BILINGUAL READING · 第07章
超越地域的网络经济
CHAPTER 7 TRANSCENDING LOCALITY The Emergence of the Cybereconomy
桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。
导读 本章论证
- 网络经济从辅助现实交易,逐步走向远程服务,再走向支付、结算和资产都在网络中完成。
- 原书预期数字货币会削弱政府的货币垄断与铸币税。
- 高流动资本可以在不同管辖区之间选择,从而迫使政府展开税收与服务竞争。
- 网络经济被划分为三个阶段:网络辅助在岸交易、跨境远程服务、交易与结算均迁入网络空间。现实长期停留在多阶段并存,而非整齐升级。
- 原书用复利损失说明税率差异会放大迁移激励,但其示例依赖税率、收益率和执行假设,不能直接转为个人财务建议。
01开篇Opening
真正的问题在于控制。互联网无远弗届,任何一个政府都无法轻易控制。它将创造一个无缝链接的、不可监控的、反主权的全球经济区,并对民族国家的概念发出质疑。 —— 约翰·佩里·巴洛(JOHN PERRY BARLOW)
信息高速公路,已经成为数字时代早期人们比较熟悉的比喻之一。它之所以引人注目,不仅因为它无处不在,更因为它其实是对网络经济的普遍误解。高速公路只是人行道的工业化版本,是人员和货物的物理运输网络。信息经济并不是高速公路、铁路或运输管道。它将信息从一点传输到另一点的方式,并不像重型卡车沿着横贯加拿大的高速公路,把货物从艾伯塔省运到新不伦瑞克省。世人眼里的“信息高速公路”,并不仅仅是运输路线;它其实就是目的地。
网络空间超越了地域局限。它可以让人们彻彻底底即时共享数据,无时无地又无影无踪。新兴的信息经济,建立在数百万计算机用户的连接与再连接所构成的互连之上。它的本质是这些连接将孕育出来的新可能。正如约翰·巴洛所说:“网络有望带来一个全新的社会空间,它将是全球性的,是反主权的。在这个空间,任何地方的任何人,都可以畅所欲言,向其他同类表达他的真实想法。这种新的媒介预示着智识与经济的自由,它可能会推翻地球上所有的专制权力。”网络空间,就像人们想象中荷马众神的领域,与我们熟悉的农场和工厂的地面世界全然不同。但是,网络空间的到来,并不是凭空想象,而是真实的。而且,远超现在人们的认知,信息的即时共享会像溶剂一样,瓦解掉大型机构。我们已经讨论过,它会改变暴力的逻辑;不仅如此,它还将从根本上改变信息与交易的成本,而这决定着商业的开展与经济的运行。我们预计微处理技术将改变世界上的经济组织。
相比历史上的任何时期,今天的企业,都更有可能在任何地方落户,使用来自任何地方的资源,生产能够销往任何地方的产品。 —— 米尔顿·弗里德曼(MILTON FRIEDMAN)
“The real issue is control. The Internet is too widespread to be easily dominated by any single government. By creating a seamless global-economic zone, anti-sovereign and unregulatable, the Internet calls into question the very idea of a nation-state.”1 —JOHN PERW BARLOW
The Information Superhighway has become one of the more familiar metaphors of the early days of the digital age. It is remarkable not only for its pervasiveness, but also for the common misunderstanding it betrays about the cybereconomy. A highway, after all, is an industrial version of a footpath, a network for the physical transit of people and goods. The information economy is not like a highway, a railroad, or a pipeline. It does not haul or transport information from point to point the way the Trans-Canada Highway carries heavy trucks from Alberta to New Brunswick. What the world calls the “Information Superhighway” is not merely a transit link. It is the destination.
Cyberspace transcends locality. It involves nothing less than the instantaneous sharing of data everywhere and nowhere at once. The emerging information economy is based in the interconnections linking and relinking millions of users of millions of computers. Its essence lies in the new possibilities that arise from these connections. As John Perry Barlow put it, “What the Net offers is the promise of a new social space, global and anti-sovereign, within which anybody, anywhere can express to the rest of humanity whatever he or she believes without fear. There is in these new media a foreshadowing of the intellectual and economic liberty that might undo all the authoritarian powers on earth.”2
Cyberspace, like the imaginary realm of Homer’s gods, is a realm apart from the familiar terrestrial world of farm and factory. Yet its consequences will not be imaginary, but real. To a far greater extent than many now understand, the instantaneous sharing of information will be like a solvent dissolving large institutions. It will not only alter the logic of violence, as we have already explored; it will radically alter information and transaction costs that determine how businesses organize and the way the economy functions. We expect microprocessing to change the economic organization of the world.
“It is today possible, to a greater extent than at any time in the world’s history, for a company to locate anywhere, to use resources from anywhere to produce a product that can be sold anywhere.” —MILTON FRIEDMAN
02地域限制THE TYRANNY OF PLACE
正在衰亡的工业时代在想象信息经济时,第一反应就是把它看成是一项巨大的公共工程项目。由此我们可以看出,过去的范式在人们思维中的地位是多么地根深蒂固。这就好比听到 18 世纪末的农民说工厂是“一个有屋顶的农场”。然而,“高速公路”的比喻更成问题,它暴露出我们被地方限制绑架的严重程度。即使我们在技术上已经可以超越地域的局限性,但解放我们的工具被赋予的绰号,依然象征着一条从一个地方到另一个地方的路线。就像鲑鱼总是游回出生地的天生本能一样,地方性的理念还深深地蚀刻在我们的意识之中。
从古至今,人类的经济活动都被拴在地方性的区域内。20 世纪以前的人,大部分人终其一生,都像被软禁的囚犯一样,很少离开他们出生地超过几天的时间。一趟去往远方的旅程,往往需要几代人的努力。只有偶然发生的危机才会导致广泛的迁移,如战争、瘟疫或气候的不利变化。要把人类从一个悲惨的村庄迁出去,需要泰山压顶般的理由。没有什么能刺激他们背井离乡,去外面寻找更好的生活。
一直到最近,那些离家外出发展的少数人,还常常变得很出名。想想马可·波罗,直到今天还因为穿越欧亚大陆访问忽必烈的宫廷而闻名。他是那个时代的异类。前现代时期的游记留存下来的不多。在被广泛阅读过的作品中,《曼德维尔游记》(Mandeville’s Travels)是 1357 年用法语写成的。不过值得注意的是,它可能是由一个从未离开过欧洲的人创作的。曼德维尔描述了世界各地令人愉快、引人遐想的生活细节,包括很多埃塞俄比亚人只有一只脚的说法,“这只脚硕大无比,当他们躺下来休息的时候,可以用它为全身遮阳。”很显然,与曼德维尔同时代的人,很少有人知道他笔下的“埃塞尔比亚大脚”并不存在。
直到 15 世纪末,现代的探索之旅开启,各大洲之间才有了持续的接触。像哥伦布和达伽马这样无畏的船长,远航去开辟香料贸易,他们的非凡成就足以让每个有文化的家庭,在过去五个世纪的时间里铭记。
从农耕出现直到最近几代人,人类生活的特点就是死水一滩,波澜不惊。今天的人已经忘了这一点,特别是在“新世界”殖民地定居的欧洲人,那里的人员流动更加自由,每个人都倾向于从移民的角度看待问题。北美小学教育的一个主题就是,殖民者从欧洲过来是为了寻找自由和机会。这诚然是事实,但很少有人告诉我们,为什么大部分人不愿意出远门,即使家里贫困潦倒也不愿意。用今天的话说,为数不多的移民为了自立遭受了难以想象的磨难,只有最具进取心或最绝望的穷人才会移民。17 世纪中叶,被关在伦敦臭名昭著的布赖德维尔感化院的囚犯通过反抗表示“他们不愿意去弗吉尼亚”。1720 年,巴黎的街头发生暴乱,要求释放即将被驱逐到路易斯安纳州的流浪汉、小偷和杀人犯。
The fact that the fading industrial era’s first stab at conceiving the information economy is to think of it in terms of a gigantic public works project tells you how grounded our thinking is in the paradigms of the past. It is rather like hearing farmers at the end of the eighteenth century describe a factory as “a farm with a roof.” Yet the “superhighway” metaphor is more revealing than that. It also betrays the extent to which we are hostage to the tyranny of place. Even when technology enables us to transcend locality, the instrument of our deliverance is given a nickname describing it as a route from place to place. Like salmon marked by their homing instinct, our consciousness is still deeply etched by notions of locality.
For the whole of history until now, economies have been tethered to a local geographic area. Most people who lived before the twentieth century passed their days like de facto prisoners under house arrest, seldom venturing more than a few days’ walk from where they were born. A journey of any distance was the work of generations. Only occasionally did some crisis—war, pestilence, an adverse shift in climate—stimulate a broad migration. To move human beings out of a wretched village required something spectacular and pressing. Nothing less could stimulate people to bundle up their belongings and wander off in search of a better life.
Until recently, the few who looked outside their own locale for opportunity often became famous. Consider that Marco Polo is still renowned for having traipsed the Eurasian continent to visit the court of the Great Khan. He was the exception in his time. Few other travelogues survive from the premodern period. Among the more widely read, Mandeville’s Travels, written in French in 1357, is notable for having been composed by someone who probably never left Europe. Mandeville conveys delightful and often fanciful details about life around the globe, including the suggestion that many Ethiopians have only one foot: “[T]he foot is so large that it shadoweth all the body against the sun when they will lie and rest them.”3 Clearly, few of Mandeville’s contemporaries who read his popular story were likely to have known that his Ethiopian “Bigfoot” did not exist.
Not until the modern age began with the journeys of exploration at the very end of the fifteenth century were there sustained contacts between the continents. Intrepid captains like Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama who set out to capture the spice trade were extraordinary enough to be remembered in every literate household for the better part of five centuries.
From the advent of farming until recent generations, life was characterized by its immobility. This is all but forgotten today, particularly in the European settlement colonies of the “New World,” where movement is more fluid and everyone tends to draw his perspective from the vantage point of an immigrant. A theme of elementary education in North America is that the colonists came from Europe seeking freedom and opportunity, which is true. What is seldom told, however, is how reluctant most people were to take the trip, even when faced with destitution at home. The few who did migrate suffered what are in today’s terms unimaginable ordeals to establish themselves. Only the most enterprising or the most desperate of the poor came. In the middle of the seventeenth century, inmates locked up in Bridewell, London’s notorious house of correction, revolted to show “their unwillingness to go to Virginia.”4 In 1720, there were riots in the streets of Paris to free vagabonds, thieves, and murderers scheduled for deportation to Louisiana.
03狭隘的视野Narrow Horizons
通信和运输的实际困难,加上在大部分时间和地点内,人们的语言技能都很有限,这使得人类的活动一直处于狭隘和地方性的状态。就在 20 世纪初,在中国的沿海地区还很常见,相隔几英里的村庄说着互不相通的方言。几乎所有地方性的经济组织都会受到市场狭窄和机会丧失的惩罚。由于竞争有限,要素成本就一直很高,人们获得专业技能的机会也很少。全世界大部分的小农都生活在贫困之中,他们收入极低只够勉强维持生计,而且无法受益于外部的资本和高效的保险市场。我们前面探讨过,封闭的乡村生活施加给农民的困难与挑战。即使现在,在我们写作的时候,也至少有 10 亿人——大部分在亚洲和非洲,还在为每天不足1 美元的生活成本而挣扎。
Physical difficulties of communication and transport, compounded at most times and places by limited language skills, kept the focus of human action narrow and local. As recently as the early twentieth century, it was common to find Chinese villages lying only five miles apart speaking mutually unintelligible dialects, even along the coast. The local organization of almost all economies imposed a penalty of narrow markets and lost opportunity. Factor costs were kept high due to limited competition. Access to specialized skills was minimal. With incomes so low they scraped the margins of destitution, and no access to outside capital or efficient insurance markets, small farmers in much of the world were trapped in poverty. We have explored some of the difficulties imposed upon peasants by the confines of closed village life. Even now, as we write, at least a billion people, mostly in Asia and Africa, struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day.
