BILINGUAL READING · 第02章
历史视野下的大政治变革
CHAPTER 2 MEGAPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。
导读 本章论证
- 制度并不只由观念和政治意志塑造,也受更底层的物理与技术条件约束。
- 大政治的四个变量是地形、气候、微生物和技术。
- 分析关键是:在特定条件下,攻击、防御、掠夺和保护各自需要多大成本、能获得多少回报。
01开篇Opening
在历史上,如同在自然界中,生与死是同样平衡的。 —— 约翰·惠泽加(JOHAN HUIZINGA)
“In history, as in nature, birth and death are equally balanced.”1 —JOHAN HUIZINGA
02现代世界的没落THE WANING OF THE MODERN WORLD
在我们看来,你们正在亲眼目睹现代时期的衰亡;驱动它的是一种无情且隐蔽的逻辑。人们普遍还没有认识到,CNN 电视和报纸更没有告诉你们,下一个千年将不再是“现代”。我们这么说,并不是想暗示未来是野蛮或落后的,虽然这种可能性很大;我们是想强调,现在开启的历史阶段与你出生时的阶段,有本质的不同。
变革正在到来。正如农业社会和狩猎采集的部落大相径庭,工业社会与封建社会或自耕农体系有天壤之别,即将到来的新世界,与旧世界的一切也天差地别。
在新的千年里,政治和经济不会再像近代的几个世纪那样,组织规模庞大,笼罩在民族国家的统治之下。给你带来了世界大战、流水线、社保、所得税、除臭剂和烤面包机的文明,正在走向死亡。除臭剂和烤面包机可能还有机会幸存,其他的就没戏了。就像一个古代的强人,民族国家的倒计时以年和日为单位,而不是以世纪或年代为单位。
政府管理和强制的权力,已经大大丧失。共产主义的崩溃,标志着一个长达五世纪的周期的结束;在该周期中,政府权力的规模压倒了组织的效率。那是个暴力回报率很高且不断上升的时期,现在不是了。在世界史的维度,一个阶段性的转变正在开始。实际上,在下一个千年,当未来的吉本(历史学家)编著“曾经的现代时期”的衰亡史时,他可能会宣布,在你读到我们这本书的时候,这个时期就已经结束了。他可能会像我们一样认为,回首往昔,现代时期终结于 1989 年柏林墙的倒塌,或者说是 1991 年苏联的灭亡。这两者中的任何一件,都可以作为文明演进中的代表性事件,定义我们所知的“现代时期”的结束。
人类历史的第四阶段正呼之欲出,而它最难预测的部分,可能是它的称呼。你可以叫它“后现代”、“网络社会”或“信息时代”,或者你自己起一个名字。没人会知道,这个新的历史阶段,会被贴上一个什么样的概念或绰号。
我们甚至也不知道,这刚刚过去的五百年,在以后是不是还会被继续称作“现代”。
如果未来的历史学家理解词语的引申含义的话,可能就不会这么叫了。它更贴切的名称,应该是“国家时代”或者“暴力时代”。但是,这样的称谓,不符合目前定义历史时代的时间谱系。根据《牛津英语词典》的解释,“现代”是关于现在或近代,区别于遥远的过去;在历史应用中,通常是指中世纪以后的时期。
西方人只有发现中世纪已经结束了,他们才有可能意识到自己是“现代人”。在公元 1500 年之前,没有人会认为,封建时代是西方文明的“中间”阶段,是中世纪。道理很明显:一个时代被认为是夹在两个时代中间,如果这么说没错的话,那么在此之前,这个时代肯定已经结束了。那些生活在封建时代的人,不可能想象到,自己是活在古代文明和现代文明的中间阶段;直到他们意识到,不仅中世纪已经结束,而且中世纪文明与黑暗时代或古代文明,有很大的不同。
人类的文化中存在着盲点。关于生活的最大边界的变化,尤其是发生在我们身上的,我们没有相应的词汇去描述。自从摩西时代以来,已经发生了很多剧变,但只有少数异端人士殚精竭虑,思考了人类文明从一个阶段到另一个阶段的转型是怎么发生的。它们是怎么被触发的?它们有什么共同点?有哪些模式可以帮助你判断,它们何时发生、何时结束?英国或美国什么时候会走到尽头?这些问题,你很难通过常规的思维找到答案。
In our view, you are witnessing nothing less than the waning of the Modern Age. It is a development driven by a ruthless but hidden logic. More than we commonly understand, more than CNN and the newspapers tell us, the next millennium will no longer be “modern.” We say this not to imply that you face a savage or backward future, although that is possible, but to emphasize that the stage of history now opening will be qualitatively different from that into which you were born.
Something new is coming. Just as farming societies differed in kind from hunting-and-gathering bands, and industrial societies differed radically from feudal or yeoman agricultural systems, so the New World to come will mark a radical departure from anything seen before.
In the new millennium, economic and political life will no longer be organized on a gigantic scale under the domination of the nation-state as it was during the modern centuries. The civilization that brought you world war, the assembly line, social security, income tax, deodorant, and the toaster oven is dying. Deodorant and the toaster oven may survive. The others won’t. Like an ancient and once mighty man, the nation-state has a future numbered in years and days, and no longer in centuries and decades.
Governments have already lost much of their power to regulate and compel. The collapse of Communism marked the end of a long cycle of five centuries during which magnitude of power overwhelmed efficiency in the organization of government. It was a time when the returns to violence were high and rising. They no longer are. A phase transition of world-historic dimensions has already begun. Indeed, the future Gibbon who chronicles the decline and fall of the once-Modern Age in the next millennium may declare that it had already ended by the time you read this book. Looking back, he may say, as we do, that it ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Or with the death of the Soviet Union in 1991. Either date could come to stand as a defining event in the evolution of civilization, the end of what we now know as the Modern Age.
The fourth stage of human development is coming, and perhaps its least predictable feature is the new name under which it will be known. Call it “Post-Modern.” Call it the “Cyber Society” or the “Information Age.” Or make up your own name. No one knows what conceptual glue will stick a nickname to the next phase of history.
We do not even know that the five-hundred-year stretch of history just ending will continue to be thought of as “modern.” If future historians know anything about word derivations, it will not be. A more descriptive title might be “The Age of the State” or “The Age of Violence.” But such a name would fall outside the temporal spectrum that currently defines the epochs of history. “Modern,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary, means “pertaining to the present and recent times, as distinguished from the remote past.… In historical use commonly applied (in contradiction to ancient and medieval) to the time subsequent to the MIDDLE AGES.”2
Western people consciously thought of themselves as “modern” only when they came to understand that the medieval period was over. Before 1500, no one had ever thought of the feudal centuries as a “middle” period in Western civilization. The reason is obvious upon reflection: before an age can reasonably be seen as sandwiched in the “middle” of two other historic epochs, it must have already come to an end. Those living during the feudal centuries could not have imagined themselves as living in a halfway house between antiquity and modern civilization until it dawned on them not just that the medieval period was over, but also that medieval civilization differed dramatically from that of the Dark Ages or antiquity.3
Human cultures have blind spots. We have no vocabulary to describe paradigm changes in the largest boundaries of life, especially those happening around us. Notwithstanding the many dramatic changes that have unfolded since the time of Moses, only a few heretics have bothered to think about how the transitions from one phase of civilization to another actually unfold.
How are they triggered? What do they have in common? What patterns can help you tell when they begin and know when they are over? When will Great Britain or the United States come to an end? These are questions for which you would be hard-pressed to find conventional answers.
03预言未来是人类文化的禁忌The Taboo on Foresight
从既有系统的外面看问题,就像一个舞台工作人员试图和剧中人强行对话一样,它违反了那些保持系统运作的惯例。每一种社会秩序,都含有一个重要的禁忌,那就是,生活在其中的人不能思考该秩序将如何结束,以及取而代之的新秩序应该使用什么规则。隐藏的含义就是,不管既存的是什么系统,它都是最后的或唯一的系统,将永世不衰,万寿无疆。这话说得有点直白。读过历史的人,如果在书中看到这样的观点,恐怕很少有谁会认为这种假设是现实的。然而,这就是统治世界的传统。每一种社会体系,不管它对权力的掌控有多强,或者多弱,都会装出一副千秋万代、永不可能被取代的样子。它们一言九鼎,或者定于一尊。原始人认为,他们的系统,就是组织人类生活的唯一可能。经济上更加复杂的系统,也具有了一定的历史感,往往会把自己置于人类发展的顶点。无论是紫禁城里的中国官吏,还是克里姆林宫里的马克思主义干部,或者是华盛顿的众议院议员,当权者要么根本无视历史,要么认为自己登上了历史的巅峰,相比既往的众生以及未来的先锋,他都要更加优越。
出于实际的考虑,这么做也没错。一个体系越是明显地接近尾声,人们就越不愿意遵守它的法律。所以,任何社会组织,都会倾向去阻止或淡化那些预测它灭亡的分析。仅仅这一点就确保了,当重大的历史变革正在发生时,很少有人能够注意到。如果你对未来一无所知,那你可以放心,即使剧变当前,正统的思想家们也会视而不见,更不会通知你。
你不可能依靠传统的信息源,等待它们向你发出客观和及时的警告,告诉你世界将如何变化,以及为什么会变。如果你想知道当下正在发生什么,除了自己去弄清楚,基本没有别的选择。
To see “outside” an existing system is like being a stagehand trying to force a dialogue with a character in a play. It breaches a convention that helps keep the system functioning. Every social order incorporates among its key taboos the notion that people living in it should not think about how it will end and what rules may prevail in the new system that takes its place. Implicitly, whatever system exists is the last or the only system that will ever exist. Not that this is so baldly stated. Few who have ever read a history book would find such an assumption realistic if it was articulated. Nonetheless, that is the convention that rules the world. Every social system, however strongly or weakly it clings to power, pretends that its rules will never be superseded. They are the last word. Or perhaps the only word. Primitives assume that theirs is the only possible way of organizing life. More economically complicated systems that incorporate a sense of history usually place themselves at its apex. Whether they are Chinese mandarins in the court of the emperor, the Marxist nomenklatura in Stalin’s Kremlin, or members of the House of Representatives in Washington, the powers-that-be either imagine no history at all or place themselves at the pinnacle of history, in a superior position compared to everyone who came before, and the vanguard of anything to come.
This is true for practical reasons. The more apparent it is that a system is nearing an end, the more reluctant people will be to adhere to its laws. Any social organization will therefore tend to discourage or play down analyses that anticipate its demise. This alone helps ensure that history’s great transitions are seldom spotted as they happen. If you know nothing else about the future, you can rest assured that dramatic changes will be neither welcomed nor advertised by conventional thinkers.
