BILINGUAL READING · 第03章

农业革命与政府的出现

CHAPTER 3 EAST OF EDEN The Agricultural Revolution and the Sophistication of Violence

桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。

导读 本章论证

  • 农业创造了固定、可积累、可掠夺的财富。
  • 财产保护成为专业活动,暴力组织也能通过提供保护或实施掠夺获利。
  • 政府可被理解为在特定地域内垄断保护和暴力的组织。

01开篇Opening

中文译本

耶和华对该隐1说:“你的兄弟亚伯2在哪里?”他说:“我不知道!我岂是看守我兄弟的么?”耶和华说,“你作了什么事呢?你兄弟的血有声音从地里向我哀号3。 —— 创世记 4:9-10

五百代人之前,人类社会组织的第一场阶段性变革开始了。在几个不同的地区,我们的祖先极不情愿地拿起粗糙的工具,削尖的木桩和拼装的锄头,开始下地干活。他们种下了第一批庄稼,同时为权力的世界奠定了新的地基。农业革命是第一场伟大的经济和社会革命。它从亚当和夏娃被逐出伊甸园开始,发展非常缓慢,以至于到 20 世纪开幕,在全球适合农耕的所有地区,农业还没有完全地取代狩猎和采集。专家们认为,即使在最早出现农业的近东地区,它也是在“一个漫长的过程中逐渐引进的”,可能用了五千年甚至更长的时间。

将一个蔓延数千年的进程描述为一场“革命”,似乎有点虚夸。然而,正是农耕的出现,开启了一场慢动作的革命,使人类的生活因暴力逻辑的变化而彻底改变。

凡是农业扎根的地方,暴力都会成为社会生活中的主要特征,善于操纵或控制暴力的阶层就开始主宰社会。

理解农业革命是认识信息革命的第一步。耕作与收割技术的导入,为我们提供了一个范例,它说明了:一个明显很简单的工作性质的转变,就可以从根本上革新社会的组织形式。看透这场过去的革命,你就可以更准确地预测,当微处理器的导入再次革新暴力的逻辑,历史会对此做出怎样的反应。

要理解农业革命的特征,你首先需要了解农耕之前的原始社会是如何运作的。我们在《大清算》中对此做了研究,下面会做进一步的概述。在漫长的史前沉睡期,人类的生活经过一代又一代人,都变化不大,甚至可以说毫无改变。狩猎和采集是那时唯一的社会组织形式。人类学家认为,自从人类出现在地球,在 99%的时间内都是狩猎采集者。狩猎采集的部落能够长久生存但最终又彻底消亡,关键在于,他们必须在一个非常广阔的区域内以一个很小的规模去活动。

觅食者(即狩猎采集者)只能在人口密度低的地方生存。你要问为什么,请想一下大群体的问题。首先,1000 名猎人在同一个地方一起狩猎,会引起很大的骚动,吓跑他们的猎物。更糟糕的是,如果一群猎人偶然捕获了大批的猎物,他们得到的食物,包括野外发现的水果和能吃的植物,也没办法长期保持充足和新鲜。

大规模的觅食队伍,就会像三十年战争中饥饿难耐的军队一样,因为过度地采摘而毁坏了农田。因此,为了减少过度捕杀,狩猎的组织必须是小团伙。正如斯蒂芬·博伊登(Stephen Boyden)在《生物学视角下的西方文明》(Western Civilization in Biological Perspective)中所写的:“狩猎采集的团体最常见的规模是 25 到 50 人之间。”今天,在温和的气候下生活在上万英亩的土地上是一种奢侈,只有超级富豪才能享受到。但是,一个狩猎采集者的家庭,如果没有这么多的地就很难活下去;即使在最肥沃的觅食区,他们通常也需要人均数千英亩的土地。这就可以说明,为什么在特别适合觅食的历史时期,人口的增长会导致后来的人口危机。由于养活一个人需要那么大面积的土地,所以,狩猎采集社会的人口密度非常稀疏。在农耕出现以前,人类的居住密度跟熊差不多。

那时候的人在饮食上跟熊也大同小异。觅食社会赖以生存的食物,主要来自于开放的田野或附近的水体中。虽然有些采集者是渔民,但大部分是猎人,他们 1/3到 1/5 的饮食依靠大型哺乳动物的蛋白质。除了一点简单的工具和随身携带的物品外,狩猎采集者几乎不掌握任何技术。他们没办法有效地储存大量的肉类或其他事物,以供日后食用。大部分食物在得到以后就要尽快吃完,不然就只能任其变质。当然,这并不意味着他们不吃变质的食物。博伊登在书中说,“据说爱斯基摩人就非常喜欢吃腐烂的东西。”他复述了专家们的观察,爱斯基摩人会“把鱼头埋起来,让它们腐烂,等到骨头变得和鱼肉一样黏稠,他们就会把这些散发着恶臭的东西揉成面团状然后吃下去。”他们还喜欢“生吃驯鹿尸体上肥大的蛆状幼虫……鹿的粪便,像浆果一样嚼着吃……还有腐烂一年多的骨髓,上面爬满了驱虫。”除了这些美味佳肴之外,觅食者基本没开发出其他的食物。人类学家格雷格指出,“流动人口一般不储存食品,以应对资源供应的季节性或意外性的短缺。”因此,觅食者也没什么可偷的。在无法储存多余食物的情况下,劳动分工包括暴力的专业化是行不通的。狩猎的逻辑也决定了,狩猎觅食部落之间的暴力永远也不可能上升到很大的规模,因为这些群体自身就必须保持小规模。

在另一个方面,小规模对觅食组织也大有裨益。小群体的成员彼此都很熟悉,合作起来更加高效。因为随着成员人数的增加,激烈的难度会激增,做决策就越来越困难。你可以想一下,组织成百上千的人,在一个流动的宴席上走来走去是多么的让人绝望。狩猎采集的部落没有稳定独立的政治组织或官僚机构,专门去处理战争事宜,所以他们只能依赖于说服和共识,这在关系温和的小团体中最好用。

至于狩猎采集者是否随和,还有待商榷。亨利·梅因爵士(Henry Maine)提到过“原始人普遍好战”。用他的话说,“在自然界和原始社会中,普遍状态不是和平,而是战争。”他的观点得到了进化生物学家研究的支持。保罗·肖和王玉华4(Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong)评论说,“有明显的迹象显示,在第四冰川期及之前阶段,在欧洲的南方古猿人、直立人和智人的遗骸中,有许多伤痕明显是由打斗造成的。”但也有人对此表示怀疑。像斯蒂芬·博伊登这样的专家认为,原始群体通常不喜欢战争,不容易发生暴力。原始社会的习俗主要是为了减少内部的紧张关系,促进猎物的分享。特别是在捕猎大型动物的地区,这些猎物对猎人个体来说是一种崇拜,因此出现了宗教和社会信条,用来支持对集体捕获的任何猎物的重新分配。与其他猎人分享热量来源是摆在首位的,所以,必要性而不是情感,才是激励的动因。首先分得资源的是最有经济能力及最具战斗力的人,而不是老弱病残。这种优先权的形成,毫无疑问,是因为正值壮年的猎人是整个团队种最具战斗力的。保证他们的优先权,整个团队就可以最大限度地减少潜在的致命内斗。

只要人口密度保持比较低的水平,觅食者就不会崇拜好战的神,而是崇拜自然力量或者他们狩猎的动物的化身。因为资本匮乏,边境开放,大部分情况下根本没必要打仗。除了自己的小家庭或者部落,也很少有什么邻居能构成威胁。觅食者往往都是四处漫游去寻找食物,超出最低生存限度的个人财产其实是一种负担。

财产不多,就不容易遭到抢劫。如果发生冲突,争执的双方会倾向于走开,反正他们在任何地方都没有什么特定的投资。对于个人之见的恩怨或者其他过分的要求,逃离是个很简单的解决办法。但这并不意味着早期的人类都爱好和平,他们的暴力和凶残可能超出我们的想象。但如果他们使用暴力,那主要是出于个人原因,或者更糟糕的,只是为了做运动。

狩猎采集者的生存取决于他们在小范围内的运作能力,除了性别的分工,几乎没有其他分工的空间。他们没有政府组织,通常也没有永久的居住点,也不可能积累财富。甚至像书面语言这种基本的文明构成在原始社会也不存在,没有书面语言,就不可能有正式的记录和历史。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

“And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said, I know not; Am I my brother’s keeper? And he said, What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground”. —GENESIS 4:9-10

Five hundred generations ago, the first phase change in the organization of human society began.1 Our ancestors in several regions reluctantly picked up crude implements, sharpened stakes and makeshift hoes, and went to work. As they sowed the first crops, they also laid a new foundation for power in the world. The Agricultural Revolution was the first great economic and social revolution. It started with the expulsion from Eden and moved so slowly that farming had not completely displaced hunting and gathering in all suitable areas of the globe when the twentieth century opened. Experts believe that even in the Near East, where farming first emerged, it was introduced in “a long incremental process” that “may have taken five thousand years or more.”2

It may seem an exaggeration to describe a process that stretched out over millennia as a “revolution.” Yet that is precisely what the advent of farming was, a slow-motion revolution that transformed human life by altering the logic of violence. Wherever farming took root, violence emerged as a more important feature of social life. Hierarchies adept at manipulating or controlling violence came to dominate society.

Understanding the Agricultural Revolution is a first step toward understanding the Information Revolution. The introduction of tilling and harvesting provides a paradigm example of how an apparently simple shift in the character of work can radically alter the organization of society. Put this past revolution into perspective and you are in a far stronger position to forecast how history may unfold in response to the new logic of violence introduced with microprocessors.

To appreciate the revolutionary character of agriculture, you first need a picture of how the primeval society functioned before farming. We surveyed this in The Great Reckoning and offer a further sketch below. Hunting-and-gathering societies were the only forms of social organization through a long, prehistoric slumber when human life changed little or not at all from generation to generation. Anthropologists claim that humans have been hunters and gatherers for 99 percent of the time since we appeared on earth. Crucial to the long success and ultimate failure of hunting-and-gathering bands is the fact that they had to operate on a very small scale over a very wide area.

Foragers could survive only where population densities were light. To see why, think of the problems that larger groups would have posed. For one thing, a thousand hunters parading together across a landscape would have raised such a ruckus as to scare away the game they sought to trap. And even worse, had a small army of hunters occasionally managed to corner a huge herd of game, the food they harvested, including fruits and edible plants found in the wild, could not have remained plentiful for long. A large group of foragers would have laid waste to the countryside through overharvesting like a starving army in the Thirty Years War. Therefore, to minimize overkill, hunting bands had to be small. As Stephen Boyden writes in Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, “Most commonly, hunter-gatherer groups number between twenty-five and fifty individuals.”3

To live on ten thousand acres in a temperate climate today is a luxury allowed only to the very rich. A family of hunter-gatherers could scarcely have survived on less. They generally required thousands of acres per person, even in areas that were most fertile for foraging. This suggests why the growth of human populations during periods particularly favorable to foraging may have created the basis for population crises. Because so much land was required to support a single person, the population densities of hunting-and-gathering societies had to be incredibly sparse. Before farming, humans were about as densely settled as bears.

