BILINGUAL READING · 第04章

教会衰落与保姆国家的类比

CHAPTER 4 THE LAST DAYS OF POLITICS Parallels Between the Senile Decline of the Holy Mother Church and the Nanny State

桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。

导读 本章论证

  • 原书将晚期中世纪教会与现代福利国家类比:组织规模膨胀、财政压力加重、规则阻碍生产力。
  • 火药和印刷等技术削弱教会垄断;信息技术可能以类似方式削弱民族国家的垄断。
  • 这一类比提供思考工具,但不等于两个历史阶段在制度和因果关系上完全相同。
  • 印刷术大幅降低知识复制成本,打破教会的信息垄断,并推动从象征解释转向因果解释。
  • 原书把新教竞争释放生产力的机制概括为:简化仪式、减少非生产性投入、重新分配土地、减少节庆停工并放松利息禁令。具体数字和因果强度需要历史资料核验。

01开篇Opening

中文译本

我相信并且希望,政治和经济在未来不再像在过去那样重要。中世纪最敏锐的头脑曾经把精力耗费在神学辩论中,如今看来已是微不足道或毫无意义;我们现在关于政治和经济的大部分争论,当有一天看起来和中世纪的神学辩论一样,那个未来就来临了。 —— 阿瑟·C·克拉克

如果说政治即将消亡,肯定会被认为荒谬或者乐观,这取决于每个人的态度。但这就是信息革命可能导致的后果。20 世纪是一个政治氛围浓厚的世纪,对于在该世纪中长大的读者来说,认为生活中可以没有政治,简直就是异想天开,这就好像说一个人只靠从空气中吸收营养就能活下去。然而,现代意义上的政治,作为控制国家权力并将其合理化的一套思想,它主要是一种现代发明。我们相信它也会随着现代社会一起结束;就像中世纪的人们纠葛的封建责任和义务,随着中世纪一起消亡一样。就像历史学家马丁·范·克雷维尔德1(Martin van Creveld)所指出的,在封建时期,“政治并不存在”。我们现在所了解的政治在现代时期之前并不存在,这种说法可能会令人感到讶异;毕竟,在亚历山大大帝的时代,亚里士多德就写过一篇以此为题的文章。但是仔细想一下,古代文本中的词语并不一定等同于当代的概念。亚里士多德也写过一篇题为《辩谬篇》2的文章,这个词在今天就好像“政治”在中世纪一样毫无意义,当时还没有人使用它。它最早在英语中出现是 1529 年,而且在那时,它似乎还是个贬义词,来自于古法语的一个单词 politique,用来描述“机会主义者和见风使舵者”。

近两千年后,亚里士多德的概念才出现了我们现在所知的内涵。原因何在?因为在现代社会将亚里士多德的词语赋予实质的用途之前,需要满足相应的大政治条件,这些条件可以极大地提高暴力的回报。我们在《大清算》中分析过,这就是火药革命,它使暴力的回报率远远超过了以往。在这种情况下,国家控制在谁的手里,就变得前所未有地重要。从逻辑上讲,运用权力可以获得的战利品急剧增加,在控制这些战利品的斗争中,不可避免地就产生了政治。

政治开始于五个世纪之前的工业化早期,如今它正在消亡。对政治和政客的普遍反感正席卷全球。这一点,你可以从对白水公司的报道以及对隐藏细节的猜测中看到,可以从文森特·福特谋杀案的拙劣掩盖中看到。从比尔·克林顿海量的丑闻中;从主要国会议员挪用众议院邮局公款的报道中;从导致约翰·梅杰圈内人辞职的丑闻中;法国最近的两任总理,爱德华·巴拉迪尔和阿兰·朱佩,也爆发了类似的丑闻。意大利,丑闻更大,做了七任总理的吉奥·安得利奥迪被送上被告席接受审判,罪名包括与黑手党有染,还下令谋杀调查记者米诺·佩克雷利。

西班牙首相菲利普·冈萨雷斯,也因为一些丑闻名誉受损。在 20 世纪 90 年代的前 5 年,四位日本首相因为腐败指控而下台。加拿大司法部在给瑞士当局的一封信中指称,其前总理布莱恩·穆罗尼在加拿大航空公司 18 亿加元的空客合同中吃了回扣。甚至在瑞典,副总理和准总理莫娜·萨赫林,因为被指控使用政府信用卡购买尿布和其他家庭用品而被迫辞职。在那些拥有成熟福利的国家,在几乎所有治理良好的国家,无论你走到哪儿,人们都讨厌他们的政治领导人。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

“I also believe—and hope—that politics and economics will cease to be as important in the future as they have been in the past; the time will come when most of our present controversies on these matters will seem as trivial, or as meaningless, as the theological debates in which the keenest minds of the Middle Ages dissipated their energies.”1 —ARTHUR C. CLARKE

To speak of the coming death of politics is bound to seem ridiculous or optimistic, depending on your disposition. Yet that is what the Information Revolution is likely to bring. For readers reared in a century saturated in politics, the idea that life could proceed without it may seem fanciful, the equivalent to claiming that one could live merely by absorbing nutrients from the air. Yet politics in the modern sense, as the preoccupation with controlling and rationalizing the power of the state, is mostly a modern invention. We believe it will end with the modern world just as the tangle of feudal duties and obligations that engrossed the attentions of people in the Middle Ages ended with the Middle Ages. During the feudal period, as historian Martin van Creveld points out, “politics did not exist (the very concept had yet to be invented, and dates back only to the sixteenth century).”2

The thought that politics, as we now know it, did not exist prior to the modern period may seem surprising, especially given that Aristotle had written an essay of that title in the days of Alexander the Great. But look closely. Words used in ancient texts are not necessarily contemporary concepts. Aristotle also wrote an essay entitled Sophistical Refutations, a term about as meaningless today as Politics was in the Middle Ages. The word simply was not in use. Its first known appearance in English dates to 1529.3 Even then, “politics” appears to have been a pejorative, derived from an Old French word, politique, used to describe “opportunists and temporizers.”4

It took almost two thousand years for Aristotle’s latent concept to emerge with the meaning we now know. Why? Before the modern world could put Aristotle’s word to a meaningful use, megapolitical conditions were required that dramatically raised the returns to violence. The Gunpowder Revolution, which we analyzed in The Great Reckoning, did just that. It raised the returns to violence far above what they had ever been. This made the question of who controlled the state more important than it had ever been. Logically and inevitably, politics emerged from the struggle to control the sharply increased spoils of power.

Politics began five centuries ago with the early stages of industrialism. Now it is dying. A widespread revulsion against politics and politicians is sweeping the world. You see it in news and speculation on the hidden details of Whitewater, and the poorly disguised murder of Vincent Foster. You see it in numerous other scandals touching President Bill Clinton. You see in it reports of embezzlement by leading congressmen from the House Post Office. You see it in scandals leading to resignations in John Major’s circle, and similar scandals in France, reaching two recent prime ministers, Eduard Balladur and Alain Juppe. Even larger scandals have been revealed in Italy, where-seven-time prime minister Giulio Andreotti was brought to the dock to stand trail on charges that included links to the Mafia and ordering the murder of Mino Pecorelli, an investigative journalist. Still other scandals have tarnished the reputation of Spanish prime minister Filipe Gonzales. Corruption allegations cost four Japanese prime ministers their jobs in the first five years of the 1990s. Canada’s Justice Department alleged in a letter to Swiss authorities that former prime minister Brian Mulroney had received kickbacks on a C$1.8 billion sale of Airbus planes to Air Canada.5 Willy Claes, the secretary-general of NATO, was forced to resign under a cloud of corruption allegations. Even in Sweden, Mona Sahlin, a deputy prime minister and presumptive prime minister, was forced to resign in the face of allegations that she used government credit cards to purchase diapers and other household goods. Almost everywhere you turn in countries with mature welfare states once thought of as well governed, people hate their political leaders.

02蔑视是一种先行指标Disdain as a Leading Indicator

中文译本

对腐败领导人的道德愤怒并不是孤立的历史现象,而是一种常见的变革先兆。当一个时代让位给另一个时代时,这种现象就会一再发生。每当技术的进步导致旧体制与新的经济驱动力脱离,社会的道德标准就相应地发生改变,人们就会对那些旧制度的掌控者越来越不屑。而且,在新的、系统性的革命意识形态形成之前,这种普遍的反感就已经出现了。目前还几乎看不到一种清晰成形、能够明确说出口的反政治立场;那要到后面才会出现。你们同时代的大多数人还想象不到,没有政治的生活是可能的。在二十世纪的最后几年,我们所感受到的还只是无言的蔑视。

类似的情景也发生在 15 世纪末,不同的是,当时处于衰退之中的,是宗教而不是政治。尽管人们还相信“圣职者的神圣性”,但无论高级的还是低级的神职人员,都遭到了极大的蔑视,与今天人们对待政客和官僚的态度并无二致。当时的人们普遍认为,上层神职人员腐败、世俗、贪婪。这不是没有原因的,15 世纪的几个教皇都公开拥有私生子。下层神职人员的地位更低,他们在乡下和城里泛滥成灾,乞讨施舍,并向任何愿意给钱的人兜售上帝的恩典与罪过的赦免。

在“表明虔诚的外壳”之下,是一个腐败的、日益失灵的系统。在有人敢于指出这一点之前,人们已经不再尊重它的管理者。宗教充斥着生活的方方面面,不分精神和世俗,它的可能性已经耗尽了。早在马丁·路德将他的《九十五条论纲》钉在维登堡教堂的门上之前3,它的结局就已经注定了。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Moral outrage against corrupt leaders is not an isolated historical phenomenon but a common precursor of change. It happens again and again whenever one era gives way to another. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. As we write, there is as yet little evidence of an articulate rejection of politics. That will come later. It has not yet occurred to most of your contemporaries that a life without politics is possible. What we have in the final years of the twentieth century is inarticulate disdain.

Something similar happened in the late fifteenth century, but at that time it was religion rather than politics that was in the process of being downsized. Notwithstanding popular belief in “the sacredness of the sacerdotal office,”6 both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt —not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today. It was widely believed that the upper clergy were corrupt, worldly, and venal. And not without reason. Several fifteenth-century popes openly sported bastards. The lower clergy were held in even lower esteem as they proliferated in country and town, begging for alms and frequently offering to sell God’s grace and the forgiveness of sins to anyone who would put cash into the bargain.

Beneath the “crust of superficial piety”7 was a corrupt and increasingly dysfunctional system. Many lost respect for those who ran it, long before anyone dared to say that it did not work. A life saturated with religion, making no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, had exhausted its possibilities. Its end was inevitable long before Luther nailed his 95 theses on the church door at Wittenberg.

03世俗改革A SECULAR REFORMATION

中文译本

我们相信,政治的饱和也会导致同样的变革。苏联的灭亡和对社会主义的否定,就是席卷全球的去政治化格局中的一部分。这一点在人们对各国政府领导人的日益蔑视上,体现得最为明显。部分原因是,人们认识到政客是腐败的,他们经常通过出售政治“赎罪券”以换取竞选资金,或者在商品交易中提供特殊服务,以充实自己的财政。

另外一部分原因是,人们越来越认识到,政客花费巨大代价所做的一切都是无益的。就像在 15 世纪末期,组织忏悔者再一次朝圣,在雪地里赤脚前行;或者再成立一个托钵修道会一样,都是徒劳的,对提高生产力或者缓解生活压力,毫无帮助。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

We believe that the reaction against saturation politics is following a similar path. The death of the Soviet Union and the repudiation of socialism are part of a broad pattern of depoliticization sweeping the world. This is now most evident in a growing contempt for those who run the world’s governments. It is driven only in part by the realization that they are corrupt, and prone to sell “indulgences” from political difficulty in exchange for campaign contributions or special help on commodity trades to subvene their personal finances.

The reaction against politicians is also motivated by the widening realization that much of what they do at great cost is futile, in the same way that organizing another pilgrimage of penitents to march barefoot in the snow, or the founding of yet another order of mendicant monks in the late fifteenth century, could have done little to improve productivity or relieve pressures on living standards.

04圣母教会最后的日子The Last Days of the Holy Mother Church

中文译本

到中世纪末期,一元化的教会机构已经衰老不堪,并且严重影响生产力的发展。

这与它在五个世纪前对经济的积极贡献形成鲜明的对比。在上一章中我们探讨过,在 10 世纪末,在教会主导下,城乡秩序得以恢复,经济得以发展,整个社会从无政府状态中走了出来,这也标志着黑暗时代的结束。在当时,对于构成西欧大部分人口的自由民和农奴来说,教会的存在是不可或缺的。而到 15 世纪末,教会已经成为了生产力的严重阻碍,它强加的负担大大降低了人们的生活水准。

今天的民族国家也是如此。五个世纪前的火药革命创造了新的大政治条件,民族国家是对此的必要适应。民族国家取代了支离破碎的地方势力,扩大了市场范围,更大的贸易区带来了更丰厚的回报。在整个欧洲,当中央的君主在巩固权威时,几乎所有的商人都会自发地与他结盟。这一事实本身就足以说明,民族国家在早期的形式下,对商业发展是大有裨益的,它有助于减轻封建领主和地方豪强对商人的压迫。

在暴力回报很高且不断上升的世界里,民族国家是一个很有用的机构。但是 500年过去了,在这个千年的末尾,大政治的环境已经发生了改变。使用暴力的回报率正在下降,民族国家成为了经济增长和生产力发展的阻力,就像中世纪暮年的教会一样,它已经不合时宜了。

和当年的教会一样,今天的民族国家也穷尽了它的可能性。它已经到了衰老的顶点,是一种破产的机构。和当年的教会一样,作为社会组织的主导形式,民族国家也已经存在了五个世纪。促使它诞生的条件已经不复存在,它已经熟透可以坠落了。而它也必将坠落。技术发展正在酝酿一场新的权力革命,毋庸置疑,它必将摧毁民族国家,就像火药武器和印刷术摧毁中世纪教会的垄断一样。

如果我们的推理无误,民族国家将被新的主权形式所取代。有些是历史上前所未有的,有些则会让人联想到前现代社会的城邦国家和中世纪的商人共和国。到2000 年之后,旧的将变成新的;难以想象的将变成习以为常的。随着技术规模的急剧下降,政府会发现它们将不得不像公司一样为收入而竞争,它们收入的服务费不会再超过它们所能提供的价值。这种变革的深远影响,现在难以估量。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

At the end of the Middle Ages, the monolithic Church as an institution had grown senile and counterproductive, a marked change from its positive economic contribution five centuries earlier. As we explored in the last chapter, the Church played a leading role at the end of the tenth century in establishing order and facilitating economic recovery from the anarchy that marked the close of the Dark Ages. At that time, the Church was indispensable to the survival of large numbers of small freeholders and serfs who made up the bulk of the Western European population. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Church had become a major drag upon productivity. The burdens it imposed upon the population were pushing living standards down.

Much the same thing can be said of the nation-state today. It was a necessary adaptation to the new megapolitical conditions created by the Gunpowder Revolution five centuries ago. The nation-state widened the scope of markets and displaced fragmented local authorities at a time when more encompassing trading areas brought large returns. The fact that merchants almost everywhere in Europe spontaneously allied themselves to the monarch at the center as he maneuvered to consolidate authority is itself telling evidence that the nation-state in its early form was good for business. It helped lift the burdens on commerce imposed by feudal landlords and local magnates.

In a world where returns to violence were high and rising, the nation-state was a useful institution. But five centuries later, as this millennium draws to a close, megapolitical conditions have changed. Returns to violence are falling, and the nation-state, like the Church at the twilight of the Middle Ages, is an anachronism that has become a drag on growth and productivity.

Like the Church then, the nation-state today has exhausted its possibilities. It is bankrupt, an institution grown to a senile extreme. Like the Church then, it has served as the dominant form of social organization for five centuries. Having outlived the conditions that brought it into existence, it is ripe for a fall. And fall it will. Technology is precipitating a revolution in the exercise of power that will destroy the nation-state just as assuredly as gunpowder weapons and the printing press destroyed the monopoly of the medieval Church.

If our reasoning is correct, the nation-state will be replaced by new forms of sovereignty, some of them unique in history, some reminiscent of the city-states and medieval merchant republics of the premodern world. What was old will be new after the year 2000. And what was unimaginable will be commonplace. As the scale of technology plunges, governments will find that they must compete like corporations for income, charging no more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable.

