音;所以,令人高兴的是,你不用关心电话系统运作的技术细节。但事实上,电话网络交换机和路由器是高度依赖日期的。所有通话的日期和时间,都会被记录在一个日志上,这对计费至关重要。如果在 1999 年 12 月 31 日 11:59:30 时,你打了一个一分钟的电话,而在 12 点整的时候,系统把你的通话时长计成了超过 99 年,从而发生错误和崩溃都是可能的。虽然长途电话公司正在花费巨资升级交换机,以使其符合 2000 年的要求,本地服务供应商大概也在做同样的事,但如果有哪怕一小部分公司未达到标准而停机,也会使整个网络受到影响。在 2000 年 1 月 1 日,如果你能获得一个拨号音,你就已经很幸运了。
用千年虫专家彼得·代·雅格(Peter de Jager)的话说,“如果我们不能打电话,那我们就什么都干不了。我们的电子专注,我们的交易,还有银行业务。”而千年虫故障的后果可能远不止这些。
今天还没有人知道,关键系统因千年虫问题而崩溃的话,波及面会有多大。1976年以后制造的汽车、卡车和公共汽车,其中的嵌入式系统都不能重新编程,如果它们对日期敏感不能运行,就必须更换。(也许你不会与戴着不符合要求的心脏起搏器的人,发生交通事故,因为他们的汽车可能也无法启动。)嵌入式系统还广泛存在于所有类型的发电厂、水厂和污水处理系统、医疗设备、军事设备、飞机、离岸石油平台、游轮、警报系统和电梯。虽然很多微处理器组件的功能对日期不敏感,但它们内部的操作可能依赖于一个时钟,而这个时钟受千年虫的影响。
For centuries, the end of this millennium has been seen as a pregnant moment in history. More than 850 years ago, St. Malachy fixed 2000 as the date of the Last Judgment. American psychic Edgar Cayce said in 1934 that the earth would shift on its axis in the year 2000, causing California to split in two and inundating New York City and Japan. A Japanese rocket scientist, Hideo Itokawa, announced in 1980 that the alignment of the planets in a “Grand Cross” on August 18, 1999, would cause widespread environmental devastation, leading to the end of human life on earth.18
Such visions of apocalypse make a plump target for ridicule. After all, the year 2000, while an imposing round number, would appear to be only an arbitrary artifact of the Christian calendar as adopted in the West. Other calendars and dating systems calculate centuries and millennia from different starting points. By the reckoning of the Islamic calendar, for example, A.D. 2000 will be the year 1378. As ordinary-sounding as a year can be. According to the Chinese calendar, which repeats itself every sixty years, A.D. 2000 is just another year of the dragon. It is part of a continuous cycle that extends millennia into the past. Yet there is more than theological investment in the year 2000. Its importance is undergirded not only by Christian tradition, but by the limitations of mid-century information technology. The so-called Y2K or year 2000 computer problem, a potentially devastating logic flaw in billions of lines of computer code, could approximate apocalyptic conditions by closing down essential elements of industrial society on the millennial midnight. Many computers and microprocessors use software preserved and recycled from the earliest days of computers, when memory space, at $600,000 per megabyte, was more valuable than gold. To save expensive space, the early programmers tracked dates with only the last two numbers of the year. This convention of employing two-digit date fields was carried over into most software employed in mainframe computers, and even found wide use in personal computers and so-called embedded chips, microprocessors that are used to control almost everything, from VCRs to car ignition systems, security systems, telephones, the switching systems that control the telephone network, process and control systems in factories, power plants, oil refineries, chemical plants, pipelines and much more. Thus, abbreviated into a two-digit field, the year 1999 would be “99.” The trouble is what happens when 00 comes up for the year 2000. Many computers will read this as 1900. This may make it impossible for many unremediated computers and other digital devices to recognize the year 2000 in date fields.
The result will be a massive problem of data corruption that will provide an accidental illustration of a new potential for information warfare. In the Information Age, potential adversaries will be able to wreak havoc by detonating “logic bombs” that sabotage the functions of essential systems by corrupting the data upon which their functioning depends. As a military exercise, for example, you would not need to shoot down an airplane, if you could corrupt data crucial to its safe operation. Data corruption can do almost as much as physical weapons can to thwart the function of a modern society. That this has potentially far-reaching consequences should be obvious on reflection. For example, the Mail of London reported on December 14, 1997, that airlines around the globe were planning to cancel hundreds of flights on January 1, 2000 out of fear that air traffic control systems could fail.19 Potential problems include not only the air traffic systems, but also date-sensitive functions built into the airplanes themselves. According to Boeing, many airplanes will require Y2K remediation. Many devices may have a problem if they try to log an event on an invalid date. The fly-by-wire computer-controlled systems that operate airplanes may malfunction if they are programmed to conclude that crucial maintenance was last performed in the year 1900. They many even go into an error loop and shut down.
The potentially lethal feedback effects of a logic time bomb that closes down noncompliant control systems could make the turn of the millennium a memorable date for unpleasant reasons. Remember, you can be affected by many devices that go into an error loop and shut down even if you are lucky enough not to find yourself in midair when the new millennium begins.