You cannot depend upon conventional information sources to give you an objective and timely warning about how the world is changing and why. If you wish to understand the great transition now under way, you have little choice but to figure it out for yourself.
04超越显而易见Beyond the Obvious
这意味着你要有能力穿越显见的事实。历史记录表明,即使是那些事后看来真实确凿、无可否认的变革,在它发生后的几十年甚至几个世纪内,都不被人们接受和承认。想一下罗马的衰亡,这可能是基督教时代第一个千年里最重要的历史进程。但是,在罗马灭亡后很长一段时间内,关于它仍然幸存的虚构故事,还在不断地向公众散布,就像经过防腐处理的列宁的尸体。那些对“新闻”的理解建立在官员的糊弄之上的人,要等到很久以后,当那些信息与现实已毫不相干,他们才会了解罗马已不复存在。
之所以会这样,不仅仅是因为古代的通讯不够发达。即使 CNN 能够奇迹般地在古罗马开展业务,在公元 476 年的 9 月,用录像带记录下一切,情况也好不到哪里去。当时,西罗马的末代皇帝,罗慕路斯·奥古斯都在拉文纳被俘,被迫退居到坎帕尼亚的一栋别墅里,在那里领着奉养金。即使沃尔夫·布里泽1在 476 年用微型摄像机记录了这一历史事件,但要把它定性为罗马帝国结束的标志,不管是布里泽还是其他人,恐怕都不敢这么说。然则,后世的历史学家正是这么定性的。
CNN 的编辑应该也不会批准一个头条新闻说,“罗马亡于今夜”。当时掌权的人,不会承认罗马已经灭亡。兜售“新闻”的人,基本不会陷入到可能损害自身利益的争论中。他们也许是偏颇的,甚至极度偏颇,但一般不会发出可能导致读者取消订阅的报道。这就是为什么,即使在技术上有可能,也不会有什么人报道罗马的灭亡。专家们会站出来说,声称罗马已经灭亡,简直荒唐可笑。如果不附和这样的说法,就会对生意不利,或者对报道者的健康不利。毕竟,在五世纪的罗马,掌权者是野蛮人,他们不认为罗马已死。
这不仅因为当局会威胁,“不要报道,否则我们就杀了你。”还有部分原因是,在五世纪的后期,罗马已经堕落不堪、腐烂透顶,以致于当时活着的人对它的“衰落”根本没有感觉。事实上,过了一代人之后,马尔切利努斯伯爵(Count Marcellinus)才首次提出,“西罗马帝国和这位奥古斯都一起灭亡了。”又过了几十年,也许几个世纪,人们才普遍承认,西罗马帝国已经彻底作古了。当然了,查理曼大帝在公元 800 年的时候,还认为他是合法的罗马皇帝。
重点并不在于说,查理曼大帝和所有在 476 年之后还以传统思维理解罗马帝国的人都是蠢货。恰恰相反。对历史发展的定性经常是模糊的。当主导性制度的权力被卷入其中,用来强化某个方便而有利的结论时,即使这个结论是基于伪装和糊弄,也只有少数性格刚硬、观念强烈的人,才敢站出来反驳。把你自己放到五世纪末罗马人的位置上,就很容易想象到,一个“啥都没变”的结论更加诱人;这种态度还很乐观。如果不这么想,那感觉就很可怕了。既然一个让人岁月静好的结论就在眼前,为什么还要自讨苦吃,做出一个令人恐惧的推论呢?毕竟,有一点会被人们拿出来证明,一切事务还在照常进行。过去的人也这么做过。那就是罗马的军队,特别是边境驻军,几个世纪以来就处于野蛮化的状态。
到公元 3 世纪,军队宣告新皇登基已经是很常规的操作。到 4 世纪,甚至军官都日耳曼化了,而且大部分是文盲。在罗慕路斯·奥古斯都被赶下皇位之前,暴力推翻皇权的事,已发生过很多次。那是个混乱的年代,在罗慕路斯的同代人看来,他的下台和其他的动乱并没什么不同;而且他是带着奉养金离开的。就是他领奉养金这件事,让人们觉得整个体系还依然健在,虽然他领了没多久就被杀死了。
在一个乐观主义者看来,废黜罗慕路斯·奥古斯都的奥多亚塞,并没有摧毁罗马帝国,而是重新统一了它。身为阿提拉的随从艾德康的儿子,奥多亚塞是一个聪明人。他没有自宣为王,而是召集了元老院,说服了言听计从的元老院成员,将皇帝职位及整个帝国的主权,交给远在拜占庭的东罗马皇帝芝诺,他自己则只以芝诺麾下“帕特里修斯”的身份代治意大利。
正如威尔·杜兰特2(Will Durant)在《文明的故事》3(The Story of Civilization)中写道,这些变化似乎算不上是“罗马的衰亡”,而只是“国家舞台上微不足道的表面变化”。当罗马衰落时,奥多亚瑟说,罗马经久不衰。和几乎所有人一样,他热衷于假装什么都没变,一如既往。他们知道,“罗马的荣耀”远比取而代之的野蛮人的好,野蛮人自己也这么认为。所以,就像查尔斯·普雷威特·奥顿4在他的《剑桥中世纪简史》中所说,五世纪末,当“罗马皇帝被野蛮的日耳曼国王取代”后,是一个“不断虚构(make-believe)”的时代。
This means looking beyond the obvious. The record shows that even transitions that are undeniably real in retrospect may not be acknowledged for decades or even centuries after they happen. Consider the fall of Rome. It was probably the most important historic development in the first millennium of the Christian era. Yet long after Rome’s demise, the fiction that it survived was held out to public view, like Lenin’s embalmed corpse. No one who depended upon the pretenses of officials for his understanding of the “news” would have learned that Rome had fallen until long after that information ceased to matter.
The reason was not merely the inadequacy of communications in the ancient world. The outcome would have been much the same had CNN miraculously been in business, running its videotape in September 476. That is when the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustulus, was captured in Ravenna and forcibly retired to a villa in Campania on a pension. Even if Wolfe Blitzer had been there with minicams recording the news in 476, it is unlikely that he or anyone else would have dared to characterize those events as marking the end of the Roman Empire. That, of course, is exactly what latter historians said happened.
CNN editors probably would not have approved a headline story saying “Rome fell this evening.” The powers-that-be denied that Rome had fallen. Peddlers of “news” seldom are partisans of controversy in ways that would undermine their own profits. They may be partisan. They may even be outrageously so. But they seldom report conclusions that would convince subscribers to cancel their subscriptions and head for the hills. Which is why few would have reported the fall of Rome even if it had been technologically possible. Experts would have come forth to say that it was ridiculous to speak of Rome falling. To have said otherwise would have been bad for business and, perhaps, bad for the health of those doing the reporting. The powers in late-fifth-century Rome were barbarians, and they denied that Rome had fallen.
But it was not merely a case of authorities’ saying, “Don’t report this or we will kill you.” Part of the problem was that Rome was already so degenerate by the later decades of the fifth century that its “fall” genuinely eluded the notice of most people who lived through it. In fact, it was a generation later before Count Marcellinus first suggested that “The Western Roman Empire perished with this Augustulus.”4 Many more decades passed, perhaps centuries, before there was a common acknowledgment that the Roman Empire in the West no longer existed. Certainly Charlemagne believed that he was a legitimate Roman emperor in the year 800.
The point is not that Charlemagne and all who thought in conventional terms about the Roman Empire after 476 were fools. To the contrary. The characterization of social developments is frequently ambiguous. When the power of predominant institutions is brought into the bargain to reinforce a convenient conclusion, even one based largely on pretense, only someone of strong character and strong opinions would dare contradict it. If you try to put yourself in the position of a Roman of the late fifth century, it is easy to imagine how tempting it would have been to conclude that nothing had changed. That certainly was the optimistic conclusion. To have thought otherwise might have been frightening. And why come to a frightening conclusion when a reassuring one was at hand?
After all, a case could have been made that business would continue as usual. It had in the past. The Roman army, and particularly the frontier garrisons, had been barbarized for centuries.5 By the third century, it had become regular practice for the army to proclaim a new emperor. By the fourth century, even officers were Germanized and frequently illiterate.6 There had been many violent overthrows of emperors before Romulus Augustulus was removed from the throne. His departure might have seemed no different to his contemporaries than many other upheavals in a chaotic time. And he was sent packing with a pension. The very fact that he received a pension, even for a brief period before he was murdered, was a reassurance that the system survived. To an optimist, Odoacer, who deposed Romulus Augustulus, reunified rather than destroyed the empire. A son of Attila’s sidekick Edecon, Odoacer was a clever man. He did not proclaim himself emperor. Instead, he convened the Senate and prevailed upon its too-suggestible members that they offer the emperorship and thus sovereignty over the whole empire to Zeno, the Eastern emperor in faraway Byzantium. Odoacer was merely to be Zeno’s patricius to govern Italy.
As Will Durant wrote in The Story of Civilization, these changes did not appear to be the “fall of Rome” but merely “negligible shifts on the surface of the national scene.”7 When Rome fell, Odoacer said that Rome endured. He, along with almost everyone else, was keen to pretend that nothing had changed. They knew that “the glory that was Rome” was far better than the barbarism that was taking its place. Even the barbarians thought so. As C. W. Previte-Orton wrote in The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, the end of the fifth century, when “the Emperors had been replaced by barbaric German kings,” was a time of “persistent make-believe.”8
05“不断虚构,制造相信”“Persistent Make-Believe”
这种“虚构”是为了维护旧制度的门面,虽然它的本质已经“被野蛮人败坏了”。
当最后一个罗马皇帝被野蛮人的“中尉”所取代,政府的规制并未改变。元老院还在开会。“地方行政官员及其他高级职位继续存在,并由有声望的罗马人担任。”执政官依然每年提名一次。“罗马的民政管理部门完好无损地留存”;确实,在某些方面,它一直完整存续到十世纪末封建主义的诞生。在公共场合,使用的依然是旧帝国的徽章。基督教依然是国教。野蛮人也一直假装效忠于君士坦丁堡的东方皇帝,以及罗马法的传统。但事实上,用杜兰特的话说,“伟大帝国在西方已经不复存在了。”
This “make-believe” involved the preservation of the façade of the old system, even as its essence was “deformed by barbarism.”9 The old forms of government remained the same when the last emperor was replaced by a barbarian “lieutenant.” The Senate still met. “The praetorian prefecture and other high offices continued, and were held by eminent Romans.”10 Consuls were still nominated for a year. “The Roman civil administration survived intact.”11 Indeed, in some ways it remained intact until the birth of feudalism at the end of the tenth century. On public occasions, the old imperial insignia was still employed. Christianity was still the state religion. The barbarians still pretended to owe fealty to the Eastern emperor in Constantinople, and to the traditions of Roman law. In fact, in Durant’s words, “in the West the great Empire was no more.”12
06那又如何呢?So What?