05过去和现在THIN AND NOW

中文译本

五百年前,15 世纪之交,可能有人说过类似的话。当时和现在一样,西方文明站在一个重大变革的门槛上。虽然人们还没有认识到,但中世纪社会正在消亡。

他们既没有预见,也理解不了。普遍的情绪是一种深深的忧郁,这在一个时代结束时很常见,因为传统的思想家感觉到事态正在崩溃,“猎鹰听不到猎鹰人的哨声”。但是他们的思维惯性太大,无法理解正在出现的权力结构的潜在影响。

中世纪历史学家约翰·惠泽加,在谈到中世纪的衰落时写道:“15 世纪的编年史学家们,几乎全都被其时代的误解而蒙骗了,社会演进的真正动力,他们都没有注意到。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Something similar might have been said five hundred years ago, at the turn of the fifteenth century. Then as now, Western civilization stood at the threshold of a momentous transformation. Although almost no one knew it, medieval society was dying. Its death was neither widely anticipated nor understood. Nonetheless, the prevailing mood was one of deep gloom. This is common at the end of an era, as conventional thinkers sense that things are falling apart, that “the falcon cannot hear the falconer.” Yet their mental inertia is often too great to comprehend the implications of the emerging configurations of power. Medieval historian Johan Huizinga wrote of the waning days of the Middle Ages, “The chroniclers of the fifteenth century have, nearly all, been the dupes of an absolute misappreciation of their times, of which the real moving forces escaped their attention.”8

06被背叛的神话Myths Betrayed

中文译本

当驱动权力的基本动力发生重大的变化,传统的思想家往往会迷惑不解,因为它揭露出,使旧秩序合理化的神话,其实缺乏真正的解释力。中世纪末和今天一样,在人们普遍接受的神话和现实之间存在巨大的差距。惠泽加在谈到 15 世纪末的欧洲人时说:“他们的整个思想体系都充斥着一种虚构,认为是骑士精神统治着世界。”在当今世界,有一种假想与此异曲同工,那就是认为世界是由选票和支持率所统治。这两种观点都经不起仔细推敲。事实上,认为历史的进程是由民主的意愿所决定的,这种想法和中世纪的观念一样愚蠢;那时候的人们认为,历史是由一套精心设计的礼仪规范决定的,也就是骑士精神。

这样的说法近乎异端,这也表明了,传统思维与工业社会晚期权力动态的现实之间是多么的脱节。在我们看来,投票是导致现代民族国家产生大政治条件所带来的一个结果,而不是原因。大众民主和公民概念,随着民族国家的发展而日益丰富,也必将随之一起衰落。华盛顿将面临的不安和骚动,就像 500 年前骑士精神失格后,勃艮第公爵的宫廷中所遭遇的一样。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Major changes in the underlying dynamics of power tend to confound conventional thinkers because they expose myths that rationalize the old order but lack any real explanatory power. At the end of the Middle Ages, as now, there was a particularly wide gap between the received myths and reality. As Huizinga said of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century, “Their whole system of ideas was permeated by the fiction that chivalry ruled the world.”9 This has a close second in the contemporary assumption that it is ruled by votes and popularity contests. Neither proposition stands up to close scrutiny. Indeed, the idea that the course of history is determined by democratic tallies of wishes is every bit as silly as the medieval notion that it is determined by an elaborated code of manners called chivalry.

The fact that saying so borders on heresy suggests how divorced conventional thinking is from a realistic grasp of the dynamics of power in late industrial society. It is an issue we examine closely in this book. In our view, voting was an effect rather than a cause of the megapolitical conditions that brought forth the modern nation-state. Mass democracy and the concept of citizenship flourished as the nation-state grew. They will falter as the nation-state falters, causing every bit as much dismay in Washington as the erosion of chivalry caused in the court of the duke of Burgundy five hundred years ago.

07骑士精神与公民身份的相似之处PARALLELS BETWEEN CHIVALRY AND CITIZENSHIP

中文译本

如果你能理解骑士精神誓言的重要性,以及为什么随着社会向工业组织的过渡,它会逐渐消失;那么,你就能更好地理解,我们今天所熟知的公民身份,将如何在信息时代逐渐退出历史舞台。这两者有着同样的功能,在两套完全不同的大政治环境中促进了权力的行使。

在封建誓约盛行的时代,防御性的技术是最重要的。那时候主权很分散,私人和法人团体都凭自身的实力行使军事权力。在火药革命之前,战争通常都是小规模的武装人员进行的。即使是最强大的君主,也没有长期的军事力量,即常备军。

他需要从他的附庸——大领主那里得到支持,大领主又要从他的附庸——小领主那里寻求支持,小领主又要从他的附庸——骑士那里获得支持。整个效忠的链条沿着等级制度向下延伸,直到被认为有资格携带武器的、社会地位最卑微的人为止。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

If you can understand how and why the importance of chivalric oaths faded away with the transition to an industrial organization of society, you will be better positioned to see how citizenship as we now know it could fade away in the Information Age. Both served a similar function. They facilitated the exercise of power under two quite different sets of megapolitical conditions.

Feudal oaths prevailed at a time when defensive technology was paramount, sovereignties were fragmented, and private individuals and corporate bodies exercised military power in their own right. Before the Gunpowder Revolution, wars had normally been fought by small contingents of armed men. Even the most powerful monarchs did not have militum perpetuum, or standing armies. They drew their military support from their vassals, the greater lords, who in turn drew upon their vassals, the lesser lords, who in turn drew upon their vassals, the knights. The whole chain of allegiance carried down the hierarchy to the person of the meanest social standing who was considered worthy to bear arms.

08制服还是区分?Uniforms or Divergences?

中文译本

与现代军队不同,在公民身份兴起之前的中世纪,军队在战场并没有穿着统一的制服。相反,每个家臣或随从,每个骑士、男爵或不同身份的领主,都有自己独特的装束,用以反映他在等级制度中的地位。与其说是服装,不如说是对社会垂直结构的强调,在这个结构中,每个位置都是不同的。惠泽加指出,中世纪的士兵主要通过以下方式做区分,“外在的分别标志主要有:着装、颜色、旗帜以及口号”。

战争也不仅仅发生在政府或国家之间。马丁·范·克雷维尔德认为,卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨等战略家所塑造的现代战争概念,扭曲了前现代时期军事冲突的性质。

范·克雷维尔德写道:

在罗马灭亡后的一千年里,武装冲突可以由不同类型的社会实体发动。其中包括野蛮人的部落、教会、各种等级的封建男爵、自由的城邦,甚至是私人。这一时期的“军队”与我们今天所知的军队也不一样,实际上,很难找到一个合适的词描述它。那时的战争,往往是由一群披上战装、跟随领主的家臣们发动的。

在这样的情况下,对领主来说,他的家臣能真的“披上战装,跟在后面”显然是至关重要的。因此,骑士精神的誓言就受到高度的推崇。中世纪骑士的荣誉和今天服兵役的义务具有类似的功能。中世纪的人,被他向别人和教会许下的誓言所约束,就像今天的人被民族国家的公民身份所约束一样。在中世纪违反誓言,就相当于今天的叛国罪。中世纪晚期的人们,为了不打破自己的誓言不惜走向极端,就像在世界大战期间,数百万的现代人为了履行公民义务而冲进机枪窝里。

任何头脑未受过灌输的人,都不会愿意投身到战场,并且在形势恶劣的情况下还留在那里。而骑士精神和公民身份为这种简单的盘算,增加了一个维度,提高了计算难度。骑士精神和公民意识都引导人们去杀人、去冒死。能够发挥这种作用的价值观,只能是经由统治机构大力强化及高度夸张过的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Unlike a modern army, a medieval army before the rise of citizenship did not march on the field of battle outfitted in uniforms. To the contrary, each retainer or vassal, each knight, baronet, or lord of different degree had his own distinctive livery that reflected his place in the hierarchy. Instead of uniforms, there were divergences that emphasized the vertical structure of society in which each station was different. As Huizinga said, medieval warriors were distinguished by “outward signs of… divergences: liveries, colors, badges, party cries.”10

Nor were wars fought only by governments or nations. As Martin van Creveld has pointed out, modern notions of war, as stylized by strategists like Carl von Clausewitz, misrepresent the reality of premodern conflict. Van Creveld writes:

For a thousand years after the fall of Rome, armed conflict was waged by different kinds of social entities. Among them were barbarian tribes, the Church, feudal barons of every rank, free cities, even private individuals. Nor were the “armies” of the period anything like those we know today; indeed, it is difficult to find a word that will do them justice. War was waged by shoals of retainers who donned military garb and followed their lord.11

Under such conditions, it was obviously crucial to the lord that his retainers actually “donned their military garb and followed.” Hence the heavy emphasis placed upon the chivalric oath.

The honor of the medieval knight and the duty of the conscript soldier served parallel functions. The medieval man was bound by oaths to individuals and the Church in much the way that moderns are bound by citizenship to the nation-state. Violating an oath was the medieval equivalent of treason. People in late-medieval times went to extremes to avoid violating oaths, just as millions of modern citizens went to extremes in the World Wars, charging machine-gun nests to fulfill their duties as citizens.

Both chivalry and citizenship added an extra dimension to the simple calculus that would otherwise deter unindoctrinated human beings from going onto a battlefield and staying there when the going got rough. Chivalry and citizenship both led people to kill and to risk death. Only demanding and exaggerated values that are strongly reinforced by leading institutions can serve that function.

09规避成本效益分析Circumventing Cost-Benefit Analysis

中文译本

任何制度的成功与生存,都取决于它在危机时分调集军事力量的能力。很显然,中世纪的骑士或一战壕沟里的士兵,他们决定在战斗中冒生命危险,不可能经过冷静的成本计算。很少有战争是这么容易打赢的,对那些愿意冲锋在先的士兵,战争所给予的回报,也很少能够远超其所付出的代价。不然的话,统治者就可以招募一支经济最优化的部队,送到前线去冲锋陷阵。几乎每一场战争,或者大多数战争,都有一个瞬间扭转局面的时刻。研究军事史的学生都清楚,战斗的胜利和失败往往一线之隔,就取决于个别士兵的英勇、果敢和凶猛。一块阵地,不过是一块在战斗结束后一文不值的土地,如果打仗的人不愿意为这样一块地而牺牲,他们就很可能战胜不了原本势均力敌的对手。

这一点,意义深刻。主权国家在限制叛逃和鼓励牺牲方面做得越成功,就越有可能在军事上取得胜利。在战争中,最有效的价值体系会诱导人们从事某些行为,而这些行为只要稍加理性思考就不可能被接受。被送到战场上的士兵,如果可以自由地计算对自己最有利的选择是什么,并以此决定是打是逃,那么任何组织都无法有效地调动军力。能够理性思考的人,就永远不会参与战争。一个理性的人,如果分析过短期的成本和收益,还决定参加一场致命的战争,那只可能是在最有利的条件下,或者在最绝望的形势下。在一个阳光灿烂的日子,当己方的军力占据压倒性的优势,敌人不堪一击,而战利品极其丰厚的情况下,一个理性经济人可能会加入战斗。也许吧。而如果他被食人族逼到墙角的话,应该也会奋起抗争。

这些都是极端的情况,更常见的战争呢?往往既没有诱人的战利品,也无法通过成本和效益进行分析,也没有绝望到无路可走的地步。正是在这里,骑士精神和公民身份等概念,为发动军事力量提供了强力的支撑。早在战争发生之前,统治集团就必须让个人相信,坚守对领主或民族国家的某些职责,比生命本身更重要。

在社会上编织神话,鼓励到战场上冒险与牺牲,将其合理化,是统治者军事力量的一个关键组成部分。这些神话要想有效,就必须根据当时的大政治条件进行调整。骑士精神统治世界的虚构在今天毫无意义,特别是在纽约这样的城市。但它是封建主义顶礼膜拜的神话。它使义务的纽带合理化,这个纽带将每个人都束缚在教会及好战的贵族的统治之下。在那个贪恋财富、私人战争司空见惯的时代,权力的行使与个体的生存,都取决于他人是否愿意在威胁之下履行兵役的承诺。这些承诺是否可靠,显然是生死攸关的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The success and survival of any system depends upon its capacity to marshal military effort in times of conflict and crisis. Obviously, the decision on the part of a medieval knight or a private in the trenches in World War I to risk his life in battle was not likely to be informed by a sober, cost-benefit calculation. Seldom are wars so easily fought, or do rewards for those who bear the brunt of the fighting so far overshadow the possible costs that an army of economic optimizers could be recruited to rush out to the battlefield. Almost every war and, indeed, most battles have moments in which the tide could turn on a heartbeat. As students of military history are well aware, the difference between defeat and victory is often told by the valor, bravery, and ferocity with which individual soldiers take up their task. If the men doing the fighting are not willing to die over a piece of ground that would not be worth a fig once the battle stops, then they probably will not prevail against an otherwise evenly matched foe.

This has important implications. The more effective sovereignties are in limiting defections and encouraging military effort, the more likely they are to prevail militarily. In warfare, the most useful value systems induce people to behave in ways that short-term rational calculation would rule out. No organization could mobilize military power effectively if the individuals it sent into battle felt free to calculate where their own best advantage lay, and join in the fight or run away accordingly. If so, they would almost never fight. Only under the most propitious circumstances, or the most desperate, would the rational person care to engage in a potentially lethal battle based upon short-term cost-benefit analysts. Perhaps Homo economicus might fight on a sunny day, when the forces on his side were overwhelming, the enemy weak, and the potential rewards of battle enticing. Perhaps. He might also fight if backed into a corner by marauding cannibals.

But those are extreme circumstances. What of the more common conditions of warfare, which are neither so attractive that they would pass the scrutiny of cost-benefit analysis nor so desperate that they afford no way out? It is here that concepts like chivalry and citizenship are important contributors to the successful use of military power. Long before a battle begins, predominant organizations must convince individuals that upholding certain duties to the lord, or the nation-state, are more important than life itself. The myths and rationalizations that societies employ to encourage risk-taking on the battlefield are a key part of their military prowess.

To be effective, these myths must be tailored to the prevailing megapolitical conditions. The fiction that chivalry rules the world means nothing today, especially in a city like New York. But it was the cherished myth of feudalism. It justified and rationalized the ties of obligation that bound everyone under the domination of the Church and a warlike nobility. At a time when private wars of covetousness were commonplace,12 the exercise of power and the very survival of individuals depended upon the willingness of others to fulfill their promises of military service under conditions of duress. It was obviously crucial that those promises be dependable.

10在国籍出现之前Before Nationality

中文译本

与今天不同的是,在中世纪,国籍的概念对于确立主权几乎没有任何作用。在那个时代,君主、红衣主教以及有权势的领主们,以私人权利的形式拥有领土。他们能以现代人无法比拟的方式,出售或赠送领地,或者通过转让、联姻及征服获得新的领土。今天你很难想象,一个不会讲英语的葡萄牙总统碰巧娶了美国前总统的女儿,美国就会归于葡萄牙的主权之下。但这样的事情在中世纪是很常见的。

权力通过血统世袭传承,城市和国家更换主权,就好像古董更换主人一样。很多时候,君主并不是他财产所在地的本地人,他不会讲当地的语言,或者讲得很糟糕,口音很重。但是,不管雅典的国王是西班牙人,还是西班牙的国王是奥地利人,这对个人所承受的义务都没有任何影响。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Unlike today, the concept of nationality played little or no role in establishing sovereignty in the Middle Ages. Monarchs, as well as some princes of the Church and powerful lords, possessed territories by private right. In a way that has no modern analogy, these lords could sell or give away territories or acquire new ones by conveyance or marriage as well as by conquest. Today, you could hardly imagine the United States falling under the sovereignty of a non-English-speaking Portuguese president because he happened to marry the former American president’s daughter. Yet something similar was commonplace in medieval Europe. Power passed by hereditary descent. Cities and countries changed sovereigns the way that antiques change owners. In many cases, sovereigns were not native to the regions in which their properties lay. Sometimes they did not speak the local language, or spoke it badly with heavy accents. But it made little difference to the ties of personal obligation whether a Spaniard was king of Athens, or an Austrian was king of Spain.