04所有的政治都是地方性的“ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL”
人员和资产的不可移动性塑造了我们看待世界的方式,并超出人们普遍认知的程度。在 20 世纪末地球只是一个小地方,而即使是那些最愿意接受这种观点的人,也还在使用过时的、工业政治的概念进行思考。在 20 世纪 80 年代,环保主义者中间流行一句口号,就突出了这一点:“全球思考,本地行动。”这个口号映射出一种政治逻辑,该逻辑一直建立在地方性权力优势的基础之上。
在过去所有的社会形态中,地方性的思维习惯都是由大政治因素所决定的。阻碍或促进权力行使的所有地形特征都是地方性的。河流、山川、岛屿都是地方的。气候也是地方性的,温度、降雨量和生产条件,会在你爬上或翻过一座山之后发生变化。每一种微生物都在某个地方循环,而不在别处。
所以,地方专制渗透到我们关于社会组织和运作的概念之中,一点也不奇怪。迄今为止,一个群体或另一个群体能够在地方形成暴力垄断,他们的权力优势总是发起于某个地方,然后沿着划定边界的大政治边缘而消逝。这也是为什么从来没有出现过一个世界政府。
地方对权力行使的重要性,很少有人明确指出,但早在 1930 年代,一些想强制重新分配人类活动回报的人,已经开始感觉到地方的影响力在下降。借助现代交通体系的例子,他们看到了社会等级在高收入者和贫困者之间的区分。约翰·多斯·帕索斯(JOHN DOS PASSOS)在他的《大钱》(the Big Money)一书中,捕捉到了这种恐惧:“破产的‘流浪汉’坐在高速路边,饥饿不堪。在他们头顶上,掠过一架可以横跨大陆的飞机,上面坐满了高薪的管理人员。上层阶级坐着飞机,下层阶级坐在路边。他们之间不再有任何联系,他们是两个国家。”这其实从另外一个方面说明了,交通条件的改善,增加了成功人士自由选择地点的可能性,从而削弱了敲诈勒索的杠杆。在地面道路上的流浪者,当然不可能向头顶上的飞行者索求施舍。多斯·帕索斯在 60 年前观察到的这种趋势,现在变得更加明显了。
To a greater extent than is commonly realized, the immobility of people and their assets has informed the way we see the world. Even those who seem most ready to agree that the earth is a small place as the twentieth century ends continue to think in terms constrained by antiquated concepts of industrial politics. This is underscored by a slogan that became popular among environmentalists in the 1980s: “Think globally but act locally.” It is an injunction that mirrors the logic of politics, a logic that has always turned on local power advantages.
The local habit of mind has been dictated by the megapolitics of all past societies. All topographical features that serve as barriers or facilitators to the exercise of power are local. Every river, every mountain, every island is local. Climate is local. Temperature, rainfall, and growing conditions vary as you climb up and over a mountain. Every microbe that circulates, circulates somewhere, and not in some other place.
Little wonder that the tyranny of place permeates our concepts of how society must organize and function. The power advantages that have given one group or another a local monopoly on violence have heretofore always originated someplace and faded along the megapolitical margins where borders are drawn. That is why there has never been a world government.
While the importance of place to the exercise of power has rarely been made explicit, some advocates of compulsion to redistribute the rewards of human action began to sense the declining leverage of place as long ago as the 1930s. They saw in modern transportation a division of social space between the highly paid and the poor. This fear was captured by John Dos Passos in The Big Money: “The ‘vag’ sits on the edge of the highway, broken, hungry. Overhead, flies a transcontinental plane filled with highly paid executives. The upper class has taken to the air, the lower class to the road: there is no longer any bond between them, they are two nations.”5 This is another way of saying that improved transportation reduced the leverage of extortion simply by increasing the choice of places where successful persons might choose to be. Certainly, the vagabond on the road below was in no position to press for a handout from those flying overhead. The tendencies that Dos Passos observed sixty years ago have only become more pronounced.
05大众运输Mass Transit
1995 年,每天在世界各地有 100 万人在跨越边界。与过去相比,这是一个惊人的变化。在 20 世纪以前,旅行极为少见,以致于大部分的边界只是名义上的,基本不构成过境的障碍。护照也还是未知事物。远洋轮船、火车及其他交通方式的改进,极大地促进了人员流动。交通与通讯方式的发展,使平民旅行更便宜也更容易;但它也同时加强了国家权力,使之可以对人员流动进行更严格的监管。
电影,尤其是电视的出现,极大地开阔了人们的视野,刺激了旅行和移民。然而,直到今天,社会和政治组织的根基依然固定在地方之上。
……为了避免勇气的失败——历史对此给予过严厉的惩罚,我们必须敢于遵循技术推断得出的所有逻辑结果。 —— 阿瑟·克拉克 ARTHUR C. CLARKE
In 1995, a million persons crossed borders somewhere in the world each day. This represents a startling change from the past. Before the twentieth century, travel was so infrequent that most borders were simply frontiers, not barriers to transit. Passports were unknown. The development of ocean liners, trains, and other improved forms of transportation dramatically increased movement. But this movement became more heavily regulated by states whose powers were increased by the same improvements in transportation and communications that made civilian travel cheaper and easier. The advent of movies and, especially, television also did a great deal to open horizons and stimulate travel and immigration. Yet until now, the bedrock assumptions of social and economic organization have remained anchored in locality.
“…to avoid that Failure of Nerve for which history exacts so merciless a penalty—we must have the courage to follow all technical extrapolations to their logical conclusion.”6 —ARTHUR C. CLARKE
06预期不足的错误THE ERROR OF MINIMAL EXPECTATIONS
直到现在,地理还严重约束着人们的想象力。就在 1995 年,一些研究互联网的专家认为,除了作为聊天的电子媒介和色情产品的销售渠道之外,它毫无商业潜力和意义。很多人怀疑网络空间的经济重要性,都是信息时代的“飞艇上校1”。他们的自满情绪,可以媲美上世纪 30 年代面临帝国衰落的英国当局。每当发现自己受到威胁时,精英们的第一反应就是否认。这一点,从他们热切期望互联网无所作为就可以看出来,这种态度有时还会得到更懂行的权威的支持。我们前面提到过大卫·克莱恩和丹尼尔·波斯坦的作品《公路勇士》(Road Warriors),他们对网络经济的否定就再一次证明了,技术上博学广识并不等同于深刻理解技术的后果。
即使是过去最专业的技术观察家,也往往看不透新技术带来的影响。1878 年,英国议会委员会审议了托马斯·爱迪生的白炽灯的前景,报告说,爱迪生的发明“对我们跨大西洋的朋友来说足够好了,……但没有实用价值,不值得科学人士关注。”爱迪生本人虽然富有远见,但他也认为自己发明的留声机将主要被商人用于听写。就在莱特兄弟证明飞机会飞的前不久,美国杰出的天文学家西蒙·纽科姆(Simon Newcomb),还权威地证明了比空气重的物质不可能飞行。他总结道:“已知物质、已知机械形式和已知力的形式,不可能组合出一种实用的机器,使人们可以在空中进行长距离的飞行。在作者看来,该证明与对其他所有物理事实的证明一样完整。”而在飞机开始飞行后,另一位著名的天文学家威廉·皮克林(William H. Pickering),又向公众解释为什么商业飞行永远不可能实现:“在公众的脑海中,经常会出现一种图景,类似现代蒸汽船的巨大飞行器,载着无数乘客飞跃大西洋……(然而)很明显,以目前的设备,我们不可能超越汽车或火车的速度。”在前文中我们曾回顾过,另外一则对新技术潜力的错误判断——奔驰公司在 20 世纪初预测,全球的汽车数量将不会超过 100 万辆。他们对汽车的了解可能比任何人都多,但对汽车带来的社会影响,他们的估计同样大错特错。
鉴于这种愚蠢的误解传统,观察家们迟迟不能把握信息技术的意义也就不足为奇了,而它最重要的影响就是对地方专制的超越。第一次,新的技术为经济活动创造了一个无限的、不止于地面的领域。它为探索网络经济的新空间、为“全球思考、全球行动”提供了选择。本章将对此做出阐释。
The geographic tether on imagination is still so tight that some experts examining the Internet in 1995 concluded that it has little commercial potential and almost no significance other than as an electronic medium for chat and an outlet for pornography. The many doubters of the economic importance of cyberspace are the Colonel Blimps of the Information Age. Their complacency rivals that of the British establishment facing the decline of the empire in the 1930s. Whenever elites find themselves threatened, their first reaction is denial. This is evidenced by the fond hope that the Internet will never amount to much, sometimes endorsed by authorities who should know better. We referred earlier to David Kline and Daniel Burstein’s work, Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares Along the Information Highway. Their dismissal of the economic potential of the Net is another proof that being technically well-informed is not synonymous with understanding the consequences of technology,7
Even the most technically expert observers in the past have frequently failed to grasp the implications of new technologies. A British parliamentary committee, convened in 1878 to consider the prospects for Thomas Edison’s incandescent lamp, reported Edison’s ideas to be “good enough for our transatlantic friends,… but unworthy of the attention of practical or scientific men.”8 Thomas Edison himself was a man of great vision, but he thought that the phonograph he invented would be employed mainly by businessmen for dictation. Only a short time before the Wright brothers proved that airplanes would fly, the distinguished American astronomer Simon Newcomb authoritatively demonstrated why heavier-than-air flight was impossible. He concluded: “The demonstration that no possible combination of known substances, known forms of machinery and known forms of force, can be united in a practical machine by which men shall fly long distances through the air, seems to the writer as complete as it is possible for the demonstration of any physical fact to be.”9 Soon after airplanes began to fly, another renowned astronomer, William H. Pickering, explained to the public why commercial travel would never get off the ground: “The popular mind often pictures gigantic flying machines speeding across the Atlantic and carrying innumerable passengers in a way analogous to our modern steamships.…[I]t is clear that with our present devices there is no hope of competing for racing speed with either our locomotives or our automobiles.”10 We have previously recalled another wildly inaccurate prophecy about the potential of a new technology—the forecast from the beginning of the twentieth century by the makers of Mercedes that there would never be more than a million automobiles worldwide. Again, they knew more about automobiles than almost anyone but they could not have been more wrong in estimating the impact of autos on society.
Given this tradition of clueless misunderstandings, it is hardly surprising that many observers are slow to grasp the most important implications of the new information technology—the fact that it transcends the tyranny of place. The new technology creates for the first time an infinite, nonterrestrial realm for economic activity. It opens an option to explore the new frontiers of the cybereconomy, to “think globally and act globally.” This chapter explains why.
07超越地域局限BEYOND LOCALITY
对信息的处理和使用正在快速取代和改变实物产品,成为最重要的利润来源,这意义深远。信息技术将获得收入的可能性与特定地理位置的约束相脱离。产品和服务的价值,越来越多地是由注入其中的思想和知识创造出来的,因此,能够被地方管辖攫取的增值部分越来越小。思想可以在任何地方形成,并以光速在全球传播。这意味着信息经济与工厂经济势必存在巨大的差异。
我们承认某些批评家的观点,在 1998 年你能用互联网做的事确实平淡无奇。毕竟,在网上读一篇关于园艺的文章,或者从遥远的地方购买一箱葡萄酒,并没有什么了不起的革命性。但是,你不能仅仅根据它的早期表现,来判断网络经济的潜力;就像你不可能通过在 1900 年看到的东西,去断言汽车对社会的改变一样。
我们预计,网络经济的发展会经过以下几个阶段:
在信息时代最原始的阶段,网络只是作为一种信息媒介来促进工业时代的日常交易。在这一时期,网络不过是一个外来的传递销售目录的系统。例如,虚拟葡萄园(Virtual Vineyards)是最早的网络商户之一,而它只是在万维网的一个网页上销售葡萄酒。这种交易还没有直接颠覆旧的机构;它使用的还是工业货币,并在可识别的管辖范围内开展。互联网的这些用途还不具备大政治意义上的影响力。
在互联网商业的中间阶段,会以工业时代闻所未闻的方式使用信息技术,如远程会计或医疗诊断。在下文中,我们会举出更多的例子,来说明计算能力的发展带来的全新应用。网络商业的第二阶段,仍将在旧的制度框架内运作,使用国家货币并服从民族国家的管辖。利用网络进行销售的商人只是为了赚取收入,还不会通过网络把钱存入银行。这时期网络交易的收入还会被征税。
这是一个更高级的阶段,标志着向真正的网络商务的转变。交易不仅在网络上进行,还将迁移出民族国家的管辖范围。付款将以网络货币的形式,收入将在网络银行入账,投资将通过网络经济公司。很多交易将免受征税的侵扰。在这个阶段,网络经济开始释放出巨大的冲击力,产生我们之前阐述的那种大政治后果。政府在传统经济领域内保有的权力,将会遭到网络新逻辑的革命。地面以上的监督权力将崩溃,管辖权会发生转移。公司的结构以及工作和就业的性质,都将发生改变。
信息革命可能是有史以来影响最深远的一次经济大转型,以上的阶段概述,只是对这场变革的最简单勾勒。
The processing and use of information is rapidly replacing and modifying physical products as the most important source of profit. This has major consequences. Information technology divorces income-earning potential from residence in any specific geographic location. Since a greater and greater portion of the value of products and services will be created by adding ideas and knowledge to the product, an ever-smaller component of value-added will be subject to capture within local jurisdictions. Ideas can be formulated anywhere and transmitted globally at the speed of light. This inevitably means that the information economy will be dramatically different from the economy of the Factory Age.