罗马衰亡这个久远的例子,与我们思考当今世界有多重相关性。大多数探讨未来的书,其实都在谈论现在。我们试图弥补这一缺陷,使这本未来之书首先成为过去之书。我们相信,如果能用过去的实例,阐明大政治理论的重要观点,也就是关于暴力的逻辑;那么,就能帮助你更准确地预测未来。
历史是一位神奇的老师,它讲的比我们编的都要有意思;其中有关罗马衰亡的故事,更加值得品味和琢磨。人们记录了许多重要的教训,对你认识信息时代的变迁,可能很有启迪。
首先,在整个人类历史上,罗马的消亡,更加生动鲜明地说明了,在重大转型时期,当政府的规模崩溃时会导致什么后果。公元 1000 年的转折也涉及中央权威的崩盘,不过这次崩盘,也提高了经济活动的复杂性和范畴。15 世纪末的火药革命,同样给权力机构带来了巨大的变化,但这些变化增加而非减小了统治的规模。而今天,一千年来第一次出现,西方的大政治环境,正在破坏政府、企业集团、工会,以及其他大规模运行的组织。
当然了,对比罗马帝国的末期与信息时代的前夜,引发政府规模崩溃的原因,是非常不同的。罗马之所以灭亡,部分原因很简单,就是它的扩张超出了暴力经济能维持的规模。帝国戍边的成本,使古代农业所能形成的经济优势荡然无存。资助军事行动所需的税收和监管负担不断攀升,经济被掏空。腐败遍地。根据历史学家拉姆齐·迈克穆伦5的描述,当时军事指挥官的大部分精力,都花在了“以职权谋取非法利益”上。他们的手段就是敲诈平民,这正是四世纪的观察家辛奈西斯6(Synesius)所描述的“和平时期的战争,主要由士兵的不守军纪和军官的贪婪腐败所致,它比野蛮人的战争还要糟糕。”罗马崩溃的另一个重要因素,是安敦宁瘟疫导致了人口赤字。在当时的很多地区,人口都大量减少,这显然造成了罗马在经济和军事上的衰落。这样的情况今天也没有发生,至少目前还没有。从更长远的角度看,在接下来的千年里,新的“瘟疫”之灾将加剧技术转型带来的挑战。20 世纪人口的空前膨胀,为快速变异的微型寄生虫创造了理想的目标。担心埃博拉或者其他类似的病毒攻击大城市的人口,并非杞人忧天。但是,我们这本书并不是要思考人类和疾病的共同演化,尽管这是个有趣的话题。在这个历史的关口,我们要探讨的不是罗马为什么消亡;甚至也不是要分析,导致罗马灭亡的因素有哪些同样威胁着今天的世界。
我们要谈的与此不同,我们是想搞清楚,每当重大的历史变革发生时,人们是如何认知的,或者更准确地说,是如何错误认知的。
在某种程度上,古今中外的人都有点保守;人们不愿意从某些角度去思考问题,如解散悠久的社会习俗、推翻公认的体制、违抗他们赖以生存的法律和价值观。也很少人会想到,在气候、技术或其他变量上,一些看上去非常细微的变化,就能够切断他们与父辈世界的联系。罗马人不愿意承认,周遭的世界已经改变了。
我们也是如此。
然而,不管你是否承认,我们都正在经历一场历史性的变革,它将革新人们组织生计和保护自我的方式,重塑整个社会。其意义之深远,变化之深刻,你要想理解它,就不能把任何事情视为是理所当然的,天经地义的。无论何时何地,都会有人想让你相信,即将到来的信息时代,和你成长的工业时代没什么两样。我们对此深表怀疑。在我们看来,微处理技术会把这堵墙里的灰浆一点点化开,颠覆暴力的逻辑,必然改变人们谋生与自卫的方式。然而,对这些变化的必然性和进步性,人们倾向于淡化,或者闭口不谈;好像历史如何演进这件事,只能由工业机构主导和说了算。
The faraway example of the fall of Rome is relevant for a number of reasons as you contemplate conditions in the world today. Most books about the future are really books about the present. We have sought to remedy that defect by making this book about the future first of all a book about the past. We think that you are likely to draw a better perspective about what the future has in store if we illustrate important megapolitical points about the logic of violence with real examples from the past. History is an amazing teacher. The stories it has to tell are more interesting than any we could make up. And many of the more interesting relate to the fall of Rome. They document important lessons that could be relevant to your future in the Information Age.
First of all, the fall of Rome is one of history’s more vivid examples of what happened in a major transition when the scale of government was collapsing. The transitions of the year 1000 also involved the collapse of central authority, and did so in a way that increased the complexity and scope of economic activity. The Gunpowder Revolution at the end of the fifteenth century involved major changes in institutions that tended to raise rather than shrink the scale of governance. Today, for the first time in a thousand years, megapolitical conditions in the West are undermining and destroying governments, corporate conglomerates, labor unions, and many other institutions that operate on a large scale.
Of course, the collapse in the scale of governance at the end of the Roman Empire had very different causes from those prevailing now, at the advent of the Information Age. Part of the reason that Rome fell is simply that it had expanded beyond the scale at which the economies of violence could be maintained. The cost of garrisoning the empire’s far-flung borders exceeded the economic advantages that an ancient agricultural economy could support. The burden of taxation and regulation required to finance the military effort rose to exceed the carrying capacity of the economy. Corruption became endemic. A large part of the effort of military commanders, as historian Ramsay MacMullen has documented, was devoted to pursuit of “illicit profits of their command.”13 This they pursued by shaking down the population, what the fourth-century observer Synesius described as “the peace-time war, one almost worse than the barbarian war and arising from the military’s indiscipline and the officers’ greed.”14
Another important contributing factor to Rome’s collapse was a demographic deficit caused by the Antonine plagues. The collapse of the Roman population in many areas obviously contributed to economic and military weakness. Nothing of that kind has happened today, at least not yet. Taking a longer view, perhaps, the scourge of new “plagues” will compound the challenges of technological devolution in the new millennium. The unprecedented bulge in human population in the twentieth century creates a tempting target for rapidly mutating microparasites. Fears about the Ebola virus, or something like it, invading metropolitan populations may be well founded. But this is not the place to consider the coevolution of humans and diseases. As interesting a topic as that is, our argument at this juncture is not about why Rome fell, or even about whether the world today is vulnerable to some of the same influences that contributed to Roman decline. It is about something different—namely, the way that history’s great transformations are perceived, or rather, misperceived as they happen.
People are always and everywhere to some degree conservative, with a small “c.” That implies a reluctance to think in terms of dissolving venerable social conventions, overturning the accepted institutions, and defying the laws and values from which they drew their bearings. Few are inclined to imagine that apparently minor changes in climate or technology or some other variable can somehow be responsible for severing connections to the world of their fathers. The Romans were reluctant to acknowledge the changes unfolding around them. So are we.
Yet recognize it or not, we are living through a change of historical season, a transformation in the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves that is so far-reaching that it will inevitably transform the whole of society. The change will be so profound, in fact, that to understand it will require taking almost nothing for granted. You will be invited at almost every turn to believe that the coming Information Societies will be very like the industrial society you grew up in. We doubt it. Microprocessing will dissolve the mortar in the bricks. It will so profoundly alter the logic of violence that it will inevitably change the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves. Yet the tendency will be to downplay the inevitability of these changes, or to argue about their desirability as if it were within the fiat of industrial institutions to determine how history evolves.
07巨大的幻觉The Grand Illusion
有些作者,在很多方面比我们学识渊博,但在思考未来的问题上,却会将你引入歧途,因为他们对社会运转的认识过于肤浅。例如,大卫·克莱恩和丹尼尔·伯斯汀(David Kline and Daniel Burstein)经过精心研究,写了一本专著,名为《公路勇士:信息高速公上的梦想与噩梦》(Road Warrior)。书中充满了令人赞叹的细节,但是,这些细节却是用来论证一种幻觉,那就是,“公民可以自觉地、齐心协力地行动,去塑造他们周围自发的经济和自然进程”。举一个不是很明显的例子,这其实相当于在说,如果当时每个人都重拾骑士精神,封建主义是可以存活下去的。在 15 世纪末的法庭上,没有人会反对这样的观点,反对它甚至被视为是异端。但是,这依然是一种彻头彻尾的误导,就像蛇想把明天的身体塞进昨天的皮囊。
变化发生的深层原因,正是那些不受意识控制的因素,这些因素改变了暴力获利的条件。事实上,它们与任何人为的操纵都相距甚远,在一个充满政治的世界里,它们甚至不是政治操纵的对象。从来没有人在游行中高喊:“提高生产,扩大经济规模”;也没有人打着横幅要求:“发明武器系统,提升步兵地位”;更没有候选人承诺:“改变应对暴力的效率和规模之间的平衡”。这些口号很荒谬,因为它们的目标超出任何人可以主观影响的范畴。然而,正如我们即将探讨的,恰恰是这其中的变量决定了世界的运转,它们的影响超过任何政治宣言。
如果你仔细想一想,显而易见,很少有什么重要的历史转折是由人们的愿望驱动的。它们之所以发生,不是因为人们突然厌倦了某种生活方式,而喜欢上了另外一种。而稍加思考就会明白:如果人们的想法和愿望是事情发生和改变的唯一决定因素,那么历史上的所有突变,都不得不被解释为,与实际生活条件的改变毫不相干的情绪躁动。这实际上从来没有出现过。除了在影响部分人的医疗问题上,我们很少看到完全脱离客观原因的情绪暴走。
一般来说,芸芸众生不会因为觉得很好玩,就突如其来地摒弃他们的生活方式。
一个觅食者不会说:“我厌倦了生活在史前时代,我想住在农村,当个农民。”人类在行为模式和价值观念上任何决定性的改变,毫无例外,都是对生活条件切实变化的因应。至少在这个意义上,人类始终是现实的。如果他们的观点确实发生了突变,那很可能说明,他们熟悉的生活条件被某些东西打断了,一次侵略,一场瘟疫,一次突然的气候变化,或者一场改变他们谋生和自卫能力的技术革命。
大多数人都渴望稳定,而不是翻天覆地的历史变动;当变革来临,他们会感到困惑,并普遍陷入迷失,特别是那些失去收入或社会地位的人。你要是盯着民意调查或者其他测量情绪的指数,想从中了解大政治变革的发生与发展,必将徒劳无功。
Authors who are in many ways better informed than we are will nevertheless lead you astray in thinking about the future because they are far too superficial in examining how societies work. For example, David Kline and Daniel Burstein have written a well-researched volume entitled Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares Along the Information Highway. It is full of admirable detail, but much of this detail is marshaled in arguing an illusion, the idea “that citizens can act together, consciously, to shape the spontaneous economic and natural processes going on around them.”15 Although it may not be obvious, this is equivalent to saying that feudalism might have survived if everyone had rededicated himself to chivalry. No one in a court of the late fifteenth century would have objected to such a sentiment. Indeed, it would have been heresy to do so. But it also would have been entirely misleading, an example of the snake trying to fit the future into its old skin.