11社团主权Corporate Sovereignty

中文译本

圣殿骑士团、圣约翰骑士团、条顿骑士团和马耳他骑士团等宗教团体也可以行使主权。这种混合型的机构在今天找不到对应的产物;虽然马耳他骑士团还依然存在,而且在我们写这本书的时候,他们正准备恢复对马耳他圣安杰洛堡的主权。

这些机构将宗教、社会、司法和金融活动与对地方的主权结合了起来。虽然他们也行使领土管辖权,但与今天的政府完全相反,他们赢得支持及推进管理计划时,完全不是依靠国籍身份。这些宗教团体的成员和管理者,来自欧洲所有信奉基督教的地区,即“基督教世界”。

没有人认为应该或者必须从当地居民中选拔统治者。在支离破碎的中世纪主权格局中,要动员支持者,不像现代那样取决于民族身份或对国家的责任,而是取决于个人的忠诚和习惯性的联系,这些东西必须作为个人荣誉去维护。来自任何地方的任何人,都可以宣誓遵从这些义务,只要他的社会地位满足相应的资格。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Sovereignty was also exercised by religious corporations like the Knights Templar, the Knights of St. John, the Teutonic Knights, and the Knights of Malta. While the Knights of Malta still exist and as we write are poised to recover sovereignty over Fort St. Angelo in Malta, such hybrid institutions have had no modern counterparts. They combined religious, social, judicial, and financial activities with sovereignty over localities.13 While they exercised territorial jurisdiction, they were almost the opposite of today’s governments in that nationality played no role in the mobilization of their support or their scheme of governance. The members and officers of these religious orders were drawn from all parts of Christian Europe, or “Christendom,” as it was known.

No one thought it appropriate or necessary that those who ruled be drawn from the local populations. The mobilization of support in the fragmented medieval scheme of governance did not depend upon a national identity or duty to the state, as in modern times, but upon personal loyalty and customary ties that had to be upheld as a matter of personal honor. Oaths to uphold these duties could be sworn by anyone from anywhere provided he was otherwise deemed worthy by his station in life.

12宣誓The Vow

中文译本

骑士的誓言将人们联结到了一起,并以当事人的名誉起誓。就像惠泽加所写的,“立下誓言,人们就对自己施加了一些束缚,作为履行承诺的动力。”当时的人对遵守誓言看得非常重,为了避免失信于人,他们经常冒着生命的危险或者遭受严重的后果。遵守誓言被视为一种个人荣誉,约束着人的行为。而其中某些行为,在本书的读者看来,可能是很滑稽的。

例如,星辰骑士团曾经发誓,绝不“离开战场超过四英亩之地”;不久之后,他们中的九十多人就因为这一誓言而送命。作为一种军事战略,连战术性的撤退都禁止可能是不合理的,但所有的骑士誓言都有这样的要求。在阿金库尔战役之前,英格兰国王发布了一道命令,要求巡逻的骑士们脱掉盔甲;因为如果他们穿着斗篷盔甲从敌阵上撤退,那就太有失荣耀了。而碰巧的是,国王本人迷路了,路过他的先锋部队夜宿的村庄。穿着盔甲的国王,在意识到自己的错误后,他的骑士荣誉感使他无颜走进那个村庄,只好暴露在危险之中,在外面度过了一夜。

这个例子尽管看起来很傻,但亨利国王的盘算可能并没有错。相比在敌人后方睡觉的危险,撤退会辱没自己的荣誉,并为整个军队树立榜样,打击士气,这种损失要大得多。

中世纪的历史上充满了各种事例,都是杰出的人物在履行那些很荒谬的誓言。在很多情况下,他们做的事并不能带来任何客观上的利益,只是生动地表现了宣誓人对誓言本身的重视。这些誓言常见的形式,是给自己套上一条单人囚链(one-person chain gang):遮住一只眼睛,只能站着吃喝,故意把自己折磨成瘸子。当时有一种普遍的习俗,就是戴着痛苦的脚镣行走。今天如果你看到有人戴着沉重的脚镣在大街上挣扎,你肯定会觉得他疯了,而不会认为他是个大德之人。但在骑士精神的背景下,心甘情愿地戴上这样的装置是一种荣誉的象征。还有很多类似的习俗,在今天看来都很可笑。根据惠泽加的描述,许多人发誓“周五不吃肉,周六不睡床,一个又一个禁欲主义的行为变本加厉。一个贵族承诺:永不穿盔甲,每周有一天不喝酒,不在床上睡觉,不站着吃饭,并穿着刚毛衬衣。”相比这些自我折磨,斋戒显得都温和多了。

很多狂热的誓言分子成立了一些教团,对他们的成员施加严厉的苦修,作为一种荣誉的考验。例如,克拉洛瓦和加洛伊奇骑士团,在夏季“穿着毛皮和毛皮衬里的帽子,还在壁炉里烧着火。在冬天,则只允许穿一件没有毛皮的单薄外套,不能穿斗篷,也不能戴帽子和手套,床单也很薄。”正如惠泽加所说,“大量的成员被冻死也就不足为奇了。”

中世纪的自虐是一种严酷的折磨。人们对自己施加这种折磨,是希望审判和惩罚的上帝能收起棍子,宽恕他们的罪行,使他们免受在今生和来世都应得的更大惩罚。 —— 诺曼·库恩(NORMAN COHN)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Chivalric vows bound individuals to one another and were sworn on the honor of those who were parties to them. As Huizinga wrote, “in making a vow, people imposed some privation upon themselves as a spur to accomplishment of the actions they were pledged to perform.”14 So much importance was placed upon honoring vows that people frequently risked death or suffered serious privations in order to avoid breaking their vows. Often, the oaths themselves bound individuals to perform as matters of honor acts that would probably seem ludicrous to you and most readers of this book.

For example, the Knights of the Star swore an oath never to retire “more than four acres from the battlefield, through which rule soon afterwards more than ninety of them lost their lives.”15 The prohibition on even tactical retreat is irrational as a military strategy. But it was a common imperative of the chivalric vows. Before the Battle of Agincourt, the king of England issued an order that knights on patrol should remove their armor, on grounds that it would have been incompatible with their honor to withdraw from enemy lines if they were wearing their coat armor. It so happened that the king himself got lost and passed by the village that had been night quarters for the vanguard of his army. Since he was wearing armor, his chivalric honor forbade him to simply turn around when he discovered his mistake and return to the village. He spent the night in an exposed position.

As silly as this example seems, King Henry probably did not miscalculate in thinking that he would have risked more in trespassing his honor by retreating, and thus setting a demoralizing example for his entire army, than he did by sleeping behind enemy lines.

The history of the Middle Ages is filled with examples of prominent people fulfilling pledges that would seem ridiculous to us. In many cases, the actions proposed involved no objective connection to any benefit other than a vivid demonstration of the importance those undertaking them placed upon the vow itself. Among the common vows: to keep one eye closed, to eat and drink only when standing, and to become a self-imposed cripple by entering a one-person chain gang. There was a widespread custom of wearing painful foot irons. If today you saw someone struggling along the street in a heavy leg iron, you would probably assume that he was insane, not that he was a man of great virtue. Yet in the context of chivalry, willingly donning such a device was a badge of honor. And there were many similar customs that would seem equally ludicrous today. As Huizinga describes it, many took a pledge “not to sleep in a bed on Saturday, not to take animal food on Friday, etc. One act of asceticism is heaped upon another: one nobleman promises to wear no armor, to drink no wine one day in every week, not to sleep in a bed, not to sit down to meals, to wear the hair shirt,”16

Lent survives as a much moderated version of this self-imposed discomfort.

Many enthusiasts for vows formed orders that placed particularly difficult privations on their members as tests of honor. The Order of Galois and Galoises, for example, dressed during summers in “furs and fur-lined hoods and lighted a fire in the hearth, whereas in winter they were only allowed to wear a simple coat without fur; neither mantles, not hats, nor gloves, and had only very light bed clothes.” As Huizinga reports, “It is not surprising that a great many members died of cold.”17.

“Medieval self-flagellation was a grim torture which people inflicted on themselves in the hope of inducing a judging and punishing God to put away his rod, to forgive their sins, to spare them the greater chastisements which would otherwise be theirs in this life and the next.”18 —NORMAN COHN

13鞭刑,过去和现在Flagellation, Then and Now

中文译本

从施加危险和清苦的誓言,到考验、朝圣、折磨、不适,甚至是故意的自残,这中间只是很短的一步。在中世纪,这些行为都被认为是非常有益的,值得高度赞扬。它们象征着宣誓的严肃性,这种逻辑,在今天的兄弟会或联谊会的入会仪式中依然适用。

夏天闷热,冬天冰冷,或者在雪地里赤脚朝圣,这样的折磨,比起自我鞭挞的严酷,都是小巫见大巫。自我鞭挞是中世纪很特别的一种忏悔方式,它与封建主义差不多是同时出现,最早是“在 11 世纪初被卡马尔多利和阿维拉纳修道院的隐士们所采用。”鞭笞者不只是在寒冷的天气里赤脚行走,他们组织游行,日夜不停的赶路,从一个城镇到另一个城镇。“每当他们到达一个城镇,就会在教堂前排成一排,连续鞭打自己几个小时。”我们相信,当未来的人们回顾民族国家的时代,会发现 20 世纪的人以公民的名义所做的事情,和我们看待自我鞭刑一样可笑。从信息社会的角度看,现代时期的士兵出于对民族国家的忠诚而穿越半个地球去赴死,是一种怪诞又愚蠢的景象。它和那些异常夸张的骑士仪式并没有太大的区别,比如戴着脚镣走来走去;而在封建时期,即使是那些理智的人,也以此为荣。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

It was a short step from the vow that imposed danger and privation to ordeals, pilgrimages, mortification, discomfort, and even purposefully self-inflicted injury. These could be seen as highly beneficial and praiseworthy in the medieval period. They were gestures of the seriousness with which vows were held, a logic that is not entirely foreign even today to fraternity or sorority initiations.

Stifling in summer, freezing in winter, or walking in barefoot pilgrimages in the snow was relatively tame compared to “the grim torture” of self-flagellation. This was a particularly medieval form of penance that came into being almost exactly at the same time feudalism, began. It was first “adopted by hermits in the monastic communities of Camaldoli and Fonte Avellana early in the eleventh century.”19

Rather than just walking barefoot in cold weather, flagellants organized processions in which they would march day and night, from one town to the next. “And each time they came to a town they would arrange themselves in groups before the church and flog themselves for hours on end.”20

We believe that people in the future who look back at the era of the nation-state will find some of the undertakings done in the twentieth century in the name of citizenship as ludicrous as we consider self-flagellation. From the vantage point of the Information Society, the spectacle of soldiers in the modern period traveling halfway around the world to entertain death out of loyalty to the nation-state will come to be seen as grotesque and silly. It will seem not far different from some of the extraordinary and exaggerated rites of chivalry, like walking about in leg irons, which otherwise sensible people took pride in doing during the feudal period.

14骑士精神让位于公民责任Chivalry Yields to Citizenship

中文译本

当大政治的条件发生了改变,宣誓效忠领主的军事意义已经过时,骑士精神就逐渐式微了,被公民责任所取代。在火药武器和工业化军队的世界里,打仗的人和他们的指挥官之间的关系就非常不同了。公民身份出现在暴力回报率很高且不断攀升的时期,相比中世纪发动战争的社会实体,这时候的国家拥有更多的资源。

民族国家以其强大的实力和财富,可以直接与穿着制服作战的普通士兵进行交易。

历史证明,这种交易对国家来说要便宜得多,而且,相比通过与有权有势的领主和地方豪强谈判以组建军队,也要省事得多;因为这些人每一个都有能力拒绝与自身利益相悖的要求,而民族国家的个体公民则做不到这一点。

公民身份的关键取决于一个事实,那就是没有任何个人或小的团体,在大政治层面,具备独立行使军权的能力。在后面我们会深入探讨这其中的原因。

随着信息技术改变打仗的逻辑,它必将使公民身份的神话破产;就像火药使中世纪的骑士精神过时一样。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Chivalry faded away, to be replaced by citizenship, when megapolitical conditions changed and the military purpose of the vow to one’s lord was antiquated. The world of gunpowder weapons and industrial armies involved very different relations between the individuals who did the fighting and their commanders. Citizenship emerged when returns to violence were high and rising, and the state had vastly greater resources than the social entities that waged war in the medieval period. Because of its great power and wealth, the nation-state could strike a bargain directly with the mass of common soldiers who fought in its uniform.

Such bargains proved to be far cheaper to the state and much less troublesome than attempts to assemble military forces by negotiating with powerful lords and local notables, each of whom was capable of resisting demands that ran counter to his interests as no individual citizen in the nation-state conceivably could.

For reasons we explore at greater depth later, citizenship crucially depended upon the fact that no individual or small group of individuals was megapolitically capable of exercising military power independently. As information technology alters the logic of battle, it will antiquate the myths of citizenship just as assuredly as gunpowder antiquated medieval chivalry.

15马背上的地狱天使Hell’s Angels on Horseback

中文译本

在西欧主宰了几个世纪的骑兵贵族,可算不上是他们后代那样的绅士。他们是粗俗的、暴力的;用今天的话说,可以把他们理解为中世纪的机车帮派。礼仪规则和骑士精神的伪装,更多是用来约束他们的过激行为,而不是描述他们真正的作风。即使对骑士精神的规则和义务进行百科全书式地描述,也很少或根本无法揭示出贵族权力的来源。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The aristocracy of mounted warriors that dominated Western Europe for centuries were hardly the gentlemen their descendants became. They were rough and violent. In today’s terms they could be better understood as the medieval equivalent of motorcycle gangs. The rules of manners and pretenses of chivalry served more to temper their excesses than as a description of the way they really behaved. Even an encyclopedic account of the rules and obligations of chivalry would have revealed little or nothing about the foundations of the nobility’s power.

16完美是枯竭的同义词Perfection as a Synonym for Exhaustion

中文译本

十五世纪末,就在武装骑士刚刚把他们的战斗技艺提高到臻于完美的境界时,有效的火药武器出现了,在他们的脚底下引发了一场强烈的爆炸。在那时,经过精心培育,终于产出一匹高达 16 掌高的战马,这批骏马的身材可以舒适地承载一个全副武装的骑士。然而,正如诺斯科特·帕金斯(C. Northcote Parkinson)睿智地指出,“只有处于崩溃边缘的制度才会达到完美。”完美的新战马诞生了,新式武器也被部署到了战场上,可以轰炸战马和骑士。这种火药武器可以由普通人使用,不需要什么特殊的技巧;但要大量采购,则非常昂贵。与作为封建经济基础的农业相比,商业的重要性随着新武器的扩散逐步提升。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The advent of effective gunpowder weapons at the end of the fifteenth century detonated a powerful blast under their feet—just as armed knights had perfected their art as never before. By then, careful breeding had finally produced a battle horse sixteen hands high, a steed with the stature to carry comfortably a mounted knight in full armor. Yet “perfection,” as C. Northcote Parkinson shrewdly noted, “is achieved only by institutions on the point of collapse.”21 Just as the new warhorse was perfected, new weapons were deployed to blast horse and knight from the battlefield. These new gunpowder weapons could be fired by commoners. They required little skill to use but were expensive to procure in quantity. Their proliferation steadily increased the importance of commerce as compared to agriculture, which had been the foundation of the feudal economy.

17更大规模的战争War at a Higher Scale

中文译本

火药武器是怎么促成这种转变的?首先,它提高了战斗的规模,这使得发动战争的代价很快就远超中世纪时期。在火药革命之前,战争往往都是在很小的团体之间展开的,他们甚至可以在一块贫瘠狭小的领地上征战。火药为更大规模的战争提供了有利条件。在这种新的条件下,只有那些拥有富裕臣民的统治者,才有能力派遣出强大的军队。而最能适应商业发展的统治者,往往是那些与城市商人结盟的君主,他们会发现自己在战场上享有竞争优势。用范·克雷维尔德的话说,“部分原因就在于,他们拥有更优越的财政资源,可以购买更多的大炮,从而把敌人轰得粉碎。”火药武器的逻辑全部被演绎出来,是在几个世纪之后,法国大革命中的平民军队。

但火药对战争的改造,早在文艺复兴时期对军服的采用上,就显示出来了。军装恰如其分地象征了战士与民族国家之间的新型关系,这种发展与骑士精神到公民身份的转变相辅相成。在封建主义时期,君主或者教皇要与一长串的诸侯分别达成不同的交易,而新兴的民族国家,则可以与它的公民达成“统一”(也是制服的意思)的交易。在旧制度下,每个人都在等级结构中有一个不同的位置,每个人都可以达成一个特殊的交易,就像他的纹章或者悬挂的彩旗一样。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

How did gunpowder weapons precipitate such a transformation? For one thing, they raised the scale of fighting, which meant that waging war soon became far more costly than it had been during the medieval period. Before the Gunpowder Revolution, wars had normally been fought by groups so small that they could be levied over a small and poor territory. Gunpowder gave a new advantage to fighting on a larger scale. Only leaders with claims on rich subjects could afford to field effective forces under the new conditions. Those leaders who best accommodated the growth of commerce, usually monarchs who allied themselves with the urban merchants, found that they enjoyed a competitive advantage on the battlefield. In van Creveld’s words, “thanks in part to the superior financial resources at their disposal, they could purchase more cannon than anybody else and blast the opposition to pieces.”22

Even though it would be centuries before the full logic of gunpowder weapons would be unleashed in the citizen armies of the French Revolution, an early hint of the transformation of warfare by gunpowder was the adoption of military uniforms in the Renaissance. The uniforms aptly symbolize the new relations between the warrior and the nation-state that went hand in hand with the transition from chivalry to citizenship. In effect, the new nation-state would strike a “uniform” bargain with its citizens, unlike the special, divergent bargains struck by the monarch or the pope with a long chain of vassals under feudalism. In the old system, everyone had a different place in an architectonic hierarchy. Everyone had a bargain as unique as his coat of arms and the colorful pennants he flew.