We would concede to the critics that a recital of the tasks you could have undertaken through the Internet in 1998 might seem mundane. There is, after all, nothing terribly revolutionary about reading an article about gardening on the Net, or buying a case of wine long-distance. However, the potential of the cybereconomy cannot be judged solely on its early beginnings, any more than the potential of the automobile to transform society could have been judged by what you could have seen around you in 1900. We expect the cybereconomy to evolve through several stages.
1. The most primitive manifestations of the Information Age involve the Net simply as an information medium to facilitate what are otherwise ordinary industrial-era transactions. At this point, the Net is no more than an exotic delivery system for catalogues. Virtual Vineyards, for example, one of the first cybermerchants, simply sells wine from a page on the World Wide Web. Such transactions are not yet directly subversive of the old institutions. They employ industrial currency, and take place within identifiable jurisdictions. These uses of the Internet have little such megapolitical impact.
2. An intermediate stage of Internet commerce will employ information technology in ways that would have been impossible in the industrial era, such as in long-distance accounting or medical diagnosis. More examples of these new applications of advanced computational power are spelled out below. The second stage of Net commerce will still function within the old institutional framework, employing national currencies and submitting to the jurisdiction of nation-states. The merchants who employ the Net for sales will not yet employ it to bank their profits, only to earn revenues. These profits made on Internet transactions will still be subject to taxation.
3. A more advanced stage will mark the transition to true cybercommerce. Not only will transactions occur over the Net, but they will migrate outside the jurisdiction of nation-states. Payment will be rendered in cybercurrency. Profits will be booked in cyberbanks. Investments will be made in cyberbrokerages. Many transactions will not be subject to taxation. At this stage, cybercommerce will begin to have significant megapolitical consequences of the kind we have already outlined. The powers of governments over traditional areas of the economy will be transformed by the new logic of the Net. Extraterritorial regulatory power will collapse. Jurisdictions will devolve. The structure of firms will change, and so will the nature of work and employment.
This outline of the stages of the Information Revolution is only the barest sketch of what could be the most far-reaching economic transformation ever.
08商业的全球化THE GLOBALIZATION OF COMMERCE
在信息时代,目前大部分的管辖权优势将很快被技术所侵蚀。新型的优势将会出现。通信成本的下降,已经削弱了必须在近距离内做生意的限制。在 1946 年,伦敦的投资者向纽约的经纪人下单,技术上已经是可行的;但只有最大笔和最有赢利可能的交易才会这么做,因为在当时的伦敦和纽约之间,打 3 分钟的电话,费用为 650 美金。而今天它的价格是 0.91 美元。半个世纪以来,一通洲际电话的费用已经下降了 99%以上。
In the Information Age, most current jurisdictional advantages will be eroded rapidly by technology. New types of advantages will emerge. Falling communications costs have already reduced the need for proximity as a necessary condition of doing business. In 1946, it was technically possible for an investor in London to place an order with a broker in New York. But only the largest and most compelling transaction would have justified doing so: a three-minute phone call between New York and London cost $650. Today, it costs $0.91. The price of an intercontinental phone call has plunged by more than 99 percent in half a century.
09通信融合Convergent Communication
在不久的将来,洲际聊天和本地通话之间的差别将微乎其微。你的电话、电脑和电视之间的区别也可能如此。所有这些都将是互动式的通信设备,相对于它们的功能,从人体工程学的角度更容易做出区分。你可以通过个人电脑上的麦克风和扬声器在网上进行语音对话,或者看电影。你还可以与你的电视对话,并通过电视娱乐媒体提供的网络进行数据交换。总之,工业时代对通信方式的区分将会被打破,成本会大幅降低,越来越多的服务会按照使用的时间进行收费,而不再区分通信的目的地。世界上所有地方的通信和数据传输费用,将比 1985 年大多数地区的国内通话成本要低得多。
Soon, the difference between intercontinental chat and a local call may be minimal. So, too, may be the differences among your telephone, your computer, and your television. All will be interactive communications devices, more easily distinguished on ergonomic than functional grounds. You will be able to hold a voice conversation over the Internet using microphones and speakers on your personal computer. Or watch a movie. You will be able to talk back to your television, and communicate vast amounts of data through the network provided by the television entertainment media. As the industrial-era distinction between various forms of communication breaks down and costs plunge, more and more services will bill you by time of use rather than according to the destination of your messages. Conversation or data transmission anywhere in the world will cost little more than a local call did in most jurisdictions in 1985.
10无线网络Internet Unwired
未来的低轨道卫星和其他的无线技术,可以直接与你口袋里的电话、便携式电脑或工作站之间来回传输信息,根本不需要与当地的电话运营或电视电缆系统打交道。简单来说,未来的互联网都是无线的。当然,通往这个方向的第一步注定会受到一些阻碍。因为早期无线媒体的数据传输速度相对较慢,可能很难“听到”来自用户设备的微弱信号;其中一些设备会是移动的并由电池供电。不过,随着带宽的增加,这些技术问题都会得到处理和解决。
Low-orbit satellites and other approaches to wireless technology will transmit feeds back and forth directly to a beeper in your pocket, a portable computer, or a workstation, without interfacing with a local telephone operating or TV cable system at all. In short, the Internet will be unwired. The first steps in that direction are bound to be halting because of the relatively slow speed of data transmission in the early wireless media and the difficulties of “hearing” weak signals broadcast from subscriber devices, some of which will be mobile and battery-powered. Nonetheless, these technical problems will be tackled and solved as bandwidth increases.
11商业无国界Business Without Borders
计算能力的持续发展会带来更好的压缩技术,加速数据的传输。现有的公钥/私钥加密算法,会得到广泛使用。它可以使供应商,如卫星系统,将收费功能内置到服务当中,进一步降低成本。即在提供服务的时候,供应商可以从个人计算机上加载的账户中直接扣费,类似法国电信在巴黎电话亭中使用“智能卡”的形式。
Continued expansion of computational power will lead to better compression technology, speeding data flow. Widespread adoption of existing public key/ private key encryption algorithms will allow providers, such as satellite systems, to incorporate the billing function into the service, lowering costs. Simultaneous with the service, vendors will be able to debit accounts loaded on personal computers in much the way that France Telecom debits the “smart cards” employed in Paris phone boxes.
12手机银行Your Phone Becomes a Bank
不同的是,在不久的将来,你可以随身携带你的公共电话亭,还可以通过各种交易为你的账户赚取积分。你的个人电脑将成为你的银行以及全球货币经纪公司的分支机构,它还相当于你在巴黎购买匿名电话卡的小卖部。小偷撬开智能卡付费电话亭什么也得不到,同样,只会使用撬棍的无赖,得到你的电脑也只能望之兴叹,因为只有那些有能力破解复杂电脑密码的人才能进入它。有了合适的加密,你电脑中的所有东西都不可能被破译或盗用。
到了千年之交,在南极洲以北的任何地方,在可以使用有线或数字蜂窝电话的所有地方,在开通了交互式有线电视系统的地方,在有卫星或其他无线传输方式覆盖的地方,你都可以进行商业交易。通过虚拟现实,你可以随心所欲地跨越边界,进行通话、传输数据和旅行。通过区号识别通话人所在地的电话号码,可能会被全球性的接入号码所代替;通过这种号码,你可以在地球上的任何地方与任何人联系。请见证铱星公司的实现。
The difference is that in the near future, you will be able to earn credits to your account with all manner of transactions and carry your phone box with you. Your PC will be the branch office of your bank and global money brokerage, as well as the equivalent of the Paris kiosk where you buy your anonymous phone card. And like the smart-card pay phones that are useless to thieves if broken open with a crowbar, your computer could only be raided by someone capable of breaking or manipulating sophisticated computer code. That would leave out a lot of ruffians capable of manipulating a crowbar. With proper encryption, nothing in your computer could be deciphered or misused.
By the turn of the millennium, you will be able to transact business almost anywhere north of Antarctica. Anywhere wired or digital cellular telephone is available. Anywhere interactive cable television systems are in use. Anywhere a satellite is overhead or other wireless transmission systems are in place. You will be able to speak, transmit data, and journey via virtual reality over borders and boundaries at will. Telephone numbers that identify the locale of the speaker by area codes are likely to be superseded by universal access numbers, which will reach the party with whom you wish to communicate anywhere on the planet. Witness Iridium.
13听懂中文Understanding Chinese
未来,你所能做的不仅仅是交谈和发送传真。有一天,你无需再经过多年的学习,就可以用中文与上海工厂的工头交流。你会不会讲他们的语言或方言,已经不再重要。他讲的是中文,而你听到的则是经过粗略翻译后的英文;同样,他听到的也是被翻译后的中文。随着时间发展,在目前还存在着严重语言和习语障碍的地区,即时翻译的采用,会极大地加剧其间的竞争。当那一天到来时,即使中国政府不希望电话被打出去,也无关紧要了。
You will not only be able to talk and send a fax. In time, you will be able to shorten a multiyear learning process and converse in Chinese with a factory foreman in Shanghai. It will no longer matter as much that you do not speak his language or dialect. His words may be in Chinese but you will hear them roughly translated into English. He will hear your conversation in Chinese. In time, the capacity to employ instantaneous translation will significantly increase competition in regions where obstacles of language and idiom have heretofore been significant When that happens, it will matter little or not at all that the Chinese government may not wish the call to be placed.
14定制媒体Customized Media
随着世界的联系越来越紧密,你将拥有前所未有的机会,去定制你在其中的特殊位置。你从媒体上定期收到的消息,可以是你自己筛选的。现在的大众媒体将变成个性化的媒体。如果你对国际象棋感兴趣,或者喜欢养猫,就可以对晚间新闻进行编程,让它介绍你更感兴趣的猫或者国际象棋的信息。你不用再受丹·拉瑟或 BBC 的摆布,而是可以选择根据你的指令汇总和编辑的新闻。
As the world grows closer together, you will have a greater opportunity than at any time in history to customize your particular place in it. Even the information you receive on a regular basis from the media will be information of your choosing. The mass media will become the individualized media. If you are interested in chess above all else, or are a keen cat fancier, you will be able to program your evening news broadcast to feature information important to you about cats or chess. No longer will you be at the mercy of Dan Rather or the BBC for the news that reaches you. You will be able to select news compiled and edited according to your instructions.
15从大规模生产到定制化生产From Mass to Customized Production
如果新闻定制进展缓慢,你可以在万维网上访问一个虚拟目录。当你看到一条很喜欢的长裤,你可以在下单时调整裤腿的宽度。在马来西亚的机器人会进行定制裁剪,并根据从你电脑里扫描并经网络传输的照片,为你量身定做。
If the news is slow, you can access a virtual catalogue on the World Wide Web. If you see a pair of trousers that you almost like, you can adjust the width of the cuff when you place your order. It will be custom-cut and tailored to fit your body by robots in Malaysia from photographs scanned into your computer and transmitted through the Net.
16网络经纪Cyberbroking
在未来,你能够使用网络货币进行投资与支付,购买服务和商品。如果你生活在像美国这样的管辖区,你的投资可能会受到严格的监管;在这种情况下,你可以选择注册到一个允许公民全方位自由投资的管辖区。无论你住在克利夫兰还是贝洛奥里藏特(巴西东南部城市),你都可以在百慕大、开曼群岛、里约热内卢或布宜诺斯艾利斯开展投资业务。随着网络经济的发展,数字资源的使用范围将不断扩张;无论你在哪里,你都能利用专家系统帮助你管理投资,并通过网络会计和档案管理实时监控你持有资产的走向。
You will be able to use cybermoney to make investments as well as pay for services and products. If you live in a jurisdiction like the United States that heavily regulates your investment options, you can choose to domicile your activities in a jurisdiction that permits the freedom to pursue a full range of investment options. Whether you live in Cleveland or Belo Horizonte, you can do your investment business in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Rio de Janeiro, or Buenos Aires. Wherever you find yourself, the use of digital resources will widen as the cybereconomy evolves. You will be able to employ expert systems to help select your investments, and cyberaccountants and -bookkeepers to monitor the progress of your holdings on a real-time basis.
17虚拟文化Virtual Culture
在你投资之余的闲暇时光,你可以到卢浮宫进行一次虚拟参观。但是,该访问可能需要你支付相当于三分之一版税的费用,给比尔·盖茨或者其他同样高瞻远瞩的人,他们已经购买了参观卢浮宫的虚拟现实权利。当你在怀疑蒙娜丽莎的牙齿是否有问题时,你的电脑可能正在帮你下载熊式一翻译的《西厢记》。在你选定的时间,你的个人通信系统会大声地朗诵它,就像古代的游吟诗人。通过多任务程序,你可以同时进行多项活动。
When you are not reviewing profit-and-loss data, you may take a virtual visit to the Louvre. Your trip may require you to pay a royalty payment equivalent to one-third of a penny to Bill Gates, or someone of equal foresight who has purchased the virtual-reality rights to tour the museum. While you are wondering whether the Mona Lisa had trouble with her teeth, your computer could be downloading S. I. Hsiung’s translation of The Romance of the Western Chamber. At times of your choosing, your personal communications system will read the text aloud like a bard of old. Multitasking programs will allow you to perform many functions simultaneously.