With minor differences, the human diet resembled that of bears. Foraging societies depended upon food gathered from the open countryside or from nearby bodies of water. Although some gatherers were fishers, most were hunters who depended for a third to a fifth of their food upon protein from large mammals. Other than a few simple tools and objects carried around with them, hunter-gatherers had almost no technology at their disposal. They usually had no way to effectively store quantities of meat or other foods for later use. Most food had to be consumed soon after it was gathered or left to spoil. That is not say, of course, that some hunter-gatherers did not eat spoiled food. Eskimos, as Boyden reports, “are said to have a particular liking for decomposed food.”4 He repeats the observations of experts that Eskimos “ ‘bury fish heads and allow them to decay until the bones become of the same consistency as the flesh. They then knead the reeking mass into a paste and eat it’; they also enjoy the ‘fat maggoty larvae of the caribou fly served raw … deer droppings, munched like berries… and marrow more than a year old, swarming with maggots.’ ”5

Other than such delicacies, foragers developed little surplus food. As anthropologist Gregg notes, “mobile populations generally do not store foodstuffs against seasonal or unexpected lows in resource availability.” Consequently, foragers had little to steal. A division of labor that included specialization to employ violence was insupportable in settings where surplus food could not be stored. The logic of the hunt also dictated that violence among hunting-and-foraging bands could never rise above a small scale because the groups themselves had to remain tiny.

The small scale of foraging bands was advantageous in another way. Members of such small groups would have known one another intimately, a factor that made them more effective in working together. Decision-making becomes more difficult as numbers rise, because incentive traps proliferate. You need only think how hard it is to get a dozen people organized to go out to dinner. Imagine how hopeless would have been the task of organizing hundreds or thousands of persons to traipse around on a moveable feast. Lacking any sustained and separate political organization or bureaucracy required by specialization for war, hunting-and-gathering bands had to depend on persuasion and consensus—principles that work best among small groups with relatively easygoing attitudes.

Whether hunting-and-gathering bands were easygoing is open to debate. Sir Henry Maine refers to “the universal belligerency of primitive man.” In his words, “It is not peace which is natural and primitive but war.”6 His view has been underlined by the work of evolutionary biologists. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong comment: “[T]here are strong indications that many of the injuries apparent in remains of Australopithecus, Homo erectus, and Homo sapiens of the European fourth and pre-fourth glacial periods resulted from combat.”7 But others doubt this. Experts like Stephen Boyden argue that primitive groups were usually not warlike or prone to violence. Social conventions developed to reduce internal tensions and facilitate the sharing of the hunt. Especially in areas where humans preyed on larger game, which was difficult for a single hunter to fell, religious and social doctrines emerged to facilitate the redistribution of any game that was taken with the whole group. The first priority of sharing of caloric resources was with other hunters. Necessity, rather than sentiment, was the spur. The first claim on the resources was exercised by the most economically competent and militarily strong, not by the sick and the weak. Undoubtedly, a major influence informing this priority was the fact that hunters in the prime of life were also militarily the most potent members of the small band. By assuring them a first claim on the hunt, the group minimized potentially lethal internal squabbling.

So long as population densities remained low, the foragers’ gods were not militant gods but embodiments of natural forces or the animals they hunted. The scantiness of capital and open frontiers made war in most cases unnecessary. There were few neighbors outside one’s own small family or clan to pose threats. Because foragers tended to roam in search of food, personal possessions beyond a bare minimum became an encumbrance. Those with few possessions necessarily experienced little property crime. When conflicts arose, the contending parties were often content to walk away because they had little invested in any given locale. Escape was an easy solution to personal feuds or exorbitant demands of other kinds. This does not mean that early humans were peaceful. They may have been violent and unpleasant to a degree we can scarcely imagine. But if they employed violence, it was mostly for personal reasons or, what may be worse, for sport.

The livelihoods of hunter-gatherers depended upon their functioning in small bands that allowed little or no scope for a division of labor other than along gender lines. They had no organized government, usually no permanent settlements, and no possibility for accumulating wealth. Even such basic building blocks of civilization as a written language were unknown in the primeval economy. Without a written language there could be no formal records and no history.

02过度猎杀Overkill

中文译本

觅食动力学发展出来的工作动机,与我们在农业出现后所习惯的工作动机大不相同。觅食者所需要的生活资本是最小的,只需一点原始的工具和武器就够了。他们没有投资渠道,也没有土地等私有财产,除了偶尔在采石场凿几块打火石或肥皂石。人类学家苏珊·艾琳·格雷格在《觅食者与农民》中写道,“(觅食者的)资源的所有权和使用权”是由“群体共同拥有的。”因为没有固定的住所,他们也不需要努力干活获得财产或维护财产;他们没有抵押贷款,不交税,也不需要购置家具。他们为数不多的消费品是动物皮毛,以及由团体成员自制的个人装饰品。没有什么可买的,也就没有什么动力去获取或积累可以被当作金钱的东西。

在这种情况下,对于觅食者来说,储蓄只是一个还未发展起来的概念。

没有赚钱的理由,就基本没有劳动分工,勤奋工作作为一种美德概念,对狩猎采集者来说肯定是陌生的。除了在非常的困难时期,需要长时间出去觅食,在大部分时间内,他们很少干活,因为没什么需求。超出最低限度生存所需的工作,实际上也不会得到更多东西。所以,狩猎采集部落里的成员,每周只需工作 8-15个小时。猎人的劳动并不能增加食物的供应,反而会消耗它。如果一个人殷勤地加班,猎杀了更多的动物或者采集了更多的水果,在腐烂变质之前吃不掉,那他对集体的繁荣其实没有任何贡献。相反,过度地猎杀会影响未来觅食的前景,对集体的福祉产生不利的后果。这就是为什么一些觅食者,如爱斯基摩人,会惩罚或排斥那些过度猎杀的成员。

爱斯基摩人惩罚过度猎杀的例子特别有说服力,因为相比其他人类,他们更有条件和能力通过冷冻去储存更多的肉类。或者,至少可以储存一些从大型海洋动物中提炼的油。但觅食者很少这么做,这反映出他们在与自然的互动中非常被动。

这可能也说明了,人类的认知和智力发展受文化影响的程度。复杂环境对学习和行为的限制,使得要采用某些策略比看起来要困难得多。就像保罗·肖和王玉华所写的那样,“生态位千差万别,对学习的偏见也是如此。”从这个角度看,农业的出现不仅仅改变了人类的饮食结构,还改变了暴力的逻辑,启动了经济生活和文化组织的重大变革。农业创造了大规模的土地资本,有些地方还发明了灌溉系统。农民培养的农作物和饲养的动物都是有价值的资产,它们可以被储存和囤积,也会被盗窃。由于农作物从种植到收获的整个生长季节都需要照顾,特别是在干旱地区,农业只局限在有可靠水源的小块土地上,这就使得人们即使面临威胁,也不太愿意逃离到别处了。逃离越来越难以选择,有组织的抢劫和掠夺就增加了。到了收割季节,农民特别容易遭到袭击,这逐渐提高了战斗的规模。

社会的规模因此而扩大,因为在暴力的竞争中,获胜的往往是人数更多的群体。

对土地的争夺以及对土地产出的控制越来越激烈,社会变得更加固定。劳动的分工越来越明显,第一次出现了职业和奴隶制。农民和牧民负责生产食物,陶工负责制造储存粮食的容器,祭司们祈求风调雨顺和粮食丰收。专门从事暴力的人——也就是政府的前身,越来越多地致力于掠夺以及保护自己的社团免受掠夺;这些人和祭祀们一起,成为了人类历史上的第一批富人。

在农业社会早期,这些武士开始控制每年收成的一部分,作为提供保护的成本。

在威胁最小的地方,自耕农有时候还能保留较大的自主权。但是,随着人口密度的增加,对食物的竞争加剧,特别是在沙漠周围,那里能产粮食的土地非常宝贵,保护集团就可以拿走总产量的很大一部分。这些武士抽取的利益高达粮食产量的25%,以及驯养的动物增长量的一半,他们用这些抽成建立了第一批国家。因此,农业极大地提高了压制的重要性。可掠夺资源的激增,带来了掠夺的爆发。

农业革命的全部逻辑用了几千年的时间才完全实现。很长一段时间内,在人口稀疏的温带地区,农民还像他们的觅食者祖先一样生活。在土地和雨水充足的地方,没有太多暴力的干扰,农民们可以小规模地耕作。但随着几千年来人口不断增加,即使在人口稀少的地区,农民也会不定期地遭到掠夺,有时候甚至没有足够的种子去播种下一年的作物。在那些没有保护的社区,由于没有暴力垄断的专门组织,可能就会出现一种极端的情况,就是竞争性的掠夺,或者说是无政府状态。

随着时间推移,农业固有的暴力逻辑,深入到了越来越广阔的地域。不受政府掠夺还可以从事农牧的范围,退缩到了少数真正偏远的地区。举个极端的例子,阿富汗的卡菲尔地区,到 19 世纪的最后十年之前,都一直抵制强加的政府组织。

但为了抵制,在几个世纪之前,他们就演进成了一个好战的民族,按照亲属关系组织起来;即使这样的组织没有能力集结大规模的暴力。在英国人把现代武器带到该地区之前,卡菲尔人5一直在偏远的巴什加尔和瓦加尔山谷中保持着独立,高山和沙漠等地形的保护,在他们的堡垒与外部的征服者之间形成了天然的屏障。

慢慢地,在所有从事农业的社会,农业革命的基本逻辑开始强大起来。农耕大大提高了人类社区的规模。大约一万年以前,城市开始出现了。虽然以今天的标准看,这些城市很小,但它们是第一批“文明”中心,这个词来自于 civitas,在拉丁语中是“公民”或“城市居民”的意思。农业创造了可掠夺和需保护的财产,所以也催生了对库存会计的要求。因为如果不能汇编记录和开具收据,就没办法征税。会计师账簿中使用的符号就是书面语言的雏形,这种创新在狩猎采集者中间从未出现过。

农业还拓宽了人类解决问题的范围。狩猎者生活在一种即时的时间范畴,他们很少开展超过几天的活动。但种植和收割庄稼则需要几个月的时间。从事长时间框架的活动,让农民把注意力投入到了星空之上。详细的天文观察,是制定历法和日历的前提条件;而历法则是作物种植及收割的最佳指南。所以,随着农业的出现,人类的视野扩大了。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The dynamic of foraging created very different incentives to work than those to which we have become accustomed since the advent of farming. The capital requirements for life as a forager were minimal. A few primitive tools and weapons sufficed. There was no outlet for investment, not even private property in land, except occasionally in quarries where flint or soapstone was mined.8 As anthropologist Susan Ailing Gregg wrote in Foragers and Farmers, “Ownership of and access to resources” was “held in common by the group.”9 With rare exceptions, such as fishers living on the shores of lakes, foragers usually had no fixed place of abode. Having no permanent homes, they had little need to work hard to acquire property or maintain it. They had no mortgage or taxes to pay, no furniture to buy. Their few consumer goods were animal skins, and personal adornments made by members of the group themselves. There was little incentive to acquire or accumulate anything that might have passed for money because there was little to buy. Under such conditions, savings for the foragers could have been no more than a rudimentary concept.