You would be well advised to avoid an accident arising from non-Y2K-compliant pacemakers, or simply inebriated millennial revelers, because if the pacemakers shut down, the phone system might also, so the ambulance might never come. Unless you live in Brazil or Ukraine, you are used to picking up the telephone or turning on the car phone and automatically getting a dial tone. Happily, you seldom have to concern yourself with the technical details of how the telephone system operates. But it turns out that phone network switches and routers are highly date dependent. All connections are logged to a date and time, which is crucial to calculating call duration for billing. If you happen to make a one-minute call at 11:59:30 on December 31, 1999, and at 12:00:00 the system reads your call as having had a negative duration of more than 99 years, error loops and shutdown are possible. While long-distance companies are spending great sums to upgrade their switches to make them year 2000 compliant, and local service providers presumably are too, if even a few smaller companies fail to comply and go down, the whole network could be affected. You will be lucky to get a dial tone on January 1, 2000.
In the words of the Y2K expert Peter de Jager, “If we lose the ability to make a phone call, then we lose everything. We lose electronic fund transfers, we lose trading, we lose branch banking.” And the follow-on consequences of Y2K failures could come to more than that.
Today, no one knows how pervasively crucial systems will crash because of the year 2000 problem. Embedded systems that cannot be reprogrammed but must be replaced if nonfunctional on a date-sensitive basis are found in cars, trucks, and buses built after 1976. (Perhaps you won’t be in an accident with vehicles driven by persons with noncompliant pacemakers, because their vehicles might not start.) Embedded systems are also widespread in all types of power plants, water and sewage systems, medical devices, military equipment, aircraft, offshore oil platforms, oil tankers, alarm systems, and elevators. While many assemblies of microprocessors perform no date-sensitive functions, they may nonetheless depend upon a clock, which may be Y2K sensitive, for their internal operations.
29大型主机和 2000 年的定时炸弹MAINFRAMES AND THE Y2K TIME BOMB
Y2K 问题最初成为关注的焦点,主要是政府和大公司的大规模指挥控制系统,涉及到部署在大型计算机上的超高交易量。因为它们在大型机上运行,而大多数软件都是几十年前开发的,基本都不符合要求。所以,彼得·雅格在 20 世纪 90年代首次提出关于 Y2K 的警报时,主要就是针对需要升级的大型多处理器主机的操作系统。雅格先生担心,所有使用着脆弱系统的公司和政府机构,即使在几年前开始了崩溃修补计划,可能也找不到足够多精通 COBOL20的程序员,来完成对日期敏感代码的修补和替换。因为这些问题还没有爆发,而且很多系统的操作者才刚刚开始评估它们的脆弱性,所以,你可以很有把握地预测,大量的大型机系统无法顺利运行到 2000 年。
这无疑是个重大的问题,因为按照现在的经济机构,除了使用计算机处理,没有其他的选择。大多数企业,如果它们的规模大到需要主机来处理业务,那么它们的生存都依赖于交易量,这么大的交易量是 19 世纪的老式文书系统无法管理的。
如果这些企业不得不恢复到使用纸张,那它们只能完成正常交易量的一小部分。
这种程度的业务下跌对收入的冲击,将危及所有公司的生存,除非是资本化程度最高的公司。
几乎所有与钱相关的东西——发票、采购和工资系统,加上库存控制和执行标准——都会被破坏。大量的数据将会丢失,因为计算机遇到 Y2K 问题时,可能会崩溃或喷涌出虚假数据。在某些情况下,如果系统能够立即崩溃,而不是以复合的方式破坏数据,直到发生大规模的故障引起人们的注意,这反而是一件好事。
当一个备份工具把源自 1999 年 4 月 7 日的文件,复制到 2000 年 4 月 1 日的更新系统中时,会发生什么情况?谁也说不准。计算机会不会把一份“1900 年”211 月 4 日的保险单支付收据,理解为该保单已经违约一个世纪,从而使该保单被取消并从文档中被删除?对于那些跨越新千年的贷款,银行和财务公司的计算机是否会要求支付百年的利息?你的银行和经纪公司是否会保留你账户余额的准确记录,并及时为你提供资金证明?这些只能算是千年虫问题给你带来的一些有趣的窘境。
这可能是千年虫问题中最具破坏力的部分。这不是晚发几天工资造成的不方便,而是将会血流成河。 —— 里昂·克柏曼博士(DR.Leon Kappelman)
信息管理协会 2000 年工作小组联合主席在你的关注清单上,最重要的是如果千年虫故障导致电力中断会发生什么。没有电,即使大多数没有受到千年虫影响的系统也无法运行,如你的冰箱、冰柜,甚至是你的热源。千年虫的兼容问题,可能会影响到核电站安全的访问和控制功能。
例如,核设施的工作人员需要佩戴计量检测工具,测量他们在核电站中受到的辐射量。这些工具被定期分析,辐射量的数据会保存在计算机系统中,然后计算机控制着工作人员能够进入核设施。显然,如果计算机发生故障,那么这些精心设计的控制措施,原本旨在确保运行安全和正常维护的,将全部化为泡影。而更严重的是,核管理委员会的一份备忘录指出,许多“与安全无关的,但极为重要的计算机系统,主要是关于核电站的数据库和数据收集”,对日期很敏感。
传统型发电站在千年虫问题面前也非常脆弱。首先,以煤为动力的工厂很容易受到影响,因为把煤运送到锅炉的地面运输系统会出问题。在 1997-1998 年的冬季供暖季节,煤电运营商发现,在某些情况下会被迫减少产量,因为南太平洋和联合太平洋铁路系统合并后,西部煤炭的铁路运输变慢了。问题就在于两家铁路公司使用的计算机控制和调度系统之间不兼容。根据联合太平洋公司发言人的说法,尽管联合太平洋技术公司一直被认为是,开发计算机化运输控制系统的行业领导者,但整合这两个系统却成为了一场“噩梦”。由于编程上的困难,该铁路公司无法准确跟踪货运车辆的移动。联合太平洋公司不能顺利完成与南太平洋公司的合并,这是一个很坏的兆头,说明千年虫逻辑炸弹,对交通、电力和其他经济方面,可能造成什么样的危害。
然而,对电网最大的担忧在于,整个系统都受到敏感的监测和计算机控制,以便将电力从过剩的地区转移到不足的地区。这个过程必须由计算机仔细监控,防止电力浪涌和系统故障。所有电力传输都要记录时间和日期,用来确定供电时长,这点与电话很像。虽然用来连接的是重型的机械继电器,但它们是由计算机控制着。这些计算机对负载平衡至关重要,但它们可能会因为与电话网络相同的原因而失灵。实际上,北美的电力负荷分配控制系统,是通过 T-1 线路和电话微波链接联网的。因此,如果电话网络出现故障,你就知道,电力也会瘫痪。要记住,1998 年 1 月加拿大的经验表明,一旦大面积停电,要让系统重新运行是一个很大的挑战。所以,停电可能会持续很长时间,会很麻烦。
The large-scale command and control systems of government and major corporations that involve high transaction volumes on mainframe computers were the original focus of Y2K concern. Because they operate on big machines for which most software is decades old and mostly noncompliant, the original alarms about Y2K, first sounded by Peter de Jager early in the 1990s, have focused mainly on the need to upgrade operating systems for big, multiprocessing mainframes. Mr. de Jager voiced concern that there might not be enough programmers conversant with COBOL, the old mainframe language, to complete the necessary patches and repairs to date-sensitive code, even if every company and government agency with a vulnerable system had begun a crash program several years ago. Since this has not happened, and many operators of date-sensitive information systems have only just begun to assess their vulnerability, you can predict with a high degree of confidence that many mainframe systems will not be prepared to operate smoothly into the year 2000.