18降低了富人的机会成本Lowering the Opportunity Costs of Riches

中文译本

火药武器还以另外一种方式,从根本上改变了社会的性质。它将权力的行使与体力区分开来,从而降低了商业活动的机会成本。富有的商人不需要再靠技巧和力量进行徒手搏斗,也无需再依靠忠诚度可疑的雇佣兵保护自己;他们可以寻求最高统治者更大规模的、新式军队的保护。正如威廉·普莱费尔在谈到中世纪时所说,“在敌对的情况下,人力是激怒别人的力量,……所以,在当时,一个人不可能长期保持同时富有和强大。”而当火药出现以后,不富有就不可能强大。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Gunpowder weapons radically altered the nature of society in yet another way. They separated the exercise of power from physical strength, thereby lowering the opportunity costs of mercantile activity. Rich merchants no longer had to depend upon their own finesse and strength in hand-to-hand combat or on mercenaries of uncertain loyalty to defend themselves. They could hope to be defended by the new, larger armies of the great monarchs. As William Playfair said of the Middle Ages, “While human force was the power by which men were annoyed, in cases of hostility,… [t]o be wealthy and powerful long together was then impossible.”23 When gunpowder came along, it was impossible to be powerful without being rich.

19社会地位与静态思维Status and Static Understanding

中文译本

商业对塑造现代社会起到了无与伦比的作用。然而,就像今天的大多数人还不能预见到信息社会的新动态一样,中世纪时期的主流思想家们,也无法预测或理解商业的兴起。五个世纪之前的大多数人,都以静态的眼光看待他们不断变化的社会。惠泽加说,“从现代意义上说,(中世纪)很少有财产是流动的。权力还没有与金钱紧密地联系在一起;它仍然是与生俱来的,取决于掌权者所激发的某种宗教敬畏,它以奢侈浮华的排场及大量忠实的追随者来彰显自我。通过可见的标志,封建或等级思想表现为那种追求显赫的想法。”中世纪晚期的人们最关心的是社会地位,他们还想不到商人能对王国的生活做出什么突出的贡献。因为商人都是平民,几乎毫无例外;他们处于三层身份的最底层,低于贵族和神职人员。

在中世纪的暮年,即使是更加有洞察力的思想家,也认识不到,在农业之外,商业和其他形式的社团对于积累财富的重要性。对他们来说,贫穷是一种使徒般的美德;在他们看来,有钱的银行家和乞丐没有区别。用惠泽加的话说,“在第三阶层中,原则上不区分富人和穷人,也不区分城镇居民和乡村居民。”在当时的体制下,职业和财富都不重要,重要的是骑士身份。

这种对生活中经济层面的盲视,又被教会人士强化了,这些人是中世纪意识形态的守护者。教士对商业重要性的认识严重不足,以致于在 15 世纪,推出了一项广受赞誉的改革方案,要求所有非贵族身份的人都要专门从事手工业或农业劳动。完全没有考虑到商业的任何作用。

1492 年,被习惯性地用来区分中世纪和现代时期,其实也可以作为其他一切事态的分界点。因为从世界史的角度看,哥伦布的大航海,象征着西欧与全球其他地区之间崭新关系的开始。 —— 弗雷德里克·莱恩

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

For many of the same reasons that most people today are ill-prepared to anticipate the new dynamics of the Information Society, the leading thinkers of medieval society were unable to anticipate or understand the rise of commerce that played so important a part in shaping the modern period. Most people five centuries ago viewed their changing society in static terms. As Huizinga said, “Very little property is, in the modern sense, liquid, while power is not yet associated predominantly with money; it is still rather inherent in the person and depends on a sort of religious awe which he inspires; it makes itself felt by pomp and magnificence, or a numerous train of faithful followers. Feudal or hierarchic thought expresses the idea of grandeur by visible signs.…”24 Because people in the late Middle Ages thought before all else of status, they were ill-prepared to comprehend that merchants could possibly contribute anything of importance to the life of the realm. Almost without exception, merchants were commoners. They fit at the bottom of the three estates, below the nobility and the clergy.

Even the more perceptive thinkers of late-medieval society failed to appreciate the importance of commerce and other forms of enterprise outside of farming for accumulating wealth. To them, poverty was an apostolic virtue. They literally made no distinction between a wealthy banker and a beggar. In Huizinga’s words, “No distinction in principle was made in the third estate, between rich and poor citizens, nor between townsmen and country-people.”25 Neither occupation nor wealth mattered in their scheme, merely chivalric status.

This blindness to the economic dimension of life was reinforced by churchmen, who were the ideological guardians of medieval life. They were so far from grasping the importance of commerce that one widely applauded fifteenth-century reform program proposed that all persons of nonnoble status be required to devote themselves exclusively to handicrafts or farm labor. No role was contemplated for commerce whatsoever.26

“The date 1492, conventionally used to separate medieval from modern history, serves as well as any other dividing point, for in the perspective of world history, Columbus’s voyage symbolizes the beginning of a new relationship between Western Europe and the rest of the world.”27 —FREDERIC C. LANE

20工业社会的诞生THE BIRTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL AGE

中文译本

十五世纪众多最敏锐的头脑,也完全没有捕捉到一个重大的历史进程,而该进程就发生在他们眼皮底下。封建主义的消亡,标志着西方主导全球的伟大的现代时期开始了。在这一时期,暴力的回报率不断上升,企业的规模越来越大。在过去的两个半世纪里,现代经济为能够享受到其最大利益的那部分人,带来了生活水平的空前提高。这些变化的催化剂是新技术,从火药武器到印刷术,以很少有人能够掌控的方式改变了生活的边界。

到十五世纪的最后 10 年,哥伦布等探险家才打开了通往广阔未知大陆的通道。

在人类生存的漫长岁月中,第一次足迹囊括了整个世界。西班牙大帆船,是在地中海帆船的基础上打造的新型高桅帆船,它环绕地球,绘制出了海上的通道,这些海图成为了后来商业贸易、疾病传播和军事征服的指南。在海上,在岸上,征服者靠着他们的新式青铜大炮,开疆拓土。他们发现了代表财富的黄金和香料;种下了新的经济作物,从烟草到土豆;还为他们的牛群开辟了新的牧场。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Many of the keenest minds of the fifteenth century totally missed one of the more important developments in history, one that began under their eyes. The eclipse of feudalism marked the onset of the great modern phase of Western predominance. It was a period of rising returns to violence and rising scale in enterprise. For the past two and a half centuries, the modern economy has delivered an unparalleled rise in living standards for that fraction of the world that enjoyed its greatest benefits. The catalysts for these changes were new technologies, from gunpowder weapons to the printing press, which changed the boundaries of life in ways that few could grasp.

By the final decade of the fifteenth century, explorers like Columbus were just beginning to open an approach to vast, unknown continents. For the first time in the immemorial ages of human existence, the whole world was compassed. Galleons, new high-masted improvisations on Mediterranean galleys, circumnavigated the globe, charting the passages that were to become trade routes and thoroughfares for disease and conquest. Conquistadors wielding their new bronze cannon on sea and on shore blasted open new horizons. They found fortunes in gold and spices, planted the seeds of new cash crops, from tobacco to potatoes, and staked out new grazing lands for their cattle.

21第一种工业技术The First Industrial Technology

中文译本

就像火炮打开了新的经济领域,印刷术开拓了新的知识领域。它是第一种大规模生产的机器,也是工业主义萌芽的标志性技术。说到这里,我们同意亚当·斯密在《国富论》中的观点,即工业革命早在他写这本书之前就已经开始了;虽然它肯定还没有达到成熟的阶段,但规模化生产和工厂系统的原则已经确立。他所举例的大头针制造商,就是一个著名的例证。斯密解释了怎么用 18 个工人分开操作来生产大头针。得益于专门的技术和劳动分工,每个员工在一天内生产的大头针,是他自己单独制造数量的 4800 倍。

亚当·斯密的例子还突出了一个事实:工业革命的开端,比传统历史学家认为的要早几个世纪。大多数教科书都把它的起源定于 18 世纪中叶,这也不是不合理,因为那是人类生活水平起飞的时期。但在大政治层面,封建主义和工业主义之间的过渡,实际上要早得多,是在 15 世纪末。几乎是发生的同一时间,它的影响就在统治机构的变革上体现出来了,特别是中世纪教会的消亡。

把工业革命的开端定在较晚时期的历史学家,是在衡量另外一件事,就是由发动机驱动的大规模生产带来的生活质量的飞跃。这提高了非熟练劳动力的价值,并导致各种消费品的价格下降。事实上,不同国家的生活水平在不同时期开始急剧上升,这就提示出,人们是以大政治转型以外的因素在衡量工业革命。在《剑桥欧洲经济史》中,谈到“工业革命”时用的是复数,并明确地将它与国民收入的持续增长联系在一起。在日本和俄国,这种收入的猛涨一直推迟到 19 世纪末。在亚洲其他国家和非洲的一些地区,生活水平的提高和国民收入的增长是 20 世纪才发生的景象。非洲另外一些地区,持续增长至今还是一个梦想。但这并不意味着它们不是生活在现代时期。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Just as the cannon was opening new economic horizons, the printing press opened new intellectual horizons. It was the first machine of mass production, a signature technology that marked the onset of industrialism. In saying this, we share the view advanced by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations that the Industrial Revolution had already happened well before he wrote. It had not reached maturity, to be sure, but the principles of mass production and the factory system were well established. His famous example of the pin manufacturers makes this case. Smith explains how eighteen separate operations are employed to produce pins. Because of specialized technology and the division of labor, each employee could make 4,800 times more pins in a day than an individual could fabricate on his own.28

Smith’s example underscores the fact that the Industrial Revolution began centuries earlier than historians conventionally assume. Most textbooks would date its origins to the middle of the eighteenth century. That is not unreasonable as a date for the takeoff stage in the improvement of living standards. But the actual megapolitical transition between feudalism and industrialism began much earlier, at the end of the fifteenth century. Its impact was felt almost immediately in the transformation of dominant institutions, particularly in the eclipse of the medieval Church.

The historians who place the Industrial Revolution later are really measuring something else, the takeoff of living standards attributable to mass production powered by engines. This raised the value of unskilled labor and led to falling prices for a wide variety of consumer goods. Indeed, the fact that living standards began to rise sharply at different times in different countries is a tip-off that something other than the megapolitical transition is being measured. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe speaks of “Industrial Revolutions” in the plural, explicitly linking them to the sustained growth of national incomes.29 In Japan and Russia, this income surge was delayed until the end of the nineteenth century. The rise in living standards and sustained growth of national income in other parts of Asia and some parts of Africa was a twentieth-century phenomenon. In some parts of Africa, sustained growth remains a dream to this day. But that does not mean that these regions are not living in the modern age.

22转型期收入的下降Falling Income in Transition

中文译本

工业主义的出现,并不是收入增长的同义词。向工业社会的转变是个大政治事件,并不能直接用收入统计来衡量。事实上,在工业时代的头两个世纪里,大多数欧洲人的实际收入都在下降;到了 18 世纪初的某个时候才开始上升,直到 1750年左右才恢复到 1250 年的水平。我们把工业时代的启动时间定在 15 世纪末。因为正是早期现代技术的工业特征,包括以化学为动力的武器和印刷机,导致了封建主义的崩溃。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The growth of income is not synonymous with the advent of industrialism. The shift to an industrial society was a megapolitical event, not measurable directly in income statistics. Indeed, real incomes for most Europeans fell for the first two centuries of the Industrial Age. They only began rising sometime after the beginning of the eighteenth century, and they did not recover to levels of 1250 until about 1750. We place the launch of the Industrial Age at the end of the fifteenth century. It was the industrial features of early-modern technology, including chemically powered weapons and printing presses, that precipitated the collapse of feudalism.

23知识成本的降低Lowering the Cost of Knowledge

中文译本

大规模生产书籍的能力,对中世纪的机构形成了不可思议的颠覆;就像微处理技术将颠覆现代民族国家一样。印刷术很快就破坏了教会对神的话语的垄断,甚至为异端邪说创造了一个新的市场。与封建社会格格不入的思想迅速传播,到 15世纪的最后 10 年,共出版了 1000 万本书籍。由于教会压制印刷业,大部分新书都是在欧洲那些当局权威最弱的地区出版的。当今天的美国政府试图压制加密技术时,很可能发生类似的情况。教会发现,审查制度并没有抑制住颠覆性技术的传播,反而把它推到了最能发挥颠覆作用的地方。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The capacity to mass-produce books was incredibly subversive to medieval institutions, just as microtechnology will prove subversive to the modern nation-state. Printing rapidly undermined the Church’s monopoly on the word of God, even as it created a new market for heresy. Ideas inimical to the closed feudal society spread rapidly, as 10 million books were published by the final decade of the fifteenth century. Because the Church attempted to suppress the printing press, most of the new volumes were published in those areas of Europe where the writ of established authority was the weakest. This may prove to be a close analogy with attempts by the U.S. government today to suppress encryption technology. The Church found that censorship did not suppress the spread of subversive technology; it merely assured that it was put to its most subversive use.

24修道院地位被降低Depreciating the Monasteries

中文译本

印刷机原本是人畜无害的,因为内容而具有了颠覆性。无畏的冒险家和商人赚取财富的知识被四散传播,这本身就是一种强大的溶剂,可以溶解封建义务的约束。

新型市场的诱惑,大规模资助军队和海军的机会,使货币产生了封建时期所不具备的价值。有了新的投资渠道,加上强大的武器,提高了暴力的收益,要求地方领主和城市商人向教会捐献资本的成本越来越高。因此,仅仅是在土地占有之外创造出的投资机会,就破坏了封建制度的稳定,削弱了它的意识形态。

印刷机的另一个颠覆性后果是大大降低了信息复制的成本。在中世纪,识字率极低,经济极不发达,一个重要原因是手工复制书稿的成本太高。正如我们讨论过的,在罗马沦陷以后,教会承担的主要生产职能之一,就是在本笃会修道院4复制书籍和手稿。这是一项成本极高的工作。而印刷机极大地降低了手稿复制的价值,修士们日复一日、月复一月地辛勤劳作,制作出来的手稿,用印刷机只需要几个小时就够了。新技术使本笃会的缮写室成为了昂贵的、过时的知识复制手段,而反过来说,这就降低了继续使用抄写员的宗教团体和教会在经济上的重要性。

书籍的大规模印刷结束了教会对圣经及其他信息的垄断。书本的广泛普及也降低了识字成本,从而使得有能力就重要课题——特别是神学问题——提出自己见解的思想家成倍增加。神学史家尤安·卡梅伦(Euan Cameron)指出,16 世纪头20 年的“一系列的出版里程碑”为为“把现代文本批评方法运用于《圣经》”奠定了基础。这“威胁到了教会的垄断”,因为“人们开始质疑为了支撑传统教条而对经文进行的扭曲式解读。”新知识鼓励了教会竞争,新教出现了,他们要制定自己对《圣经》的解释。总之,书籍的大规模生产降低了异端和异教传播的成本,使他们也获得了大量的读者。

出版也帮助摧毁了中世纪的世界观。信息的成本更低,更加容易获得,使得人们对世界的认识从象征主义转到了因果关系。“象征主义的世界图景,特点就是无懈可击的秩序、建筑结构、等级从属关系。每一种象征性的联系都意味不同的等级和神圣性……核桃象征着耶稣,甜美的内核是他的神性,青涩多肉的外皮是他的人性,中间的木壳是十字架。因此,一切事物都在使人的思想上升到永恒。”符号化(即象征主义)的思维方式不仅是对社会等级结构的补充,它也更适合教育文盲。木刻画中的符号所传达的思想,可以被文盲所接受。而相比之下,现代时期印刷术的出现,使得识字的人口可以运用科学方法,发展因果关系。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Many apparently innocent uses of the printing press were subversive because of their content. Merely the spread of knowledge of the fortunes to be earned by intrepid adventurers and merchants was itself a powerful solvent dissolving the bonds of feudal obligation. The temptation of new markets, along with the need and opportunity to fund armies and navies on a larger scale, gave money a value it had lacked in the feudal centuries. These new avenues for investment, reinforced by powerful weapons that raised the returns to violence, made it increasingly costly to the lord in the hinterlands or the merchant in the city to donate his capital to the Church. Thus the very creation of investment opportunities outside of landholdings destabilized the institutions of feudalism and undercut its ideology.