The basic causes of change are precisely those that are not subject to conscious control. They are the factors that alter the conditions under which violence pays. Indeed, they are so remote from any obvious means of manipulation that they are not even subjects of political maneuvering in a world saturated with politics. No one ever marched in a demonstration shouting, “Increase scale economies in the production process.” No banner has ever demanded, “Invent a weapons system that increases the importance of the infantry.” No candidate ever promised to “alter the balance between efficiency and magnitude in protection against violence.” Such slogans would be ridiculous, precisely because their goals are beyond the capacity of anyone to consciously affect. Yet as we will explore, these variables determine how the world works to a far greater degree than any political platform.
If you think about it carefully, it should be obvious that important transitions in history seldom are driven primarily by human wishes. They do not happen because people get fed up with one way of life and suddenly prefer another. A moment’s reflection suggests why. If what people think and desire were the only determinants of what happens, then all the abrupt changes in history would have to be explained by wild mood swings unconnected to any change in the actual conditions of life. In fact, this never happens. Only in cases of medical problems affecting a few people do we see arbitrary fluctuations in mood that appear entirely divorced from any objective cause.
As a rule, large numbers of people do not suddenly and all at once decide to abandon their way of life simply because they find it amusing to do so. No forager ever said, “I am tired of living in prehistoric times, I would prefer the life of a peasant in a farming village.” Any decisive swing in patterns of behavior and values is invariably a response to an actual change in the conditions of life. In this sense, at least, people are always realistic. If their views do change abruptly, it probably indicates that they have been confronted by some departure from familiar conditions: an invasion, a plague, a sudden climatic shift, or a technological revolution that alters their livelihoods or their ability to defend themselves.
Far from being the product of human desire, decisive historic changes more often than not confound the wish of most people for stability. When change occurs, it typically causes widespread disorientation, especially among those who lose income or social status. You will look in vain at public opinion polls or other measures of mood for an understanding of how the coming megapolitical transition is likely to unfold.
08缺乏预见性的人生LIFE WITHOUT FORESIGHT
我们之所以察觉不到周围正在发生的重大变化,部分原因是变化并非人类之所欲,我们不想看到它。觅食者——人类的祖先,同样顽固不化,但他们有很好的借口。一万年前,没人能预料到农业革命的后果。那时候的人除了在哪里找下一顿饭之外,几乎什么也预见不了。农耕开始的时候,没有任何关于过去的记录,无从预测未来。甚至没有后来西方的那种时间观念,时间还未被有序被分成秒、分、小时、日等单位,以衡量年份。觅食者处于“永恒的现在”,没有日历,实际上也根本没有任何书面的记载。他们也不懂科学,除了直觉以外,也没有足够的智力去理解因果关系。在展望未来时,我们的原始祖先是盲目的。引用《圣经》中的比喻,他们还没有“尝过知识的果实”。
If we fail to perceive the great transition going on around us, it is partly because we do not desire to see. Our foraging forebears may have been just as obdurate, but they had a better excuse. No one ten thousand years ago could have foreseen the consequences of the Agricultural Revolution. Indeed, no one could have foreseen much of anything beyond where to find the next meal. When farming began, there was no record of past events from which to draw perspective on the future. There was not even a Western sense of time divided into orderly units, like seconds, minutes, hours, days, and so on, to measure out the years. Foragers lived in the “eternal present,” without calendars, and indeed, without written records at all. They had no science, and no other intellectual apparatus for understanding cause and effect beyond their own intuitions. When it came to looking ahead, our primeval ancestors were blind. To cite the biblical metaphor, they had not yet eaten of the fruit of knowledge.
09以史为鉴Learning from the Past
幸运的是,我们现在的条件要优越得多。经过 500 代人的进化,我们具备了祖先们缺乏的分析能力。借助科学和数学,我们解开了自然界的诸多奥妙。我们对因果关系的理解,相比于早期的觅食者,简直堪称神奇。高速计算机的发展,使我们通过算法对复杂动态系统的运转有了新的认识,例如人类的经济。艰难发展起来的政治经济学,虽然远非完美,但也训练了人们对影响自身行为的因素的理解。
其中很重要的一点就是,无论何时何地,人们都会对激励做出反应,虽然不像经济学家所想的那么机械。成本与回报是其中的关键。在其他条件不变的情况下,通过提高奖励或者降低成本,改变某行为的外部条件,将激励人们更多地从事它。
Luckily, we have a better vantage point. The past five hundred generations have given us analytic capabilities that our forebears lacked. Science and mathematics have helped unlock many of nature’s secrets, giving us an understanding of cause and effect that approaches the magical when compared to that of the early foragers. Computational algorithms developed as a result of high-speed computers have shed new insights on the workings of complex, dynamic systems like the human economy. The painstaking development of political economy itself, although it falls well short of perfection, has honed understanding of the factors informing human action. Important among these is the recognition that people at all times and places tend to respond to incentives. Not always as mechanically as economists imagine, but they do respond. Costs and rewards matter. Changes in external conditions that raise the rewards or lower the costs of certain behavior will lead to more of that behavior, other things being-equal.
10激励措施不可小觑Incentives Matter
人们会对成本与回报做出反应,这是行为预测的一个基本要素。你可以很有把握地说,往大街上扔 100 块钱,不管是在纽约、墨西哥城还是莫斯科,很快就会有人把它捡走。这种情形并不像看起来那么微不足道,它足以证明,那些认为预测是不可能的聪明人是错误的。任何正确衡量了激励措施影响的预测,大体上都可能是对的。而且,成本与回报的预期变化越大,它预示的发展就越不简单。
最具深远意义的预测,可能就来自于,认知和解读大政治变量的细微变化背后的含义。暴力是决定人类行为边界的终极力量。如果你能理解暴力的逻辑,以及它会如何运转,你就可以有效地预测,接下来人们会在哪里丢弃或捡起 100 块的大钞。
这并不是说你能知道不可知的东西。我们无法告诉你怎么预测彩票的中奖号码,或者其他任何完全随机的事件。我们没办法知道,恐怖分子会不会以及什么时候在曼哈顿引爆原子弹;或者一颗小行星会不会掉到沙特阿拉伯。我们也没法预测,会不会有的冰河世纪,会不会有火山突然爆发,或者新的疾病出现。有大量不可知的事情,都可能改变历史的进程。但是,猜测不可知与推导出已知事情的涵义,是完全不同的。如果你看到远处有闪电,就可以有把握地说,很快就会打雷;预测大政治的转型以及它的后果,与此类似,只是它涉及更长的时间框架,以及不那么确定的联系。
在后果展露之前,大政治变革的催化剂就已经出现了。农业革命的影响,用了五千年的世界才全部呈现。工业社会基于制造业和化学力量,从农业社会向它的过渡,就非常快,只用了几个世纪。信息社会的转型会更快,可能只需一生的时间。
不过,即使考虑到历史在缩短,现有信息技术对大政治的影响要完全实现,预期也得几十年的时间。
The fact that people tend to respond to costs and rewards is an essential element of forecasting. You can say with a high degree of confidence that if you drop a hundred-dollar bill on the street, someone will soon pick it up, whether you are in New York, Mexico City, or Moscow. This is not as trivial as it seems. It shows why the clever people who say that forecasting is impossible are wrong. Any forecast that accurately anticipates the impact of incentives on behavior is likely to be broadly correct. And the greater the anticipated change in costs and rewards, the less trivial the implied forecast is likely to be.
The most far-reaching forecasts of all are likely to arise from recognizing the implications of shifting megapolitical variables. Violence is the ultimate boundary force on behavior; thus, if you can understand how the logic of violence will change, you can usefully predict where people will be dropping or picking up the equivalent of one-hundred-dollar bills in the future.
We do not mean by this that you can know the unknowable. We cannot tell you how to forecast winning lottery numbers or any truly random event. We have no way of knowing when or whether a terrorist will detonate an atomic blast in Manhattan. Or if an asteroid will strike Saudi Arabia. We cannot predict the coming of a new Ice Age, a sudden volcanic eruption, or the emergence of a new disease. The number of unknowable events that could alter the course of history is large. But knowing the unknowable is very different from drawing out the implications of what is already known. If you see a flash of lightning far away, you can forecast with a high degree of confidence that a thunderclap is due. Forecasting the consequences of megapolitical transitions involves much longer time frames, and less certain connections, but it is a similar kind of exercise.
Megapolitical catalysts for change usually appear well before their consequences manifest themselves. It took five thousand years for the full implications of the Agricultural Revolution to come to the surface. The transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society based on manufacturing and chemical power unfolded more quickly. It took centuries. The transition to the Information Society will happen more rapidly still, probably within a lifetime. Yet even allowing for the foreshortening of history, you can expect decades to pass before the full megapolitical impact of existing information technology is realized.