This is certainly a major concern because there is really no alternative to computer processing as the economy is now structured. Most businesses that are large enough to require a mainframe to handle their transactions are dependent upon transaction volumes that could not be managed with old-fashioned nineteenth-century paperwork systems. If such businesses were forced to revert to shuffling paper they could expect to complete only a fraction of their normal transaction volume. The revenue shock from such a drop-off in business would endanger the survival of all but the most highly capitalized companies.
Almost everything related to money—invoicing, purchasing, and payroll systems, plus inventory controls and regulatory compliance—would be fouled up. Huge quantities of data would be lost as computers crash or spew out false data in response to the Y2K problem. In some cases, it would actually prove a blessing if systems crash immediately rather than corrupting their data on a compounding basis until massive malfunction draws attention to the problem. What happens to files when a backup utility copies files originating on 07/04/99 to an update on 01/04/00? Who knows? Will the computer interpret a payment made on January 4, “1900,” for an insurance policy as a signal that the policy has been in default for a century, resulting in a canceled policy that is stricken from the file? Will banks and finance company computers seek to assess a hundred years of interest on loans that span the shift to the new millennium? Will your banks and brokerage firms retain accurate records of your account balances and give you timely access to your funds? These are just some of the interesting quandaries that you will confront because of the Y2K problem.
“This is potentially the most destructive part of the year 2000 problem. This isn’t the inconvenience part where your paycheck comes a few days late. This is the blood-in-the-streets part.” —DR. LEON KAPPELMAN, CO-CHAIR, SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT’S YEAR 2000 WORKING GROUP
Also high on your list of concerns should be what happens if the electricity goes off because of Y2K-related malfunctions. Without electricity, even most systems that are not Y2K-impaired will not function: your refrigerator, your freezer, perhaps even your source of heat. Y2K compliance issues could effect safety-related access and control functions at nuclear power plants. For example, personnel at nuclear facilities wear dosimetry devices that measure the amount of radiation exposure they receive while in the plant. These devices are analyzed regularly, with the data on exposure amounts maintained on a computer system that controls personnel access to the facility. Obviously, if the controlling computers fail, they will make a hash of all the elaborate controls designed to insure safe operation and guarantee proper maintenance. But, more importantly, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission memo notes that many “non-safety-related, but important computer-based systems, primarily databases and data collection necessary for plant operations,” are date sensitive.
The conventional generating plants are not less vulnerable to Y2K disruption. For one thing, coal-powered plants are susceptible to disruptions in the surface transportation system that brings the coal to the boilers. In the 1997-1998 winter heating season, operators of coal-fired electricity generation found themselves forced to reduce output in some instances because of a slowdown in rail deliveries of Western coal arising from the merger of the Southern Pacific and Union Pacific railway systems. The problem arose because of incompatibilities between the computer control and dispatch systems employed by the two railroads. According to a Union Pacific spokesman, integrating the two systems became a “nightmare,” in spite of the fact that Union Pacific Technologies has been considered an industry leader in developing computerized transportation control systems. As a result of the programming difficulties, the railroad was unable to accurately track the movements of its freight cars. The failure of Union Pacific to master the assimilation of Southern Pacific is a bad omen about what could happen when Y2K logic time bombs disrupt transportation, power generation, and other aspects of the economy.