Another subversive consequence of the printing press was its effect in dramatically lowering the costs of reproducing information. A crucial reason why literacy and economic progress had been so minimal during the Middle Ages was the high cost of duplicating manuscripts by hand. As we have seen, one of the major productive functions assumed by the Church after the fall of Rome was reproducing books and manuscripts in Benedictine monasteries. This was an extremely costly undertaking. One of the more dramatic consequences of printing was to devalue the scriptoria, where monks labored day after day, month after month to produce manuscripts that could be duplicated in hours by printing presses. The new technology made the Benedictine scriptorium an obsolete and costly means of reproducing knowledge. This, in turn, made the religious orders and the Church that sustained the scribes less economically important.

Mass production of books ended the Church’s monopoly on Scripture, as well as on other forms of information. The wider availability of books reduced the cost of literacy and thus multiplied the number of thinkers who were in a position to offer their own opinions on important subjects, particularly theological subjects. As theological historian Euan Cameron put it, “[a] series of publishing milestones” in the first two decades of the sixteenth century set the groundwork for the application of “modern text criticism to Scriptures.”30 This “threatened the monopoly” of the Church “by questioning corrupt readings of texts which had been used to support traditional dogmas.”31 This new knowledge encouraged the emergence of competitive Protestant sects who sought to formulate their own interpretations of the Bible. Mass production of books lowered the cost of heresy and gave the heretics large audiences of readers.

Publishing also helped destroy the medieval worldview. The greater availability and lower costs for information led to shifts away from a view of the world linked by symbolism rather than causal connections. “Symbolism’s image of the world is distinguished by impeccable order, architectonic structure, hierarchic subordination. For each symbolic connexion implies a difference of rank or sanctity.… The walnut signifies Christ; the sweet kernel is His divine nature, the green and pulpy outer peel is His humanity, the wooden shell between is the cross. Thus all things raise the thoughts to the eternal.…”32

A symbolic mode of thinking not only complemented a hierarchic structure of society; it also suited illiteracy. Ideas conveyed by symbols in woodcuts were accessible to an illiterate population. By contrast, the advent of printing in the modern period led to the development of causal connections, employing the scientific method, for a literate population.

25与今天的对比A PARALLEL FOR TODAY

中文译本

在 15 世纪中叶,中世纪社会的信仰基础似乎是无与伦比的安全和稳定,但却很快就被改变了。它的主要机构,也就是教会,眼睁睁看着自己的垄断地位受到挑战并被打破。几个世纪以来都未曾受到过质疑的权力,突然陷入了争议。那种神圣的信仰和忠诚,超出今天任何民族国家对公民的束缚,而在短短几年的时间内,被人们重新认知并放弃。这一切的缘由,就是十五世纪最后 10 年出现的一场技术革命。

我们相信,像 500 年前那样的剧变将会再次上演。信息革命将摧毁民族国家对权力的垄断,就像火药革命摧毁教会的垄断一样,毋庸置疑。十五世纪末的情形与今天的状况惊人地相似:当时的生活完全被有组织的宗教所淹没,而今天的世界则充满了政治。当时的教会和今天的民族国家,都是已经衰老到极限的组织机构。

和中世纪暮年的教会一样,20 世纪末的民族国家也是负债累累,无力再支撑自身的存续。对于那些不久前还坚定支持民族国家的人来说,它的存在对他们的繁荣幸福越来越无关紧要,甚至还起反作用。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Medieval society, seemingly so stable and secure in its beliefs in the middle of the fifteenth century, was rapidly transformed. Its predominant institution, the Church, saw its monopoly challenged and shattered. Authority that had been unquestioned for centuries was suddenly in dispute. Beliefs and loyalties more sacred than those that bind any citizen to a nation-state today were reconsidered and renounced within a few short years, all because of a technological revolution that came into its own in the last decade of the fifteenth century.

We believe that change as dramatic as that of five hundred years ago will happen again. The Information Revolution will destroy the monopoly of power of the nation-state as surely as the Gunpowder Revolution destroyed the Church’s monopoly. There is a striking analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and that of today, when the world has become saturated with politics. The Church then and the nation-state today are both examples of institutions grown to a senile extreme. Like the late-medieval Church, the nation-state at the end of the twentieth century is a deeply indebted institution that can no longer pay its way. Its operations are ever more irrelevant and even counterproductive to the prosperity of those who not long ago might have been its staunchest supporters.

26贫穷、贪婪、奢侈“Impoverished, Grasping, and Extravagant”

中文译本

今天的政府收取了钱财,但他们提供的价值则是极其糟糕的。15 世纪末的教会也是一样。教会历史学家尤安·卡梅伦说,“贫困的地方神职人员,向人要的钱不少,提供的服务却很差。他们所征收到的财物,实际上都消失在了修道院或神秘的高层那里。尽管教会的某些部门收到了大量的礼物,但整个机构却可以同时显得贫穷、贪婪和奢侈。”你很难否认 20 世纪末的政府也是如此。

十五世纪末的宗教活动层出不穷,就像今天福利国家搞的项目一样。不仅仅有特殊的祝祷节庆,就连圣人和圣骨的供应都是无止境的;每年都有更多的教堂、更多的修道院、更多的修会、更多的忏悔师(家庭常驻牧师)、更多的传教士、更多的大教堂分会、更多的捐赠圣堂、更多的遗迹崇拜、更多的宗教联合团体、更多的宗教节日和新圣日。宗教仪式越来越长,祈祷和赞美诗越来越复杂。新的募缘修道团一个接一个地出现,到处乞求施舍。最终的结果是超出了制度的负荷极限,和今天高度政治化的社会一样。

宗教节日和各种节庆全面激增,礼拜仪式越来越多,圣母玛利亚、她的姐妹和耶稣家谱中的所有圣人,都有专门的纪念日。对信徒来说,履行宗教义务的成本和负担越来越沉重,就像今天遵守法律的成本越来越高。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Just as government today offers poor value for the money it collects, so did the Church at the end of the fifteenth century. As ecclesiastical historian Euan Cameron put it, “[A]n impoverished local priesthood seemed to offer a poor service for the money it demanded; much of what was levied effectively ‘disappeared” into enclosed monasteries or the arcane areas of higher education or administration. In spite of gifts prodigally given to some sectors of the Church, the institution as a whole managed to appear simultaneously impoverished, grasping, and extravagant.”33 It would be hard to deny the parallel with late-twentieth-century government.

Religious observances in the late fifteenth century grew like programs proliferating in welfare states today. Not only did special benedictions multiply endlessly, along with the supply of saints and saints’ bones, but every year there were more churches, more convents, more monasteries, more friaries, more confessors (resident household priests), more preacherships, more cathedral chapters, more endowed chantries, more relic cults, more religious co-fraternities, more religious festivals, and new holy days. Services grew longer. Prayers and hymns grew more complicated. One after another, new mendicant orders appeared to beg for alms. The result was institutional overload similar to that characterizing heavily politicized societies today.

Religious festivals and feast days proliferated on all sides. Religious services grew more numerous, with special festivals in honor of the seven sorrows of Mary, of her sisters, and of all the saints of Jesus’ genealogy.34 For the faithful to meet their religious obligations became increasingly costly and burdensome, much as the costs of remaining within the law have proliferated today.

27无辜者付出代价Innocents Pay

中文译本

过去和现在一样,是生产者承担着收入再分配的成本,而他们肩上的担子越来越重。由于资本利用方式的转变,这些成本的增长幅度超出了所有当权者的认知。

与货币资本相比,持有土地的相对优势正在下降。但中世纪的人们脑子里想的依然是地位和身份;社会地位取决于你是谁,而不是你有效配置资本的能力。人们很少或者根本没有考虑过,举办浮夸宗教仪式的机会成本已大大增加。这些成本都沉重地砸到了勤劳工作的农民、市镇居民和自耕农身上,相较于贵族阶级,他们需要更加高效地利用自己的资本。他们不得不支付不成比例的费用,为无休止的盛宴、圣日餐饮以及奢侈的教会官僚买单。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Then as now, the productive bore a growing burden of income redistribution. These costs were rising more sharply than anyone in authority recognized because of a shift in the use of capital. The relative advantage of holding land as compared to money capital was falling. Yet the medieval mind continued to think in terms of a status-bound society, where social position was determined by who you were, rather than by your skill in deploying capital effectively. Little or no consideration was given to the rising opportunity costs of staging exaggerated religious observances. These costs fell most heavily upon the more ambitious and hardworking peasants, burghers, and yeoman farmers, who depended more than the aristocracy upon deploying their capital usefully. They were obliged to shoulder a disproportionate cost of outfitting the tables at the endless feasts and holy days (holidays), as well as paying to support an extravagant Church bureaucracy.

28适得其反的监管Counterproductive Regulation

中文译本

在 15 世纪末,教会在很大程度上控制了后来由政府掌握的监管权力。教会主导着重要的法律领域,记录契约、登记婚姻、认证遗嘱、许可贸易、规定土地所有权以及商业的条款和条件。教会法对生活细节的规范几乎和今天的官僚机构一样彻底,而且目的也大同小异。和今天的政治法规一样,500 年前的教会法也充满了混乱和矛盾。这些规章制度往往搞得很复杂,以压制商业进步,这表明监管者根本就没想过促进生产力的发展。

例如,不管最近一年的 12 月 28 日是星期几,在一整年当中,每周的这一天都不能做生意。因此,如果某年的 12 月 28 日是星期二,在全年的所有星期二都不能合法做生意。这是为了纪念“诸圣婴孩殉道日”必须表达的一种虔诚。如果 12月 28 日落在周日以外的任何一天,那么这个禁令就限制了很多种商业的经营潜力,延迟或阻碍了正常的交易,从而增加了成本。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Church largely controlled the regulatory powers that have since been assumed by governments. The Church dominated important areas of law, recording deeds, registering marriages, probating wills, licensing trades, titling land, and stipulating terms and conditions of commerce. The details of life were almost as thoroughly regulated by canon law as they are today by bureaucracy, and to much the same end. Just as political regulation today has become riddled with confusions and contradictions, so canon law was five hundred years ago. These regulations often suppressed and complicated commerce in ways that revealed that facilitating productivity was far from the minds of the regulators.

For example, it was forbidden to do business for an entire year on whatever day of the week the most recent twenty-eighth of December happened to fall. Thus if it was a Tuesday, no legal business could be conducted on Tuesdays as an obligatory expression of piety in honor of the Slaughter of the Innocents. On years when December 28 fell on any day other than Sunday, this injunction hampered the potential for many types of commerce, increasing costs by delaying transactions or forestalling them altogether.

29垄断定价Monopoly Pricing

中文译本

教会法的实施也是为了加强垄断价格。教会在意大利托尔法的地产中开采明矾,通过销售明矾获得了大量的收入。当纺织业的客户想要选择从土耳其进口的更便宜的明矾时,梵蒂冈通过教会法宣布使用较低成本的明矾是有罪的,以维持其对价格的垄断。坚持购买便宜的土耳其明矾的商人将被逐出教会。星期五禁止吃肉的著名禁令,也是出于同样的考虑。教会不仅是最大的封建地产所有者,它还控制着主要的渔业。教父们发现虔诚的教徒对于吃鱼有神学上的需求,在当时的交通和卫生条件还不利于鱼肉消费的情况下,教会能够满足吃鱼的需求,绝不是偶然的。

和今天的民族国家一样,中世纪晚期的教会,不仅对某些特定行业进行限制以保证自己的利益;它还充分利用监管的权力进行创收。教士们煞费苦心地颁布了很多难以被遵守的法规和禁令。例如,对乱伦的定义特别宽泛,即使是远房表亲或者只有姻亲关系的人,也需要得到教会的特别许可才能结婚。在现代旅行出现之前,这几乎包含了很多欧洲小村庄里的每个人。于是,为乱伦婚姻出售豁免权成为教会丰厚的收入来源。即使是婚内的性行为,也受到教会法的严格限制。夫妻间的性活动,在周日、周三和周五以及复活节和圣诞节前的 40 天之内都是非法的。此外,夫妻在接受圣餐的前 3 天也要禁欲。换句话说,如果没有赎罪券,在一年中至少 55%的日子里,夫妻双方不能享受性生活。在《主教的妓院》(The Bishop’s Brothels)一书中,历史学家 E.J.伯福德(E. J. Burford)认为,这些“愚蠢的”婚姻规定,刺激了中世纪卖淫业的发展,教会也从中获得了巨大的利益。

伯福德指出,在长达几个世纪的时间里,温彻斯特大教堂的主教都是位于南华克的伦敦河岸妓院的主事人。而且,教会从卖淫中牟利绝不仅限于英国:

教皇西克斯图斯四世(约 1471 年),传闻从众多情妇中的一个感染了梅毒;他是第一个向妓女发放许可证并对她们征税的教皇,并因此而获利颇丰。他的继任者,教皇里奥十世,靠出售卖淫许可证据说赚了大约 2.2 万金币,是他在德国出售赎罪券所得的 4 倍。

即使是对牧师实行的著名的独身主义规则,也是中世纪教会有利可图的收入来源。伯福德说,教会采取了一种被称为“情妇税”(cullagium)的敲诈手段,对包养情妇的牧师进行征税。这种税的利润无比丰厚,以致于法国和德国的主教对所有的牧师统一征收;尽管在 1215 年,拉特兰会议谴责了“这种可耻的交易,教长是在出售罪恶的许可。”而这不过是违反教会法规出售许可证以谋取利益的众多方式之一,这种交易背后的动机与逻辑,和贪婪的政客寻求对商业的任意监管权是一致的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Canon law was also imposed to reinforce monopoly prices. The Church earned significant revenues from the sale of alum mined from its properties in Tolfa, Italy. When some of its customers in the textile industry showed a preference for cheaper alum imported from Turkey, the Vatican attempted to sustain its monopoly pricing through canon law, declaring it sinful to use the less costly alum. Merchants who persisted in purchasing the cheaper Turkish product were excommunicated. The famous ban on eating meat on Friday originated in the same spirit. The Church was not only the largest feudal landholder; it also held major fisheries. Church Fathers discovered a theological necessity for the pious to eat fish, which not incidentally ensured a demand for their product at a time when transport and sanitary conditions discouraged fish consumption.

Like the nation-state today, the late-medieval Church not only regulated specific industries to directly underpin its own interests; it also made the most of its regulatory powers to gain revenue for itself in other ways. Clerics went to special pains to promulgate regulations and edicts that were difficult to abide by. For example, incest was very broadly defined, so that even remote cousins and persons related only by marriage required special dispensation from the Church to marry. As this included almost everyone in many small European villages before the era of modern travel, selling waivers for incestuous marriages became a thriving source of Church revenue. Even sex within marriage itself was tightly circumscribed by ecclesiastic regulation. Sexual relations between spouses were illegal on Sundays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, as well as for forty days prior to Easter and Christmas. Further, couples were to abstain from sex for three days prior to receiving communion. In other words, married couples were forbidden to enjoy sex without an indulgence for a minimum of 55 percent of the days of the year. In The Bishop's Brothels, historian E. J. Burford suggests that these “idiotic” regulations of marriage helped stimulate the growth of medieval prostitution, from which the Church profited mightily.35 Burford reports that the Bishop of Winchester was for many centuries the principal of London’s Bankside brothels in Southwark. Further, ecclesiastical profiteering from prostitution was by no means merely a local English affair:

Pope Sixtus IV (c. 1471) who allegedly caught syphilis from one of his many mistresses—became the first pope to issue licences to prostitutes and to levy a tax on their earnings, augmenting vastly the papal revenues in the process. Indeed the Roman Curia partly financed the building of St. Peter’s by this tax and the sale of licences. His successor, Pope Leo X, is said to have made some twenty-two thousand gold ducats through the sale of licences, four times as much as he made by selling indulgences in Germany.36

Even the famous rule of celibacy imposed on priests was a lucrative source of revenue for the medieval Church. As Burford reports, the Church imposed “a racket known as cullagium," a fee imposed upon “concubinary priests.”37 This proved so lucrative that it was imposed uniformly upon all priests by bishops in France and Germany, in spite of the fact that the Lateran Council in 1215 had denounced “this disgraceful traffic by which such prelates regularly sell permission to sin.”38 It was merely one of many lucrative markets for the sale of licenses to infringe canon law and regulation, a trade motivated by the same logic that impels grasping politicians to seek arbitrary regulatory powers over commerce.