18在网上选购管辖区Shopping for Jurisdictions on the Net
如果你从经典作品中受到启发,你可以创办一个虚拟公司,推销著名文学作品衍生出来的戏剧性产品,通过三维视网膜显示器来观看。它的图像不是被投射到空中,而是通过每秒波动 5 万次的低能量激光直接投射到观看者的视网膜上。这项技术已经由华盛顿州西雅图的微视(Micro Vision)公司开发成功,就连天生的盲人都能够看到。在开展这个项目之前,你可以指示你的数字助理,对马来西亚、中国、秘鲁、巴西和捷克等国现行的关于生产设施保护的法律进行研究。
当你选定好一个地点后,只需要一个小时,你就可以在巴哈马注册成立公司,圣乔治信托公司会很荣幸为你提供代办服务。你可以同时在纽芬兰、开曼群岛、乌拉圭、阿根廷和列支敦士登的网络银行开设网络账户,并把公司所有的流动资产存入网络账户中。当任何一个管辖区试图撤销你的经营权或者扣押存款时,这些资产将以光速自动转移到另外一个管辖区。
If you are inspired by your dose of the classics, you can organize a virtual corporation to market dramatic productions of famous literature for viewing through three-dimensional retinal display. Instead of being projected into the air, the images will be projected directly onto the retinas of viewers with low-energy lasers fluctuating fifty thousand times a second. This technology, already under development by Micro Vision of Seattle, Washington, will allow many persons who are legally blind to see. Before undertaking the project, you could instruct your digital assistant to canvass the current contract offers of protection for manufacturing facilities in Malaysia, China, Peru, Brazil, and the Czech Republic. When you pick a location, you will be able to have your company incorporated in one hour in the Bahamas, courtesy of the St. George’s Trust Company. Your instructions will place all the company’s liquid assets in a cyberaccount in a cyberbank that is domiciled simultaneously in Newfoundland, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, Argentina, and Liechtenstein. If any of the jurisdictions attempt to withdraw operating authority or seize the assets of depositors, the assets will automatically be transferred to another jurisdiction at the speed of light.
19网络体验的提升QUALITATIVE ADVANCES
要不了多久,你在网上可以体验的很多活动,在工业时代都是绝不可能的,这不仅仅是因为打破了语言障碍。你的数字助理可以帮助查找发表在匈牙利科学期刊上尚未翻译的论文,但相比你与图书馆员直接交流还是有本质的不同。远在五千英里之外坐着听牛津大学的课程,和睡在距离卡法克斯(牛津市中心)六英里以内的地方听,感觉也是不一样的。在乌拉圭的埃斯特角城(Punta del Este)的聚会上,通过虚拟现实,到蒙特卡洛的巴黎酒店玩轮盘赌,更是一种新奇的体验。
Many of the transactions you soon will be able to perform in cyberspace would have been impossible in the Industrial Age, and not simply because they cross a language barrier. Sending your digital assistants to locate untranslated articles published in Hungarian scientific journals is qualitatively different from talking to a librarian. Sitting in on an Oxford tutorial from a distance of five thousand miles is not the same as taking the tutorial when you are sleeping within six miles of Carfax. And playing the roulette wheel at the Hotel de Paris, Monte Carlo, is a novel experience when you can do it via virtual reality from a party at Punte del Este, Uruguay.
20在网上看医生A Cybervisit to the Cyberdoctor
现实生活中的很多活动,很快将会迁移到网络经济当中,可能比很多专家预期的还要快。新技术会以前所未见的方式组合起来,超越地域的束缚和工业经济的陈旧体制。在未来的某一天,如果你肚子疼,你可以在网上咨询数字医生,这是一个对病症、治疗及开药具有百科全书式知识的专家系统。它通过加密方式访问你的病历,询问你的疼痛发生在饭前还是饭后,是锐痛还是钝痛,是持续性的还是急性的。反正医院的医生问什么问题,它就问你什么问题。然后它会诊断出你是喝了太多的酒,还是喝得不够多,或者把你介绍给网络医疗专家。如果需要动手术的话,在百慕大有网络外科医生,借助专门的设备,可以进行远程的微创手术。
In short order, faster than many experts now think possible, activities will migrate into the cybereconomy that combine technologies in novel ways to transcend the tyranny of place and the antiquated institutions of the industrial economy. One day soon, if you have a stomachache, you will be able to consult a digital doctor, an expert system with an encyclopedic knowledge of symptoms, maladies, and antidotes. It will access your medical history in encrypted form, ask whether your pain happens after eating or before meals. Whether it is sharp or dull, persistent or episodic. Whatever questions doctors ask, the digital doctor will ask. It may determine that you drink too much wine, or not enough. You may be referred to a cyberspecialist. If you need an operation, a cybersurgeon in Bermuda may perform the operation long-distance with the aid of specialized equipment that performs micro-incisions.
21生命信息处理Life-and-Death Information Processing
你可能觉得这听起来像科幻销售。但网络外科手术需要的很多设备组件已经到位了。当你读到这本书的时候,会有更多的部件投入使用。通用电气已经将一种新型核磁共振治疗仪(MRT)引入到了全球 15 家医院。这台机器预计会经过三年的研发阶段,然后就可能迅速普及开来,并成为进行多种手术的标准配置。这是科技改变生活的一个很好的例子。
我们大部分人都熟悉核磁共振成像仪(MRI),它利用核磁共振技术为医生提供软组织图像,帮助进行诊断。它所能提供的图像比 X 射线和超声波更好,已经成为现代诊断技术的重要组成部分,特别是在癌症方面。但到目前,这种仪器存在两个明显的局限,一是管子不能自由地进入病人体内,二是机器的功率有限。
This may sound like science fiction. But many of the components of cybersurgery are already in place. Others will be functional by the time you read this book. General Electric has introduced a new magnetic resonance treatment machine (MRT) into fifteen hospitals around the world. The machine is expected to have a three-year research-and-development phase, but after that it is likely to spread rapidly and become a norm for many types of surgery. It is one example, but a good one, of the way in which technology is changing society.
Most of us are familiar with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines, in which magnetic resonance techniques are used to provide doctors with soft-tissue images for diagnostic purposes. They provide better images of soft tissues than X-rays or ultrasound, and have become an essential part of modern diagnostic techniques, particularly in cancers. They have, however, two significant limitations at present. The tube does not allow free access to the patient; the machines are of limited power.
22网络外科手术Cybersurgery
通用电气重新设计了核磁共振机器,使其既可以用于诊断,也可以用于治疗。机器的功率提高了五倍;检查管被切成了两半,不再是完全封闭的,病人将躺在两个甜甜圈装的装置中间。医生可以在做手术的同时,从仪器中看到他在做什么,而不再是先拍摄图像,然后根据图像进行手术。MRT 将与无创或微创手术相结合。外科医生不用再做很大的手术切口,而是可以使用探针从微小的切口进行操作,并且能在手术时看到探针的成像。医生可以根据图像进行手术,而无需直接观察身体。所以,原则上探针手术能够远程操作。它可以利用激光、低温冷冻或加热的设备非常精准地摧毁肿瘤。
很多现在做不了的手术,利用这种技术都可以进行,特别是神经外科方面的。因为在神经外科手术中,肿瘤往往距离大脑的重要部位非常近。这种技术还允许重复操作,而传统手术留下的创伤是无法重复的,否则会导致难以接受的损伤。
一些研究人员认为,到 2010 年,用于软组织手术的手术刀会成为过时的产物。如果这是真的,手术带来的恐惧和其他后遗症都将会消失。对病患来说,这无疑是大好的消息。现在需要几个小时才能完成、且必须在医院住几天甚至几周时间的手术,未来只需要半个小时就可以了,甚至根本不需要住院。而且,实际上外科医生和病人可能根本不会出现在同一个房间里。这将对医院和外科手术产生什么样的影响呢?
General Electric has redesigned magnetic resonance machines so that they can be used for treatment as well as diagnosis. The power has been upped five times. The tube has, in effect, been cut in two, so the patient will lie between two doughnut-shaped units, rather than being fully enclosed. Instead of taking an image and then performing surgery in the light of that image, the surgeon will be able to see what he is doing as he does it. MRT will be combined with noninvasive, or less invasive, surgery using microtechniques. Instead of having to make large incisions with scalpels, the surgeon will make micro incisions with probes, and will be able to see what the probes reveal as he operates. He will perform the surgery from the image rather than by looking directly into the body. In principle, the probes will be operable from a distance. They will be able to destroy tumors with laser or cryogenic—heating or freezing—devices of great precision.
This will permit operations that are now impossible, particularly in neurosurgery, where tumors often lie very close to essential parts of the brain. It will also permit repeated operations, when the trauma of the traditional surgical operation cannot be repeated without unacceptable damage.
Some researchers believe that the knife for soft-tissue surgery may be looked back on as an obsolete relic by 2010. A lot of fear, and much of the aftershock, will be taken out of surgery if that is true. Obviously, this is very good news for the patient. Operations which now take hours to perform, and have to be followed by days or weeks in the hospital, will take only half an hour, and may not require hospitalization at all. Indeed, the surgeon and the patient may never even be in the same room. But what will this do to hospitals and surgeons?
23更少的显微外科医生,做更多的手术Fewer Microsurgeons Doing More
这将导致外科手术的一场革命。在培训中,有 1/3 的年轻外科医生掌握不了显微手术的技能,有 1/3 只是勉强能做,剩下的 1/3 则会非常优秀。在向高级外科医生进阶的课程中,也存在类似的比例。所以更少的外科医生,将在更短的时间内,操作更多的手术。医疗保险商和需要做手术的病人,可能都会要求查看每个外科医生的手术结果统计,而这里面的差距会相当大。病人当然希望找手术效果最佳的医生,特别是在病情危急生命时。在某些情况下,最好的外科医生会进行远程手术。整个手术可能会放在另外一个管辖区,那里税率比较低,法院也不太支持对医疗事故的过高索赔。
There will be a revolution in surgery. In training, a third of young surgeons have failed to acquire the skills needed for microsurgery. A third are just able to do it, and a third become excellent. Similar proportions are found in conversion courses for senior surgeons. Fewer surgeons will be able to carry out more operations in a shorter time. It is likely that health care insurers and individuals seeking surgery will insist on outcome statistics for each surgeon, which will vary rather widely. Patients will want to go to surgeons who produce the best results, particularly if their conditions are life-threatening. In some cases, the best surgeons may operate long-distance. They may perform the whole operation from another jurisdiction where taxes are lower and courts do not honor exorbitant malpractice claims.
24数字律师Digital Lawyers
在同意实施手术之前,有经验的外科医生会请出数字律师,根据核磁共振图像显示出的肿瘤大小和特征,即时起草一份合同,以明确并限制自己的责任。数字律师是一套自动选择合同条款的信息检索系统,它采用神经网络等人工智能程序,定制符合跨国法律要求的私人合同。大多数高额或重要交易的参与者,不仅会付费去寻找合适的商业伙伴,他们也会为交易寻找合适的住所地。
Before agreeing to perform an operation, the skilled surgeon will probably call upon a digital lawyer to draft an instant contract that specifies and limits liability based upon the size and characteristics of the tumor revealed in images displayed by the magnetic resonance machine. Digital lawyers will be information-retrieval systems that automate selection of contract provisions, employing artificial intelligence processes such as neural networks to customize private contracts to meet transnational legal conditions. Participants in most high-value or important transactions will not only shop for suitable partners with whom to conduct a business; they will also shop for a suitable domicile for their transactions.