The biggest worry about the electric grid, however, arises from the fact that the whole system is subject to sensitive monitoring and computer control to transfer electricity from areas of surplus generation to those with a deficit. This process must be carefully monitored by computer to prevent power surges and system failures. All the transfers of electricity are logged to time and date for duration, much like a telephone connection. While heavy-duty mechanical relays are used to make the connections, they are controlled by computer systems. These computer controls, essential for load balancing, may fail for the same reasons as the phone networks. In fact, the power load distribution-control systems in North America are networked together through T-1 lines and telephone microwave links. So if the phone network fails, you can expect the electricity to go down as well. And remember, as the experience in Canada in January 1998 confirms, once the electricity shuts down over a wide area, getting the system running again is a challenge. A blackout may last for an inconveniently long time.
30千年虫与核武库Y2K AND THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL
对于现代经济体来说,寒冬时节停电会造成很大的破坏,并有可能威胁到健康,特别是对那些依赖电热源和医疗设备的人。但是,最坏的情况可能比这还要糟。
据克林顿总统的 Y2K 转换委员会的负责人约翰·科斯基宁说,美国的军事武器库可能会在 1999 年 12 月 31 日午夜时分停止运作。虽然科斯基宁表示他不希望引起不必要的恐慌,但他补充说,“有些事需要担心。”关于核导弹,需要担心的是,“如果数据出问题,它们真的会爆炸。”当然,这种担忧同样或更加适用于俄罗斯的核导弹。破产的俄罗斯,要把系统升级到符合 2000 的要求,比美国更难。而且有证据表明,俄罗斯还没有认真对待Y2K 的转换问题。虽然人们会祈祷不要发生意外发射,但毫无疑问,2000 年之交很可能会加剧全球的不稳定风险,原因很简单,就是很多国家的军事通信系统可能无法正常运作。就像科斯基宁所说:“如果你正在某个国家里坐着,突然间你搞不清到底发生了什么,而且你的通讯方式也都失灵了,你会更加紧张。”因此,这一点也应该列入你的千年虫顾虑清单。逻辑定时炸弹可能导致真正的炸弹被发射,这一事实,突出了信息战对中央指挥控制系统的威胁。
如果恐怖分子想攻击任何中央系统,他们很可能会选择在 1999 年 12 月 31 日行动,因为这是各种系统最脆弱的时候。不仅通信系统最紧张,还有可能出现电力故障,车辆无法启动,警察、救援和救护车、911 服务无法工作,等等。而且,很多你现在觉得是理所当然的功能,如空中交通管制,可能都会停止运转。没电意味着没水;污水处理系统会停工;交通灯会熄灭。在交通系统崩溃后的几个小时内,超市的食物会被买光(或抢光)。根据美国城市的最近经验,你可以认为,没有点,没有水,很多人没有暖气,没有灯光,以及与紧急服务相关的部分通讯,包括警察和救援,所有这些加起来就等于没有了人类文明。虽然没有人能确定Y2K 问题的影响究竟有多大,但它可能导致街头抢劫和暴乱,特别是如果人们得知,大范围的工资、福利和养老金都将无法发放。
我们不再是旧日的自己,而是开始成为新的样子。 —— 菲奥雷的约阿希姆(JOACHIM DE FIORE)
关于新千年的不详预感,并不一定完全来自于和基督教信仰相关的神学,但它确实落在菲奥雷的约阿希姆22的千年传说之中。约阿希姆的沉思使他相信,基督只是“历史的第二中枢”,而另外一个中枢也注定要打开。哲学家迈克尔·格罗索(Michael Grosso)也持同样的看法,他认为,信息革命正在引导人类的历史,朝着实现西方世界预言的愿景前进;他称之为“科技启示”。不管技术的发展有没有受到千年愿景的影响,千年虫问题,都是西方主流关于时间想象的一个产物。它以一种怪异的方式,补充了人类关于末日的梦境、遐想和幻觉,或者是对幻觉的数字解释,就像牛顿对但以理预言的润色。
这些直觉上的跳跃,始于一种特定的视角,就是把基督的诞生看作是历史的中心。
还有超级整数23的心理暗示作用;所有的股票交易员都知道,超级整数有别具一格的影响。这些因素叠加在一起,使得第二个千年,必然成为拥有直觉的人们的想象焦点。