30赎罪券Indulgences

中文译本

任意监管的权力也是出售豁免的权力,豁免监管可能导致伤害。教会出售许可证或“赎罪券”,豁免范围无所不包,从减轻商业上的琐碎负担到允许在斋戒期间吃乳制品。这些“赎罪券”不仅高价卖给贵族阶级和富有的乡民,还被包装成彩票式的奖品,就像今天的政府经营彩票一样,用来吸引穷人的钱财。随着教会的支出远超收入,赎罪券的买卖也不断膨胀。很多人开始看到那个显而易见的事实,制度化的教会利用它的权力主要是为了谋利。就像一位当代的批评家所说,“制定教会法完全是为了赚大钱,谁要想成为基督徒,就得为它的规定而买单。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The power to regulate arbitrarily is also the power to sell an exemption from the harm such regulations can do. The Church sold permits, or “indulgences,” authorizing everything from relief from petty burdens on commerce to permission to eat dairy products in Lent. These “indulgences” were not only sold at high prices to the aristocracy and the rich burghers. They were also packaged as lottery prizes much like the government-run lotteries of today to attract the pennies of the poor.39 The trade in indulgences increased as the Church’s expenditures outran its income. This led many to infer the obvious, that the institutional Church was using its powers primarily to raise revenues. As a contemporary critic put it, “[C]anon law was instituted solely for the purpose of making a great deal of money; whoever would be a Christian has to buy his way out of its provisions.”40

31沉重的官僚主义Bureaucratic Overload

中文译本

到 15 世纪末,制度化宗教的成本已经达到了历史的极点,就像今天支撑政府运作的成本到达极限一样。宗教充斥着人们的生活,它的饱和度越高,教会的成本就越昂贵,也愈发地官僚化。用卡梅伦的话说,“在中世纪,找人填补大量增加的教会职位,比找到钱支付这些职位要容易得多。”今天破产的政府用反动的方式搜刮钱财,500 年前的教会也是如此。而且,教会所使用的一些掠夺性手段,就是今天的政客们在玩弄的。

500 年前的中世纪教会,就像今天的民族国家,它们所消耗的社会资源,是空前绝后的。当时的教会虽然达到了创纪录的收入,但似乎已经失去了正常运行和存续的能力,今天的国家也是如此。国家主导了工业社会晚期的经济,在一些西欧国家,政府的支持超过全部收入的一半;同样,在封建社会后期,教会主导着经济,它抽干了社会的资源,阻碍了生产力的增长与进步。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today. The more life was saturated with religion, the more expensive and bureaucratic the Church became. In Cameron’s words, “It was far easier to find people to fill the vastly increased number of Church posts at the end of the Middle Ages, than to find money to pay for them.”41 Just as bankrupt governments today scrounge for revenues in counterproductive ways, so did the Church five hundred years ago. Indeed, the churchmen used some of the same predatory tricks mastered by the politicians today.

The medieval Church five hundred years ago, like the nation-state today, consumed more of society’s resources than it ever had before, or ever would again. The Church then, like the state today, seemed incapable of functioning and sustaining itself on even record amounts of revenue. Just as the state has come to dominate late-industrial economies, spending more than half of all revenue in some Western European countries, so the Church dominated the late-feudal economy, draining resources and retarding growth.

32十五世纪的财政赤字Deficit Spending in the Fifteenth Century

中文译本

教会运用了一切可以想象得到的权宜之计,从它征收的费用中挤出更多的钱,以便养活臃肿的官僚机构。在有直接管辖权的地区,教会索取越来越高的税负;在没有直接征税权的外省或王国,梵蒂冈征收一种由当地君主直接支付的“年金”,代替直接的教会税。

和今天的国家一样,教会也搜刮自己的国库,把用于指定用途的捐赠资金,转用于支付一般的管理费用。有俸的圣职和宗教职位被公开售卖,就像什一税5的收入流一样。实际上,什一税就是神职人员发行的债券,而现代政府为支撑长期赤字而发行的债券是一回事。

在意识形态上,教会是封建主义的捍卫者,是商业和资本主义的批判者。但是,和今天的民族国家一样,教会利用一切可能的营销手段优化自己的收入。教会经营的圣物销售生意极为兴隆,包括圣蜡,在圣枝主日受到祝福的圣枝,还有圣母升天节受到祝福的草药,特别是各种圣水。今天的选民,如果拒绝支付更高的税款,政客就会威胁减少垃圾收集,或者采取其他侮辱尊严的手段或措施。15 世纪的教会也经常中断宗教服务,随心所欲地向教众勒索罚款。罚款往往是因为几个人的轻微违法行为,而这些人甚至不一定是有关教区的成员。例如,1436 年,雅克·杜·夏特利埃主教,“一个非常浮夸、贪婪的人”,将巴黎的圣公会教堂关闭了 22 天,停止了所有的宗教活动,就为了要两个乞丐支付一笔不可能的巨额罚款。因为这两个人在教堂里争吵,还流了几滴血。主教认为这玷污了教堂的神圣性;他不允许任何人使用教堂举行婚礼、葬礼或日常的历法圣事,直到他拿到了罚款。

一个意大利人的妓院(为了讨教皇的欢喜)每年付给他两万杜克特金币,他们给牧师的报酬则是一个鸡的利润,或者两个三个鸡。我想一定是邪恶的神灵才会与妓院有这样的关系。 —— 15 世纪的英国民谣

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The Church resorted to every conceivable expedient to squeeze more money out of its charges to feed its overgrown bureaucracy. Regions directly under the lordship of the Church were required to pay higher and higher taxes. In provinces and kingdoms where the Church lacked direct taxing power, the Vatican imposed “annates,” a payment to be made by the local sovereign in lieu of direct ecclesiastic taxes.

The Church, like the state today, also raided its own coffers, diverting funds from benefactions earmarked for specific uses to pay for general overhead expenses. Benefices and venal religious offices were openly sold, as were the income streams from tithes. In effect, the interests in tithes became the ecclesiastic equivalent of bonds issued by modern governments to finance their chronic deficits.

While the Church was the ideological defender of feudalism and critic of commerce and capitalism, like the nation-state today, it utilized every available marketing technique to optimize its own revenues. The Church operated a thriving business in the sale of sacramentals, including consecrated candles, palms blessed on Palm Sunday, “herbs blessed on the Feast of the Assumption, and especially the varieties of Holy Water.”42

Like today’s politicians who threaten constituents with curtailed garbage pickup and other indignities if they decline to pay higher taxes, religious authorities in the fifteenth century were also prone to cutting off religious services to blackmail congregations into paying arbitrary fines. Often the fines were imposed for some petty offense done by a few persons who need not even have been members of the congregation in question. For example, in 1436, Bishop Jacques Du Chatelier, “a very ostentatious, grasping man,” closed the Church of the Innocents in Paris for twenty-two days, halting all religious services while waiting for an impossibly large fine to be paid by two beggars. The men had quarreled in the church and shed a few drops of blood, which the bishop claimed had deconsecrated the church. He would not allow anyone to use the church for weddings, burials, or the normal sacraments of the calendar until his fine was paid.43

The Italian Stewes (to make the Pope good cheer) payd twentie thousand Duckets in a yeere. Besides they give a Priest (t’amend his fee) the profit of a whore, or two or three.… Methinkes it must be a bad Divintie that with the Stewes hath such affinitie.44 —FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH BALLAD

33对宗教领袖的憎恨Hatred of Church Leaders

中文译本

也难怪 15 世纪末的人们,普遍鄙视上层和下层的神职人员,就像高度政治化的今天,人们都看不惯官僚机构和政客一样。惠泽加说,“憎恨这个词用在这里是很恰当的,因为憎恨是潜在的,但却是普遍且持久的。听到神职人员的恶行被审判,人们总是津津乐道。”人们普遍相信教会“贪婪又挥霍无度”,部分原因在于这是事实。“神职人员高层的世俗化和底层的堕落”实在是太明显了,有眼睛的人都能看得到。从教区牧师到教皇本人,神职人员腐败的普遍性,只有占据社会统治地位的机构才能做得到。

比起 500 年前的教皇亚历山大六世(Alexander VI),朱里奥·安得利奥迪和比尔·克林顿都堪称是正直的典范。亚历山大六世以举办狂野的派对而闻名。作为锡耶纳的红衣主教,他举办过一场著名的狂欢,只有“锡耶纳最漂亮的年轻女子被邀参加,但她们的丈夫、父亲和兄弟都被排除在外。”锡耶纳的派对虽然很有名,但与亚历山大成为教皇之后的疯狂相比,就显得平淡无奇了。其中最淫乱的当属所谓的“栗子芭蕾舞”,它是一场交配大赛,参与者有罗马最性感的50名妓女、教会神父以及罗马有头有脸的人。威廉·曼彻斯特对此描述道:仆人们对每个男人的高潮表现进行计分,因为教皇非常欣赏阳刚之气……在所有人都精疲力尽之后,教皇会颁发奖品,有斗篷、帽子、靴子和精美的丝质外衣。根据记载,获奖者是那些与妓女做爱次数最多的人。

亚历山大至少有七个或八个私生子。有一个叫乔瓦尼的(Giovanni),就是所谓的“罗马之子”,显然是他的儿子。乔瓦尼是亚历山大的私生女卢克雷齐娅·博尔吉亚(Lucrezia Borgia)在 18 岁时生下的。在一份秘密的教皇诏书中,亚历山大承认他是乔瓦尼的父亲。如果不是父亲,那他也肯定是双方的祖父。教皇与卢克雷齐娅发生了三方乱伦关系;卢克雷齐娅也是亚历山大最年长的私生子甘迪亚公爵——胡安的情妇,她还是亚历山大另外一个私生子切萨雷·博尔吉亚的情妇。

切萨雷是红衣主教(Cardinal Cesare Borgia),他就是尼科洛·马基雅维利6(Niccolò Machiavelli)创作《君主论》的灵感来源。和教皇一样,切萨雷也是个杀手,据说他曾经谋划过几起杀人案。他们两个中的一个显然对胡安产生了嫉妒,后者的尸体于 1497 年 6 月 15 日在台伯河被捞出。中世纪晚期教会的领导层,与今天民族国家的管理层是一样的腐败。

今天我已经两次成为父亲7。上帝保佑。 —— 鲁道夫·阿格里科拉

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Little wonder that the common opinion of the late fifteenth century despised the higher and lower clergy, much as common opinion in highly politicized societies today despises the bureaucracy and politicians. As Johan Huizinga put it, “Hatred is the right word to use in this context, for hatred it was, latent, but general and persistent. The people never wearied of hearing the vices of the clergy arraigned.”45 Part of the reason that people were commonly convinced that the Church was “grasping and extravagant” is that it was true. “The worldliness of the higher ranks of the clergy and the deterioration of the lower grades”46 were too obvious to miss. From the parish priest to the pope himself, the clergy appeared to be corrupt as only the personnel of a predominant institution can be.

Five hundred years ago, the pope, Alexander VI, made even Giulio Andreotti and Bill Clinton seem like exemplars of integrity. Alexander VI was known for his wild parties. As a cardinal in Siena, he staged a famous orgy to which only “Siena’s most beautiful young women had been invited, but their ‘husbands, fathers, and brothers’ had been excluded.”47 The Siena orgy was famous, but it later proved to be tame compared to those Alexander threw after becoming pope. Perhaps the most lurid of those was the so-called Ballet of the Chestnuts, which involved Rome’s “fifty most beautiful whores” in a copulation contest with the Church Fathers and other important Romans. As William Manchester describes it, “Servants kept score of each man’s orgasms, for the pope greatly admired virility.… After everyone was exhausted, His Holiness distributed prizes—cloaks, boots, caps, and fine silken tunics. The winners, the diarist wrote, were those who made love with those courtesans the greatest number of times.”48

Alexander fathered at least seven and perhaps eight illegitimate children. One of his apparent sons, Giovanni, was the so-called Infans Romanus, born to Alexander’s illegitimate daughter, Lucrezia Borgia, when she was eighteen. In a secret papal bull, Alexander admitted fathering Giovanni. If he was not the father, he was certainly the grandfather on both sides. The pope was involved in a three-way incestuous affair with Lucrezia, who was also the mistress of Juan, duke of Gandia, Alexander’s oldest illegitimate son, as well as the mistress of another illegitimate son, Cardinal Cesare Borgia. Cesare was the prince of the Church who served as Niccolò Machia-velli’s inspiration for The Prince. Cesare was a killer, as was the pope, who was known to have plotted several murders. One or the other of them apparently became jealous of Juan, whose lifeless body was fished out of the Tiber River on June 15, 1497.49

The leadership of the late-medieval Church was as corrupt as the leadership of the nation-state today.

“Today I have twice become a father. God’s blessing on it.”50 —RODOLPH AGRICOLA, on hearing that his concubine had given birth to a son on the day he was elected abbot

34伪君子HYPOCRISY

中文译本

在“表面的虔诚”之下,中世纪晚期的社会堕落放荡,是非常不敬神的。教堂是男女青年最喜欢的幽会场所,也是妓女和淫秽图片小贩经常聚集的地方。历史学家报告说,“日常宗教活动中的不敬行为毫无节制。”受雇为亡灵超度的唱诗班,经常在弥撒中使用渎神的字眼。守夜和列队祈祷在中世纪的宗教活动中的重要性,比在今天大得多,但据中世纪晚期欧洲最重要的神学权威——加尔都西会的德尼(Denis the Carthusian)说,它们还是被“黄段子、讽刺的模仿秀与酗酒所玷污。”有人可能会说,这些指责是古板的道学家在发牢骚,但这只是众多同类描述中的一种。有充分的理由相信,在中世纪,猥亵和神圣往往是亲密无间的伙伴。例如,朝圣活动就经常沦为骚乱和淫乱,以致于一些品德高尚的改革者主张禁止朝圣,但没有成功。地方性的宗教游行,也为暴民提供了破坏和抢劫的机会,以及各种能激起他们兴趣的醉酒闹剧。即使是静静地坐在教堂听弥撒,人民也普遍处于不清醒的状态。教堂里喝掉的酒是惊人的,特别是在节日的晚上。斯特拉斯堡理事会的记录显示,在圣阿道夫之夜,那些在“守望中祈祷”的人,喝光了教会为纪念圣人而准备的 1000 升葡萄酒。

15 世纪著名的神学家让·格森(Jean Gerson)记述道,“即使最神圣的节日,甚至圣诞夜,都是在打牌、讲荤段子、骂脏话、淫乱放荡之中”度过的。当平民百姓因为这些行为受到惩戒时,他们就会以“贵族和神职人员”为榜样,因为这些人做同样的事却不会受到惩罚。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Beneath a “superficial crust of piety,” late-medieval society was remarkably blasphemous, irreverent, and debauched. Churches were the favorite trysting places of young men and women, and frequent gathering spots of prostitutes and vendors of obscene pictures. Historians report that “the irreverence of daily religious practice was almost unbounded.”51 Choristers hired to chant for the souls of the dead commonly substituted profane words in the mass. Vigils and processions, which played a far bigger role in medieval religious practice than they do today, were nonetheless “disgraced by ribaldry, mockery and drinking.” So said late-medieval Europe’s leading theological authority, Denis the Carthusian.52

While such a report could be challenged as the griping of a stiff-lipped moralist, it is merely one of many accounts that paint the same picture. There is ample reason to believe that the bawdy and the sacred were frequently close companions in medieval life. Pilgrimages, for example, so often degenerated into riot and debauchery that high-minded reformers argued without success that they be suppressed. Local religious processions also provided regular occasions for mobs to vandalize, loot, and generally indulge in whatever drunken antics caught their fancy. Even when people sat still to hear mass, it was frequently not a sober experience. Prodigious quantities of wine were consumed in church, especially on festival nights. Accounts from the Council of Strasbourg show that those who “watched in prayer” on St. Adolphus Night drank 1,100 liters of wine provided by the council in honor of the saint.