25紧急咨询Emergency Consultation
继续以网络外科为例。信息时代的技术,会为医术最高超的外科医生带来服务溢价。事实上,几乎所有工作都会如此。只要能预约到他们,患者就愿意为此支付这样的溢价。但在过去,由于信息的限制,以及在紧急状态下,要在某特定地区找到外科医生所面临的困难,使得外科手术市场非常不完善。信息技术将会弥补和改写这一切。一个病人,可能在 24 小时甚至 45 分钟内就需要做手术,他可以委托数字助理,找到全球前十名可以远程执行这种手术的外科医生,回顾他们在类似病例中的成功率,并从相应的数字助理那里获得他们对特殊病例的报价。而这一切可以在几分钟内完成。因此,最受青睐的前 10%的外科医生,在全球手术市场中的份额会大大增加。MRT 仪器,加上显微外科技术,将提高他们的工作溢价。而技术能力较低的外科医生,将专注于剩余的本地市场。
这个关乎生死的例子有助于人们理解,当经济从当地的限制中解脱出来以后,会产生怎样的革命性后果。有人可能会反对说,通用的 MRT 仪器不是用于远程操作的。也许吧,但他们没有抓住重点。它或者其他类似的仪器,很快就会用于远程。当外科医生看着屏幕比看着病人能更好地完成手术时,这个医生和他的屏幕在什么地方,就没有我们现在想象的那么重要了。信息技术会使人们在地球上的任何地方进行任何互动,即使是动手术这样精微的活动。越来越多的服务必将被重新配置,以反映这一现实。而在其他对设备精确度要求不高、失败风险较低的领域,网络经济会更加蓬勃迅猛地发展。
福利国家的财政政策使得财富所有者无法保护自己。 —— 艾伦·格林斯潘2
To continue the example of cybersurgery, the technology of the Information Age will place a premium on the highest skills in surgery, as it will in almost every endeavor. Patients have been willing to pay such a premium for as long as there have been knives. But limits on information and the difficulty of shopping for surgeons in an emergency in any given locale made the market for surgery a very imperfect one. It will be less imperfect in the Information Age. A patient facing the need for an operation in twenty-four hours, or perhaps even forty-five minutes, could deputize digital assistants to locate the top ten surgeons worldwide available to perform such a task remotely, review their success rates in similar cases, and solicit offers for their particular case from corresponding digital servants. All of this could be canvassed in a matter of moments. As a consequence, the most-favored 10 percent of surgeons will have a far larger share in the global market for surgery. The MRT machine, plus microsurgery techniques, will raise the premium for their work. Surgeons with less skill will focus on residual local markets.
This life-and-death example helps suggest some of the revolutionary consequences of the liberation of economies from the tyranny of place. Someone may object that General Electric’s MRT machine was not meant to be employed long-distance. Perhaps, but this misses the point. It or some equipment like it soon will be. When operations are better performed by surgeons watching a screen than looking at the patient directly, it will matter less than we now suppose where the surgeon and his screen are located. Increasing numbers of services are destined to be reconfigured to reflect the fact that information technology allows persons anywhere on the globe to interact in even so delicate a matter as surgery.
In activities that require less precise equipment, and involve lower risks of failure, the cybereconomy will flourish even more rapidly.
“The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.” —ALAN GREENSPAN
26强制力的贬值THE DEVALUATION OF COMPULSION
世界上的每一个竞争性领域,包括价值数万亿美元的投资交易活动,为了逃避掠夺性税收,以及通货膨胀对以法币形式持有财富者抽走的税收,将以一种近乎液压般的强大压力涌向网络空间。
In almost every competitive area, including most of the world’s multitrillion-dollar investment activity, the migration of transactions into cyberspace will be driven by an almost hydraulic pressure—the impetus to avoid predatory taxation, including the tax that inflation places upon everyone who holds his wealth in a national currency.
27逃离保护性勒索Escaping the Protection Racket
只要对信息时代的大政治稍加思考,你就会认识到,最富有的工业国家对其公民施加的掠夺性税收和通货膨胀,在今天看来是理所当然的,但在网络空间这片新边疆上,它们将彻底失去竞争力。在千年之交后不久,凡是还按当前的税率缴纳所得税的人,都是出于自由自愿的选择。就像弗雷德里克·莱恩所指出的,历史表明在“边境和公海上,没有人能持久地垄断暴力,当商人可以通过其他方式更廉价地获得保护,他们就会抗拒缴纳高额的苛捐杂税。”网络经济正好提供了这样的选择。在这里,任何政府都无法形成垄断。而且,它所包含的信息技术为金融资产提供的保护,将比大多数政府所能提供的更加便宜、更加有效。
You do not need to think long about the megapolitics of the Information Age to realize that predatory taxes and inflation of the kind imposed as a matter of right by the wealthiest industrial countries upon their citizens will be preposterously uncompetitive on the new frontier of cyberspace. Soon after the turn of the millennium, anyone who pays income taxes at rates currently imposed will be doing so out of choice. As Frederic C. Lane pointed out, history shows that on “the frontiers and on the high seas, where no one had an enduring monopoly in the use of violence, merchants avoided payment of exactions which were so high that protection could be obtained more cheaply by other means.”11
The cybereconomy provides just such an alternative. No government will be able to monopolize it. And the information technologies comprised by it will provide cheaper and more effective protection for financial assets than most governments ever had reason to provide.
28复利的黑魔法The Black Magic of Compound Interest
请记住,在 40 年里每年多缴纳 5000 美元的税,按 10%的资本回报,你的净资产少增加 220 万美元;在 20%的回报率下,复利损失就高达约 4400 万美元。对高税率国家的高收入者来说,在一生中因掠夺性税收导致的损失,累计起来是很惊人的。大多数人失去的比得到的还要多。
这听起来好像不太可能,但数学不会骗人,你可以用袖珍计算机亲自确认。美国前 1%的纳税人,平均每年要缴纳超过 12.5 万美元的联邦所得税,而只需要其中的一小部分,即每年 4.5 万美元,就可以在瑞士的私人税务条约下生活,享受可能是世界上最诚实的警察和司法系统提供的法律和秩序。从这个角度看,每年 8万美元的所得税超出这个优越的水平线,完全应该归类为贡品或战利品。考虑到警察的保护本来就是一种公共产品,4.5 万美元用于维护法律和秩序,无疑是一笔不小的费用。理论上,公共产品扩大到更多的使用者,其边际成本为零。瑞士人会很乐意与你协商,然后接受你每年缴纳 4.5 万美元(5 万瑞士法郎)的税款,因为他们会从每个报名的百万富翁身上每年赚取 4.5 万美元的利润。
与瑞士的方案相比,对于一个年平均回报率能达到 20%的投资者来说,按美国税率缴纳联邦所得税,终生的损失将达到 7.05 亿美元。而且要记住,这假设的是每年缴纳 4.5 万美元。与百慕大这样的避税天堂相比,它的所得税为零,按美国税率交税,终生的损失为 11 亿美元。
你可能会反对说,每年 20%的回报太高了。你说的也没错。但要看到,近几十年来亚洲的经济增长是很惊人的,世界上的很多投资者都能达到这个回报率,甚至更高。自 1950 年以来,香港房地产的复合回报率每年都在 20%以上。即使在一些增长速度并不显山露水的经济体,也有机会轻松获得很高的投资回报。过去 30 年,如果你在乌拉圭银行有美元存款,就可以把年化 30%的实际回报率收入囊中。高投资回报率在某些地方更容易实现,但投资老手在好的年头肯定能实现 20% 以上的收益,即使他们的表现无法一直与乔治·索罗斯或沃伦·巴菲特相提并论。
显然,你能达到的资本回报率越高,掠夺性税收和资本利得税所产生的机会成本就越大。但是,我们说你的损失会超过你的所得,和你是否能获得超高的回报率没有关系。美国一些共同基金,半个多世纪以来,平均年收益率只有 10%。如果你是美国收入最高的 1%,即使你连 10% 的年化收益也做不到,那么你每年支付的超过 4.5 万美元以上部分的所得税,会使你的净资产少增加 3300 多万美元。而与一个不征收所得税的管辖区相比,你的损失是 5500 万美元。
Remember, each $5,000 of annual tax payments paid over forty years slashes your net worth by $2.2 million, assuming you could realize just a 10 percent return on your capital. At a 20 percent return, the compound loss balloons to about $44 million. For high-income earners in a high-tax country, the cumulative losses from predatory taxation over a lifetime are staggering. Most will lose more than they ever had.
This sounds impossible, but the mathematics are clear. It is something that you can confirm for yourself with a pocket calculator. The top 1 percent of taxpayers in the United States pay an average of more than $125,000 in federal income taxes annually. For a fraction of that amount, $45,000 a year, one would be welcome to live under a private tax treaty in Switzerland, and enjoy law and order provided by what is arguably the most honest police and judicial system in the world. From this perspective, the additional $80,000 a year of income tax paid above that generous level might well be classified as tribute or plunder. Forty-five thousand dollars is certainly a substantial payment toward the maintenance of law and order, considering that police protection is meant to be a public good. In theory, public goods can be extended to additional users at a marginal cost of zero. The Swiss are glad to have you pay a negotiated fixed tax of $45,000 (50,000 Swiss francs) per year because they make an annual profit of $45,000 on every millionaire who signs up.
Compared to the Swiss alternative, the lifetime losses from paying federal income tax at U.S. rates would be $705 million for an investor who could average a 20 percent rate of return. But remember, that assumes an annual tax payment of $45,000. Compared to a tax haven like Bermuda, where the income tax is zero, the lifetime loss for paying taxes at American rates would be about $1.1 billion.
You may object that an annual return of 20 percent is a high rate of return. No doubt you would be right. But given the startling growth in Asia in recent decades, many investors in the world have achieved that and better. The compound rate of return in Hong Kong real estate since 1950 has been more than 20 percent per annum. Even some economies that are less widely known for growth have afforded easy opportunities for high profits. You could have pocketed an average real return of more than 30 percent annually in U.S. dollar deposits in Paraguayan banks over the last three decades. High investment returns are easier to realize in some places than others, but skilled investors can certainly achieve profits of 20 percent or more in good years, even if they do not consistently match the performances of George Soros or Warren Buffet.
Obviously, the higher the rate of return that you could earn on your capital, the greater the opportunity costs that predatory income and capital gains taxes impose. But the conclusion that the loss is huge, indeed greater than the total amount of wealth that you may ever accumulate, does not depend upon your being able to achieve outlandish rates of return. Some mutual funds operating in the United States have averaged annual gains of more than 10 percent for more than half a century. If you could do no better than that and you are among the top 1 percent of American earners, then your net worth is reduced by more than $33 million just by the income tax you pay in excess of $45,000 annually. Compared to a jurisdiction without income tax, the loss is $55 million.
2955美元而不是5500万美元$55 Rather Than $55 Million
如果经济学家关于利润最大化的假设是正确的——我们相信通常如此——那么你几乎可以肯定地预测:只要有机会,大多数人都会采取行动,去挽回这 5500 万美元的损失。我们也正是这样判断的。当复利的黑魔法在高税率国家的成功人士心中变得愈发清晰,他们就会开始认真比较不同管辖区,就像今天比较汽车或保险一样。如果你对此表示怀疑,不妨到纽约或多伦多的街头随机拦住一些人,问他们是否愿意为了 5500 万美元搬到百慕大。答案几乎不言自明。
成熟福利国家的居民,尤其是美国的,接受起来可能会比较慢,这只是因为他们还不知道自己所面临的选择。有朝一日,他们会发现的。任何想要追求美好生活的人,包括你,都会看到减少掠夺性税收所导致的损失是无法拒绝的诱惑。而你所要做的,只是把交易转移到网络空间。当然,这在很多管辖区是非法的。但旧法律挡不住新技术。20 世纪 80 年代,在美国发传真也是违法的。美国邮局认为传真属于一级邮件,它对这种业务拥有古老的垄断权。美国还就此发布了一项法令,重申所有的传真都要送到最近的邮局,与普通邮件一起投递。后来人们发了数十亿条的传真信息,也不知道有没有人遵守这项法令。即使有,恐怕也是稍纵即逝。新兴网络经济带来的运营优势,比绕过邮局发送传真更加强大。
用不了多久,当公钥/私钥加密技术被广泛采用,你就可以在任何地方从事各种经济活动。正如《战略投资》的科技编辑詹姆斯·贝内特(James Bennet)所写的那样:法律的执行——尤其是税法,已经严重依赖对通信和交易的监控。一旦下一个合乎逻辑的发展步骤被采用,即离岸银行网点提供经过 RSA 强加密的电邮沟通服务,这些电邮的账号又是从公钥系统中提取出来的,那么,银行或通信中的金融交易就几乎不可能被监控到。即使税务机关在离岸银行安插内鬼,或者盗取银行记录,也无法识别存款人的身份。
所以,在前所未见的程度上,个人可以自主决定他经济活动的住所地,以及希望支付所得税的额度。在信息时代,许多交易将完全不需要在任何主权的领土范围内进行。它们会越来越多地发生在百慕大、开曼群岛、乌拉圭或类似的管辖区内,这些地方不会对商业活动征收所得税或其他高昂的交易费用。
If the profit-maximizing assumptions of economists are correct, as we believe they generally are, one of the more certain predictions you could make is that most people would act to salvage $55 million if they could. That is our prediction. When the black magic of compound interest becomes more clear in the minds of successful people in high-tax countries, they will begin to shop in earnest among jurisdictions, just as they now shop for automobiles or compare rates on insurance policies. If you doubt it, merely stop people at random on the streets of New York or Toronto and ask whether they would move to Bermuda for $55 million. The question answers itself. The quandary it poses is reminiscent of that Mark Twain imagined in deciding whether he would prefer to spend the night with Lillian Russell stark naked or General Grant in full dress uniform. He did not deliberate long. Residents of mature welfare states, particularly the United States, may be slower on the uptake, but only because they are not yet aware of the choice they face. In the fullness of time, they will be. You or anyone motivated by the desire to live a better life will see the attraction of reducing the losses you suffer from predatory taxation. You need merely lodge your transactions in cyberspace. This will, of course, be illegal in many jurisdictions. But old laws seldom can resist new technology. In the 1980s, it was illegal in the United States to send a fax message. The U.S. Post Office considered faxes to be first-class mail, over which the U.S. Post Office claimed an ancient monopoly. An edict to that effect was issued reiterating the requirement that all fax transmissions be routed to the nearest post office for delivery with regular mail. Billions of fax messages later, it is unclear whether anyone ever complied with that law. If so, compliance was fleeting. The advantages of operating in the emerging cybereconomy are even more compelling than sidestepping the post office in sending a fax.