With no reason to earn and almost no division of labor, the concept of hard work as a virtue must have been foreign to hunting-and-gathering groups. Except during periods of unusual hardship, when protracted effort was required to find something to eat, little work was done because little was needed. There was literally nothing to be gained by working beyond the bare minimum required for survival. For the members of the typical hunting-and-gathering band, that meant working only about eight to fifteen hours a week.10 Because a hunter’s labor did not augment the food supply but could only reduce it, one who heroically labored overtime to kill more animals or pick more fruit than could be eaten before it spoiled contributed nothing to prosperity. To the contrary, overkill reduced the prospects of finding food in the future, and thus had a detrimental impact on the well-being of the group. That is why some foragers, such as Eskimos, punished or ostracized members of the band who engaged in overkill.

The example of the Eskimos punishing overkill is particularly telling, because they, far more than others, might well have been able to store meat by freezing it. Further, it would have been feasible to provide at least some storage for oils rendered from large marine animals. The fact that foragers generally chose not to do so reflects their far more passive interactions with nature. It may also indicate the degree to which cognition and mental processes are biased by culture. Constraints on learning and behavior in complex environments make adoption of some strategies far more difficult than would otherwise appear. As R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong have written, “Because niches differ in many respects, so, too, do biases in learning.”11

Seen in this perspective, the advent of agriculture entailed more than a change in diet; it also launched a great revolution in the organization of economic life and culture as well as a transformation of the logic of violence. Farming created large-scale capital assets in land and sometimes in irrigation systems. The crops and domesticated animals farmers raised were valuable assets. They could be stored, hoarded, and stolen. Because crops had to be tended over the entire growing season, from planting through harvest, migration away from threats became less attractive, especially in arid regions where opportunities to grow crops were confined to the small areas of the land with dependable water supplies. As escape became more difficult, opportunities for organized shakedowns and plunder increased. Farmers were subject to raids at harvesttime, which gradually raised the scale of warfare.

This tended to increase the size of societies because contests of violence more often than not were won by the larger group. As competition over land and control of its output became more intense, societies became more stationary. A division of labor became more apparent. Employment and slavery arose for the first time. Farmers and herders specialized in producing food. Potters produced containers in which food was stored. Priests prayed for rain and bountiful harvests. Specialists in violence, the forefathers of government, increasingly devoted themselves to plunder and protection from plunder. Along with the priests, they became the first wealthy persons in history.

In the early stages of agricultural societies, these warriors came to control a portion of the annual crop as a price of protection. In places where threats were minimal, yeoman farmers were sometimes able to retain a relatively large degree of autonomy. But as population densities rose, and competition over food intensified, especially in regions around deserts where productive land was at a premium, the warrior group could take a large fraction of total output. These warriors founded the first states with the proceeds of this rake-off, which reached as high as 25 percent of the grain crop and one-half the increase in herds of domesticated animals. Farming, therefore, dramatically increased the importance of coercion. The surge in resources capable of being plundered led to a large surge in plunder.

It took millennia for the full logic of the Agricultural Revolution to play itself out. For a long while, sparse populations of farmers in temperate regions may have lived much as their foraging forebears had done. Where land and rainfall were ample, farmers harvested crops on a small scale without much violent interference. But as populations rose over a period of several thousand years, farmers even in thinly settled regions became subject to erratic plunder that sometimes must have left them with insufficient seed to replant the next year’s crop. Competitive plundering, or anarchy, was a possibility at one extreme, as well as unprotected communities living without any specialized organization to monopolize violence.

As time passed, the logic of violence inherent in agriculture imposed itself over an ever-wider terrain. The regions where farming and herding could continue without the predations of government receded to a few truly remote areas. The Kafir regions of Afghanistan, to cite an extreme example, resisted the imposition of government until the last decade of the nineteenth century. But in so doing, they were transformed centuries earlier into a quite militant society, organized along kinship lines. Such arrangements were not capable of mustering force on a large scale. Until the British brought modern weapons to the region, the Kafirs remained independent in their remote Bashgal and Waigal valleys because their redoubts were protected by features of topography, high mountains, and deserts that stood between them and conquerors from the outside.12

Over time, the basic logic of the Agricultural Revolution impressed itself on the societies where farming took hold. Farming sharply raised the scale at which human communities could form. Beginning about ten thousand years ago, cities began to emerge. Although tiny by today's standards, they were the centers of the first “civilizations,” a word derived from civitas, which means “citizenship” or “inhabitants of a city” in Latin. Because farming created assets to plunder and to protect, it also created a requirement for inventory accounting. You cannot tax unless you can compile records and issue receipts. The symbols employed in the accountant's ledger became the rudiments of written language, an innovation that had never existed among hunters and gatherers.

Farming also extended the horizon over which humans had to solve problems. Hunting bands lived within an immediate time horizon. They seldom undertook projects that lasted more than a few days. But planting and harvesting a crop took months. Pursuing projects of a longer time frame led farmers to train their attentions on the stars. Detailed astronomical observations were a precondition for drawing up almanacs and calendars to serve as guides on when to best plant and reap. With the advent of farming, human horizons expanded.

03财产PROPERTY

中文译本

向定居型农业社会的转变,诞生了私有财产。很显然,没有人愿意眼睁睁看着,他忙碌了一整季种植的作物被别人跑过来抢走。财产的概念是农业发生的必然结果。但是,私有财产作为一个概念,它的明确性也被随农业而来的暴力逻辑给削弱了。因为在觅食社会,每个健康的成年男人都是猎人,且同等武装;而在农耕时代,个人的大政治力量不再像觅食社会那么平等,这使得财产的情况变得很复杂。农耕使得暴力开始专业化。因为它生产了可以偷和抢的东西,投资于更好的武器装备就变得有利可图。结果就是大部分的盗抢都是高度组织化的。

强力之人开始构建一种新的掠夺形式:地方暴力的垄断组织,或者叫政府。社会因此而急剧分化,通过掠夺获益的人和耕种农田的广大穷人,分别落入了不同的境地。少数控制武装力量的人,以及受到他们宠幸的,开始富有起来。神王和他们的盟友,即那些统治近东最早一批国家的小型地方势力,比起在下面劳作的广大民众,享有更多更接近现代形式的财产。

当然,在农业社会的早期,要想区分私人和公共财产是不合时宜的。执政的神王拥有国家的全部资源供其支配,跟拥有一个大庄园差不多。和欧洲的封建时期很像,所有的财产都受制于更高的权贵;处于等级制度下层的人,会发现他们的财产会因统治者的兴致所至而减少。

不过,专制君主虽然不受法律约束,但并不意味他可以随心所欲地夺取任何东西。

成本与回报限制着法老的自由,就像今天对加拿大总理的影响一样。而且,比起当代的领导人,法老更加受制于交通和通讯的困难。仅仅是转移战利品,特别是当战利品是农产品时,就会因为变质和盗窃而造成大量损失。官员们要互相监督,以减少盗窃,这会增加法老不得不承担的管理成本。权力的分散,在某些情况下会优化产出,但也催生了强大的地方势力,有时候会发展为对王朝统治的全面挑战。所以,即使东方的专制者也不可能肆意妄为。他们别无选择,在他们发现原始权力的时候,也只能接受其间的平衡。

虽然每个人的财产都可能遭到任意的征用,包括富人,但还是有些人可能积累起自己的财产。当时和今天一样,国家把大部分收入用于公共工程。灌溉系统、宗教纪念堂和国王的陵墓等大型项目,都为建筑师和工匠们提供了赚钱的机会。一些有条件的人因而积累了大量的私人财产。事实上,在现存的美索不达米亚早期文明——苏美尔人的楔形文字中,就有很大一部分记录了各种贸易行为,其中广泛涉及财产所有权的转让。

农业社会的早期确实出现了私有财产,但它不属于社会金字塔的底层。占人口绝大多数的农民,往往都一贫如洗,不可能积累起财富。实际上,除了少数历史阶段,直到现代时期,大部分农民都处于勉强维生的状态,一旦有干旱、洪水或病虫害造成作物减产,他们就面临被饿死的危险。因此,农民不得不以某种形式去组织他们的生计,以尽量减少坏年景下的风险。于是,在整个社会广大的贫困阶层中,一种更原始的财产组织方式出现了。它增加了农民的生存概率,但却剥夺了他们积累资本及在经济系统中上升的大部分机会。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The move to a settled agricultural society resulted in the emergence of private property. Obviously, no one would be content to toil through the whole growing season to produce a crop just to see someone else wander along and harvest what he produced. The idea of property emerged as an inevitable consequence of farming. But the clarity of private property as a concept was attenuated by the logic of violence that also accompanied the introduction of farming. The emergence of property was confused by the fact that the megapolitical power of individuals was no longer as equal as it had been in foraging societies, where every healthy adult male was a hunter, as well armed as anyone else. Farming gave rise to specialization in violence. Precisely because it created something to steal, farming made investments in better weaponry profitable. The result was theft, much of it highly organized.

The powerful were now able to organize a new form of predation: a local monopoly of violence, or government. This sharply differentiated society, creating quite different circumstances for those who benefited from the plunder, and the mass of poor who tilled the fields. The few who controlled military power could now become rich, along with others who found favor with them. The god-kings and their allies, the various lesser, local potentates who ruled the first Near Eastern states, enjoyed much more nearly modern forms of property than the great mass who toiled beneath them.

Of course, it is anachronistic to think of a distinction between private and public wealth in the early agricultural societies. The ruling god-king had the full resources of the state at his disposal in a way that could hardly be distinguished from ownership of a sprawling estate. Much as in the feudal period of European history, all property was subject to the overlordship of higher potentates. Those down the chain of hierarchy found their property subject to attenuation at the whim of the ruler.

Yet to say that the potentate was not restrained by law does not mean that he could afford to seize anything he pleased. Costs and rewards impinged upon the freedom of the pharaoh as much as they do today upon the prime minister of Canada. And the pharaoh was much more constrained than contemporary leaders by the difficulties of transport and communication. Simply hauling loot from one spot to the next, especially when loot was measured mainly in the form of agricultural produce, involved a lot of loss from spoilage and theft. The proliferation of officials to check on one another reduced the loss due to pilfering but increased the total overhead costs the pharaoh had to bear. Decentralized authority, which optimized output under some circumstances, also gave rise to stronger local powers who sometimes blossomed into full-fledged challengers for dynastic control. Even Oriental despots were by no means free to do as they pleased. They had no choice but to recognize the balance of raw power as they found it.

Although everyone, including the rich, was subject to arbitrary expropriation, some were able to accumulate property of their own. Then as now, the state devoted much of its income to public works. Projects such as irrigation systems, religious monuments, and crypts for the kings provided opportunities for architects and artisans to earn income. Some well-situated individuals were able to accumulate considerable private property. In fact, a large portion of the surviving cuneiform tablets from Sumer, an early Mesopotamian civilization, record various acts of trade, most of which involve the transfer of property titles.