Jean Gerson, a leading fifteenth-century theologian, reports that “the most sacred festivals, even Christmas night,” were spent “in debauchery, playing at cards, swearing and blaspheming.” When admonished for these lapses, the common people “plead the example of the nobility and the clergy, who behave in like manner with impunity.”53

35虔诚与同情Piety and Compassion

中文译本

在中世纪晚期,虔诚合理化了充斥社会的有组织宗教,今天为政治生活而辩护的“同情心”,也是出于同样的目的。为了满足毫无道德的虔诚渴望而出售赎罪券,与支出奢侈的福利以满足假模假式的、没有善行的同情心一样。赎罪券是否产生了提升道德或拯救灵魂的实际效果,福利项目是否真正改善了它计划帮助对象的生活品质,根本不重要。“虔诚”和“同情”一样,是一种近乎迷信的召唤。

在一个基本不了解因果关系的时代,教会的仪式和圣礼渗透到生活的各个阶段。

“……一次旅行,一项任务,一次访问,都有无数同样的手续:祈祷、仪式、规则。”刻在羊皮纸上的祈祷词像项链一样,串在发烧者的身上。营养不良的女孩,将一缕缕的头发挂在圣乌尔班的图像前,以防止进一步的脱发。在干旱的季节,纳瓦拉的农民抬着圣彼得像列队游行以求雨。人们热衷于这些及其他“无效的技术,在没有什么好办法的情况下来减轻焦虑。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The piety that rationalized the saturation of society by organized religion in the late Middle Ages served the same purpose as the “compassion” that is meant to justify the political domination of life today. The sale of indulgences to satisfy a desire for piety without morals parallels lavish welfare spending to slake the pretense of compassion without charity. It was largely immaterial whether the actual effect of received practices was to improve moral character or save souls, just as it is largely immaterial whether a welfare program actually improves the lives of the people to whom it is directed. “Piety,” like “compassion,” was an almost superstitious invocation.

In a time when causal relationships were scarcely understood, rituals and sacraments of the Church permeated every phase of life. “… A journey, a task, a visit, were equally attended by a thousand formalities: benedictions, ceremonies, formulas.”54 Prayers inscribed on pieces of parchment were strung like necklaces on those suffering from fevers. Malnourished girls draped locks of their hair in front of the image of St. Urban to prevent further hair loss. Peasants in Navarre marched in processions behind an image of St. Peter to solicit rain during droughts.55 People eagerly adopted these and other “ineffective techniques to allay anxiety when effective ones were not available.”56

36两个错构成一个善Two Wrongs to Make a Rite

中文译本

人们对圣人遗物的神奇力量深信不疑,当任何有影响力的虔信者去世之后,都会被疯狂地分尸。托马斯·阿奎那在福萨努瓦修道院逝世后,那里的修士将他的尸体斩首并煮沸,以便得到他的骨头。匈牙利的圣伊丽莎白在下葬前供公众瞻仰时,“一群崇拜者冲到这里,剪断或扯走了裹在她脸上的亚麻布条,还剪掉了她的头发、指甲,甚至乳头。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

People were so firmly convinced of the miraculous qualities attaching to the relics of saints that the death of any notably pious person frequently occasioned a mad rush to divide up the body. After Thomas Aquinas died in the monastery of Fossanuova, the monks there decapitated and boiled his body in order to secure control of his bones. When St. Elizabeth of Hungary was lying in state, “a crowd of worshippers came and cut or tore strips of the linen enveloping her face; they cut off the hair, the nails, even the nipples.”57

37没有美德的虔诚Piety Without Virtue

中文译本

中世纪的人把圣人和他们的遗物看作是信仰武器的一部分;在那样一个世界里,冬天之冷、夜晚之黑、疾病面前之绝望,远超本书读者的想象。与现代人相比,中世纪人更相信魔鬼是真实存在的,相信上帝会积极地干预世界,而祈祷、忏悔和朝圣可以赢得神的眷顾。

如果只是说人们相信上帝,既不能表达他们信仰的强度,也不能表达中世纪人把虔诚与罪恶搞在一起的容易程度。对仪式、典礼和圣事的功效的信仰无处不在,这不可避免地削弱了良善行事的紧要性。对于任何罪恶或精神缺陷,都有一种补救措施,一种可以洗刷污点的忏悔,这就是所谓的“救赎数学”。当宗教变得无孔不入,它的诚信必然开始削弱。对此,惠泽加说:“宗教渗入到了生活的一切关系之中,意味着圣洁的与亵渎的思想领域不断融合。神圣的东西变得太过普通,无法再带给人们深刻的感受”。事实确实如此。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The medieval mind saw the saints and their relics as part of the arsenal of faith in a world that was colder in winter, darker at night, and more desperate in the face of disease than any reader of this book will have been likely to know. More emphatically than in the modern period, people in the Middle Ages believed that demons were real, that God actively intervened in the world, and that prayer, penance, and pilgrimages earned divine favor.

To say simply that people believed in God could convey neither the intensity of their adherence nor the apparent ease with which medieval piety seemed to bed down with sin. Belief in the efficacy of rites, rituals, and sacraments was so pervasive that it perhaps inevitably undercut the urgency of behaving in a virtuous way. For any sin or spiritual defect there was a remedy, a penance that would clear the slate, in what came to be a “mathematics of salvation.”58 Religion became so all-pervasive that its sincerity necessarily began to flag. As Huizinga put it, “Religion penetrating all relations in life means a constant blending of the spheres of holy and of profane thought. Holy things will become too common to be deeply felt.”59 And so it was.

38教会规模的缩小DOWNSIZING THE CHURCH

中文译本

到 15 世纪末,教会不仅与今天的民族国家同样腐败,也是经济增长的主要阻力。

教会吸走了大量的资本,但不是用于生产;它还强加了各种负担,限制社会产出,压制商业。这些负担与今天的民族国家所施加的一样,多如牛毛。我们都知道,火药革命给有组织的宗教带来了什么:它制造了强烈的改革动机,促使教会缩小规模并降低成本。当传统的教会拒绝这么做的时候,新教教派加入竞争,抓住了机会。他们动用了几乎所有能想到的手段去降低虔信生活的成本:

他们建造了简朴的新教堂,有时候还拆除旧教堂的祭坛,腾出资金另做他用。

他们修订了基督教教义,以降低信仰的成本,并强调信仰而非善行是得救的关键。

他们制定了新的、简洁的礼仪,缩减或取消了众多节日,并废除了很多圣礼。

他们关闭了修道院和修女院,并停止对修行者的施舍。贫穷从一种使徒的美德,变成了一个不受欢迎的、值得谴责的社会问题。

要理解教会的缩小怎么解放了生产力,就必须回顾垄断被打破之前,教会有哪些阻碍发展的表现。就像当今的民族国家,教会在 15 世纪末强加给社会的超额成本,负担之沉重是令人难以置信的:

诸如什一税、教会税和各种费用等直接成本,养活了极度臃肿的教会官僚机构。在取代中世纪“圣母教会”的新教教堂中,什一税也很常见,但在城市地区一般征收不到。事实上,教会垄断的结束使商业最发达地区的边际税率不断下降。

宗教教义很不利于储蓄。中世纪教会中的大反派就是守财奴,即不惜出卖灵魂去储蓄黄金的人。教义要求信徒资助善行,于是他们要向教会捐赠高昂的费用。“赎罪”的教义迫使那些想得到救赎的人捐助弥撒或圣堂,以避免落入炼狱。对于这一点,路德在他的《九十五条论纲》的第 8 条和第 13 条进行了直接的抨击。他写到:“垂死之人以其死亡偿还了所有的债务。” 换句话说,新教信徒的财产是可以传给他的继承人的。根据新教教义,通常是 30 年内没有必要重复捐赠做追思弥撒的小教堂,对于特别富有的人,则是永久的。

中世纪教会的意识形态还鼓励将资本用于购买圣物。圣物崇拜俘虏了大量的资金,用以获取与基督或其他圣人相关的物品。非常有钱的人甚至建立自己的圣物收藏。例如,萨克森的选帝侯弗雷德里克就积累了 19000 件圣物,有一些是在 1493 年去耶路撒冷朝圣时获得的。在他的收藏品中,包含他认为的“一个圣婴的尸体、玛利亚的乳汁和耶稣诞生地马厩的稻草。”根据推测,投资这些圣物的资本回报率是很低的。随着宗教改革强调信仰及选民的概念(上帝拣选),购买圣物作为护身符的重要性就大大降低了。这也鼓励资金去寻找效益更高的投资渠道,可以支付君主索要的回报。

新教教派的出现,打破了中世纪教会的经济垄断,并大幅削弱了教会监管的权力。我们前面谈论过,教会法经常被扭曲,用来支持教会的垄断和商业利益。由于新教教派需要保护和加强的经济利益比较少,他们的教义往往会促成一个更自由的体系,对商业的压制也更少。

新教革命废除了中世纪教会的许多仪式和典礼,它们给信徒的时间带来了沉重的负担。到 15 世纪末,经过精心的设计,仪式、圣事和圣日,几乎在日历上排满了。这种超负荷的仪式安排,是教会坚持“一个人可以随意增加祈祷或敬拜的次数,还可以从中获得好处”的必然结果;它们确实在增加。更加冗长、复杂的仪式,在忏悔中重复背诵祈祷词的要求,不能工作的圣日不断增加,这些都影响了生产力的发展。繁多的规章制度和仪式贯穿在一天和四季之中,大大减少了可以从事生产的时间。在中世纪 90%的人口在从事农业。农业的节奏被打断,影响还不大。在耕作的季节里,很多时候不需要每天都下地干活。在当时的条件下,农作物的产量更多是受天气变化和不可控的病虫害的影响;而不是教会日历所能允许的最低限度以外的边际劳动力的增加。 但在农业之外的其他领域,生产力的损失就是一个大问题。在手工业、制造业、运输业、商业,以及其他由劳动量决定产出和利润的事业,就会与教会对时间的要求产生冲突。 15 世纪末的大转型,发生在地租上涨和农民实际收入下降的时候,这应该不是巧合。人口压力的增加,减少了公共土地的产量。这些土地一般位于河流或溪流的周围,农民靠这些土地放牧,有时候也从中获取鱼和柴火。生活水平的下降,让农民感受到了越来越迫切的生活压力,他们需要寻找其他收入来源。因此,“越来越多的农村人口开始转向小规模的制造市场,最早就是纺织业,这个过程被称为‘原工业化’。”教会强加的负担抑制了在新经济方向上的时间投入,它阻碍了更有进取心的农民,去从事手工业以补充农业收入。 新教教派做出的一大贡献,就是取消了 40 个节庆日。这不仅节省了大量的费用,如活动时需要的饮食,还释放了大量的宝贵时间。停止敬拜这 40 个节日,还意味着每个人可以在一年中增加 300 个工时或更多。简而言之,仅仅通过取消中世纪教会超负荷的仪式活动,释放出本来可能会在商业上损失的时间,就为社会产出的显著提高打开了局面。

垄断地位被打破后,教会吐出了大量的资产。这些资产在教会的管理下,回报极低,这种情况与 20 世纪末国有资产的运用有明显的相似之处。教会显然是最大的封建地主;它对土地的控制力,与高度政治化的今天,政府的控制力不相上下。在欧洲一些国家,如波西米亚,教会控制了超过总量 50%的土地。根据教会法,一项财产一旦归教会所有,就不能被转让出去。因此,随着教会从信众那里收到的遗赠越来越多,教会的土地持有量也不断增加;而那些遗赠原本是用于资助各种社会福利服务、建造圣堂及其他活动的。 虽然很难精确衡量教会持有土地的相对生产率,但它在中世纪末期的水平肯定远远低于早期。到了 14 世纪,人们越来越重视市场生产,而不再是自给自足的农业,这使得大多数非宗教领主,从不识字的工头变成了职业经理人,以便优化他们的土地产出。他们所采取的激励措施,可能使他们的土地产出很快就超越了教会;毕竟在理论上,教会的财产不会给任何人带来私利。毫无疑问的是,一些更世俗的红衣主教,也使用普通领主的方式管理财产。但是,其他教会财产的生产力肯定会受到失败管理的影响,毕竟它们是在一个大而无当且远在天边的机构手里。这其中的弊端,与今天的国家所有制和集体所有制的弊端是差不多的。另外很明显的一点是,对修道院的查封也重新调配了资源,在印刷机出现之后,这些资源无需再用于复制手稿和书籍。

在《大清算》一书中,我们详细阐述过,火药革命发生后,一些新教教派迅速做出了反应,他们修改了教义以鼓励商业的发展,例如取消了对高利贷及贷款利息的禁令。中世纪的教会在意识形态上是反对资本主义的,它是经济增长的累赘。教会教义的主旨是加强封建主义,因为教会是最大的封建土地所有者,在其中有巨大的利益。无论是否是故意使然,教会都倾向于把自己的经济利益作为宗教美德,同时反对通过制造业和独立商业积累财富,因为它们必然会破坏封建制度的稳定。例如,教会下令反对“贪婪”,但这主要适用于商业贸易,而不是封建税收,也从来没有用在赎罪券的销售上。教会还无耻地为商业项目制定“公正的价格”,这其实抑制了那些非教会生产的商品和服务的经济回报。教会对商业创新的抵制,禁止“高利贷”就是一个明显的例子。银行和信贷是工商业大规模发展的关键。教会限制信贷供应,延缓了商业发展。

更加微妙的变化是,新的教派对《圣经》文本的专注,摧毁了中世纪教会的思维模式和意识形态,这两者都为社会进步设置了障碍。中世纪晚期的文化编程,鼓励人们用象征性的模拟去看待世界,而不是通过因果关系去理解。 这削弱了人们的逻辑推理能力,也远离了商业主义的思想。用符号等价物的方式思考,很难转入到市场价值的思维模式。杰出的中世纪史学家约翰·惠泽加举例说;“三个庄园代表着圣女的品质;七个候选人象征着美德;1477年仍然忠于勃艮第家族的阿图瓦和埃诺的五个城镇,是五名聪慧的处女……同理,鞋子象征关怀与勤勉、长袜象征坚韧、袜带象征决心等,其余物品亦各有其寓意。”这些例子表明,人们的思维被宗教教条、僵化的符号和寓言所支配,生活的方方面面被等级隶属关系捆在一起。每一种职业、每一个部门、每一种颜色、每一个数字,甚至每一个语法元素,都被绑在一个宏大的宗教概念的体系之中。 因此,日常生活中的点点滴滴不是用因果关系来解释,而是通过静态的符号和寓言。美德和恶习有时会被人格化,每样东西都代表着别的东西,后者又代表另外一些东西,这不仅没有理清因果关系,还搞得更加混乱。为了进一步混淆是非,事物间的各种联系被数字系统任意地套在一起;数字 7 好像特别重要。有七种美德、七宗罪、主祷文中有七个祈愿、圣灵有七种恩赐、激情有七种时刻、还有七种至福和七种圣礼,以及“由七种动物代表,后面跟着七种疾病。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

By the end of the fifteenth century, the Church was not only as corrupt as the nation-state today; it was also a major drag on economic growth. The Church engrossed large amounts of capital in unproductive ways, imposing burdens that limited the output of society and suppressed commerce. These burdens, like those imposed by the nation-state today, were numerous. We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution: it created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. When the traditional Church declined to do this, Protestant sects seized the opportunity to compete. In so doing they employed almost every device imaginable to reduce the cost of living a-pious life:

They built spare new churches and sometimes stripped the altars of older ones to free capital for other uses.

They revised Christian doctrine in ways that lowered costs, emphasizing faith over good deeds as a key to salvation.

They developed a new, terse liturgy, pared or eliminated feast days, and abolished numerous sacraments.

They closed monasteries and nunneries, and stopped giving alms to mendicant orders. Poverty went from being an apostolic virtue to an unwelcome and often blameworthy social problem.60

To understand how downsizing the Church liberated productivity, you have to review the many ways that the Church stood in the way of growth before its monopoly was broken. Much as the nation-state does today, the Church at the end of the fifteenth century imposed an incredible burden of excess costs.