11主要及次要的大政治变革Major and Minor Megapolitical Transitions
在本章中,我们会分析大政治变革的一些共同特征。在接下来的章节中,我们将更仔细地研究农业革命,以及第二大的阶段变化,就是从农田到工厂。在农业文明时期,还有一些次级的大政治变革,如罗马的衰落与 1000 年时的封建革命;这些标志着权力等式的消长,政府的兴衰,农业战利品从一个人手上转移到另一个人。罗马时期的大庄园主,欧洲黑暗时期的自耕农,以及封建时代的领主和农奴,他们吃着同一块地里长出来的粮食;但由于不同的技术、气候的波动、疾病的破坏累积起来的影响,他们经验的制度,判然有别。
我们并不打算彻底解释所有这些变化,这不是我们的目的;尽管我们已经勾勒出一些解释,说明了在过往的历史中,大政治变量的不断变化,是如何颠覆权力的行使方式的。简言之,由于大政治变量的波动,降低或提高了运用权力的成本,政府也随之盛衰盈缺。
如果你想要理解信息革命,应该牢记以下要点:
远在权力革命爆发之前,权力的大政治基础就已经开始改变了。
每当重大的变革开始时,人们的收入通常会下降。这是因为,由于人口的压力,社会资源趋向边缘化,从而导致自身危机四伏。
跳出系统,在“外面”观察,是一种文化禁忌。人们往往对现有社会的暴力逻辑视而不见,所以,他们也看不到这种逻辑的变化,无论是潜在的,还是公开的。大规模的政治变革在发生之前,很少有人能看得出来。
重大的历史变革总是涉及文化革命,新旧观念的支持者之间会发生冲突。
大政治的变革从来都不受欢迎,因为它会使苦心积累的知识资本变得过时,使既定的道德标准发生混乱。它不是来自于民众的普遍要求,而是在一定的历史背景下,由于暴力逻辑的外部条件发生了改变,社会必然做出的反应。
向新的谋生方式或新型政府的转变,在开始的时候,只局限在那些大政治的催化剂起作用的地区。
旧系统的失序和崩溃,往往导致暴力的加剧,所以,历史上的变革都有一个社会混乱的阶段,可能农业社会的早期是个例外。
腐败、道德滑坡和效率低下,是一个系统到了最后阶段的信号。
技术对暴力逻辑的影响日益加强,这导致了历史的加速,并大大缩短了两个阶段转折时的适应期。
This chapter analyzes some of the common features of megapolitical transitions. In following chapters we look more closely at the Agricultural Revolution, and the transition from farm to factory, the second of the previous great phase changes. Within the agricultural stage of civilization there were many minor megapolitical transitions such as the fall of Rome and the feudal revolution of the year 1000. These marked the waxing and waning of the power equation as governments rose and fell and the spoils of farming passed from one set of hands to another. The owners of sprawling estates under the Roman Empire, yeoman farmers in the European Dark Ages, and the lords and serfs of the feudal period all ate grain from the same fields. They lived under very different governments because of the cumulative impact of different technologies, fluctuations in climate, and the disruptive influences of disease.
Our purpose is not to thoroughly explain all of these changes. We do not pretend to do so, although we have sketched out some illustrations of the way that changing megapolitical variables have altered the way that power was exercised in the past. Governments have grown and shrunk as megapolitical fluctuations have lowered and raised the costs of projecting power.
Here are some summary points that you should keep in mind as you seek to understand the Information Revolution:
A shift in the megapolitical foundations of power normally unfolds far in advance of the actual revolutions in the use of power.
Incomes are usually falling when a major transition begins, often because a society has rendered itself crisis-prone by marginalizing resources due to population pressures.
Seeing “outside” of a system is usually taboo. People are frequently blind to the logic of violence in the existing society; therefore, they are almost always blind to changes in that logic, latent or overt. Megapolitical transitions are seldom recognized before they happen.
Major transitions always involve a cultural revolution, and usually entail clashes between adherents of the old and new values.
Megapolitical transitions are never popular, because they antiquate painstakingly acquired intellectual capital and confound established moral imperatives. They are not undertaken by popular demand, but in response to changes in the external conditions that alter the logic of violence in the local setting.
Transitions to new ways of organizing livelihoods or new types of government are initially confined to those areas where the megapolitical catalysts are at work.
With the possible exception of the early stages of farming, past transitions have always involved periods of social chaos and heightened violence due to disorientation and breakdown of the old system.
Corruption, moral decline, and inefficiency appear to be signal features of the final stages of a system.
The growing importance of technology in shaping the logic of violence has led to an acceleration of history, leaving each successive transition with less adaptive time than ever before.
12历史在加速History Speeds Up
今天的事态发展,要比以往的历史演进快上无数倍;所以,在同样的转折点,如果能提前认识到世界将发生什么样的变化,相比你的祖先,这对你要有价值得多。
历史上的第一批农民,即使他们奇迹般地洞悉了农耕在大政治上的所有影响,这些认知其实也没有用;因为还需要几千年的时间,才能完成向新社会阶段的转折。
今非昔比。历史已经加速,准确预测新技术在大政治层面的影响,在当今社会大有裨益。对于这次信息时代变革的潜在影响,如果我们建立起来的认知,能够达到现在普通人对农业革命和工业革命的了解程度,那这些认知将无比宝贵。简单来说,大政治预测起作用的范围,已经缩短到了最有用的时间段,那就是一个人的一生。
回首过往的几个世纪,或者只是看看眼前,我们就可以发现,许多人是靠着使用暴力武器的特殊本领过活的,往往活得还很好;不仅如此,他们的活动还极大地影响着社会稀缺资源的利用。 —— 弗雷德里克·C·莱恩(FREDERIC C. LANE)
我们对大政治的研究,就是想做到这一点,即挖掘出那些改变暴力行使边界的因素,以及它们可能产生的影响。这些大政治因素在很大程度上决定了:什么时候,在哪里,行使暴力能够得到回报。它们也有助于了解收入是如何在市场中分配的。
就像经济史学家弗雷德里克·莱恩明确指出的,如何组织和控制暴力,在决定“稀缺资源的利用”上,起着巨大的作用。
With events unfolding many times faster than during previous transformations, early understanding of how the world will change could turn out to be far more useful to you than it would have been to your ancestors at an equivalent juncture in the past. Even if the first farmers had miraculously understood the full megapolitical implications of tilling the earth, this information would have been practically useless because thousands of years were to pass before the transition to the new phase of society was complete.
Not so today. History has sped up. Forecasts that correctly anticipate the megapolitical implications of new technology are likely to be far more useful today. If we can develop the implications of the current transition to the Information Society to the same extent that someone with current knowledge could have grasped the implications of past transitions to farm and factory, that information should be many times more valuable now. Put simply, the action horizon for megapolitical forecasts has shrunk to its most useful range, within the span of a single lifetime.
“Looking back over the centuries, or even if looking only at the present, we can clearly observe that many men have made their living, often a very good living, from their special skill in applying weapons of violence, and that their activities have had a very large part in determining what uses were made of scarce resources.”16 —FREDERIC C. LANE
Our study of megapolitics is an attempt to do just that—to draw out the implications of the changing factors that alter the boundaries where violence is exercised. These megapolitical factors largely determine when and where violence pays. They also help inform the market distribution of income. As economic historian Frederic Lane so clearly put it, how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining “what uses are made of scarce resources.”17
13大政治学的速成课程A CRASH COURSE IN MEGAPOLITICS
大政治是一个强有力的概念,它有助于解释历史上的一些大问题:政府的兴亡、机构的演化、战争的时机和后果、经济繁荣和衰退的模式。通过提高或降低行使权力的成本与回报,大政治控制着人们将自己的意志强加于人的能力。从人类社会的最初就是如此,今天依然如此。在《血流成河》和《大清算》中,我们探讨了很多重要的大政治因素,正是它们,在看不见的地方决定着历史的演进。解开大政治变革及其影响的关键,在于了解那些催生暴力革命的变量。某种程度上,这些变量可以笼统地归为四类:地形、气候、微生物和技术。
1、地形是个关键因素,从一点可以明显看出:在公海上,从来没有像在陆地上那样,形成暴力垄断的局面;没有哪个政府的法律在那里是排他的。这一点至关重要,借此人们理解,随着经济迁移到网络空间,暴力及保护的组织将如何演变。
地形结合气候,在早期的历史中发挥了重要作用。第一批国家出现在被沙漠包围的洪泛区,如美索不达米亚和埃及,那里有丰富的灌溉用水,但周边地区又过于干燥,无法支持自耕农经济。在这种情况下,单个农民如果不与他人合作,去维护当时的政治结构,就面临很高的成本而活不下去。那时候的灌溉,只能是大规模地进行;没有灌溉,作物就不会生长。没有收成,就意味着挨饿。在沙漠中,控制水的人处于强势地位,这使得当时的政府既暴虐又富有。
我们在《大清算》中也分析过,地理条件对古希腊自耕农的繁荣居功至伟,并使该地区成为了西方民主的摇篮。3000 年前,地中海地区的高价值农作物是橄榄和葡萄,那时候交通条件普遍还很原始,生活在距海岸几英里之外的居民,就没办法在这些作物经济上竞争。因为如果通过陆路运输橄榄油和葡萄酒,运费成本太高,很难在市场上盈利。希腊在沿海地区精心设计了海岸线,使他们国内的大部分地区离海都不超过 20 英里。这给希腊农民带来了决定性的优势,把他们在内陆的潜在竞争者甩在了身后。