There was private property in the early agricultural societies, but seldom at the bottom of the social pyramid. The overwhelming majority of the population were peasants who were too poor to accumulate much wealth. In fact, with a few exceptions, most peasants, up until modern times, were so poor that they stood in constant danger of perishing from starvation any time that a drought or a flood or an infestation reduced crop yields. Hence the peasants were obliged to organize their affairs in a way that minimized the downside risks in bad years. Across the broad and impoverished stratum of society, a more primitive organization of property obtained. It increased the chance of survival at the expense of foreclosing the greater part of the opportunity to accumulate capital and rise in the economic system.

04农民们的保险Peasant Insurance

中文译本

这种亏本生意的形式,就是人类学家和社会历史学家所描述的“封闭的村庄”。

在前现代,作为主要的经济组织形式,“封闭的村庄”几乎存在于每一个农业社会。在更现代的经济生态中,个人倾向于到一个开放的市场上,与众多的买家和卖家做生意。而封闭的村庄与此不同,它是村里的家庭联合起来,像一个非正式的公司或者大家庭一样运作;它不是在一个开放的市场上,而是在一个封闭的系统内,因为它所有的交易往往都交给一个垄断者完成,那就是当地的地主,或者他在村里的代理人。整个村庄与地主签订合同,通常是以实物的形式,交付很高比例的粮食收成,而不是固定的租金。按比例交租意味着地主吸收了庄家歉收的部分风险,当然,地主也拿走了大部分的潜在收益。地主一般还提供种子。

这样的安排将饥荒的危险降到了最低。它要求地主,而不是农民,从他的部分收成中节省出不成比例的份额。因为在过去,很多地区的农业产量都低得吓人,每收成三粒粮食都要种下两粒。在这种情况下,收成不好就意味着大规模的饥荒。

农民理性地选择了一种制度安排,由地主对他们的生存进行投资。以垄断价向地主购买种子、然后廉价地把粮食卖给地主,并且向地主提供实物劳动,以此为代价,农民增加了他们的生存机会。基于类似的想法,封闭乡村经济中的典型农民,往往都放弃了自由保有财产所有权。把自己置于村长的摆布之下,农民家庭增加了从定期的土地重新分配中获益的机会,因为村长总是会把最好的地分给自己和他喜欢的人。这是农民必须承受的风险,为了享受村里混乱的土地所有权带来的生存保险。因为相隔一百码远的两块土地,生产条件可能就很不一样;在作物产量低得可怜的时候,往往就是生存与饥饿之间的差距。农民通常倾向于低风险的选择,甚至不惜放弃任何繁荣昌盛的机会。

一般来说,所有活在生存边缘的群体,都会倾向于规避风险。在前现代社会,纯粹的生存挑战一直制约着穷人的行为模式。在《大清算》中我们探讨过,风险规避很有意思的一点是,它缩小了社会允许个人从事经济活动的范围,即使是和平的经济行为。禁忌和社会束缚限制了实验和创新,甚至会放弃对既定做事方式明显有利的潜在改进。这是对现实的一种合理反应,因为实验会增加结果的可变性。

可变性增加虽然意味着更大的收益,但对处于生存边缘的人来说,则预示着可能遭遇毁灭性的损失。在贫穷的农业社会,一直有很大一部分文化能量致力于压制实验和创新。这种压制,实际上是他们为保险政策寻找的替代品。如果他们有保险,或者有足够的储蓄,能够为他们的实验行为提供自保,就不需要如此强烈的社会禁忌来保证生存了。

文化不是品味的问题,而是适应特定环境的系统。某种环境中的文化,放到其他环境中可能格格不入,甚至适得其反。人类生活的环境千差万别。丰富多样的环境生态,要求我们做出行为的改变。而这些变化太过复杂,是本能无法应对的。

因而,行为是由文化编程的。对于农业社会的大多数人来说,文化给他们编写的程序就是生存,而超越生存、可以参与公开市场的奢侈则被保留给了其他人。

个人能力及自主选择——现代意义上个人“追求的幸福”——往往被社会禁忌和限制所压制,这在穷人身上表现得最明显。在生产力有限的社会中,这些限制极难被取代。在农业生产力较高的地方,如古希腊,就发生了小规模的大政治革命。

人们采用了更现代的财产形式,出现了“Allod”,即自由保有地产(freehold property)6。在这种情况下,土地往往以固定的费用出租,承租人承担经济风险,而当收成良好时,也可以获得更高的收益。更高的储蓄可以承保风险更大的经济活动。这使得自耕农可以超越农民阶级,有时甚至可以积累独立的财富。随着社会逐渐摆脱贫困,在经济等级制度的顶端,开始出现类似市场性质的产权和关系;在比较罕见的情况下,可能会发展到整个经济体中。这种趋势是社会组织的一个重要特征。同样重要的是,应该注意到,历史上最常见的农业社会基本都是封建主义的,市场关系在顶层,封闭的村庄系统在底层。在几乎所有的前现代农业社会中,广大的农民都被束缚在土地上。只要农业的生产力依然很低,或者较高的生产力取决于中央的水利系统,底层农民的个人自由及财产权利就是最低的。封建主义的财产形式也因此普遍存在。农民往往只拥有土地的使用权,而不是自由产权;出售、赠送和继承的权力都受到限制。

形形色色的封建主义,不仅仅是对无处不在的暴力掠夺的回应;也是对低得惊人的生产率的一种反应。在农业社会中,这二者往往是相辅相成,互相促进的。当公共权力崩溃时,财产权和经济繁荣也会相应消退;当生产力崩溃时,公共权威也会遭到破坏。虽然不是每次干旱或不利的气候变化都会瓦解公共权力,但很多时候都会如此。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The form that this bargain took was the adoption of what anthropologists and social historians describe as the “closed village.” Almost every peasant society in premodern times had, as its main form of economic organization, the “closed village.” Unlike more modern forms of economic organization, in which individuals tend to deal with many buyers and sellers in an open market, the households of the closed village joined together to operate like an informal corporation, or a large family, not in an open marketplace but in a closed system where all the economic transactions of the village tended to be struck with a single monopolist—the local landlord, or his agents among the village chiefs. The village as a whole would contract with the landlord, usually for payment in kind, for a high proportion of the crop, rather than a fixed rent. The proportional rent meant that the landlord absorbed part of the downside risk of a bad harvest. Of course, the landlord also took the greater part of the potential profit. Landlords also typically provided seed.

This convention also minimized the danger of starvation. It required that the landlord, rather than the peasant, save a disproportionate share of his part of the harvest. Because agricultural yields were appallingly low in many areas in the past, as many as two seeds had to be planted for every three harvested. Under such conditions, a bad harvest would mean mass starvation. The peasants rationally preferred an arrangement which would require the landlord to invest in their survival. At the cost of buying at monopolized prices, selling cheaply, and providing the landlord with in-kind labor, the peasants increased their chances of survival. A similar impulse led the typical peasant in a closed village economy to forgo the security of freehold property ownership. By putting themselves at the mercy of the village head-man, a peasant family improved its chances of benefiting from the regular redistribution of fields. Not infrequently, the headman would take the best fields for himself and his favorites. But that was a risk that peasants had to tolerate in order to enjoy the survival insurance that confused village ownership of fields provided. At times when crop yields were miserably low, a difference in growing conditions of fields a hundred yards apart could make the difference between starvation and survival. Peasants frequently opted for the arrangement that lowered the downside risk, even at the cost of forgoing any hope of increased prosperity.

In general, risk-averse behavior has been common among all groups that operated along the margins of survival. The sheer challenge of survival in premodern societies always constrained the behavior of the poor. An interesting feature of this risk aversion, explored in The Great Reckoning, is that it reduced the range of peaceful economic behavior that individuals were socially permitted to adopt. Taboos and social constraints limited experimentation and innovative behavior, even at the obvious cost of forgoing potentially advantageous improvements in settled ways of doing things.13 This was a rational reflection of the fact that experimentation increases the variability of results. Greater variability means not only potentially greater gains but—more ominously for those at the very margin of survival—potentially ruinous losses. A great part of the cultural energy of poor farming societies has always been devoted to suppressing experimentation. This repression, in effect, was their substitute for insurance policies. If they had insurance, or sufficient savings to self-insure their experiments, such strong social taboos would not be needed to help ensure survival.

Cultures are not matters of taste but systems of adaptation to specific circumstances that may prove irrelevant or even counterproductive in other settings. Humans live in a wide variety of habitats. The wide number of potential niches in which we live require variations in behavior that are too complex to be informed by instinct. Therefore, behavior is culturally programmed. For the vast majority in many agricultural societies, culture programmed them for survival, but little more than survival in an environment where the luxury of participating in open markets was reserved to others.

Personal ability and personal choice—individual “pursuit of happiness,” in the modern sense—were suppressed by taboos and social restrictions that have always been most emphatic among the poor. Such restrictions were superseded only with great difficulty in societies with limited productivity. When and where agricultural productivity was higher, such as in ancient Greece, minor megapolitical revolutions occurred. Property took more modern forms. “Allod,” or freehold property, emerged. Lands tended to rent for a fixed fee, and the tenant absorbed the economic risk as well as a higher portion of the profit if the crop was good. Higher savings allow self-insurance of riskier behavior. Under such conditions, yeoman farmers could rise above the rank of peasantry and sometimes even accumulate independent wealth.

The tendency for more market-like property rights and relationships to develop near the top of an economic hierarchy or, in rarer cases, across the whole economy, as societies emerged from poverty, is an important characteristic of social organization. It is equally important to note that the most common organization of agricultural society historically has been essentially feudal, with market relations at the top and the closed village system at the bottom. The great mass of peasants were tied to the land in almost all premodern agricultural societies. So long as agricultural productivity remained low, or higher productivity was dependent upon access to centralized hydraulic systems, the freedom and property rights of individual farmers at the bottom remained minimal. In such conditions, feudal forms of property prevailed. Land was held by tenure rather than through freehold title. Typically, rights of sale, gift, and inheritance were restricted.

Feudalism in its various forms was not only a response to ever-present risks of predatory violence. It also was a reaction to appallingly low rates of productivity. The two have tended to go hand in hand in farming societies. Each frequently contributed to the other. When public authority collapsed, property rights and prosperity tended to recede accordingly. Collapsing productivity also tended to undermine authority. While not every drought or adverse climatic change resulted in the breakdown of public authority, many did.