Widespread adoption of public-key/private-key encryption technologies will soon allow many economic activities to be completed anywhere you please. As James Bennet, technology editor of Strategic Investment, has written:
Enforcement of laws and particularly tax codes has become heavily dependent on surveillance of communications and transactions. Once the next logical steps have been taken, and offshore banking locations offer the services of communication in hard RSA-encrypted electronic mail using account numbers derived from public-key systems, financial transactions will be almost impossible to monitor at the bank or in communications. Even if the tax authorities were to plant a mole in the offshore bank, or burglarize the bank records, they would not be able to identify depositors.12
To a degree that has never before been possible, individuals will be able to determine where to domicile their economic activities and how much income tax they prefer to pay. Many transactions in the Information Age will not need to be domiciled in any territorial sovereignty at all. Those that do will increasingly find their way to places like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, or similar jurisdictions that do not impose income taxes or other costly transaction burdens on commerce.
30从垄断到竞争From Monopoly to Competition
各国政府已经习惯于强行提供“保护服务”。用弗雷德里克·莱恩的话说,这些服务“质量差劲,价格高得离谱”。收费远高于政府服务的实际价值,这种惯例是在几个世纪的垄断之中形成的。就是因为政府垄断或近乎垄断了强制手段,所以任何看上去有支付能力的人都被施加以无情的税收。这种垄断的传统,将与网络商务带来的新的大政治可能,发生深刻的冲突。
加密技术将使网络交易很容易得到保护。一个有效的加密程序,如 PGP,它的成本比一个全面服务的经纪人交易 1 手(100 股)股票的佣金还要低。但是,它却可以使你所有的交易在未来的许多年内,不被政府或盗贼所发现。网络经济的参与者只需付出 55 美元,而不是承受 5500 万美元的损失,就可以获得比工业时期乃至历史上任何时期都更好的资产保护。易于使用的加密算法,加上可以自由选择的地面住所,为他们提供了切实有效的保护,使其免受最大的掠夺侵害,即来自于民族国家本身。
这并不是说领土政府将完全被击溃。它们仍然可以利用人身易受伤害的弱点,去收取人头税,甚至直接要挟富人,让他们支付赎金;它们还可能强制征收消费税。但不管如何,政府所能提供的最重要的保护服务,将被放到一个更接近竞争的位置之上。生产者为保护所支付的成本,能够被当局没收和重新分配的部分会减少。
技术创新将使全球的大部分财富,越来越多超越于政府的掌控之外。贸易的风险将因此而下降,就像历史学家珍妮特·阿布·卢格(Janet Abu-Lughod)所说,这将大幅降低“所有成本的占比”;不然的话,这些成本费用将不得不“分配给过境税、权力贡品或敲诈勒索。”在历史上,政府很少真正地受到竞争的制约。在为数不多的几次比较接近的情形中,政府都很弱小,各辖区之间的技术也大同小异。正如莱恩所言,在这种条件下,决定企业家盈利水平的关键因素,在于他们所支付的保护成本的差异。要支付 20 份通行费才能将货物运到市场的中世纪商人,当然无法与那些只需要支付4 份通行费就能把商品送到客户手中的同行相竞争。类似的竞争条件将随着信息时代的到来而回归。企业的盈利能力将再次取决于,与其说是技术优势,不如说是你能否把被迫支付的保护成本降到最低的能力。
这种新的经济动能,将与工业时代遗留下来的、政府对保护服务实行垄断定价的欲望,发生直接的冲突。但喜欢也好,不喜欢也罢,在信息时代的竞争环境中,旧制度将没有生存的余地。任何政府如果还坚持向公民施加其他政府并不要求的重税,那肯定会使利润和财富流失到别的地方。因此,成熟福利国家长期以来的减税失败,将会得到自我修正。课税过重的政府,只会使其治下的所有住所都成为破产的负债。
通过手中的特权,国王能以他喜欢的任何物质和形式制造金钱,并设定它的标准。同样,他也可以改变他金钱的实质与表象,提高或降低它的价值,甚至完全取消和废除它。 —— 摘自 1604 年英国法院判决书
Governments have become accustomed to imposing “protection services” that are, in Frederic C. Lane’s words, “of poor quality and outrageously overpriced.”13 This habit of charging far more than government’s services are actually worth developed through centuries of monopoly. Taxes were ruthlessly raised on anyone who seemed capable of paying—precisely because governments had a monopoly or near-monopoly on coercion. This tradition of monopoly will clash in a profound way with the new megapolitical possibilities of cybercommerce.
Encryption will make it easy to protect transactions in cyberspace. The cost of an effective encryption software program, like PGP, is less than the commission charged by a full-service broker on a trade of one hundred shares. Yet it will render almost any transaction invisible and impervious to governments and thieves for many years to come. The new technology of the Information Age will effectively protect cyberassets at a vanishingly small cost. For $55 rather than $55 million, participants in the cybereconomy will enjoy better actual protection of their assets than they enjoyed during the industrial era or at any previous time in history. Easily used encryption algorithms and the capacity to shop between terrestrial domiciles for transactions will provide effective protection against the largest source of predation, nation-states themselves.
That is not to say that territorial governments will be entirely outmaneuvered. They will still be able to exploit vulnerabilities to personal harm in order to extract head taxes, or perhaps even hold wealthy individuals to outright ransom. They will also be able to enforce collection of consumption taxes. Yet protection, the most important service governments provide, will be put on a more nearly competitive basis. Less of the cost that productive people pay for protection will be available to be seized and reallocated by political authorities. Technological innovations will place a large and growing portion of the world’s wealth outside the reach of governments. This will reduce the risks of trade, sharply lowering, in historian Janet Abu-Lughod’s words, “the proportion of all costs” that otherwise would have had to be “allocated to transit duties, tribute, or simple extortion.”14
It has been rare in history to find governments truly constrained by competition. In the few times when something remotely like this has happened, governments were weak and technologies were similar between jurisdictions. As Lane suggested, the principal factor affecting profitability under such conditions tends to be the difference in protection costs paid by different entrepreneurs. The medieval merchant who had to pay twenty tolls to bring his goods to market could not compete with a merchant who had to pay only four tolls to deliver the same goods to the customer. Similar conditions are destined to return with the Information Age. Profitability will once again be determined not so much by technological advantage as by your success in minimizing the costs you are forced to pay for protection.
This new economic dynamic directly contradicts the desire of government left over from the industrial era to impose monopoly pricing for its protection services. But, like it or not, the old system will be nonviable in the new competitive environment of the Information Age. Any government that insists upon lumbering its citizens with heavy taxes that competitors do not pay will merely assure that profits and wealth gravitate someplace else. Therefore, the failure of the mature welfare states to curtail taxes over the long term will be self-correcting. Governments that tax too much will simply make residence anywhere within their power a bankrupting liability.
"… as the king by his prerogative may make money of what matter and form he pleaseth, and establish the standard of it, so may he change his money in substance and impression, and enhance or debase the value of it, or entirely decry and annul it,…”15 —FROM AN ENGLISH COURT DECISION, 1604
31铸币税的死亡THE DEATH OF SEIGNIORAGE
政府不仅会失去对各种形式的收入和资本征税的权力,也必将失去对货币的垄断。从历史来看,大政治转型总是伴随着货币性质的改变。
硬币的使用,帮助启动了古代经济五百年的扩张周期,在耶稣诞生时达到顶峰,当时的利率是现代时期以前最低的。
伴随黑暗时代的来临,铸币厂实际上也在不断关闭。罗马硬币虽然还在继续流通,但数量随着贸易量的减少而减少,形成了一种自我加强的螺旋式下降。
封建革命时期,货币、硬币、汇票和其他商业结算工具被重新引入。特别是来自德国拉梅尔斯堡新矿的欧洲白银产量激增,提高了流通中硬币的数量,润滑了商业发展。
在信息时代之前,最大的货币革命发生在工业主义来临之际。早期现代国家在火药革命中巩固了权力;随着其控制力的增强,国家权力也牢牢地掌控了货币,并极大地依赖于工业主义的标志性技术——印刷术。印刷机是第一种大规模生产的工具,在现代时期被政府广泛应用于生产纸币。
纸币是一种特殊的工业产品。在印刷机被发明之前,复制收据或证书使之成为纸币,显然是不切实际的。在缮写室里的修士,当然不会安心地坐在那里画面值五十镑的纸币。纸币极大地促进了国家的权力,不仅因为货币贬值产生的利润,它还将一种杠杆交到了国家手里,由它来决定什么人可以积累财富。就像阿布·卢格所说:“当国家支持的纸币成为被认可的货币时,与国家机器相对立,或者独立于国家机器去积累资本,就变得非常困难了。”
Governments will not only lose their power to tax many forms of income and capital; they are also destined to lose their power of compulsion over money. In the past, megapolitical transitions have been associated with changes in the character of money.
The introduction of coinage helped launch the five-hundred-year cycle of expansion in the ancient economy that culminated with the birth of Christ and the lowest interest rates before the modern period.
The advent of the Dark Ages coincided with virtual closure of the mints. While Roman coinage continued to circulate, quantities of money dwindled along with trade in a self-reinforcing downward spiral.
The feudal revolution coincided with a reintroduction of money, coinage, bills of exchange, and other devices for settling commercial transactions. In particular, a surge in European silver production from new mines at Rammelsberg, Germany, facilitated an increase in the circulation of coin that helped lubricate commerce.
The greatest revolution in money prior to the Information Age came with the advent of industrialism. The early-modern state consolidated its power in the Gunpowder Revolution. As its control increased, the state asserted its power over money, and came to rely heavily upon the signature technology of industrialism, the printing press. The first implement of mass production, the printing press, has been widely used by governments in the modern period to mass-produce paper money.
Paper money is a distinctly industrial product. It would have been impractical before the printing press to duplicate receipts or certificates that became paper currency. Certainly, monks in the scriptoria would not have spent their time well drawing fifty-pound notes. Paper money also contributed significantly to the power of the state, not only by generating profits from depreciating the currency, but by giving the state leverage over who could accumulate wealth. As Abu-Lughod put it, “when paper money backed by the state become the approved currency, the chances for amassing capital in opposition to or independent of the state machinery became difficult.”16
32网络货币CYBERCASH
今天,信息时代的来临,意味着货币性质的又一场革命。网络商务经济的开启,必将带来网络货币。这种新形式的货币,将重新设定游戏的胜率,削弱民族国家对谁可以成为主权个人的决定能力。这一变革的关键来自于信息技术的影响,它将使财富拥有者从通货膨胀的剥削中解脱出来。在不远的将来,你在网上进行的任何交易,在下单的同时就可以完成支付,而且是以网络货币的形式。
这种电子形式的货币,将在网络商务中发挥核心作用。它由数百位数质数构成的加密序列组成,它是独一无二的、匿名的、可验证的,它可以容纳最大的交易量,也可以被分割成最小的价值单位。它将可以在一个无国界的、数万亿美元规模的市场上一键交易。
Now the advent of the Information Age implies another revolution in the character of money. As cybercommerce begins, it will lead inevitably to cybermoney. This new form of money will reset the odds, reducing the capacity of the world’s nation-states to determine who becomes a Sovereign Individual. A crucial part of this change will come about because of the effect of information technology in liberating the holders of wealth from expropriation through inflation. Soon, you will pay for almost any transaction over the Net or World Wide Web at the same time you place it, using cybercash.
This new digital form of money is destined to play a pivotal role in cybercommerce. It will consist of encrypted sequences of multihundred-digit prime numbers. Unique, anonymous, and verifiable, this money will accommodate the largest transactions. It will also be divisible into the tiniest fraction of value. It will be tradable at a keystroke in a multitrillion-dollar wholesale market without borders.