由于在高价值产品的贸易上占据优势,希腊农民只需要控制小块的土地,就能获得丰厚的收入。高收入使他们有能力购买昂贵的盔甲。古希腊著名的重装备步兵,就是自费武装起来的农民或地主。这些步兵装备精良,斗志昂扬,是令人生畏、不容轻视的军事对手。地理条件是希腊民主的基础,而不同的地形催生了埃及和其他东方的专制国家,道理是一样的。
2、气候也影响着暴力的作用边界。从觅食到农耕的第一次大转型,气候变化就是它的催化剂。大约一万三千年前,最后一次冰河时代结束,地表的植被发生了翻天覆地的变化。从近东开始,冰河气候首先在那里退去,温度和降雨量逐渐攀升,森林蔓延到从前的草原地区。特别是山毛榉的迅速繁衍,严重影响了人类的饮食选择。就像苏珊·艾琳·格雷格(Susan Ailing Gregg)在《觅食者和农民》(Foragers and Farmers)所写的:
榉树林大行其道,可能对当地的人、植物和动物都产生了严重的影响。橡树的树冠是相对开放的,阳光可以穿透,照射到林地;由灌木、草本植物和杂草混合的树下灌木丛就能蓬勃地生长,植物的多样性又支撑了各种野生动物的生存和繁衍。与之相反,榉树的树冠是封闭的,森林底部被遮得密不透光。树下的植被,就只有在春季榉树叶长出来之前,有一些一年生的植物;其余时节就剩一点耐阴的苔草、蕨类和杂草。
随着时间的推移,茂密的森林从整个欧洲蔓延到东部大草原,蚕食了广阔的草地。森林削减了可以养活大型动物的牧区,使觅食者人口的生存处境日益艰难。
在冰河时代的繁荣期,狩猎采集的人口膨胀得太厉害,无法再靠日益减少的大型哺乳动物养活自己,其中很多物种都被猎杀到灭绝。向农业的转变并不是人们想要的选择,而是为了弥补饮食不足而被迫采取的一种权宜之计。在遥远的北部地区,觅食者依然是多数;因为气候变暖的趋势,并没有对那里的大型哺乳动物的栖息地产生不利的影响。在热带雨林地区,全球气候变暖也没有减少那里的食物供应。自农业出现以来,更多的变化是由气候变冷而不是变暖促成的。
适当了解一点历史上的气候变化动力学,在以后气候波动的时候会很有用。如果你知道,平均气温每下降一摄氏度,植物的生长期就会减少三到四个星期,可种植作物的最高海拔就下降 500 英尺7,那么,你就会对未来人们行为的边界条件有一个概念。你可以用这些知识去预测各种变化,从粮食的价格到土地的价值。你甚至可以就气温下降对实际收入和政局稳定的影响,得出非常有见地的结论。在过去,如果粮食连年歉收,导致食物价格上涨和可支配收入减少,人们就会揭竿而起,推翻政府。
举例来说,近代以来最冷的十七世纪,也是全世界普遍爆发革命的时期,这可不是巧合。这种混乱背后的大政治因素,就是气候骤降。那时天气严寒,连凡尔赛宫中“太阳王”桌上的酒都冻成了冰块。天气变冷,作物生长期缩短,粮食歉收,收入减少。所以,大约自 1620 年开始,在全球范围内,繁荣景气转入大萧条。
后来的事实证明,社会因此而陷入大乱。十七世纪的经济危机导致世界被叛乱淹没,其中很多起集中爆发在 1648 年,刚好是另一次更著名的革命周期的 200 年前。从 1640 年至 1650 年间,爱尔兰、苏格兰、英格兰、葡萄牙、加泰罗尼亚、法国、莫斯科、那不勒斯、西西里、巴西、波西米亚、乌克兰、奥地利、波兰、瑞典、荷兰和土耳其都发生了叛乱;甚至中国和日本也被动乱所席卷。
所以,在贸易萎缩的 17 世纪,重商主义占据主导地位,应该也不是巧合。也许是在该世纪末,“当时发生了可怕的饥荒,”经济封闭达到了顶峰。到了 18 世纪,特别是 1750 年以后,气温回升,作物产量也上去了,西欧人的实际收入开始增加,对工业制成品的需求也随之攀升。更多构建自由市场的政策被采纳,工业规模也不断扩大,形成了经济增长的自我强化,这就是人们常说的工业革命。
技术和工业产出的重要性日益增加,减轻了天气对经济周期的影响。不过,即使在今天,你也不能低估气温骤降对实际收入的影响,哪怕是在北美这样的富裕地区。当既有机构的配置已经潜力耗尽时,社会就会形成一种强烈的崩坏趋势。在过去,这种趋势主要出现在人口暴涨把土地的承载力推到极限时。这种情况在 1000 年封建革命前发生过,在 15 世纪末又出现了一次。在这两次变革中,作物减产歉收、实际收入大幅下降,是统治集团被颠覆的重要诱因。今天,这种临界性主要表现在消费信贷市场。如果气温下降,作物减产,可支配收入减少,就会引发债务违约,甚至抗拒交税。以史为鉴的话,经济封闭和政治混乱,都会上演。
3、微生物传递了伤害或免于伤害的力量,所以它也常常决定着权力的运行。欧洲人征服新世界就是典型的例子,对此我们在《大清算》中讨论过。欧洲定居者,从满是病菌的农业社会来到新大陆,他们对一些儿童传染病具备了相对的免疫力,如麻疹等。但他们遇到的印第安人,还以觅食为主,以部落的形式散居在人口稀少的地区,没有相应的病毒免疫力,所以就被灭绝了。而且,死亡率最高的时候,发生在白人真正抵达之前。因为有印第安人在海边遇到了欧洲人,被感染之后带着病毒回到了内陆。
有时候,微生物也是权力机器前行的障碍。在《血流成河》中,我们谈到,热带非洲有强力的疟疾病菌,在很多个世纪内,阻止着白人的入侵。在 19 世纪中期发明奎宁以前,白人军队无法在疟疾地区生存,无论他们的武器多么先进。
人类与微生物之间的互动还产生了重要的人口效应,改变了暴力的成本和回报。
如果死亡率因为瘟疫、饥荒或其他原因而波动较大时,死于战争的相对风险就会降低。从 16 世纪开始,死亡率暴涨的频率不断下降,这就很好地解释了,为什么家庭的规模越来越小,而且今天的人们,对于突然死于战争的容忍度比过去要低得多。这也降低了人们对帝国主义的忍耐度,并且提高了在低出生率社会中行使权力的成本。
当代社会由小家庭组成,如果发生战争,即使很小的死亡人数,也难以被接受。相比之下,在现代社会早期,人们对帝国主义产生的死亡成本接受度要高得多。在本世纪之前,大多数父母都会生很多孩子,预计其中有个别孩子会随机地突然病死。在一个早夭司空见惯的时代,未来的士兵和他们的家人,对于上战场,并不是很抗拒。
机器具有侵略性。编织者成为了网,机械师沦为了机器。如果你不使用工具,你就被工具使用。 —— 爱默生(EMERSON)
4、到目前为止,在现代时期的几个世纪里,在决定权力运用的成本和回报上,技术的影响力最大。本书论证的基础,就是假设这种影响会一直延续。技术有几个关键维度:
进攻与防守之间的平衡。先进的武器技术左右着攻防之间的平衡,进而决定着政治组织的规模。当攻击能力增强时,远距离施加权力的力量就会占主导地位,管辖区域内趋于稳固,会形成更大规模的政府。在其他时期,比如现在,防守能力正在上升,这就提高了在核心区域外运用权力的成本。在这种趋势下,管辖权倾向于下放到地方,大政府会分解成小政府。
公民平等及步兵的优势。决定公民之间平等程度的一个关键因素是武器技术的性质。相对便宜、非专业人士能够操作,以及能提高步兵军事地位的武器,往往会促进权力的平等。当托马斯·杰斐逊写“人人生而平等”的时候,比几个世纪前发表类似的口号要现实得多。和拿着青铜燧发枪的典型英国士兵相比,一个拿着猎枪的农民不仅同等武装,甚至装备得更好。农民可以从更远的地方向士兵射击,而且精准度更高。中世纪与此截然不同。手上只有一把草叉的农民——他甚至买不起更多的草叉,根本不可能对抗骑着高头大马、全副武装的骑士。在 1276 年,没人提出过“人人生而平等”。因为事实很明显,人就是不平等的;一个骑士的杀伤力超过几十个农民。
大规模暴力的优势和劣势。社会可能是几个大政府还是许多小政府,另外一个决定性的变量是使用先进武器所需的组织规模。当暴力的回报越来越高时,规模越大,回报越高,政府当然就会变得更大。当一个小团体可以组织有效的手段抵抗大团体的攻击时(中世纪就是这样),国家主权就会趋于分裂;小型的、独立的组织就能行使政府的许多职能。就像我们在后面的一章中将探讨的,随着信息时代的到来,我们将看到赛博战士(cybersoldier)到来的曙光,他们是分权革命的信使。赛博战士不再专属于民族国家,很小的组织甚至个人,都可以部署和使用。下一个千年的战争,会有很多由计算机主导的不流血的战争。
大规模生产的经济性。权力应该分散在当地,还是集中在遥远的中央,另外一个重要的决定因素是,那些提供民生所需的重要企业的规模。如果重点企业只有在广阔覆盖的贸易区内大规模地组织起来,才能够获得最佳效益时,政府就可以通过为企业提供这种条件和保护,从中抽取大量的财富,用以支撑大规模政治体系所需的成本和费用。在这样的情况下,如果有一个世界霸主主宰其他所有国家,整个世界的经济反而会更有效地运行,就像 19 世纪大英帝国那样。但在有些时候,大政治变量的结合会降低经济规模。如果维持大贸易区的经济利益降低,以前利用这种模式繁荣起来的大国政府就会开始分裂,即使攻防之间的军事平衡还一如既往。
技术的分散。关键技术的分散程度,是决定权力等式的另外一个重要变量。当武器或生产工具被有效地囤积或垄断时,它们就会使权力集中化。事实证明,即使在本质上属于防御性的技术,如机枪,如果分散程度不够高,也往往沦为强有力的攻击性武器,从而促进统治规模的扩大。19 世纪末,欧洲列强享有对机枪的垄断,他们可以轻松地征服边远的国家和地区,大幅扩展殖民帝国。后来在20 世纪,特别是二战之后,机枪被广泛采用,比较容易获得,又成为了破坏帝国主义的力量。在同等条件下,关键技术越分散,权力就越分散,政府的最佳规模就越小。
The concept of megapolitics is a powerful one. It helps illuminate some of the major mysteries of history: how governments rise and fall and what types of institutions they become; the timing and outcome of wars; patterns of economic prosperity and decline. By raising or lowering the costs and rewards of projecting power, megapolitics governs the ability of people to impose their will on others. This has been true from the earliest human societies onward. It still is. We explored many of the important hidden megapolitical factors that determine the evolution of history in Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning. The key to unlocking the implications of megapolitical change is understanding the factors that precipitate revolutions in the use of violence. These variables can be somewhat arbitrarily grouped into four categories: topography, climate, microbes, and technology.
1. Topography is a crucial factor, as evidenced by the fact that control of violence on the open seas has never been monopolized as it has on land. No government’s laws have ever exclusively applied there. This is a matter of the utmost importance in understanding how the organization of violence and protection will evolve as the economy migrates into cyberspace.
Topography, in conjunction with climate, had a major role to play in early history. The first states emerged on floodplains, surrounded by desert, such as in Mesopotamia and Egypt, where water for irrigation was plentiful but surrounding regions were too dry to support yeoman farming. Under such conditions, individual farmers faced a very high cost for failing to cooperate in maintaining the political structure. Without irrigation, which could be provided only on a large scale, crops would not grow. No crops meant starvation. The conditions that placed those who controlled the water in a desert in a position of strength made for despotic and rich government.
As we analyzed in The Great Reckoning, topographic conditions also played a major role in the prosperity of yeoman farmers in ancient Greece, enabling that region to become the cradle of Western democracy. Given the primitive transportation conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean region three thousand years ago, it was all but impossible for persons living more than a few miles from the sea to compete in the production of high-value crops of the ancient world, olives and grapes. If the oil and the wine had to be transported any distance overland, the portage costs were so great that they could not be sold at a profit. The elaborate shoreline of the Greek littoral meant that most areas of Greece were no more than twenty miles from the sea. This gave a decisive advantage to Greek farmers over their potential competitors in landlocked areas.
Because of this advantage in trading high-value products, Greek farmers earned high incomes from control of only small parcels of land. These high incomes enabled them to purchase costly armor. The famous hoplites of ancient Greece were farmers or landlords who armed themselves at their own expense. Both well armed and well motivated, the Greek hoplites were militarily formidable and could not be ignored. Topographic conditions were the foundation of Greek democracy, just as those of a different kind gave rise to the Oriental despotisms of Eygpt and elsewhere.