05公元 1000 年的封建革命THE FEUDAL REVOLUTION OF THE YEAR 1000

中文译本

公元 1000 年时的变革就是如此,它开启了封建革命。当时的经济和大政治状况与我们所认为的中世纪大不相同。在罗马灭亡后的最初几个世纪里,西欧的经济萎靡不振。在前罗马帝国领土上扎根的日耳曼王国,承担了罗马政权的诸多职能,但水平难望罗马人之项背。基础设施差不多都荒废了。几个世纪过去,桥梁和水渠年久失修,无法再使用。罗马的硬币依然有效,但实际上它已经从流通中消失了。

罗马时代繁荣的土地市场也基本都退出了历史舞台。城镇曾经是罗马行政管理的中心,它伴随着国家征税权一起衰竭了。其他几乎所有的文明附属品,也都不复存在。

这一时期之所以被称为“黑暗时代”,是有原因的。识字率严重下降,以致于任何有读写能力的人,不管犯下什么罪行,都可能被免于起诉,包括谋杀。罗马时代高度发展的艺术、科学和工程技术都消失了。许多曾广为人知且达到很高标准的技术,从道路建设到葡萄等果树的嫁接,在西欧都停止使用了。甚至像陶轮这样古老的工具在很多地方都找不到了。采矿业、冶金业全都萎缩了。地中海地区的灌溉系统,也因疏于管理而破败不堪。就像历史学家乔治·杜比(Georges Duby)所观察到的,“六世纪末的欧洲是个极不文明的地方。”尽管到了 800 年左右,在查理曼大帝的统治下,中央权力曾有过短暂的复兴,但他去世之后,一切又很快陷入了困顿。

在这种枯寂的景象之下,有一个推论也许会让人感到惊讶,那就是:罗马帝国的崩溃,可能在随后的几个世纪里,反而提高了小农们的生活水平。在黑暗时代统治西欧的日耳曼王国,从他们祖先的部落中继承了一些相对随和的习俗,如自由民在法律面前一律平等。因此,黑暗时代的农民远比他们在封建时期要自由得多。

通过这一点,我们也可以推断出,他们要更加富裕。我们在上文探讨过,在不同的生产力条件下,会出现不同的财产形式。自由财产权与小农的相对繁荣,在历史上是携手并进的。在农民谋生都值得怀疑的地方,往往就会出现封闭的村庄和封建的财产形式。

可以肯定的是,黑暗时代的商业事实上已经崩溃,这使小农失去了贸易的好处及广阔市场的优势。城镇的消亡破坏了现金经济,但这也意味着农村人口可以摆脱官僚机构的沉重负担。正如居伊·布瓦所写的,罗马的城镇是寄生的社区,而不是生产的中心。“在罗马时期,城市的主要功能是维护政治秩序,它靠从周边地区抽取的土地税过活,……实际上,城镇几乎没有为周边的农村生产任何东西。”罗马当局的崩溃,在很大程度上将农民从税负中解放了出来;因为税收吸走了“土地总产值的四分之一到三分之一,这还没算中小土地所有者遭受的其他征收。”真可谓税负猛于虎,有时候甚至要通过处决来强制收税,这导致土地所有者遗弃财产的现象非常普遍。而日耳曼的蛮族统治者,则仁慈地放弃了这些税收。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Such was the case with the transformation of the year 1000, which launched the feudal revolution.14 At that time, megapolitical and economic conditions differed in important ways from those we have come to think of as characterizing the Middle Ages. In the first few centuries after the fall of Rome, the economy of Western Europe withered. The Germanic kingdoms that took root in the territories of the former Roman Empire had assumed many functions of the Roman state, but at a much less ambitious level. Infrastructure more or less went untended. As the centuries passed, bridges and aqueducts fell into disrepair and became unusable. Roman coinage was still employed, but it practically disappeared from circulation. Land markets, which had thrived in Roman times, more or less dried up. Towns, which had been centers of Roman administration, virtually vanished along with the taxing power of the state. And so did almost every other accoutrement of civilization.

The “Dark Ages” were so named for a reason. Literacy became so rare that anyone who possessed the ability to read and write could expect immunity from prosecution for almost any crime, including murder. Artistic, scientific, and engineering skills that had been highly developed in Roman times disappeared. From road building to the grafting of vines and fruit trees, Western Europe ceased employing many techniques that had once been well known and practiced to a high standard. Even so ancient a device as the potter’s wheel disappeared in many places. Mining operations contracted. Metallurgy receded. Irrigation works in the Mediterranean region disintegrated through neglect.15 As historian Georges Duby observed, “At the end of the sixth century, Europe was a profoundly uncivilized place.”16 Although there was a brief renaissance of central authority under the rule of Charlemagne around the year 800, everything soon devolved again after his death.

A surprising corollary to this dreary landscape was the fact that the collapse of the Roman state probably raised the living standards of small farmers for several centuries. The Germanic kingdoms that dominated Western Europe during the Dark Ages incorporated some of the relatively easygoing social features common to their ancestral tribes, such as the legal equality of freeholders. As a consequence, small farmers in the Dark Ages were far freer than they were to be in the feudal centuries. By that we can also infer that they were more prosperous. As we analyzed above in exploring the logic of property forms under different conditions of productivity, freehold property has historically gone hand in hand with the relative prosperity of small farmers. The closed-village and feudal forms of property tended to emerge where the capacity of small farmers to make a living was more doubtful.

To be sure, the virtual collapse of commerce during the Dark Ages cost small farmers the benefits of trade and advantages of wider markets. The demise of the towns undermined the cash economy, but it also meant the rural population was no longer called upon to support the crushing burden of bureaucracy. As Guy Bois has written, the Roman town was a parasitic community, not a center of production: “In the Roman period, the dominant function of a city was of a political order. It lived primarily from the revenues draining into it from its surroundings by the agency of the land tax.… The town, in effect, produced little or nothing for the benefit of the surrounding countryside.”17 The collapse of Roman authority largely freed farmers in the countryside from taxes, which had sucked away “between one quarter to one third of the gross product of the land, without counting the various exactions suffered by small and middling landowners.”18 The taxes were so onerous, sometimes enforced by execution, that desertion of property by owners was widespread. The barbarians mercifully allowed these taxes to lapse.

06被搁荒的农田Agri Deserti

中文译本

因为蛮族的政府,来自政府的负担被大大减轻,这就为穷人自由获得和持有财产创造了机会。在罗马帝国最后的一些年头里,一些因为业主逃避税收掠夺而被搁荒的土地,又重新投入了生产。尽管当时环境很恶劣,而且按照现代的标准,作物的产量可谓低得离谱,但对欧洲的小农户来说,黑暗时代是一个相对繁荣的时期。事实上,他们在那时候的地位,是在现代时期之前最高的。首先,他们有大片肥沃的土地,而能够耕地的人口却越来越少,大片土地被搁荒。因为瘟疫、战争以及罗马帝国的崩溃,土地所有者纷纷四散逃离,土地被遗弃,而人口也大幅减少。其次,六世纪时发明了新的农业技术,黑暗时代的小农户带来了发展的优势,那就是安装在轮子上的重型犁。这种工具与改进的马具搭配在一起,使农民可以驱使多头牛,整理北欧的林地就变得很容易。

在这种环境下,土地市场几乎完全萎缩。任何人,只需要整理土地并分享一部分产出,就可以获得新的耕地。这个过程被称为“垦伐”,在罗马崩溃后的几个世纪里,它很好地支持了人口的增长。到了 8 世纪,气温变高,农业效率也提升了,在人口稀少的北欧地区,垦伐变得特别抢手。

日耳曼部落的首领们,征服了前罗马帝国的领土,现在他们是最大的土地所有者。剩下的大部分人口,耕种小块的田地,但是条件与其后的封建时期非常不同。比较富裕的土地所有者或者主人,约占人口的 7-10%。在 1000 年之前,法国一个典型的村庄里,似乎有三分之二的村民都是土地所有者;他们拥有大约一半的土地。农奴很少,佃农的数量不超过人口的 5%。奴隶制依然存在,但规模比罗马时期小很多。

为日耳曼王国提供军事保护的都是自由人,这些人由国王在地方上的代表——伯爵——召集并武装。即使是“小业主和中等业主”也要加入,要派一个人加入步兵一起作战。在《皮特雷斯法令》中,秃头查理要求所有能力适宜的人,都要被集结起来,上马作战。而在一个世纪之前,公元 732 年,教皇格雷戈里三世曾下令禁止人们食用马肉,意图推动这种军事需求。来自自由民的步兵在地位和权利上,与骑兵并没什么区别。所有的自由人都可以参加本地的司法会议,并向伯爵提出解决争端的请求。伯爵这个职位自从罗马后期就开始存在,而在此前,并没有类似的贵族身份。

在十世纪 80 年代,一种社会现象,大规模发生的新现象,突然出现在人们的视野中,那就是社会的向下流动。而它的第一批受害者就是小型的土地所有者。 —— 居伊·布瓦(GUY BOIS)

然而,伴随着黑暗时代的到来,发生了几件事,破坏了日耳曼王国维护的、自耕农与自由民(永久产权持有者)之间相互独立的关系。

人口逐渐恢复,对土地的利用产生了更大的压力。几个世纪以来,大面积最肥沃的无主之地都被投入了生产,特别是在北欧。相对土地供应,农民人口的增长使单个农民的劳动价值降低。在黑暗时代,孩子往往可以平等地分享父母的财产。经过继承,大多数自由民的土地被分割成了越来越小的地块。在人口不断增加、地块越来越小的情况下,土地再次产生溢价;曾经消失的土地市场,在 10世纪中期也再次活跃起来。

在 10 世纪的最后几十年,气候突然变冷,给农业造成了毁灭性的打击。从982 年到 984 年,连续三年作物歉收,导致了严重的饥荒。994 年,歉收和饥荒再次袭来。随后,在 997 年,爆发了瘟疫,使粮食问题变得更加复杂。这场瘟疫对小型家庭结构的打击特别大,因为小农户缺乏资源去替代失去的家庭劳动力。连年的作物歉收和灾难使自耕农陷入了债务危机。当粮食产量无法恢复,他们就无力支付抵押贷款。

重装骑兵日益重要导致权力关系日趋不稳。中世纪历史学家弗朗西斯·吉斯(Frances Gies)描述了装甲骑兵向中世纪骑士的转变:骑士原本地位平庸,但因其昂贵的战马和盔甲而高于农民。慢慢地,他们提升了自己在社会中的地位,最终成为贵族阶级的一部分。尽管他们仍然处于上层社会的最低等级,但骑士身份被赋予了一种荣誉,这种荣誉为大贵族乃至皇室所珍视。它的魅力主要是教会将骑士身份进行了基督教化,它通过各种政策,将骑士的仪式神圣化,并且宣扬一种被称为骑士精神的行为准则。这些准则被违反的次数可能远超过被遵守的次数,但是它们对后人的思想和行为产生了无可争议的影响。 正如我们在《大清算》中所指出的,马镫的发明,使全副武装的马背骑士拥有了强大的攻击能力。他现在可以全速地进攻,而不会被长矛刺中敌人产生的冲击力给甩出马鞍。重型骑兵的军事价值,因为一项亚洲人的发明而得到了进一步的提升。这项发明在 10 世纪传到了欧洲,那就是马蹄铁,它延长了马匹在道路上奔跑的时间和寿命。此外,提升骑士作战效率的发明还有马刺,以及能让骑士在作战时单手控马的马嚼子(curb bit)。显然,这都是一些很小的技术革新,但它们组合在一起,就大大降低了小农在军事上的重要性,因为他们无力饲养战马及武装自己。在专门为打仗而饲养的马匹中,比较便宜的是一种叫做destriers 的大型冲锋战马,价值 4 头牛或 40 只羊,更好的战马则需要 10 头牛或 100 只羊。盔甲也是小户人家负担不起的,一套相当于 60 只羊的价格。

寒冷的天气、农作物的歉收、饥荒和瘟疫,在 1000 年降临之前,纷至沓来,这在一定程度上影响了人们的行为。许多人相信,世界末日或者基督再临就在眼前。大大小小的土地所有者,虔诚的信徒也好,被吓坏了也好,纷纷将他们的土地交给教会,准备迎接世界末日。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The burdens of government were so greatly reduced by the barbarian conquests that an opening was created for the poor to obtain freehold property and keep it. Some of the agri deserti, or deserted farms abandoned by owners fleeing predatory taxation in the final years of the Roman Empire, were brought back into production. Notwithstanding the rude circumstances of the time and the fact that crop yields were ridiculously low by modern standards, the Dark Ages were a period of relative prosperity for Europe’s smallholders. In fact, they were in a stronger position than they would be again until the modern era. For one thing, fewer hands were available to till the fertile land, large tracts of which had gone out of cultivation. Plagues, wars, and abandonment by owners escaping the collapsing Roman Empire had significantly depopulated areas previously under cultivation. Another advantage enjoyed by small farmers in the Dark Ages arose from the adoption in the sixth century of new farming technology: the heavy plow, often mounted on wheels. Used in tandem with an improved harness that allowed peasants to employ multiple oxen, the new technology made it much easier to clear forested land in Northern Europe.19

Under such conditions, the market for land contracted almost to the vanishing point. New land for farming could be had merely by clearing it and sharing part of each new parcel with the appropriate local authorities. This process, known as assarting, gave a comfortable outlet for population growth for centuries after Rome fell. Assarting became particularly attractive in thinly populated northern regions after warmer temperatures in the eighth century made farming more productive.