一个批评者很容易指出上述预言的愚蠢之处,他甚至都不用攻击天启和最后审判之类的神学概念,这些概念赋予了预言强大的力量,但是它们含糊不清、充满争议。有意思的是,计算机超越了千年虫问题,没有发生大规模的故障24。不然的话,就是在基督教自身的框架内,也有证据可以降低 2000 年的重要性。2000 年被认为可能成为下一历史阶段的拐点,只是因为它把新千年的到来错误提前了。严格来说,下一个千年要到 2001 年才开始。
公元 2000 年只是 20 世纪的最后一年,是耶稣诞生后的第两千年。如果耶稣是诞生在基督教时代的第一年,那么也没错;但是他没有。公元 533 年,耶稣的诞辰取代了罗马建国的日子,成为西历纪年的基础。当时引入这套新惯例的僧侣,把耶稣的生日算错了。现在人们认为,耶稣实际上诞生于公元前 4 年;照这么算的话,他出生后的整 2000 年,应该是在公元 1997 年的某个时候。因此,卡尔·荣格为新时代的开始,设置了一个与众不同的日期。25
如果你觉得好笑的话,不妨一笑;不过,我们并不鄙视或者否定对历史的直觉。
虽然我们的论点建立在逻辑上,而不是遐想中;但是我们对人类意识的预言能力感到震惊。一次又一次,它救赎了疯子、灵媒或圣人的幻觉。2000 年的这次转变可能也会如此。这个长期固定在西方人想象中的日期,可能就是那个宿命的转折点。至少有一半的人确信,历史自有定数。我们无法解释为什么会这样,但我们相信它确实如此。
我们的直觉是,历史自有定数;而自由意志和决定论只是一体两面,同一现象的两个版本。人类的互动塑造了历史,但是他们的表现又好像宿命使然。就像电子等离子体,是一种电子浓度很高的气体,它表现出来的就是一个复杂的系统,人类也是这样。电子个体的自由运动,和高度组织化的集体行为是互相兼容的。就像大卫·博姆(David Bohm)对电子等离子体的描述,人类历史是“作为一个整体在行动的、高度组织化的系统”。
要理解世界的运作方式,就要对人类社会如何服从自然演进中的数学运算,形成一种现实的直觉。和大部分人所期望的不同,现实是非线性的。要理解变化的动力,你必须认识到,人类社会和自然界的其他复杂系统一样,具有周期性和不连续性。历史的某些特征有重复的趋势,但是那些最重要的变化,当它们发生的时候,往往是突然的而不是渐进的。
在人类生活的各种周期中,有一个神秘的五百年周期,好像标志着西方文明史上的重大转折。随着 2000 年的到来,我们被一件怪事所困扰,那就是每一个能被5 整除的世纪,它的最后十年都意味着西方文明的深刻转型。就像生和死划定了人类的世代,这种衰亡和重生的模式;代表着社会组织的阶段更新。至少从公元前 500 年开始,就是如此。公元前 508 年,随着克里斯提尼的宪法改革,希腊的民主制度登上历史舞台。随后的 5 个世纪,是古代经济增长和强化的时期,到公元前 4 年,耶稣诞生的时候,达到了顶点。
在接下来的 500 年里,繁荣衰退,导致罗马帝国在公元 5 世纪末崩溃。威廉·普莱费尔对此的总结值得重温,“罗马最伟大的时刻……当属基督降生时;而同时它也开始逐渐衰落,直到 490 年。”就在那一年,最后一个罗马军团被解散,西方世界陷入了黑暗时代。
随后的五个世纪里,经济萎缩,长途贸易停滞不前,城市人口下降,流通中的货币不断减少,艺术和文化几乎完全消失。西罗马帝国的崩溃,使曾经可以有效解决争端的法律,逐渐被更原始的方式所取代。报血仇的现象,从五世纪末开始明显增多。而第一次有记录的神明审判,就刚好发生在公元 500 年。
历史来到一千年前,第十世纪的最后十年,又一次见证了“社会和经济体系的巨大动荡”。在这些年发生的变革中,最不为当时人们所知的,当属封建革命,它萌芽于一个经济和政治完全混乱的时期。巴黎大学的中世纪史教授居伊·布瓦(Guy Bois),在他的《第一个千年的变革》(The Transformation of the Year One Thousand)中写到,十世纪末的这次大断裂,使古代制度的残余彻底崩盘,然后在无政府的状态中,催生出了一种新事物,那就是封建主义。用劳尔·格拉伯(Raoul Glaber)的话说,“有人说是整个世界全心一致地抖落掉了古代的破烂。”突然出现的新制度,适应了经济的缓慢复苏。在被我们称为中世纪的 500 年里,货币和国际贸易得到了重生,伴随着算术、识字和时间意识的回归。
然后,在 15 世纪的最后十年,又一个转折点出现了。当时的欧洲,刚刚摆脱黑死病造成的人口赤字,就立即开启了对全球其他地区的征服。这次的转型,将人类社会带入了现代时期;“火药革命”、“文艺复兴”和“宗教改革”等名称,代表了它的不同侧面。查理八世带着全新的青铜大炮,入侵意大利,以一声巨响,宣布了新时代的开幕。这个时代的变革,涉及到一个开放的世界,1492 年哥伦布发现美洲就是它的缩影。对新世界的探索,推动了人类历史上最猛烈的经济增长。
它还涉及到物理学和天文学的革命,催生了现代科学。还有印刷术等新技术的涌现,促进了时代思想的广泛传播。
如今,我们正坐在另外一次千年变革的门槛之上。从工业时代继承下来的大型指挥和控制系统,在千禧年的午夜时分,可能会像古代的马车一样分崩离析。工业社会已经时日无多,不管它是否会在千年虫的逻辑炸弹下立刻崩溃。信息社会的到来将彻底改变世界,这就是本书的主旨。你完全有权利怀疑这一点;毕竟,在一个千年里只重复两次的周期,还没有足够多的迭代数据,使它在统计学上显得令人信服。实际上,即使更短的周期,也会被经济学家们怀疑,要求提供更多能够满足统计学标准的数据。丹尼斯·罗伯逊(Dennis Robertson)教授曾经写道,要确定四年或八到十年贸易周期的存在,“我们最好等上几个世纪。”按照这个标准,罗伯逊教授需要大约三万年,才能确定五百年的周期,是不是统计学上的一种偶然。我们没那么教条,或者说我们更乐意捕捉历史的暗示。我们认识到,现实的发展模式,比大多数经济学家的静态和线性平衡模型,要复杂得多。