2. Climate also helps set the boundaries within which brute force can be exercised. A climatic change was the catalyst for the first major transition from foraging to farming. The end of the last Ice Age, about thirteen thousand years ago, led to a radical alteration in vegetation. Beginning in the Near East, where the Ice Age retreated first, a gradual rise in temperature and rainfall spread forests into areas that had previously been grasslands. In particular, the rapid spread of beech forests seriously curtailed the human diet. As Susan Ailing Gregg put it in Foragers and Farmers:
The establishment of beech forests must have had serious consequences for local human, plant and animal populations. The canopy of an oak forest is relatively open and allows large amounts of sunlight to reach the forest floor. An exuberant undergrowth of mixed shrubs, forbs, and grasses develops, and the diversity of plants supports a variety of wildlife. In contrast, the canopy of a beech forest is closed and the forest floor is heavily shaded. Other than a flush of spring annuals prior to the emergence of the leaves, only shade-tolerant sedges, ferns, and a few grasses are found.”18
Over time, dense forests encroached on the open plains, spreading throughout Europe into the Eastern steppes.19 The forests reduced the grazing area available to support large animals, making it increasingly difficult for the population of human foragers to support themselves.
The population of hunter-gatherers had swollen too greatly during the Ice Age prosperity to support itself on the dwindling herds of large mammals, many species of which were hunted to extinction. The transition to agriculture was not a choice of preference, but an improvisation adopted under duress to make up for shortfalls in the diet. Foraging continued to predominate in those areas farther north, where the warming trend had not adversely affected the habitats of large mammals, and in tropical rainforests, where the global warming trend did not have the perverse effect of reducing food supplies. Since the advent of farming, it has been far more common for changes to be precipitated by the cooling rather than the warming of the climate.
A modest understanding of the dynamics of climatic change in past societies could well prove useful in the event that climates continue to fluctuate. If you know that a drop of one degree Centigrade on average reduces the growing season by three to four weeks and shaves five hundred feet off the maximum elevation at which crops can be grown, then you know something about the boundary conditions that will confine people’s action in the future.20 You can use this knowledge to forecast changes in everything from grain prices to land values. You may even be able to draw informed conclusions about the likely impact of falling temperatures on real incomes and political stability. In the past, governments have been overthrown when crop failures extending over several years raised food prices and shrank disposable incomes.
For example, it is no coincidence that the seventeenth century, the coldest in the modern period, was also a period of revolution worldwide. A hidden megapolitical cause of this unhappiness was sharply colder weather. It was so cold, in fact, that wine froze on the “Sun King’s” table at Versailles. Shortened growing seasons produced crop failures and undermined real income. Because of the colder weather, prosperity began to wind down into a long global depression that began around 1620. It proved drastically destabilizing. The economic crisis of the seventeenth century led to the world being overwhelmed by rebellions, many clustering in 1648, exactly two hundred years before another and more famous cycle of rebellions. Between 1640 and 1650, there were rebellions in Ireland, Scotland, England, Portugal, Catalonia, France, Moscow, Naples, Sicily, Brazil, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Even China and Japan were swept with unrest.
It may also be no coincidence that mercantilism predominated in the seventeenth century during a period of shrinking trade. Economic closure was perhaps most pronounced at the end of the century, “when a terrible famine occurred.”21 By the eighteenth century, especially after 1750, warmer temperatures and higher crop yields had begun to raise real incomes in Western Europe sufficiently to expand demand for manufactured goods. More free-market policies were adopted. This led to a self-reinforcing burst of economic growth as industry expanded to a larger scale in what is commonly described as the Industrial Revolution. The growing importance of technology and manufactured output reduced the impact of the weather on economic cycles.
Even today, however, you should not underestimate the impact of suddenly colder weather in lowering real incomes—even in wealthy regions such as North America. There is a strong tendency for societies to render themselves crisis-prone when the existing configuration of institutions has exhausted its potential. In the past, this tendency has often been manifested by population increases that stretched the carrying capacity of land to the limit. This happened both before the transition of the year 1000 and again at the end of the fifteenth century. The plunge in real income caused by crop failures and lower yields played a significant role in both instances in destroying the predominant institutions. Today the marginalization is manifested in the consumer credit markets. If sharply colder weather reduced crop yields and lowered disposable incomes, this would lead to debt default as well as tax rebellions. If the past is a guide, both economic closure and political instability could result.
3. Microbes convey power to harm or immunity from harm in ways that have often determined how power was exercised. This was certainly the case in the European conquest of the New World, as we explored in The Great Reckoning. European settlers, arriving from settled agricultural societies riddled with disease, brought with them relative immunity from childhood infections like measles. The Indians they encountered lived largely in thinly populated foraging bands. They possessed no such immunity and were decimated. Often, the greatest mortality occurred before white people even arrived, as Indians who first encountered Europeans on the coasts traveled inland with infections.
There are also microbiological barriers to the exercise of power. In Blood in the Streets, we discussed the role that potent strains of malaria served in making tropical Africa impervious to invasion by white men for many centuries. Before the discovery of quinine in the mid-nineteenth century, white armies could not survive in malarial regions, however superior their weapons might have been.
The interaction between humans and microbes has also produced important demographic effects that altered the costs and rewards of violence. When fluctuations in mortality are high due to epidemic disease, famine, or other causes, the relative risk of mortality in warfare falls. The declining frequency of eruptions in death rates from the sixteenth century onward helps explain smaller family size and, ultimately, the far lower tolerance of sudden death in war today as compared to the past. This has had the effect of lowering the tolerance for imperialism and raising the costs of projecting power in societies with low birthrates.
Contemporary societies, comprising small families, tend to find even small numbers of battle deaths intolerable. By contrast, early modern societies were much more tolerant of the mortality costs associated with imperialism. Before this century, most parents gave birth to many children, some of whom were expected to die randomly and suddenly from disease. In an era when early death was commonplace, would-be soldiers and their families faced the dangers of the battlefield with less resistance.
“Machinery is aggressive. The weaver becomes a web, the machinist a machine. If you do not use tools, they use you." —EMERSON
4. Technology has played by far the largest role in determining the costs and rewards of projecting power during the modern centuries. The argument of this book presumes it will continue to do so. Technology has several crucial dimensions:
Balance between offense and defense. The balance between the offense and the defense implied by prevailing weapons technology helps determine the scale of political organization. When offensive capabilities are rising, the ability to project power at a distance predominates, jurisdictions tend to consolidate, and governments form on a larger scale. At other times, like now, defensive capabilities are rising. This makes it more costly to project power outside of core areas. Jurisdictions tend to devolve, and big governments break down into smaller ones.
Equality and the predominance of the infantry. A key feature determining the degree of equality among citizens is the nature of weapons technology. Weapons that are relatively cheap, can be employed by nonprofessionals, and enhance the military importance of infantry tend to equalize power. When Thomas Jefferson wrote that “all men are created equal,” he was saying something that was much more true than a similar statement would have seemed centuries earlier. A farmer with his hunting rifle was not only as well armed as the typical British soldier with his Brown Bess, he was better armed. The farmer with the rifle could shoot at the soldier from a greater distance, and with greater accuracy than the soldier could return fire. This was a distinctly different circumstance from the Middle Ages, when a farmer with a pitchfork—he could not have afforded more—could scarcely have hoped to stand against a heavily armed knight on horseback. No one was writing in 1276 that “all men are created equal.” At that time, in the most manifestly important sense, men were not equal. A single knight exercised far more brute force than dozens of peasants put together.
Advantages and disadvantages of scale in violence. Another variable that helps determine whether there are a few large governments or many small ones is the scale of organization required to deploy the prevailing weapons. When there are increasing returns to violence, it is more rewarding to operate governments at a large scale; therefore governments tend to get bigger. When a small group can command effective means of resisting an assault by a large group, which was the case during the Middle Ages, sovereignty tends to fragment. Small, independent authorities exercise many of the functions of government. As we explore in a latter chapter, we believe that the Information Age will bring the dawn of cybersoldiers, who will be heralds of devolution. Cybersoldiers could be deployed not merely by nation-states but by very small organizations, and even by individuals. Wars of the next millennium will include some almost bloodless battles fought with computers.
Economies of scale in production. Another important factor that weighs in the balance in determining whether ultimate power is exercised locally or from a distance is the scale of the predominant enterprises in which people gain their livelihoods. When crucial enterprises can function optimally only when they are organized on a large scale in an encompassing trading area, governments that expand to provide such a setting for enterprises under their protection may rake off enough additional wealth to pay the costs of maintaining a large political system. Under such conditions, the entire world economy usually functions more effectively where one supreme world power dominates all others, as the British Empire did in the nineteenth century. But sometimes megapolitical variables combine to produce falling economies of scale. If the economic benefits of maintaining a large trading area dwindle, larger governments that previously prospered from exploiting the benefits of encompassing trading areas may begin to break apart—even if the balance of weaponry between offense and defense otherwise remains much as it had been.
Dispersal of technology. Still another factor that contributes to the power equation is the degree of dispersal of key technologies. When weapons or tools of production can be effectively hoarded or monopolized, they tend to centralize power. Even technologies that are essentially defensive in character, like the machine gun, proved to be potent offensive weapons, that contributed to a rising scale of governance during the period when they were not widely dispersed. When the European powers enjoyed a monopoly on machine guns late in the nineteenth century, they were able to use those weapons against peoples at the periphery to dramatically expand colonial empires. Later, in the twentieth century, when machine guns became widely available, especially in the wake of World War II, they were deployed to help destroy the power of empires. Other things being equal, the more widely dispersed key technologies are, the more widely dispersed power will tend to be, and the smaller the optimum scale of government.