The leaders of the Germanic tribes who conquered former Roman territories had established themselves as large landholders. Most of the rest of the population farmed small plots—but under conditions very different from those that came later under feudalism. Wealthier landowners, or masters, represented about 7-10 percent of the population. It appears that before the year 1000, two-thirds of the villagers in a typical area of France were freehold landowners.20 They owned about half of all the land in cultivation.21 There were few serfs. Coloni, or tenant farmers, amounted to no more than 5 percent of the population. Slavery persisted, but on a much smaller scale than in Roman times.

The Germanic successor kingdoms to Rome were defended militarily by all free men who assembled to bear arms on the call of the king’s local representative, the count. Even “small and middling proprietors” were expected to club together and send one of their number to fight with the infantry.22 In the Edict of Pitres, Charles the Bald ordered all those who could afford to do so to muster for battle on horseback. Pope Gregory III had attempted to advance this military imperative a century earlier by banning the human consumption of horsemeat in 732.23 But there was as yet little distinction in status or law between the infantry of freeholders and the cavalry. All free men participated in local judicial assemblies and could petition for dispute settlement to the count, an office that had existed since late Roman times. There was no nobility as such.

“A social phenomenon, new as a mass phenomenon, suddenly appeared on the horizons in the 980s: downward social mobility. Its first victims were the small allod-holders.”24 —GUY BOIS

As the Dark Ages wore on, however, several things happened to destabilize the relationships that had preserved the independence of the yeoman farmers and freeholders in the Germanic kingdoms that inherited power after Rome’s fall:

1. Populations gradually recovered, placing greater pressures on the use of land. Over several centuries, much of the most fertile of the unclaimed land was brought into production, engendering growth in Northern Europe in particular. The increasing population of farmers relative to the supply of land made the labor of each farmer worth less. Most freehold titles were broken into ever smaller plots through inheritance. During the Dark Ages, children tended to share equally in the estates of their parents. The fragmentation of holdings at a time of rising population tended to place land at a premium once again and led to the re-emergence of active land markets by the mid-tenth century.

2. In the final decades of the tenth century, temperatures suddenly turned colder, with a devastating impact on farm output. Three successive crop failures led to severe famine from 982 to 984. Famine struck again after another crop failure in 994.25 Then, in 997, the problem of falling crop yields was compounded by a plague, which struck small family holdings with particular force because the smallholders lacked the resources to replace labor supplied by lost family members. These clustered crop failures and disasters at first led the yeoman farmers to sink into debt. When yields failed to recover they could not pay their mortgages.

3. Power relations were progressively destabilized by the growing importance of heavy cavalry. Medieval historian Frances Gies describes the transformation of the armored cavalryman into the medieval knight:

Originally a personality of mediocre status raised above the peasant by his expensive horse and armor, the knight slowly improved his position in society until he became part of the nobility. Although knights remained the lowest rank of the upper class, knighthood acquired a unique cachet that made knighting an honor prized by the great nobility and even royalty. The cachet was primarily the product of the Church’s policy of Christianizing knighthood by sanctifying the ceremony of knighting and by sponsoring a code of behavior known as chivalry, a code perhaps violated more often than honored, but exercising incontestable influence on the thought and conduct of posterity.26

As we recounted in The Great Reckoning, the invention of the stirrup gave the armed knight on horseback a formidable assault capability. He could now attack at full speed and not be thrown from the saddle by the impact of his lance striking a target. The military value of the heavy cavalry was further enhanced by an Asian, invention that penetrated through Western Europe in the tenth century; the nailed iron horseshoe. This further improved the durability of the horse on the road.27 Also adding to the improved effectiveness of the armed knight were the contoured saddle, which made it easier to wield heavy weapons, the spur, and the curb bit, which enabled a rider to control the horse with one hand while fighting.28 Together, these apparently minor technological innovations dramatically devalued the military importance of the smallholders, who could not afford to maintain war-horses and arm themselves. The cheaper of the horses specially bred for war, the large chargers known as destriers, were worth four oxen or forty sheep. The more expensive warhorses cost ten oxen or one hundred sheep. Armor also cost a sum that no small holder could afford, equivalent to the price of sixty sheep.29

4. The fact that the colder weather, crop failures, famines, and plagues occurred during the run-up to the year 1000 also played a role in informing behavior. Many people were convinced that the end of the world or the Second Coming was at hand. Devout or frightened landowners, large and small, gave their land to the Church in preparation for apocalypse.

07只有穷人才卖地“Only a Poor Man Sells Land”

中文译本

十世纪末不稳定的社会状况为封建革命铺平了道路。一连串的农作物歉收和天灾,使自耕农陷入了债务困境。粮食产量迟迟不能恢复,自由民也面临着绝望的境地。市场总是会把最大的压力放到最弱的财产持有者身上,而这其实是它的一个优点:借此可以把资产从弱者手中转移出去,提高利用效率。

但是,在十世纪末的欧洲,自给自足的农业几乎是唯一的职业。一个家庭失去土地,就失去了他们唯一的生存手段。面对这种悲惨的前景,在封建革命期间,许多或大多数自由民决定放弃他们的土地。用居伊·布瓦的话说,“农民想要守住自己的耕地,唯一可靠的方法就是把土地的所有权让给教会,自己保留用益权。”其他人则把全部或部分土地让给了他们信任的富农,可能是关系比较好的邻居,或者是亲戚。

这些财产转让的条件是农民以及他的家人和后代要继续在田里工作。贫穷的农民可以享受到一些互惠的支持,来自于持有大量土地的人,现在被称为“贵族”,他们有能力购买马匹和盔甲,从而为不断扩大的庄园提供保护。这样的交易可以被视为是一种新农奴主义,它是延续经济所有权和丧失赎回权的中途站。但更多时候,它是农民无法拒绝的贱卖。

生产力的下降不仅使贫农陷入了生存的困境,还激发了暴力掠夺的增长,从而破坏了社会的财产安全。因为可获得的马匹和饲料是有限的,那些没有能力从中抢到一部分资源的人,突然发现他们和他们的财产都不再安全了。他们的境遇放到今天,就好像你必须用一种新型武器保护自己,而需要支付的价格是 10 万美元;如果你付不起,你就只能受制于那些买得起的人。

短短几年时间,国王和法院维护秩序的能力就崩溃了。任何拥有盔甲和战马的人都可以制定自己的法律,结果就像是 10 世纪末的《银翼杀手》,一场抢夺和斗争的大混战,当局根本无力阻止。武装骑士的抢劫和袭击扰乱了乡村的秩序,但这绝不是说受害者都是穷人;相反,大土地所有者中的老弱病残及准备不足的人,才是更有吸引力的目标,他们有更多的财产。

这种情况发生在降温、饥荒和瘟疫对资源造成压力的时刻,绝不是一种巧合。可能引发权力变革的大政治条件在之前已经存在了,但它的潜能要等到危机被触发才会释放出来。歉收和饥荒就是这样的催化剂。虽然很难准确重构事件的发展顺序,但抢掠是出于绝望的经济环境,至少是部分正确的。而暴力一旦被释放出来,显然已经没有人有能力再动员力量去阻止它了。绝大多数农民都武装单薄,当然无能为力;即使几十个农民也打不过一个重武装的骑士。自由民,就像他们的国王和伯爵,也同样挡不住土地被掠夺。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The unsettled conditions of the late tenth century paved the way for the feudal revolution. Clustered crop failures and disasters led the yeoman farmers to sink into debt. When crop yields failed to recover, the freeholders faced a desperate situation. Markets always place the greatest pressures on the weakest holders. Indeed, that is part of their virtue. They promote efficiency by removing assets from weak hands. But in late-tenth-century Europe, subsistence farming was practically the only occupation. Families who lost their land lost their only means of survival. Faced with this unpalatable prospect, many or most of the freehold farmers decided to give away their fields during the feudal revolution. In the words of Guy Bois, “The only sure way for a peasant to hold on to the land he tilled was to concede ownership of it to the Church, so he could retain its usufruct.”30 Others ceded some or all of their land to wealthier farmers in whom they had confidence, either friendly neighbors or relatives.

These property transfers were made on the condition that the farmer, his family, and his descendants were to remain to work the fields. The poor farmers were also to enjoy the reciprocal support of the more substantial holders, now the “nobles” who were able to afford horse and armor, and thus provide protection to the enlarged estates. Such a bargain can be seen from the new serf’s point of view as a halfway station between continuing economic ownership and foreclosure. More often than not, it was a bargain he could not refuse.

Falling productivity not only placed poor farmers in a desperate economic dilemma; it also instigated an upsurge in predatory violence that undermined the security of property. Those without the resources to wrest a share of the available and inadequate supply of horses and fodder suddenly found that they and their property were no longer safe. To put their dilemma in contemporary terms, it was as if you were forced to arm yourself today with a new type of weapon, but the cost of doing so was $100,000. If you could not pay that price, you would be at the mercy of those who could.

Within a few years, the capacity of the king and the courts to enforce order collapsed.31 Anyone with armor and a horse could now become a law unto himself. The result was a late-tenth-century version of Blade Runner, a melee of fighting and plunder that the constituted authorities were powerless to stop. Looting and attacks by armed knights disrupted the countryside. It is by no means obvious, however, that all the victims of this pillage were the poor. To the contrary, the elderly, physically weaker, or ill-prepared among the larger landholders made more attractive targets. They had more to steal.

It was not a coincidence that this happened at the very moment when colder weather, famine, and plague were placing a pinch on resources. The megapolitical conditions conducive to the breakdown of authority had been in place for some time. Their potential for altering the power relations in society was not realized, however, until a crisis was triggered. Crop failures and famines appear to have done just that. While the exact sequence of events is difficult to reconstruct, it appears that the looting was instigated, at least in part, by desperate conditions. Once the violence was unleashed, it became evident that no one could mobilize the force to stop it. The vast majority of poorly armed farmers certainly could do little. Even dozens of farmers on foot would have been outmatched by a single armed knight on horseback. The freehold farmers, like the constituted authorities, the kings with their counts, were powerless to prevent local land from being seized by armed warriors.