33不用美元做交易Dialing Without Dollars
无可避免的是,这种新的网络货币将是去国家化的。当主权个人可以在一个没有物理实体的领域内跨越国界进行交易时,他们无需再忍受长期以来政府利用通货膨胀贬低其货币价值的行径。何必再忍受呢?对货币的控制,将从权力的殿堂转移到全球市场。任何可以上网的个人或公司,都能轻而易举地从处于贬值风险的货币系统中转移出去。未来不同于今日,使用法币进行交易将完全没必要。实际上,当交易跨越全球,那么在每笔交易中,至少有一方会发现,交易中的货币对他来说并不是法定货币。
Inevitably, this new cybermoney will be denationalized. When Sovereign Individuals can deal across borders in a realm with no physical reality, they will no longer need to tolerate the long-rehearsed practice of governments degrading the value of their money through inflation. Why should they? Control over money will migrate from the halls of power to the global marketplace. Any individual or firm with access to cyberspace will be able to easily shift out of any currency that appears in danger of depreciation. Unlike today, there will be no necessity to deal in legal tender. Indeed, in transactions spanning the globe it will be likely that at least one party to every transaction will find himself dealing in a currency that is not legal tender to him.
34以物易物将更有市场Disadvantages of Barter Reduced
在网络经济中,你可以使用任何你想要的媒介进行交易。已故的诺贝尔经济学奖得主哈耶克认为“货币与非货币之间并没有明确的区别。”他写到:“什么是货币,什么不是货币?尽管我们通常假设二者之间存在一条明显的界限,法律也一般会努力做出这种区分,但就货币活动的因果效应而言,并不存在这样明确的分别。货币系统是一种连续统一体,具有不同程度流动性的物质,或价值不受其他波动影响的物质,在其中发挥货币作用的程度,其实是渐次变化的。”全球计算机网络上的数字货币,将使哈耶克的流动性连续统一体上的每一样物体,都变得更有流动性,除了政府的纸币。这会产生的一个结果就是,以物易物将变得更加适用。越来越多的物品和服务,将通过特定的竞价方式,去交换其他物品和服务。
通过网络,这些潜在的交易会在世界范围内广为宣传,其流动性将成倍增加。以物易物的主要缺点之一,就是需求匹配的问题,一个有特定需求的人很难找到另一个人,刚好可以提供他想要的东西;而后者想要的,前者又刚好可以满足。
原始的易货贸易之所以行不通,是因为在地方市场上,要使交换双方的需求完全匹配,其难度令人望而生畏。现金超越了以物易物的局限性,它的优势会在大部分交易中继续保持。但是,计算能力的大幅提高与网络商业的全球化,弥补了易货贸易的缺陷。当你可以在全球范围内去寻找,而不再局限于你在当地市场时,找到与你需求完全对等的交易伙伴的概率就大大增加了。
You will be able to trade in any medium you wish in the cybereconomy. As the late Nobel Prize-winning economist F. A. Hayek argued, there is “no clear distinction between money and non-money.” He wrote, “although we usually assume there is a sharp line of distinction between what is money and what is not—and the law generally tries to make such a distinction—so far as the causal effects of monetary events are concerned, there is no such clear difference. What we find is rather a continuum in which objects of various degrees of liquidity, or with values which can fluctuate independently of each other, shade into each other in the degree to which they function as money.”17 Digital money on global computer networks will make every object on Hayek’s continuum of liquidity more liquid—except government paper. One consequence will be that barter will become far more practical. Increasing numbers of objects and services will be offered in specific bids for other objects and services. These potential transactions will be widely advertised throughout the world on the Net, which will increase their liquidity by magnitudes.
One of the principal drawbacks of barter has always been the difficulty of matching a person with one specific demand with another who had exactly that on offer and was seeking to acquire for himself exactly what the first proposed to trade. Primitive barter stumbled over the daunting improbability of exactly matching two parties wishing to exchange in a local market. Cash transcended the limitations of barter, and its advantages will continue to be compelling in most transactions. But vast increases in computational power and the globalization of commerce in cyberspace also reduce the drawbacks of barter. The odds of finding someone with exactly reciprocal desires to yours increase dramatically when you can sort instantly across the entire world rather than drawing on only those whom you might meet locally.
35不受伪造的影响Not Subject to Counterfeiting
纸币无疑还将继续流通,作为一种残留的交换媒介,供穷人和电脑盲使用;但用于高价值交换的货币将被私有化。网络货币不像工业时代的纸币,只能以国家单位来命名。它可能会以黄金的克数或盎司来定价,并且像黄金本身一样容易分割;或者被定义为某种真正的价值存储。即使使用不同的定价方式,或者法币仍然主导着某些交易,网络货币也能为消费者提供更好的服务。日新月异的计算能力,可以将不同交换媒介间价格调整的困难化为无形。在网络货币的每笔交易中,转移的是数百位数质数构成的加密序列。在金本位时期,政府发行的纸币收据可以被随意地复制;而与此不同的是,新的数字金本位或其易货等价物,几乎不可能被伪造,原因就在于一条基本的数学原理:要解开数百位数质数的乘积几乎是不可能的。所有的数字收据都将是唯一的,并且是可验证的。
像“英镑”和“比索”这样的传统货币名称,反映了一个事实,它们源自于对特定数量贵金属的称重。曾几何时,英镑的价值就是一磅的纯银。在开始的时候,西方的纸币是贵金属存储的仓库或保险箱收据。发行这些收据的政府很快就发现,它们可以大量地印刷,远远超出它们的金银供应所能实际兑换的数量。这根本毫不费力。任何一个持有金银证书的人,都无法从他的收据中分辨出,有关贵金属实际供应的任何信息。除了序列号之外,所有的收据都是一样的;这种情况不仅吸引了造假钞的,也吸引了政客和银行家,他们从货币供应量的膨胀之中谋取暴利。
网络货币不可能以这种方式造假,无论是官方还是非官方的手段。数字收据的可验证性,杜绝了利用通货膨胀抽取财富的经典权宜之计。信息时代的新型数字货币,把对交易媒介的控制权交还到希望保留财富的所有者手中,而不是交给只想抢夺财富的民族国家。
While paper money will no doubt remain in circulation as a residual medium of exchange for the poor and computer-illiterate, money for high-value transactions will be privatized. Cybermoney will no longer be denominated only in national units like the paper money of the industrial period. It probably will be defined in terms of grams or ounces of gold, as finely divisible as gold itself. Or it may be defined in terms of other real stores of value. Even where different pricing measures are used, or certain transactions continue to be denominated in national currencies, cybermoney will serve the consumers far better than nationalized money ever did. Rapidly advancing computational capacity will diminish the difficulties of adjusting prices to various media of exchange to the vanishing point. Each transaction will involve the transfer of encrypted multihundred-digit prime-number sequences. Unlike the paper-money receipts issued by governments during the gold-standard era, which could be duplicated at will, the new digital gold standard or its barter equivalents will be almost impossible to counterfeit for the fundamental mathematical reason that it is all but impossible to unravel the product of multihundred-digit prime numbers. All receipts will be verifiably unique.
The names of traditional currencies like the “pound” and the “peso” reflect the fact that they originated as measures of weight of specific quantities of precious metals. The pound sterling was once upon a time a pound of sterling silver. Paper money in the West began as warehouse or safe-deposit receipts for quantities of precious metals. Governments issuing these receipts soon found that they could print far more of them than they could actually redeem from their supply of bullion. This was easy. No individual holding a gold or silver certificate could distinguish any information about the actual supply of precious metals from his receipt. Other than the serial numbers, all the receipts looked alike, a fact that appealed to counterfeiters as well as politicians and bankers seeking to profit from inflating the supply of money.
Cybermoney will be all but impossible to counterfeit in this way, officially or unofficially. The verifiability of the digital receipts rules out this classic expedient for expropriating wealth through inflation. The new digital money of the Information Age will return control over the medium of exchange to the owners of wealth, who wish to preserve it, rather than to nation-states that wish to spirit it away.
36自由货币的交易成本The Transaction Cost of “Free” Currency
使用这种新型的网络货币,会使你从国家权力中得到极大的解脱。在过去的半个世纪,全世界的民族国家,在维持其货币价值方面都乏善可陈;在此前的篇章,我们引用过它们的失败记录。自二战以来,德国马克因通货膨胀而贬值的比例最小。但即便如此,从 1949 年 1 月 1 日至 1995 年 6 月底,马克的价值消失了 71%。
在此期间,作为世界的储备货币,美元贬值了 84%。这很好地衡量了,利用对领土内法币的垄断地位,政府所攫取的财富比例。需要注意的是,货币并不是天生就应该贬值,名义生活费用也不是必然要每年上升。恰恰相反。保持储蓄的购买力在技术上根本没有难度。看一下黄金的长期购买力,你就能发现这一点。从 1949 年 1 月 1 日到 1995 年 6 月底,最好的国家货币损失了将近 3/4 的价值,而黄金的购买力实际上是上升的。罗伊·雅斯特罗姆(Roy W. Jastrom)教授在他的《黄金常数》(The Golden Constant)一书中记载,根据可靠的价格记录——在英国可以追溯到 1560 年,黄金一直保持着它的购买力,波动幅度非常小。
在没有紧急军事需求的情况下,与黄金挂钩的国家货币也一直保持着购买力。在相对和平的 19 世纪,英镑的价值不降反升,尽管它与黄金的联系很弱。在信息时代新的大政治条件下,真正切实可行的将不是金本位那样的弱联系,而是一种强联系;消费者手中更高质量的信息和计算资源,将第一次强化这种联系。
如果他们达不到人们的预期,就会面临迅速失去全部业务的威胁(而任何政府组织都一定会滥用这个机会操纵原材料价格!),相比任何设计出来的制度,这种威胁提供了防范政府垄断的更强有力的保障。 —— 弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克
Use of this new cybermoney will substantially free you from the power of the state. Earlier, we cited the dreary record of the world’s nation-states in maintaining the value of their currencies over the past half century. No currency has suffered a smaller loss from inflation since World War II than the German mark. Yet even so, 71 percent of its value vanished between January 1, 1949, and the end of June 1995. The world reserve currency during this period, the U.S. dollar, lost 84 percent of its value.18 This is a measure of the wealth that governments expropriated by exploiting their territorial monopolies on legal tender.
Note that there is no intrinsic necessity that currency depreciate or that the nominal cost of living rise every year. To the contrary. The technical challenge of maintaining the purchasing power of savings is trivial. You can see this merely by looking at the long-term purchasing power of gold. Between January 1, 1949, and the end of June 1995, while the best of nationalized currencies lost almost three-quarters of its value, the purchasing power of gold actually rose. As documented by Professor Roy W. Jastrom in his book The Golden Constant, gold has maintained its purchasing power, with minor fluctuations, for as far back as reliable price records are available, to 1560 in the case of England.
National currencies linked to gold have also maintained their purchasing power when military exigencies were not pressing. The value of the British pound sterling rose, rather than fell, during the relatively peaceful nineteenth century even though it was only weakly linked to gold. The new mega-political conditions of the Information Age make feasible not a weak link, like the gold standard, but a strong link, reinforced for the first time by vastly improved information and computational resources in the hands of consumers.