14大政治变量的演进速度THE SPEED OF MEGAPOLITICAL CHANGE
虽然技术是决定大政治变革的最重要因素,而且明显越来越重要,但在历史上,这四种因素都对权力的规模发挥了关键的影响。它们交织在一起共同决定了,当暴力扩张到更大的范围,它的回报是否随之上升。这进而决定了,在权力规模和资源运用效率之间进行取舍的重要性,并强烈影响着收入在市场上的分配。现在的问题是,它们在未来会扮演什么样的角色?要回答这个问题,就必须认识到,这些变量的演进速度是完全不同的。
在整个有记载的人类历史中,地形几乎是一成不变的。除了港口淤塞、垃圾填埋或地质侵蚀等局部的小变化之外,今天的地形状况与亚当和夏娃走出伊甸园时基本没差;而且,它还会继续保持现在,除非新的冰川期来临,或者发生剧烈的事件。在更深远的时间范畴,地质年代可能改变,也许是对大型陨石撞击的反应,发生时间为 1000 万至 4000 万年之间。有一天,可能会再次发生地质运动,颠覆我们星球的地形地貌。如果这样的话,你可以准确地预测到,棒球和板球的比赛都将被取消。
气候波动比地质运动要活跃得多。在过去的 100 万年里,气候是造成已知大部分地表变化的推手。在冰河时代,冰川开凿山谷,改变河流走向,将岛屿从大陆割裂,或者降低海平面使它们相连。气候波动对历史影响甚巨。它先是在上一次冰川期结束后催生了农业革命,后来又在低温和干旱期破坏了制度的稳定。
最近,人们又对“全球变暖”表示担忧,也不无道理。但是,长远来看,更可能发生的气候变化似乎是变冷,而不是变暖。根据从海底采集的样本中的氧同位素分析,对温度波动的研究表明,目前是 200 多万年以来第二温暖的时期。从 17世纪的历史我们知道,如果天气变冷,就会影响社会稳定。从这个意义上说,全球变暖的警报反而令人比较安心。如果真的变暖,那就保证了气温将在异常温暖和相对良好之间继续波动,就像过去三个世纪所经历的。
微生物的演变速度对权力的影响,令人比较迷惑。微生物变异非常快,特别是病毒。例如,普通感冒就以几何量级的速度变异。尽管微生物变异速度很快,但在改变权力边界的影响上,它们却没有技术的变革那么突然。部分原因可能是,自然界为了保持平衡,让微生物只是感染而不杀死宿主,对它们更为有利;毒性太强、太容易杀死宿主的病毒也会使自己难以存活。寄生微生物能够生存,关键就在于它们对宿主不能过于致命,或者全部是致命型的。
当然,打破权力平衡的致命疾病,也不是不可能爆发。这类事件在历史上占据重要地位。黑死病消灭了欧亚大陆的大部分人口,给 14 世纪的国际经济造成了毁灭性的打击。
While technology is by far the most important factor today, and apparently growing more so, all four major megapolitical factors have played a role in determining the scale at which power could be exercised in the past.
Together, these factors determine whether the returns to violence continue to rise as violence is employed on a larger scale. This determines the importance of magnitude of firepower versus efficiency in employing resources. It also strongly influences the market distribution of income. The question is, What role will they command in the future? A key to estimating an answer lies in recognizing that these megapolitical variables mutate at dramatically different speeds.
Topography has been almost fixed through the whole of recorded history. Except for minor local effects involving the silting of harbors, landfills, or erosion, the topography of the earth is almost the same today as it was when Adam and Eve straggled out of Eden. And it is likely to remain so until another Ice Age recarves the landscapes of continents or some other drastic event disturbs the surface of the earth. At a more profound scale, geological ages seem to shift, perhaps in response to large meteorite strikes, over a period of 10 to 40 million years. Someday, there may again be geological upheavals that will alter significantly the topography of our planet. If that happens, you can safely assume that both the baseball and cricket seasons will be canceled.
Climate fluctuates much more actively than topography. In the last million years, climatic change has been responsible for most of the known variation in the features of the earth’s surface. During Ice Ages, glaciers gouged new valleys, altered the course of rivers, severed islands from continents or joined them together by lowering the sea level. Fluctuations in climate have played a significant role in history, first in precipitating the Agricultural Revolution after the close of the last Ice Age, and later in destabilizing regimes during periods of colder temperatures and drought.
Lately, there have been concerns over the possible impact of “global warming.” These concerns cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet, taking a longer perspective, the more likely risk appears to be a shift toward a colder, not a warmer climate. Study of temperature fluctuations based upon analysis of oxygen isotopes in core samples taken from the ocean floor show that the current period is the second warmest in more than 2 million years.22 If temperatures were to turn colder, as they did in the seventeenth century, that might prove megapolitically destabilizing. Current alarms about global warming may in that sense be reassuring. To the extent that they are true, that assures that temperatures will continue to fluctuate within the abnormally warm and relatively benign range experienced for the past three centuries.
The rate of change in the influence of microbes on the exercise of power is more of a puzzle. Microbes can mutate very rapidly. This is especially true of viruses. The common cold, for example, mutates in an almost kaleidoscopic way. Yet although these mutations proceed apace, their impact in shifting the boundaries where power is exercised have been far less abrupt than technological change. Why? Part of the reason is that the normal balance of nature tends to make it beneficial for microbes to infect but not destroy host populations. Virulent infections that kill their hosts too readily tend to eradicate themselves in the process. The survival of microparasites depends upon their not being too rapidly or uniformly fatal to the hosts they invade.
That is not to say, of course, that there cannot be deadly eruptions of disease that alter the balance of power. Such episodes have figured prominently in history. The Black Death wiped out large fractions of the population of Eurasia and dealt a crushing blow to the fourteenth-century version of the international economy.
15历史的如果与可能What Might Have Been
我们可以从两个角度去理解历史,一是思考它本可能发生什么,二是看它事实上发生了什么。我们看不出有什么理由能说明,微寄生虫不会继续对现代人类社会大肆破坏。例如,有些微生物类似疟疾,但毒性更强,它本可能对权力的扩张构成障碍,阻止西方人对周边地区的侵略。第一批葡萄牙冒险家驶入非洲水域时,他们本可能感染一种逆转录病毒,就是传染性更强的艾滋病,从而使新的亚洲贸易路线在开辟之前流产。哥伦布和第一波新大陆的定居者,原本也可能遇到各种疾病,遭到灭顶之灾;就像那些被西方人带来的麻疹和其他儿童传染病灭绝的原住民一样。但是,这些本可能发生的事情,都没有发生。这种巧合强化了人们的直觉,那就是历史自有定数。
在现代时期,微生物对政权巩固造成的阻碍,远远小于对其的促进作用。在外围殖民地扩张的西方军队和殖民者往往会发现,他们在技术上的优势会被微生物因素所放大。西方人被看不见的生物武器所武装,对某些儿童流行病具有相对的免疫力,而这些流行病则足以灭绝当地的原住民。所以,来自欧洲的航海者具有明显的优势,而他们的对手生活在人口密度较低的地区,完全处于下风。随着事态的发展,疾病的传播几乎是单向的,那就是从欧洲向外扩散;而在相反的方向,从外围向欧洲核心,并没有对应的转移。
可能有一个反例,有人说西方探险家将梅毒从新世界传入了欧洲。这一点存在争议。但即使是真的,梅毒也没有影响权力的扩张,它主要影响了西方的性道德。
从 15 世纪末截至 20 世纪的最后 25 年之前,微生物对工业社会的影响是日趋良性的。尽管肺结核、小儿麻痹症和流感导致了很多个体的悲剧与不幸,但在整个现代时期,类似安敦宁瘟疫或黑死病那样大政治影响力级别的疾病,并没有爆发。公共卫生的改善,疫苗和解毒剂的发明,普遍降低了传染性微生物对现代社会的威胁,这也相对提高了技术对设定权力边界的重要性。
但是,现代近期出现的艾滋病,以及对可能大面积传播的外来病毒的警告,也许暗示着,未来不会再像过去 500 年那样,微生物对大政治的影响完全是良性的。是否以及何时会出现新的瘟疫,造成全世界大面积感染,是不可知的。相比气候或地形的剧烈变动,寄生微生物的爆发,如病毒大流行,将更有可能挑战技术在大政治变量中的主导地位。
我们没办法检测或预测,地球生命的性质与我们已知的会发生多大的背离。我们只能祈祷,在下一个千年,最重要的大政治变量是技术而不是微生物。如果运气继续站在人类一边的话,技术作为大政治变量中主导因素,将越来越重要。然而,通过对第一场大政治变革,也就是农业革命的回顾,我们可以清楚地看到,历史并非总如人们所愿。
译注:沃尔夫·布利策(Wolf Blitzer)是美国资深电视新闻主持人。
译注:威尔·杜兰特(Will Durant)是美国历史学者,以《世界文明史》闻名。
译注:此处原注所引为相关中文参考书目。
译注:C. W. Previte-Orton 是英国中世纪史学者。
译注:这里指一位耶鲁历史学家及其 1988 年出版的《腐败与罗马的衰亡》。
译注:这里指西奈西乌斯(Synesius),晚期古典世界的主教、哲学家和作家。
换算后约 152.4 米。
History can be understood in terms of what might have been as well as what was. We know of no reason that microparasites could not have continued to play havoc with human society during the modern period. For example, it is possible that microbiological barriers to the exercise of power, equivalent to malaria but more virulent, could have halted the Western invasion of the periphery in its tracks. The first intrepid Portuguese adventurers who sailed into African waters could have contracted a deadly retrovirus, a more communicable version of AIDS, that would have stopped the opening of the new trade route to Asia before it even began. Columbus, too, and the first waves of settlers in the New World might have encountered diseases that decimated them in the same way that indigenous local populations were affected by measles and other Western childhood diseases. Yet nothing of the kind happened, a coincidence that underlines the intuition that history has a destiny.
Microbes did far less to impede the consolidation of power in the modern period than to facilitate it. Western troops and colonists at the periphery often found that the technological advantages that allowed them to project power were underscored by microbiological ones. Westerners were armed with unseen biological weapons, their relative immunity to childhood diseases that frequently devastated native peoples. This gave voyagers from the West a distinct advantage that their antagonists from less densely settled regions lacked. As events unfolded, the disease transfer was almost entirely in one direction—from Europe outward. There was no equivalent transfer of disease in the other direction, from the periphery to the core.
As a possible counterexample, some have claimed that Western explorers imported syphilis from the New World to Europe. This is arguable. If true, however, it did not prove to be a significant barrier to the exercise of power. The major impact of syphilis was to shift sexual mores in the West.
From the end of the fifteenth century to the last quarter of the twentieth, the impact of microbes on industrial society was ever more benign. Notwithstanding the personal tragedies and unhappiness caused by outbreaks of tuberculosis, polio, and flu, no new diseases emerged in the modern period that even approached the megapolitical impact of the Antonine plagues or the Black Death. Improving public health, and the advent of vaccinations and antidotes, generally reduced the importance of infectious microbes during the modern period, thereby increasing the relative importance of technology in setting the boundaries where power was exercised.
The recent emergence of AIDS and alarms over the potential spread of exotic viruses are hints that the role of microbes may not be altogether as megapolitically benign in the future as it has been over the past five hundred years. But when or whether a new plague will infect the world is unknowable. An eruption of microparasites, such as a viral pandemic, rather than drastic changes in climate or topography, would more likely disrupt the megapolitical predominance of technology.
We have no way of monitoring or anticipating drastic departures from the nature of life on earth as we have known it. We cross our fingers and assume that the major megapolitical variables in the next millennium will be technological rather than microbiological. If luck continues to side with humanity, technology will continue to grow in prominence as the leading megapolitical variable.
It was not always such, however, as a review of the first great megapolitical transformation, the Agricultural Revolution, clearly shows.