08来自上帝的和平“The Peace of God”

中文译本

穷途末路之下,在暴力肆虐的农村,教会出面进行休战谈判,这在一定程度上帮助启动了封建主义革命。历史学家居伊·布瓦这样说,“政治当局失能,教会发动了一场名为‘上帝的和平’的运动,代替政权进行秩序恢复。他们以‘和平议会’的名义,发布了一系列的禁令,违反者将受到革出教门的惩罚。他们还举行了大规模的‘和平集会’,得到了骑士们的宣誓效忠。这项运动起源于法国的中部地区(989 年的夏鲁瓦议会,990 年的那波内议会),然后逐渐蔓延开来……”教会达成的交易是,承认武装骑士在当地社区的统治地位,以换取暴力掠夺的终止或缓和。在十世纪末期,由于暴力事件激增,在土地的地契上突然开始出现带有“nobilis”或“miles”的头衔,以表示领主的身份。仅仅在几年前,同一个人的财产交易记录,都没有显示出这种区别。贵族作为一种独立的身份,是封建革命创造出来的。

由于生产力下降,小农丧失经济保障,武装其实作为大政治的主导力量,不可避免地导致了领主占有的财产所有制形式(即封建主义)。到 11 世纪的前四分之一世纪末,自耕农基本上消失了;他们现在只是兼职务农,所持有的土地已经缩减到从前的一小部分。小农户及其后代沦为了农奴,大部分时间都在封建领主的庄园里劳动,包括教会的及非教会的。

伴随着封建革命,原有的社会秩序崩溃了,人们的行为方式也发生了变化,封建主义越来越被强化。其中一个很典型的现象就是,人们开始大兴土木,建设城堡。最早的城堡出现在西北欧,是 9 世纪为应对维京人的突袭而打造的,都是原始的木制结构。城堡最初是卡洛琳王朝官员的指挥中心,封建革命之后,成为了世袭财产。这些早期的堡垒比后来的要原始得多,但还是很难被攻破。城堡一旦建立起来,想把它夷为平地,就要费尽千难万险。随着城堡在乡野之间遍布林立,国王或他的伯爵们越来越不可能挑战地方领主的霸权地位。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In these desperate conditions, the Church helped to launch feudalism through its efforts to negotiate a truce in the violent countryside. Historian Guy Bois described the situation this way: “The impotence of the political authorities was such that the Church stood in for them in the attempt to restore order, in the movement known as ‘The Peace of God.’ ‘Councils of Peace’ proclaimed series of interdictions which were sanctioned by anathemas; vast ‘assemblies of peace’ received the oaths of the warriors. The movement originated in the French Midi (Council of Charroux in 989, Council of Narbonne in 990), then gradually spread.…”32

The bargain that the Church struck involved acknowledgment of the overlordship of armed knights in local communities in exchange for a cessation or tempering of the violence and looting. Land titles inscribed after the surge of violence in the late tenth century suddenly bore the title “nobilis” or “miles” as an indication of lordship. The nobility as a separate estate was created by the feudal revolution. Property transactions recorded to the same individuals only a few years earlier had listed no such distinction.33

Given falling productivity and the economic insecurity of the smallholders, the megapolitical power of the armed knights led inevitably to property holdings by feudal tenure. By the end of the first quarter of the eleventh century, yeoman farmers had largely disappeared. Their freeholdings had shrunk to a fraction of their previous extent and were now being worked just part-time. The small farmers or their descendants were serfs who spent most of their time laboring on the estates of feudal lords, lay and ecclesiastical.

The breakdown of order that accompanied the feudal revolution led to adjustments in behavior which reinforced feudalism. Among them was a surge in castle building. Castles had first appeared in northwest Europe as primitive wooden structures in the wake of Viking raids in the ninth century. Originally command centers for Carolingian officials, they became hereditary possessions after the feudal revolution. These early redoubts were far more primitive than they would later become, but they were nonetheless difficult to attack. Once erected, castles were razed only with the greatest effort. As they began to dot the countryside, the castles made it ever more implausible that the king or his counts could effectively challenge the local supremacy of the lords.

09教会对生产力的贡献Contributions of the Church to Productivity

中文译本

封建主义是农业社会在生产力低下时对秩序崩溃的一种反应。在封建社会早期,教会扮演了至关重要的角色,并促进了经济的发展。教会的贡献如下:

1、在军事力量分散的环境中,教会具有独特的优势,它可以超越割据的地方势力,制定为各方所遵守的秩序规则,维护和平。这是任何世俗权力都无法胜任的。

伟大的宗教权威 A.R.拉德克利夫-布朗7的观察,很好地解释了这一点。他指出,“宗教的社会功能与它的真假无关”,即使是那些“荒唐的、令人厌恶的宗教,如野蛮部落的,也是社会机制中重要的、有效的组成部分。”封建社会早期的教会就发挥了这样的功能。它做了只有宗教组织才能做到的事,它帮助制定了规则,并帮助人们摆脱激励的陷阱和行为的困境,其中一些是人类生活中普遍发生的道德困境,有些则是当时大政治背景下特有的地方性困境。在 10 世纪的最后几年,中世纪的教会,在恢复农村秩序方面发挥了重要的作用。教会向地方政府提供宗教和仪式上的支持,降低了在地方形成暴力垄断的成本,或者至少是一种弱垄断。

通过这种方式,教会帮助建立了社会秩序,并为最终达成更稳定的权力结构创造了条件。在其后的很长时间内,在世俗权力无力遏制的私人战争和过度的暴力冲突中,教会都发挥着重要的调节作用。相对于世俗权威,教会越来越重要,从一点即可以看出。到 11 世纪,西欧大部分地区的行政区划是基于教区,而不再是从罗马帝国到黑暗时代一直存在的民事权力划分,即基于 ager(地块)或 pagus(城镇)。

2、教会是保存和传播技术知识及信息的主要机构。在中世纪,教会资助大学,并为社会提供最低限度的教育。教会还建立了一种机制,可供人们复制书籍和手稿,包含当时几乎所有的农牧信息。那时候还没有印刷术,但本笃会修道院的缮写室可以被视为是一种替代的印刷形式。尽管缮写的成本很高、效率很低,但它是封建时期复制和保存书面知识的唯一手段。

3、教会极大地提高了欧洲农业的生产力,特别是在封建社会早期,这部分归功于农地的管理者往往是识字的。在 13 世纪以前,那些帮助世俗领主管理土地的人,几乎都是文盲,他们靠一套精心设计的符号进行记录。尽管他们都是很聪明的农民,但是,他们没办法学到那些非自己发明或非亲眼所见的、改良的生产方法。因此,教会对提高谷物、水果和种畜的质量至关重要。因为教会的机构广泛分布在整个欧洲大陆,它可以将产量最高的种子和种畜送到低产的地区。北欧对圣酒的需求,促使修士们培植了更耐寒的葡萄品种,可以在寒冷的气候中生存。教会还以其他方式提高了中世纪的农业生产力。在封建革命期间,很多捐给教会的土地,由于地块太小,经济效应不高,被教会重新分配,以提高耕作效率。教会还提供小型农业社区需要的辅助服务。例如,在许多地区,教会拥有的磨坊,可将谷物磨成面粉。

4、教会承担了今天被政府吸收的诸多职能,包括提供公共基础设施。在权力分散的时代,这是克服经济学家所谓的“公共物品困境”的一种方式。在中世纪早期,有特定的教团致力于工程建设,如修路、补桥、重修罗马时代的水渠。他们还开垦荒地,建造水坝,排干沼泽。一个新的修道会,卡尔图斯会,在法国的阿图瓦打出了第一口“自流井”。他们用冲击钻,挖了一个足够深的小洞,创造了一个不需要泵水的水井。在欧洲的低地国家,西多会负责维护海堤,并修建堤坝。

农民将土地租给西多会的修道院,再租回来,而僧侣们则承担维护和管理的全部职责。西多会还率先开发了水动力的机器,这些机器被广泛应用于“敲打、举重、研磨和压榨”。明谷修道院则从奥布河挖了一条两公里长的运河。在那些已经迁移到古罗马驻军道路之外的人口中心,教会也参与进去修建了新的道路和桥梁。

对那些修建或维修过河道以及为路人提供收容的地方领主,主教还为他们颁发了赎罪券。由圣贝内泽成立的修士会,即“桥之兄弟”,建造了当时最长的几座桥,包括阿维尼翁桥,一座横跨罗纳河的大桥,有 20 个拱形结构,在一边有一个小教堂和收费亭。就连一直到 19 世纪还屹立不倒的伦敦桥,也是由一位教士修建的,资金中还有 1000 马克的捐款是来自教皇的使节。

5、教会帮助孵化了更复杂的市场。比如说,建造大教堂与桥梁或水渠等公共设施的意义是不同的。至少在原则上,教会建筑只用于宗教仪式,而不是商业场所。但是,不要忘记,兴建教堂有助于创造一个可以深化手工业和工程技能的市场。

就像在冷战期间,民族国家的军备竞赛无意中孵化了互联网;中世纪大教堂的兴建也催化了其他种类的衍生品,这就是商业的孵化。教会是建筑商和工匠的主要客户。教会采购用于圣餐仪式的银器、烛台和装饰教堂的艺术品,创造了一个本不存在的奢侈品市场。

在诸多方面,教会缓和了武装骑士在“封建革命”期间和之后释放出的凶残暴力。教会还对提升农业经济的生产力做出了巨大贡献,特别是在封建主义早期的几个世纪。总之,教会是一个至关重要的机构,它很好地满足了黑暗时代末期农业社会的需要。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Feudalism was the response of agricultural society to the collapse of order at a time of low productivity. During the early stages of feudalism, the Church played an important and economically productive role. Among the Church’s contributions:

1. In an environment where military power was decentralized, the Church was uniquely placed to maintain peace and develop rules of order that transcended fragmented, local sovereignties. This is a job that no secular power was positioned to do. The observations of the great religious authority A. R. Radcliffe-Brown are directly relevant here. He pointed out that “the social function of a religion is independent of its truth or falsity.” Even those that are “absurd and repulsive, such as those of some savage tribes, may be important and effective parts of the social machinery.”34 This was certainly the case with the Church in the early stages of feudalism. It helped create rules, as only a religion could, that enabled people to overcome incentive traps and behavioral dilemmas. Some of these were moral dilemmas common to all human life. But others were local dilemmas, unique to the prevailing megapolitical conditions. The medieval Church had a special role to play in restoring order in the countryside in the final years of the tenth century. By providing religious and ceremonial support to local authorities, the Church lowered the costs of establishing at least weak local monopolies of violence. By helping to establish order in this way, the Church contributed to the conditions that ultimately led to more stable configurations of power.