1. Direct costs such as tithes, taxes, and fees fed the overgrown ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Tithes were common to Protestant churches that replaced the medieval “Holy Mother Church” also, but they tended not to be collectible in urban areas. In effect, the end of the Church’s monopoly led to declining marginal tax rates in regions with the most highly developed commerce.

2. Religious doctrines made saving difficult. The arch-villain of the medieval Church was the “miser,” the person who saved his gold at the risk of his soul. The requirement for the faithful to fund “good deeds” entailed costly contributions to the Church. The doctrine of “satisfactions” obliged those concerned about salvation to endow masses or “chantries” in order to avoid purgatory. Luther attacked this directly in the eighth and thirteenth of his ninety-five theses. He wrote that “the dying will pay all their debts by their death.”61 In other words, the capital of the Protestant believer was available to pass on to his heirs. Under Protestant doctrine, there was no need to endow chantries to repeat masses, usually for thirty years, and sometimes, for the very wealthy, in perpetuity.

3. The ideology of the medieval Church also encouraged diversion of capital into acquisition of relics. Numerous relic cults were endowed with large sums to acquire physical objects associated with Christ or various saints. The very wealthy even assembled personal collections of relics. For example, the Elector Frederick of Saxony amassed a collection of nineteen thousand relics, some acquired on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1493. His collection included what he believed to be “the body of a holy innocent, Mary’s milk, and straw from the stable of the Nativity.”62 Presumably, the return on capital invested in these relics was low. The shift to an emphasis on faith and the notion of the elect downgraded the importance of acquisition of the trappings of Christian life for use as charms and encouraged money to find more productive channels that paid a return that the monarch could tap.

4. The advent of Protestant denominations broke the medieval Church’s economic monopolies, and led to a significant weakening of regulation. As we have seen, canon law was frequently bent to support Church monopolies and commercial interests. Because the new denominations had fewer economic interests to protect and promote, their version of religious doctrine tended to result in a freer system, with fewer inhibitions of commerce.

5. The Protestant revolution abolished many of the rites and rituals of the medieval Church that burdened the time of the faithful. Rites, sacraments, and holy days had been elaborated to absorb almost the entire calendar by the late fifteenth century. This ceremonial overload was a logical outgrowth of the Church’s insistence “that one could multiply acts of prayer or worship as often as one liked and gain benefits from them.”63 Multiply they did. Productivity was taxed by longer and more elaborate services, obligations to recite repetitious prayers in penance, and the proliferation of feast days of saints during which no work could be done. Numerous regulations and ceremonies punctuated the day and the seasons, considerably shrinking the time available for productive tasks. This may have done little to interrupt the rhythms of medieval farming, in which 90 percent or more of the population was engaged. There were many periods during the seasons when field labor was not required on a daily basis. The yield of crops under medieval conditions probably varied more with the weather and uncontrollable rhythms of infestation than from any marginal addition of labor beyond the minimum that the Church calendar accommodated.

The larger problem of lost productivity did not fall so much in farming as in other areas. The Church’s demands on time were far less compatible with craft work, manufacturing, transport, commerce, or any other undertaking where productivity and profitability were likely to be crucially determined by the amount of time devoted to the task.

It may not be a coincidence that the great transition at the end of the fifteenth century occurred at a time when land rents were rising and real wages for the peasantry were in decline. Increased population pressures had reduced the yield from the common lands, often found surrounding rivers and streams, upon which peasants depended to graze their livestock, and in some cases, for fish and firewood. The whittling down of living standards placed increasingly urgent pressures on peasants to find alternative sources of income. As a result, “more and more of the rural population turned to small-scale manufacturing for the market, above all in textiles, in the process known as ‘putting-out’ or ‘proto-industrialization.’ ”64 The ceremonial burdens on time imposed by the Church stood in the way of efforts by the more ambitious peasants to supplement their farming income by craft work, as indeed they inhibited any redeployment of effort in new economic directions.

One of the more pronounced contributions that Protestant sects made to productivity was the scrapping of forty feast days. This not only saved the considerable costs of staging the festivals, including outfitting the village tables with food and drink; it also freed a great deal of valuable time. Implicitly, everyone who stopped honoring the forty banished feast days could add three hundred man-hours or more to his annual productivity. In short, the scrapping of ceremonial overload in the medieval Church opened the way for an appreciable increase in output simply by freeing time that would otherwise have been lost to commerce.

6. The break in the Church’s monopoly disgorged vast amounts of assets that were yielding low returns under Church management—a situation with obvious parallels to state holdings late in the twentieth century. The Church was the largest feudal landholder by far. Its grip on the land matched that of the state in highly politicized societies today—exceeding 50 percent of the total in some European countries such as Bohemia. According to canon law, once a property came under the control of the Church, it could not be alienated. Thus the holdings of Church land tended steadily to rise, as the Church received more and more testamentary gifts from the faithful for financing various social welfare services, chantries, and other activities.

While it is difficult to measure precisely the relative productivity of Church holdings, it must have been far lower at the end of the Middle Ages than it was in the early part of that epoch. By the fourteenth century, increased emphasis upon production for the market rather than subsistence farming had led most lay lords to turn from illiterate headmen to professional managers to optimize the output of their holdings. Their incentives probably led them to quickly outstrip the output of Church properties, which in theory usually did not accrue to anyone’s private profit. No doubt some of the more worldly prince-bishops husbanded their estates in ways indistinguishable from those of the lay lords. Yet the productivity of other Church properties would surely have suffered from failures of indifferent management by a huge, far-flung institution, whose drawbacks would have been similar to the drawbacks of state and communal ownership today. It is obvious, as well, that the seizure of the monasteries rearrayed resources that were no longer needed for the reproduction of books and manuscripts after the advent of the printing press.

7. As we detailed in The Great Reckoning, some of the Protestant sects immediately responded to the Gunpowder Revolution by altering their doctrines in ways that encouraged commerce, such as by lifting the injunction against usury, or lending at interest. The ideological opposition of the medieval Church to capitalism was a drag on growth. The main ideological thrust of Church teachings was to reinforce feudalism, in which the Church had a large stake, as the largest feudal landholder. Consciously, or not, the Church tended to make religious virtues of its own economic interests, while militating against the development of manufacturing and independent commercial wealth that were destined to destabilize the feudal system. Injunctions against “avarice,” for example, applied mainly to commercial transactions rather than feudal levies, and never to the sale of indulgences. The infamous attempts by the Church to fix a “just price” for items in commerce tended to suppress economic returns on those products and services where the Church itself was not a producer.

The ban on “usury” was a signal example of the Church’s resistance to commercial innovation. Banking and credit were crucial to the development of larger-scale commercial enterprises. By restricting the availability of credit, the Church retarded growth.

8. More subtly, the new denominations’ focus upon the Bible as a text helped demolish the medieval Church’s mode of thought as well as its ideology. Both placed obstacles in the way of growth. The cultural programming of the late Middle Ages encouraged people to see the world in terms of symbolic similitude rather than cause and effect. This short-circuited reasoning. It also pointed away from a mercantile conception of life. Thinking in terms of symbolic equivalences does not easily translate into thinking in terms of market values. “The three estates represent the qualities of the Virgin. The seven electors of the Empire signify the virtues; the five towns of Artois and Hainault, which in 1477 remained faithful to the house of Burgundy, are the five wise virgins.… In the same way shoes mean care and diligence, stockings perseverance, the garter resolution, etc.”65 As this example quoted from the distinguished medieval historian Johan Huizinga suggests, thinking was dominated by dogma, rigid symbols, and allegory that tied together every aspect of life in terms of hierarchic subordination. Every occupation, every part, every color, every number, even every element of grammar was tied into a grand system of religious conceptions.

Thus the mundane bits and pieces of life were interpreted not in terms of their causal connections, but in terms of static symbols and allegories. Sometimes personifying virtues and vices, each thing stood for something, which stood for something else again, in ways that often blocked rather than clarified cause and effect To confuse matters further, relationships were often arbitrarily bound together in systems of numbers. Sevens played a particularly important role. There were the seven virtues, the seven deadly sins, the seven supplications of the Lord’s Prayer, the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the seven moments of the passion, the seven beatitudes, and the seven sacraments, “represented by the seven animals and followed by the seven diseases.”66

39十五世纪的新闻报道Fifteenth-Century Journalism

中文译本

十五世纪如果有新闻业的话,那么它写出来的故事,除了间接性的、象征性的寓言,不会回答任何报道事实的经典问题。下面是一篇十五世纪的私人日记,请看它关于勃艮第谋杀案的记述:

这时,住在邪恶之塔的不和女神现身了,她唤醒了愤怒女神、疯女人、贪婪女神、狂暴女神和复仇女神,他们拿起各种武器,把上帝的理性、正义和教诲全抛在了脑后,最可耻的是,也扔掉了节制。怀着满腔的暴怒,他们开始了疯狂的谋杀、屠杀、砍伐、处死,把在监狱里发现的所有人,统统杀光……贪婪女神把她的裙子塞进裤腰带,带着她的女儿——掠夺,还有她的儿子——盗窃……完事之后,上述众人在他们的女神——也就是愤怒、贪婪和复仇的带领下,杀遍了巴黎所有的公共监狱。

摆脱中世纪的思维范式,使人们开始用因果关系等“现代”术语理解世界,而不再依靠象征性的联系和拟人化的寓言。

中世纪晚期教会的教义和思维模式是虚伪的,这一点没必要再争论。它们更倾向于契合农业封建主义的需求,而不愿意留给商业发展的空间,更不用说工业。准确地说,教会作为当时社会的主导机构,它的所作所为,塑造了道德、文化和法律方面的限制,都是为了保证封建主义的生存与发展。正因为如此,它不符合工业社会的需要。就像现代民族国家在道德、文化和法律上的约束,无益于信息时代的商业一样。我们相信,国家将步教会的后尘而遭到革命,使新的发展潜力得以实现。

新教的教义认为,只靠信仰本身就可以升入天堂,而不再需要对亡灵祈福的活动进行捐赠。这被人们视为一个神学问题,但它更是一种匹配新时代经济现实的神学。在当时,把额外的资金投入到臃肿的教会官僚机构中,它的机会成本陡然上升了;很明显,人们需要一种成本效益更高的救赎途径,新教的改革满足了这一点。在没有其他投资渠道的时候,人们还不太介意把钱交给教会。但是,他们看到,资助一个前往东方的香料船队,有机会获得百倍的回报;资助国王的一个军营,回报虽然少一点,一年也有望得到 40%的利息;在这种情况下,他们于自身利益所在之处,寻求上帝的恩典,也是可以理解的。

不久之后,相比他们在封建制度下的祖先,很多商人和平民变得富裕多了。近代早期,商人和小制造业主的生活水平急剧提高;在那些收入和生活方式随着封建主义垮台而崩溃的人们当中,他们普遍不受欢迎。教会垄断地位的削弱和富人大政治权力的增强,导致可以再分配的收入急剧减少。没能成为新制度直接受益者的农民和城市贫民,对那些受益者充满了嫉妒。惠泽加描述了当时的主流态度,“对于富人,尤其是当时出现的大量新富者,人们的憎恨是普遍的。”信息革命将与此极为相似。

同样惊人相似的是,犯罪率的大幅上升。旧秩序崩溃的后果,即使达不到封建革命时期彻底的无政府状态——对此我们在上一章探讨过,也总是会导致犯罪活动的激增。在中世纪末,随着旧的社会控制体系的瓦解,犯罪率像火箭一般蹿升。用惠泽加的话说,“犯罪开始成为对社会秩序的极大威胁。”在未来,它也具有同等的威胁。

现代世界是在新技术、新思想和黑火药的混合之中诞生的。火药武器和进步的航海技术,破坏了封建主义的军事基础;甚至成为一种新的通讯方式,瓦解了它的意识形态。而印刷术揭示出了教会的腐败,使得它的统治阶级和普通成员,在一个以宗教为中心的社会里,很矛盾地被人们普遍鄙视。这显然是一个可与当代相对照的悖论,在一个政治为王的时代,人们对政客和官僚已不再抱有任何幻想。

十五世纪的暮年,是一个幻灭、混乱、悲观和绝望的时代。一如今日。

译注:马丁·范·克雷维尔德(Martin van Creveld)是以战争史与军事理论研究闻名的历史学家。

译注:《辩谬篇》(On Sophistical Refutations)是亚里士多德逻辑学著作之一。

译注:这里指 1517 年马丁·路德公开批评赎罪券、引发宗教改革的著名事件。

译注:这里指位于意大利卡塔尼亚的本笃会修道院,现为当地重要历史建筑之一。

译注:什一税(tithe)是欧洲基督教社会长期存在的一种宗教捐税。

译注:马基雅维利(Niccolo Machiavelli)是意大利政治思想家,以《君主论》闻名。

译注:这里借一则带有讽刺意味的教会逸闻,说明修道纪律的败坏。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

A fifteenth-century news story, if it had been written, would not have answered any of the classic questions of reporting facts, except indirectly through allegoric personification. Consider this report, in a private diary, of the Burgundian murders in fifteenth-century Paris:

Then arose the goddess of Discord, who lived in the tower of Evil Counsel, and awoke Wrath, the mad woman, and Covetousness and Rage and Vengeance, and they took up arms of all sorts and cast out Reason, Justice, Remembrance of God, and Moderation most shamefully. Then Madness them enraged, and Murder and Slaughter killed, cut down, put to death, massacred all they found in the prisons.… and Covetousness tucked up her skirts into her belt with Rapine, her daughter, and Larceny, her son.… Afterward, the aforesaid people went by guidance of their goddesses, that is to say, Wrath, Covetousness, and Vengeance, who led them through all the public prisons of Paris, etc.67

The shift away from the medieval paradigm helped prepare people to think in “modern” terms about cause and effect, rather than in terms of symbolic linkages and allegoric personification.

It is not necessary to argue that the doctrine and mode of thinking of the late-medieval Church were insincere to see that they tended to fit closely with the needs of agrarian feudalism, while allowing very little place for commerce, much less industrial development. It was rather a case of the Church as a predominant institution shaping moral, cultural, and legal constraints in ways that were closely fitted to the imperatives of feudalism. For this very reason, they were ill-suited to the needs of industrial society, just as the moral, cultural, and legal constraints of the modern nation-state are ill-suited to facilitating commerce in the Information Age. We believe that the state will be revolutionized, just as the Church was, to facilitate the realization of the new potential.

The Protestant doctrine that heaven could be attained by faith alone and without the benefit of endowed prayers for the dead was cast as a theological issue. Yet it was theology to fit the economic realities of a new age. It met the obvious need for a more cost-effective path to salvation at a time when the opportunity costs of sinking additional capital into the bloated ecclesiastical bureaucracy had suddenly risen. People had minded less giving their money to the Church when there was no other outlet for it. But when they suddenly saw the chance to make one hundred times their capital financing a spice voyage to the East, or get a lesser, but still promising sum of 40 percent per annum financing a battalion for the king, they understandably sought the grace of God where their own interests lay.

Many merchants and other commoners soon became far richer than their forebears had been under feudalism. The sharp acceleration of living standards among the merchants and small manufacturers of the early-modern period was widely unpopular among those whose incomes and way of life were collapsing with feudalism. The weakening of the Church’s monopoly and the increased megapolitical power of the rich led to a sharp reduction in income redistribution. The peasants and urban poor who were not immediate beneficiaries of the new system were bitterly envious of those who were. Huizinga described the prevailing attitude, in what could well be an important parallel with the Information Revolution: “Hatred of rich people, especially of the new rich, who were then very numerous, is general.”68

An equally striking parallel arose from a tremendous surge in crime. The breakdown of the old order almost always unleashes a surge in crime, if not the outright anarchy of the feudal revolution we explored in the last chapter. At the end of the Middle Ages, crime also skyrocketed as the old systems of social control broke down. In Huizinga’s words, “[C]rime came to be regarded as a menace to order and society.”69 It could be equally menacing in the future.

The modern world was born in the confusion of new technologies, new ideas, and the stench of black powder. Gunpowder weapons and improved shipping destabilized the military foundation of feudalism, even as new communications technology undermined its ideology. Among the elements that the new technology of printing helped reveal was the corruption of the Church, whose hierarchy as well as rank and file were already held in low regard by a society that paradoxically placed religion at the center of everything. It is a paradox with an obvious contemporary parallel in the disillusionment with politicians and bureaucrats, in a society that places politics at the center of everything.

The end of the fifteenth century was a time of disillusion, confusion, pessimism, and despair. A time much like now.