我们相信,公元 2000 年,不只是连绵不绝的时间进程中一个明显的分割点,而是旧世界和即将到来的新世界之间的一个拐点。工业社会正快速成为过去,具有讽刺意味的是,它的消亡可能会因为早期计算机昂贵的内存而加速,它迫使人们广泛采用了两位数的日期设置。当 Hallerith 牌打卡机只能容纳 80 个字符时,缩写日期是一个合理的选择。但是,让早期程序员没有想到的是,缩写日期成为了意外的逻辑炸弹,埋伏了 40 年,它对工业社会的威胁持续到千禧年的结束。美国政府预算管理委员会,专门针对这个问题,在 1997 年 2 月 7 日发布了《让联邦计算机为 2000 年做好准备》的报告。委员会的结论是,这些计算机“除非被修复或替换,否则在世纪之交,它们可能会因三种情况而报废:拒绝运行正常条目;计算错误;或者根本不工作。” 这三种结果的结合,会使工业社会无法正常运转。
不管怎样,大规模生产的技术,将注定被一种小型化的新技术所取代,短期内的危机只会加快这一进程。信息技术日新月异,催生出一门新的科学,非线性动力学;它已经发展出来的惊人结论,还只是一些线索,尚未编织成一套系统的世界观。虽然生活在计算机时代,但我们的梦想还在织布机上旋转。我们还依照着工业社会的隐喻和观念在生活,还没有从奇怪吸引子26的角度去想象世界。我们的政治还横跨在左翼和右翼的工业鸿沟之上,而绘制这些意识形态的思想家,如亚当·斯密和马克思,在今天活着的人出生之前就已经去世了。在我们看来,随着世界的转变,工业时代的“常识”,在很多领域都没有用了。
奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒(Oswald Spengler),在 1911 年,对即将到来的世界大战和“西方的没落”产生了一种强烈的直觉。85 年后的今天,我们也预感到“一个阶段性的历史变革正在发生……而且在几百年前就已经注定了27。”和斯宾格勒一样,我们看到西方文明正在衰亡;与之相伴的是,自哥伦布大航海与新世界建立联系以来,主导了过去五个世纪的世界秩序也将崩溃。但与斯宾格勒不同的是,我们相信,在未来的千年里,西方文明将迎来一个崭新的阶段。
另外一种说法,牛顿预言世界将会在 2060 年重置。
译注:埃斯库罗斯(Aeschylus)是古希腊悲剧诗人,常被称为“悲剧之父”。
本书初版写于 1997 年之前。
译注:乌萨马·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)是“基地”组织创始人,后被普遍认定为“9·11”袭击主谋。
译注:“卢德分子”原指 19 世纪初英国反对机械化生产的工人;“新卢德主义”则借此概念批评技术扩张对社会与劳动的冲击。
勃艮第公爵(英文:Dukes of Burgundy)是勃艮第公国统治者的头衔,843年由西法兰克王国的查理二世创立。
译注:马耳他骑士团是历史悠久的天主教骑士团体,今天仍以准主权实体身份存在于国际社会。
现在有 100 多个。
译注:圣安杰洛城堡即罗马的天使城堡,长期兼具堡垒与教廷防御设施功能。
译注:铱星计划是 1990 年代的全球卫星电话网络构想。
译注:尼尔·斯蒂芬森(Neal Stephenson)是美国科幻作家,以《雪崩》提出“元宇宙”概念而闻名。
译注:汉萨同盟是中世纪后期德意志北部诸城市形成的商业联盟。
译注:这里借布加勒斯特指代 1989 年罗马尼亚政权崩溃与东欧剧变中的暴力转折。
译注:这里指 1995 年的俄克拉何马城爆炸案;在“9·11”之前,它被普遍视为美国本土最严重的恐怖袭击之一。
译注:威廉·普莱费尔(William Playfair)是苏格兰工程师与经济学家,也是统计图表的早期推广者。
译注:这里指一部探讨国家由盛转衰机制的 19 世纪历史研究著作。
译注:此处所引论文可在 JSTOR 检索到原文。
译注:莫妮卡·莱温斯基(Monica Lewinsky)曾因与克林顿有关的政治丑闻而广为人知。
译注:The Skin of Our Teeth 是一部以人类文明反复受创又再度延续为主题的戏剧。
译注:COBOL 是一种长期用于商业数据处理的编程语言。
译注:此处应为 2000 年。
译注:菲奥雷的约阿希姆(Joachim of Fiore)是中世纪末以末世论和历史分期思想著称的宗教思想家。
指公元 2000 年。
译注:此处意指 2000 年并没有那么可怕。
在前文中,荣格预言新时代会在 1997 年到来。
译注:strange attractor,通常译作“奇异吸引子”,是非线性动力学中的概念。
斯宾格勒语。
For modern economies to have the electricity turn off in the dead of winter would be disruptive and potentially health threatening, especially for those who depend upon electric heat and medical equipment. Yet the worst case scenario is even worse. According to John Koskinen, who heads President Clinton’s Y2K Conversion Council, U.S. military arsenals may cease to function on the stroke of midnight, December 31, 1999. While indicating that he does not wish to touch off undue alarm, Koskinen adds, “It needs to be worried about.” One concern about nuclear missiles “is if the data doesn’t function and they actually go off.”