The Church continued to play a role for a long time thereafter in tempering the private wars and excesses of violence that otherwise could not be contained by civil authorities. The relative importance of the Church as opposed to secular authorities is reflected in the fact that by the eleventh century, the main administrative division of authority in most of Western Europe came to be the parish, rather than the old divisions of civil authority, the ager and pagus (town) that had persisted from Roman times through the Dark Ages.35

2. The Church was the main source for preserving and transmitting technical knowledge and information. The Church sponsored universities and provided the minimal education that medieval society enjoyed. The Church also provided a mechanism for reproducing books and manuscripts, including almost all contemporary information about farming and husbandry. The scriptoria of the Benedictine monasteries can be understood as an alternate technology to printing presses, which did not yet exist. Costly and inefficient as the scriptoria were, they were practically the only mechanism for reproducing and preserving written knowledge in the feudal period.

3. Partly because its farm managers were literate, the Church did a great deal to help improve the productivity of European farming, especially in the early stages of feudalism. Before the thirteenth century the farm managers of lay lords were almost all illiterates who kept records through an elaborate set of marks. Shrewd farmers though they may have been, they were in no position to benefit from any improvement in production methods that they could not invent themselves or see with their own eyes. The Church was therefore essential to improving the quality of grains, fruits, and breeding stock. Because of its extensive holdings spread over the entire European continent, the Church could send the most productive seed and breeding stock to areas where output lagged. The demand for sacramental wine in Northern Europe led monks to experiment with hardier varieties of grape that could survive in colder climates. The Church also helped raise the productivity of medieval farming in other ways. Many of the uneconomically small plots donated to the Church during the feudal revolution were reconfigured to make them easier to farm. The Church also provided ancillary services required by small farming communities. In many areas, Church-owned mills ground grain into flour.

4. The Church undertook many functions that are today absorbed by government, including the provision of public infrastructure. This is part of the way that the Church helped overcome what economists call “public goods dilemmas” in an era of fragmented authority. Specific religious orders of the early-medieval Church devoted themselves to applied engineering tasks, like opening roads, rebuilding fallen bridges, and repairing dilapidated Roman aqueducts. They also cleared land, built dams, and drained swamps. A new monastic order, the Carthusians, dug the first “artesian” well in Artois, France. Using percussion drilling, they dug a small hole deep enough to create a well that needed no pump.36 The Cistercian Order undertook to build and maintain precarious seawalls and dikes in the Low Countries of Europe. Farmers deeded land to Cistercian monasteries and then leased it back, while the monks undertook full responsibility for upkeep and repairs. Cistercians also took the lead in developing water-powered machines, which were adopted to such widespread uses as “pounding, lifting, grinding, and pressing.”37 The monastery of Clairvaux dug a two-mile-long canal from the River Aube.38 The Church also intervened to build new roads and bridges where population centers had shifted outside the range of the old Roman garrison roads. Bishops granted indulgences to local lords who would build or repair river crossings and maintain hospices for travelers. An order of monks established by St. Bénezet, the Frères Pontifes, or “Brothers of the Bridge,” built several of the longest bridges then existing, including the Pont d’Avignon, a massive twenty-arch structure over the Rhone with a combination chapel and tollbooth at one end. Even London Bridge, which stood until the nineteenth century, was constructed by a chaplain and financed in part by a contribution of 1,000 marks from the papal legate.39

5. The Church also helped incubate a more complex market. Cathedral construction, for example, differs in kind from public infrastructure, like bridges and aqueducts. In principle, at least, Church structures were used only for religious services and not as thoroughfares for commerce. Yet it should not be forgotten that construction of churches and cathedrals helped create and deepen markets for many artisanal and engineering skills. In the same way that military spending of the nation-state during the Cold War unintentionally helped incubate the Internet, so the building of medieval cathedrals led to spin-offs of other kinds, the incubation of commerce. The Church was a principal customer of the building trades and artisans. Church purchases of silver for communion services, candelabra, and artworks to decorate churches helped to create a market for luxury goods that otherwise would not have existed.

In many ways, the Church helped to temper the ferocity of violence unleashed by armed knights during and after the “feudal revolution.” Especially in the early centuries of feudalism, the Church contributed significantly to improving the productivity of the farming economy. It was an essential institution, well fitted to the needs of agrarian society at the close of the Dark Ages.

10暴力面前的脆弱Vulnerability to Violence

中文译本

就像五个世纪之前罗马的陷落一样,“公元 1000 年左右的封建革命,经历了三四十年的暴力骚乱”,它看似是一个很不寻常的事件,但也是由很多相互影响的复杂因素造成的。但是,这场恶人的胜利以及他们创造出的压迫机制,完美地反映了农业社会在暴力面前的脆弱性。与人类的觅食阶段相比,在暴力的组织和压迫的强度上,农业社会都取得了质的飞跃。

这从一开始就反映在农耕民族更加好战的文化中。在农业社会早期,人们崇拜的神是雨神和水神,因为农民认为这些神决定着农作物的产量。然而,降雨与洪水之神,往往也就是战争之神,最早期的国王都会召唤他们;而国王则又是战争之王。

人们的生活因农业革命的变革而改变,农业与战争之间的紧密联系,反映在他们的宗教想象之中。被逐出伊甸园可以看作是人类社会从觅食到耕作的转变,它非常形象地描述了,人类从毫不费力就能在大自然的恩赐中获得食物的自由生活,沦落到了艰苦劳作方能糊口的境地。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In “[t]hirty or forty years of violent disturbances, the feudal revolution of the year 1000,”40 like the fall of Rome five centuries earlier, was a unique event, caused by a complex interplay of influences. Yet in one respect, the triumph of mali homines (wicked men) and the oppressions they wrought perfectly reflect the essential vulnerability of agricultural society to violence. In contrast to the foraging phase of human existence, farming introduced a quantum leap in organized violence and oppression.

From the very earliest, this was reflected in the more militant cultures of farming peoples. The gods of the early agricultural societies were gods of rainfall and flooding, whose functions reflected the preoccupations of those societies with factors that determined crop yields. The sender of rain or water was also often the god of war, invoked by the earliest kings, who were, above all else, warlords.41

The close connection between farming and warfare was reflected in the religious imagination of people whose lives were transformed by the innovations of the agricultural revolution. The expulsion from the Garden of Eden can be seen as a figurative account of the transformation of society from foraging to farming, from a free life with food picked from nature’s bounty with little work to a life of hard labor.

11失乐园PARADISE LOST

中文译本

农业使人类走上了一条全新的道路。第一批农民确实播下了文明的种子。从他们的辛勤劳作中,诞生了城市、军队、算术、天文学、地牢、葡萄酒和威士忌、文字、国王、奴隶制和战争。尽管农耕为生活增添了很多乐趣,但从原始经济转变到农业,从一开始就不那么受人欢迎。《创世纪》的记录就可以证明这一点,它讲述的就是一个人类被逐出乐园的故事。圣经中伊甸园的寓言,就是人们对觅食者在荒野中享受轻松时光的深情回忆。有学者指出,“伊甸园”这个词似乎就来自苏美尔语的“荒野”一词。

从自由自在地生活在人口稀少的野外,到定居在从事农耕的村落,无疑是一种令人深感遗憾的转变,这不仅表现在《圣经》中,也表现在人类对早起和出门工作的永恒怨恨之中。在《生物学视角下的西方文明》一书中,斯蒂芬·博伊登写到,伴随农耕而来的新生活方式,是一种“偏离进化适配的”生活(evodeviant)。在农业出现之前,成千上万代的人们,都像亚当一样生活在伊甸园中,而且他的造物主邀请说:“园中各样的果树,你都可以随便吃。”狩猎采集者没有庄稼需要照料,没有牛群需要看管,没有税收需要支付。他们像流浪汉那样,想到哪里就漂到哪里,很少干活,不用对任何人负责。

自从有了农业,一种新的生活方式开始了,而且总体上更加压迫人。“地必给你长出荆棘和蒺藜来,你也要吃田间的菜蔬。你必汗流满面才得糊口。”农耕是艰苦的劳作,在人类的记忆中,农耕之前的生活就是失乐园。

农民凭双手创造的一切极大地改变了暴力的逻辑,这远远超出他们的想象。《创世纪》把第一个杀人犯该隐确立为“耕地的人”,这不是巧合,而是圣经不可思议的预言能力的一部分。而圣经的故事之所以由牧羊人讲述,是因为他们更容易理解,农业是怎样给暴力提供了杠杆。在短短的几节经文中,圣经的记载概括了一种逻辑,在人类社会中演绎了几千年。农业是纷争的孵化器,农业创造了大规模的固定资产,提高了暴力的回报,也极大地加剧了财产保护的挑战。有史以来第一次,农业使犯罪和政府都成为了赚钱的买卖。

该隐(Cain),男,《圣经》中记载的人物,名字意为“得到”。

亚伯是亚当与夏娃的次子,该隐的弟弟,名字意为”虚空”。

该隐是农夫,亚伯是牧羊人。根据《创世纪》的记载,当他们向上帝献祭时,亚伯的祭物得到了上帝的悦纳,而该隐的祭物却没有。这使得该隐心生嫉妒,愤怒不已,该隐因嫉恨而杀害了亚伯。

音译。

译注:Kaffer 或 Kafir 原意为“异教徒”,后来在某些殖民语境中演变为带有侮辱性的称呼。

保留绝对所有权的土地。

译注:拉德克利夫-布朗(Alfred Radcliffe-Brown)是英国社会人类学的重要代表人物之一。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Farming set humanity on an entirely new course. The first farmers truly planted the seeds of civilization. From their toil came cities, armies, arithmetic, astronomy, dungeons, wine and whiskey, the written word, kings, slavery, and war. Yet notwithstanding all the drama that farming was to add to life, the shift away from the primeval economy appears to have been roundly unpopular from its earliest days. Witness the account preserved in the Book of Genesis, which tells the story of the expulsion from paradise. The biblical parable of the Garden of Eden is a fond recollection of the life of ease enjoyed by the forager in the wilderness. Scholars indicate that the word “Eden” appears to be derived from a Sumerian word for “wilderness.”42

The transition from a free and sparsely settled life in the wild to a sedentary life in a farming village was a matter of deep regret, expressed not only in the Bible but also in humankind’s continuing grudge against getting up in the morning and going to work. As Stephen Boyden wrote in Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, the new way of living that accompanied farming was “evodeviant.”43 Prior to the advent of farming, thousands of human generations lived as Adam did in Eden, at the invitation of his Maker: “Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat.” Hunters and gatherers had no crops to tend, no herd to watch, no taxes to pay. Like hoboes, foragers drifted where they pleased, worked little, and answered to no one.

With farming, a new way of life began, and on altogether more pressing terms. “Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” Farming was hard work. The memory of life before farming was that of paradise lost.

More than they could have imagined, farmers created new conditions that drastically altered the logic of violence. It is not a coincidence that the Book of Genesis makes Cain, the first murderer, “a tiller of the ground.” Indeed, it is part of the uncanny prophetic power of the Bible that its story was entrusted to shepherds who readily understood how farming gave leverage to violence. In a few verses the biblical account encapsulates logic that took thousands of years to play out. Farming was an incubator of disputes. Farming created stationary capital on an extensive scale, raising the payoff from violence and dramatically increasing the challenge of protecting assets. Farming made both crime and government paying propositions for the first time.