Of course, this concern would apply with equal or greater force to Russian nuclear missiles. Russia’s bankruptcy has made upgrades for Y2K compliance even more problematic than in the United States. And there is evidence that Russia is not yet taking Y2K conversion seriously. While one would pray that no accidental launches would occur, there should be little doubt that the turn of the year 2000 has a potential for aggravating global insecurity if for no other reason than that military communications systems in many countries may not function normally. As Koskinen puts it, “If you’re sitting in a country and suddenly you can’t quite figure out exactly what’s happening, and your communications don’t work as well, you get even more nervous.” So put that on your list of Y2K worries. The logic time bomb could precipitate the launch of genuinely explosive bombs—a fact that highlights the danger from information warfare to centralized command and control systems.
If terrorists wish to strike any centralized system, they may pick December 31, 1999, as the date for action because it will be a time of maximum vulnerability of many systems. Not only will communications be strained at best, with the possibility that electricity may fail, vehicles may not start, police, fire, and ambulance 911 service may not work, and so on, but many other functions you probably take for granted, such as air traffic control, may cease to function. No power means no water from the tap. Sewage systems would fail. Traffic lights could turn off. Within a few hours of a genuine breakdown in the transportation system, food in grocery stores would be shopped out. (Or looted.) On the basis of recent experience in American cities, you could suppose that no power, no water, no heat for many, no light, and fragmented communications with emergency services, including police and fire, all add up to no civilization. While no one can be sure what the impact of the Y2K problem may be, it could extend to looting and rioting in the streets, especially if it becomes known that there could be widespread failures to issue payroll, welfare and pension checks.
“We shall not be what we have been, but we shall begin to be other.”20 —JOACHIM DE FIORE
Premonitions of doom about the new millennium do not necessarily rest upon theology tied to the Christian faith, but they do fit within the millennial tradition of Joachim de Fiore whose mediations convinced him that Christ was only “the second hinge of history” and that another was destined to unfold.”21 So argues the philosopher Michael Grosso, who suggests that the Information Revolution is piloting human history toward the realization of the prophetic vision of the Western world. He calls this “technocalypse.” Whether or not the development of technology is somehow informed by millennial visions, the Y2K phenomenon is an artifact of the predominant Western imagination of time. In a strange way, it could complement dreams, reveries and visions, or numerical interpretations of visions, like Newton’s gloss on the prophecies of Daniel. These intuitive leaps begin with a perspective that takes the birth of Christ to be the central fact of history. They are compounded by the psychological power of large round numbers, which every trader will recognize as having an arresting quality. The two thousandth year of our epoch cannot help but become a focus for the imagination of intuitive people.
A critic could easily make these premonitions seem silly, without even addressing the ambiguous and debatable theological notions of the Apocalypse and the Last Judgment that give these visions so much of their power. Interestingly, however, the Y2K computer glitch trumps the errors of arithmetic that otherwise might seem to devalue the importance of the year 2000 even within the Christian framework. The year 2000 has the potential to become an inflection point for the next stage of history simply because it brings forward the arrival of the new millennium. In strict logic, the next millennium will not begin until 2001. The year 2000 will be only the last year of the twentieth century, the two thousandth year since Christ’s birth. Or it would be had Christ been born in the first year of the Christian era. He was not. In 533, when Christ’s birth replaced the founding date of Rome as the basis for calculating years according to the Western calendar, the monks who introduced the new convention miscalculated Christ’s birth. It is now accepted that he was born in 4 B.C. On that basis, a full two thousand years since his birth were completed sometime in 1997. Hence Carl Jung’s apparently odd launch date for the start of a New Age.
Giggle if you will, but we do not despise or dismiss intuitive understandings of history. Although our argument is grounded in logic, not in reveries, we are awed by the prophetic power of human consciousness. Time after time, it redeems the visions of madmen, psychics, and saints. So it may be with the transformation of the year 2000. The date that has long been fixed in the imagination of the West looks to be the inflection point that at least half confirms that history has a destiny. We cannot explain why this should be, but nonetheless we are convinced that it is so.
Our intuition is that history has a destiny, and that free will and determinism are two versions of the same phenomenon. The human interactions that form history behave as though they were informed by a kind of destiny. Just as an electron plasma, a dense gas of electrons, behaves as a complex system, so do human beings. The freedom of individual movement by the electrons turns out to be compatible with highly organized collective behavior. As David Bohm said of an electron plasma, human history is “a highly organized system which behaves as a whole.”
Understanding the way the world works means developing a realistic intuition of the way that human society obeys the mathematics of natural processes. Reality is nonlinear. But most people’s expectations are not. To understand the dynamics of change, you have to recognize that human society, like other complex systems in nature, is characterized by cycles and discontinuities. That means certain features of history have a tendency to repeat themselves, and the most important changes, when they occur, may be abrupt rather than gradual.
Among the cycles that permeate human life, a mysterious five-hundred-year cycle appears to mark major turning points in the history of Western civilization. As the year 2000 approaches, we are haunted by the strange fact that the final decade of each century divisible by five has marked a profound transition in Western civilization, a pattern of death and rebirth that marks new phases of social organization in much the way that death and birth delineate the cycle of human generations. This has been true since at least 500 B.C., when Greek democracy emerged with the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. The following five centuries were a period of growth and intensification of the ancient economy, culminating in the birth of Christ in 4 B.C. This was also the time of the greatest prosperity of the ancient economy, when interest rates reached their lowest level prior to the modern period.
The next five centuries saw a gradual winding down of prosperity, leading to the collapse of the Roman Empire late in the fifth century A.D. William Playfair’s summary is worth repeating: “When Rome was at its highest pitch of greatness … will be seen to be at the birth of Christ, that is, during the reign of Augustus, and by the same means it will be found declining gradually till the year 490.”22 It was then that the last legions dissolved, and the Western world sank into the Dark Ages.
During the following five centuries, the economy withered, long-distance trade ground to a halt, cities were depopulated, money vanished from circulation, and art and literacy almost disappeared. The disappearance of effective law with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West led to the emergence of more primitive arrangements for settling disputes. The blood feud began to be significant at the end of the fifth century. The first recorded incident of trial by ordeal occurred precisely in the year 500.
Once again, a thousand years ago, the final decade of the tenth century witnessed another “tremendous upheaval in social and economic systems.” Perhaps the least known of these transitions, the feudal revolution, began at a time of utter economic and political turmoil. In The Transformation of the Year One Thousand, Guy Bois, a professor of medieval history at the University of Paris, claims that this rupture at the end of the tenth century involved the complete collapse of the remnants of ancient institutions, and the emergence of something new out of the anarchy—feudalism.23 In the words of Raoul Glaber, “It was said that the whole world, with one accord, shook off the tatters of antiquity.”24 The new system that suddenly emerged accommodated the slow revival of economic growth. The five centuries now known as the Middle Ages saw a rebirth of money and international trade, along with the rediscovery of arithmetic, literacy, and time awareness.
Then, in the final decade of the fifteenth century, there was yet another turning point. It was then that Europe emerged from the demographic deficit caused by the Black Death and almost immediately began to assert dominion over the rest of the globe. The “Gunpowder Revolution,” the “Renaissance,” and the “Reformation” are names given to different aspects of this transition that ushered in the Modern Age. It was announced with a bang when Charles VIII invaded Italy with new bronze cannon. It involved an opening to the world, epitomized by Columbus sailing to America in 1492. This opening to the New World launched a push toward the most dramatic economic growth in the experience of humanity. It involved a transformation of physics and astronomy that led to the creation of modern science. And its ideas were disseminated widely with the new technology of the printing press.
Now we sit at the threshold of another millennial transformation. The large command and control systems inherited from the Industrial Era may break down like the one-horse shay on the stroke of the millennial midnight. Yet whether or not the Y2K logic bomb precipitates an immediate collapse of industrial society, its days are numbered. We expect the advent of the Information Society to utterly transform the world, in ways that this book is meant to explain. You would be perfectly within your rights to doubt this, since no cycle that repeats itself only twice in a millennium has demonstrated enough iterations to be statistically significant. Indeed, even much shorter cycles have been viewed skeptically by economists demanding more statistically satisfying proof. “Professor Dennis Robertson once wrote that we had better wait a few centuries before being sure” about the existence of four-year and eight- to ten-year trade cycles.25 By that standard, Professor Robertson would have to suspend judgment for about thirty thousand years to be sure that the five-hundred-year cycle is not a statistical fluke. We are less dogmatic, or more willing to take a hint. We recognize that the patterns of reality are more complex than the static- and linear-equilibrium models of most economists.
We believe that the coming of the year 2000 marks more than another convenient division along an endless continuum of time. We believe it will be an inflection point between the Old World and a New World to come. The Industrial Age is rapidly passing, and its demise may, ironically, be accelerated by the fact that early computer memory was so expensive that it encouraged the widespread adoption of two-digit date fields. When Hallerith punch cards could accommodate only eighty characters each, abbreviating dates seemed a prudent thing to do. Contrary to the expectations of the early programmers, however, their abbreviation of the date field endured four decades until the end of the millennium as an accidental logic bomb that could destroy a large part of Industrial society. The U.S. government’s Office of Management and Budget described the problem in “Getting Federal Computers Ready for 2000,” a report dated February 7, 1997. The OMB concludes of computers: “Unless they are fixed or replaced, they will fail at the turn of the century in one of three ways: they will reject legitimate entries, or they will compute erroneous results, or they simply will not run.” These three outcomes in combination could cripple Industrial society. Its technology of mass production is destined to be eclipsed by a new technology of miniaturization in any event. A near-term crisis will merely accelerate the process. With the new information technology has come a new science of nonlinear dynamics, one whose startling conclusions are mere strands that have yet to be woven together into a comprehensive worldview. We live in the time of the computer, but our dreams are still spun on the loom. We continue to live by the metaphors and thoughts of industrialism. We don’t yet imagine the world in terms of strange attractors. Our politics still straddles the industrial divide between right and left, as mapped by thinkers like Adam Smith and Karl Marx, who died before almost everyone now living was born.II The industrial worldview, incorporating the operating principles of industrial science, is still the “commonsense” intuition of educated opinion. It is our thesis that the “common sense” of the Industrial Age will no longer apply to many areas as the world is transformed.
More than eighty-five years after the day in 1911 when Oswald Spengler was seized with an intuition of a coming world war and “the decline of the West,” we, too, see “a historical change of phase occurring… at the point preordained for it hundreds of years ago.”26 Like Spengler, we see the impending death of Western civilization, and with it the collapse of the world order that has predominated these past five centuries, ever since Columbus sailed west to open contact with the New World. Yet unlike Spengler we see the birth of a new stage in Western civilization in the coming millennium.
I. Nomenklaturas are the entrenched elites that ruled the former Soviet Union and other state-run economies.
II. Adam Smith died in 1790, Karl Marx in 1883.