The threat of the speedy loss of their whole business if they failed to meet expectations (and how any government organization would be certain to abuse the opportunity to play with raw material prices!) would provide a much stronger safeguard than any that could be devised against a government monopoly.19 —FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK
37货币私有化Privatizing Money
弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克在 1976 年指出,使用相互竞争的私人货币将消除通货膨胀。哈耶克说,法币迫使一个管辖区内的人们接受通货膨胀的货币;没有了法币,通过市场竞争,私人货币的发行者将不得不维护其交换媒介的价值。任何不能保持购买力的私人货币,很快就会失去客户。加密网络现金的发展,将以生动的形式使哈耶克的逻辑成为现实。
被人们称为“自由银行”的理论,并不是假设性的学术猜测。从 18 世纪初到 1844年间,私人发行的竞争性货币一直在苏格兰流通。在此期间,苏格兰并没有中央银行;银行业务的准入规定和限制很少。私人银行接受存款,并发行以自家金条为支撑的私人货币。根据劳伦斯·怀特(Lawrence White)教授的记录,这种制度运行良好。相比同期英国的银行和货币系统,它更加稳定,通货膨胀率更低。
金融时报的迈克尔·普劳斯(Michael Prowse)总结了苏格兰自由银行的经验:“几乎没有欺诈,也没有证据表明纸币发行量过大。银行通常不会持有过多或不足的准备金。银行挤兑非常罕见,也没有传染性。自由银行得到了公民的尊重,为经济增长打下了坚实的基础,在这一时期的大部分时间里,苏格兰的经济增长速度都超过英格兰。”在 18 和 19 世纪的技术条件下行之有效的东西,透过 21 世纪的技术,会发挥出更好的效果。很快你就可以使用由私人公司发行的数字货币进行交易。它的发行方式,就像美国运通发行旅行支票作为现金收据一样。一家比政府更有声望的机构,比如领先的矿业集团或瑞士银行公司,可以用大量的黄金或独一无二的金条做储备,来制作加密收据,通过分子签名做识别,甚至可以刻上全息图像。用这些收据作为货币进行交易,几乎不可能被伪造或发生通货膨胀。
在过去,把黄金直接用作货币,受到很多实际问题的困扰;新的数字黄金将会克服这些问题。处理大量的黄金,将不再是一件麻烦、繁琐或危险的事情;数字收据也不会太重而难以携带。实际上,它们唯一的物理存在就是一种复杂的计算机代码。要把这种数字收据分割成很小的单位,去支付极低数额的交易,也根本不是难事。一块实物黄金,如果被分割到小得可以购买一块口香糖,那么它就很容易丢失,或者与能购买两块口香糖的黄金相混淆。但计算机就很容易区分这些数字黄金的面额,在计算机看来,它们的大小差别,就像一只花栗鼠和一头犀牛。
数字货币的小额支付能力,将催生出以往不可能存在的商业模式,那就是对低价值信息的组织和分发。这些信息的供应商,现在是通过直接借记版税获得补偿,克服了以前令人生畏的交易成本。要知道,当计费成本超过交易价值时,可能就不会发生交易了。网络货币为费用很低的同步计费提供了便利,在这种计费方式中,账户可以在使用中被扣费。在前文中我们举了一个例子,想象你通过虚拟现实参观卢浮宫,你可能会向比尔·盖茨或者其他拥有相关权利的人,支付相当于1/3 便士的版税。你可以把这个数字乘以一千倍。虚拟现实将创造出近乎无限的许可机会,而这些机会只要求微额的版税费用。有一天,你可能会通过虚拟现实,重温 1969 年世界杯系列赛的第三场比赛;而为了使虚拟现实更加逼真,其中使用了某些球员的照片,你就可以用网络货币,向这些球员支付微额的版税。
Friedrich von Hayek argued in 1976 that the use of competitive, private currencies would eradicate inflation.20 Without legal-tender requirements forcing acceptance of an inflating currency within a jurisdiction, Hayek argued, market competition would force the private issuers of currency to preserve the value of their exchange media. Any issuer of a private currency failing to maintain its value would soon lose its customers. The evolution of encrypted cybercash will bring Hayek’s logic vividly to life.
The theory of “free banking,” as it is called, is not merely a hypothetical academic speculation. Private competing currencies circulated in Scotland from early in the eighteenth century until 1844. During that period, Scotland had no central bank. There were few regulations or restrictions on entry into the banking business. Private banks took deposits and issued their own private currencies backed by gold bullion. As Professor Lawrence White has documented, this system worked well. It was more stable, with less inflation than the more heavily regulated and politicized system of banking and money employed in England during the same period.21 Michael Prowse of the Financial Times summarized Scotland’s free-banking experience: “There was little fraud. There was no evidence of over-issue of notes. Banks did not typically hold either excessive or inadequate reserves. Bank runs were rare and not contagious. The free banks commanded the respect of citizens and provided a sound foundation for economic growth that outpaced that in England for most of the period.”22
What worked well under the technological conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will work even better with twenty-first-century technology. You will soon be able to deal in digital money from a private firm, issued much as American Express issues traveler’s checks as receipts for cash. An institution of greater repute than any government, such as a leading mining company or the Swiss Bank Corporation, could create encrypted receipts for quantities of gold or even for unique bars, identified by molecular signatures and possibly even inscribed with holograms. These receipts will then trade as money, with almost no possibility that they can be counterfeited or inflated.
The new digital gold will overcome many of the practical problems that inhibited direct use of gold as money in the past. It will no longer be inconvenient, cumbersome, or dangerous to deal in large sums of gold. Digital receipts will not be too heavy to carry. Indeed, their only physical existence will be as elaborate patterns of computer code. Nor will it be difficult to divide digital receipts into units small enough to pay for even microvalue purchases. A wafer of physical gold tiny enough to pay for a chiclet would soon be lost or confused with one tiny enough to pay for two chiclets. But it will be as easy for the computer to distinguish these demoninations of digital money as if they were the size of a chipmunk and a rhinoceros.
The capacity of digital money to deliver micropayments will facilitate the emergence of new types of businesses that heretofore could not have existed, specializing in organizing the distribution of low-value information. The vendors of this information will now be compensated through direct-debit royalty schemes that overcome previously daunting transaction costs. When the cost of billing exceeds the value of a transaction, it probably will not take place. Use of cybermoney facilitates very-low-cost simultaneous billing, in which accounts are debited with use. We cited such an example above in imagining that you might pay a royalty equivalent to one-third of a penny to Bill Gates, or whoever owns the virtual-reality rights to tour the Louvre. Multiply this in a thousand ways. Virtual reality will create almost unlimited licensing opportunities that will nevertheless command only microroyalty payments. One day you will be able to replay the third game of the 1969 World Series, and pay microroyalties to the players whose images are used to make your virtual reality seem real.
38彻底消灭通货膨胀ERADICATING INFLATION
微支付固然是很可能的,但新型数字货币带来的最重要的结果,将是通货膨胀的结束和金融系统的去杠杆化。它的经济影响将是深远的。在《血流成河》与《大清算》中,我们论述过,20 世纪通货膨胀的兴衰与世界权力的平衡密切相关。
暴力的回报越来越高,刺激了军事开支的急剧增加,反过来又促使权力更加积极地征用财富。各国政府发现,它们可以有效地持有本国货币的人征收年度财富税。这种税负也可以看作是一种交易费用,因为货币的使用者通过发行者提供的便利形式来保存他们的财富。
把通货膨胀理解成因为持有货币的便利性而收取的交易费用,可能有点不太寻常,但仔细考虑一下,就说得通了。在工业时代,我们习惯认为货币的供应是一种无须直接付费的服务,以致于很容易忘记美元、比索、英镑、法郎的发行者,也就是政府,不仅要我们付费,而且价码还不低,而它们的手段就是通货膨胀。
这种通货膨胀式的货币交易费,它的费率在过去的半个世纪里,从德国马克每年2.7%的低点,到接近 100%的高危表现,不一而足。例如,从 1960 年到 1991 年,在梅内姆总统启动阿根廷货币委员会的改革后,通货膨胀使阿根廷的货币上出现了连续 17 个 0。世界上所有的财富,如果在 1960 年都兑换成阿根廷比索并且埋起来的话,那么到 1991 年,就根本不值得再费气力把它们挖出来了。
阿根廷的例子就是下一个千年的先行指标。未来的货币不会再陷入通货膨胀,因为其他的民族国家无法再逃脱通胀的惩罚,阿根廷也一样。不同的是,相比阿根廷货币委员会的自动发币系统,分散在网络上的私人货币更不容易受到政策逆转的影响;前者还可能受到其他国家输入的信贷收缩的破坏。而由于市场竞争的压力,私人发行的货币不会出现通货膨胀。
通货膨胀一旦死亡,货币发行垄断者以前从中收获的隐形利益,将统统被带走。如果货币发行的隐形利益都被消灭了,那么就需要一种新的支付方式,来直接补偿货币发行者。因此,使用新的货币体系,可能要付出更明确的交易成本,可能是每年 1%左右的费用。与民族国家每年 2.7%到 99%的通胀惩罚相比,这是一个很小的代价。更重要的是,随着垄断的削弱以及世界范围内竞争的加剧,未来的总体价格还可能进一步下降。
Such possibilities notwithstanding, surely the most momentous consequence of the new digital money will be the end of inflation and the deleverage of the financial system. The economic implications are profound. The rise of inflation in the twentieth century, as we argued in Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, was intimately connected with the balance of power in the world. Increasing returns to violence dictated sharply higher military expenditures, which in turn required ever more aggressive efforts to expropriate wealth. Governments found that they could effectively impose an annual wealth tax on all who held balances in their national currencies. This annual wealth tax on currency holders could also be seen as a transaction fee for allowing the users of currency to maintain their wealth in a convenient form provided by the issuers.I
Thinking of inflation as a transaction fee for the convenience of holding currency may be unusual, but consider it closely. During the Industrial Age we became so accustomed to thinking of the provision of currency as a service for which one does not pay directly, that it was easy to forget that the issuers of the dollars, pesos, pounds, and francs, namely governments, did require that we pay, and pay dearly—through inflation. The rate of this inflationary transaction fee on currency varied during the last half century from a low of 2.7 percent annually for the German mark, to rates perilously close to 100 percent. For example, between 1960 and 1991, when President Menem launched Argentina’s currency-board reform, inflation struck seventeen zeros off successive versions of Argentine currency. If all the wealth of the world had been converted into Argentine pesos in 1960 and buried, it would not have been worth the effort to spade it up by 1991.
Argentina’s example is a leading indicator for the next millennium. Currency will not be inflated because other nation-states will no longer be able to get away with it just as Argentina no longer can. The difference will be that private money dispersed over the Net will be even less susceptible to a reversal in policy than Argentina’s automatic currency-board system, which could be damaged by a credit contraction imported from other countries. Private money will not be inflatable because of competitive market pressures.
The death of inflation will take away the disguised profits that inflation previously conveyed to those who were the monopolistic issuers of currency. If all the disguised profits of issuing money were extinguished, a new method of payment would be needed to compensate the issuers of currency directly. Use of the new monetary system will therefore probably involve a more explicit transaction cost, perhaps a fee on the order of 1 percent per annum. This will be a small price to pay compared to the annual inflationary penalty of from 2.7 percent to 99 percent imposed by nation-states. All the more so, because there is a likelihood that overall prices will decline in the future as monopolies are eroded and competition intensifies worldwide.
39收缩杠杆Contracting Leverage
数字货币的出现,不仅将一劳永逸地战胜通货膨胀,还将收缩世界银行系统的杠杆。在市场全球化之下,世界各地的人民,都可以绕过监管当局,直接通过互联网转移资金,这是划时代的历史进步。任何政府都将无力监管。当政府不能通过印钞使货币贬值,也不能通过圈养银行系统随意扩大信贷来欺骗储户时,它们就会失去间接支配资源的大部分能力。
The emergence of digital money will not only defeat inflation once and for all; it will also contract leverage in the banking systems of the world. The ability of people everywhere to bypass regulatory authorities and shift their funds directly through the Internet is an entirely unprecedented consequence of the globalization of markets. It will be beyond the power of any government to regulate. When governments can no longer depreciate currency by printing money or defraud savers by expanding credit at will through captive banking systems, they will lose a major part of their indirect capacity to commandeer resources.
40更高的利率Higher Interest Rates
大部分西方政府将因此而陷入严重的困境。它们的税收将锐减,货币体系的杠杆作用接近清零。而与此同时,它们还保有着无资金准备的负债和对社会支出的膨胀预期,这些都是从工业时代继承下来的。可以预见,一场剧烈的财政危机必将发生,并伴随着惨烈的社会副作用;在后面的章节中,我们会对此进行讨论。这场转型危机的经济后果之一,可能是实际利率的一次性飙升。随着在旧制度下签订的长期负债被清算,优惠信贷枯竭,债务人将受到挤压。
This will create an obvious dilemma for most Western governments. They will face sharp drops in revenue from taxation and the virtual elimination of leverage in the monetary system. At the same time, they will retain the unfunded liabilities and inflated expectations for social spending inherited from the industrial era. The result to be expected is an intense fiscal crisis with many unpleasant social side effects that we will consider in later chapters. The economic consequence of this transition crisis will probably include a one-time spike in real interest rates. Debtors will be squeezed as long-term liabilities contracted under the old system are liquidated, and concessionary credits dry up.
41因竞争而改变Altered by Competition
面对货币垄断的激烈竞争,各国政府可能收紧信贷,并向本国货币储蓄者提供更高的实际收益率,与收费网络货币打价格战。为了应对私人货币,一些政府甚至会诉诸另外一个权宜之计,即尝试将黄金重新货币化。它们的如意算盘是,与其让本国货币完全被网络货币所取代,不如恢复 19 世纪的金本位制度,虽然在控制上会松散一些,但还是能获得更高的铸币税利润。
然而,不是所有的政府都会做出同样的反应。在那些计算机使用率及网络参与度较低的国家,在网络经济的早期阶段,当地政府可能会延续老式的高通胀表现。但这并不会使政府从富人那里抽走财富,只能让它从没多少钱也上不了网的人那里榨取资源。不过,使用这种策略的政府,也可能会在国际上借入网络货币。
还有一些政府会抓住信息经济创造的机会,为当地的网络货币交易提供便利。这些管辖区会率先承认数字签名的有效性,并支持地方法院强制执行拒不履行的网络债务;长期借贷资本会因此而大量地涌入,促进其经济发展。显然,如果地方法院会惩罚网络货币,或允许债务人违约且无法追偿,在这样的地方就不会出现网络货币的长期信贷。
Governments facing serious competition to their currency monopolies will probably seek to underprice the for-fee cybercurrencies by tightening credits and offering savers higher real yields on cash balances in national currencies. Some governments may even seek to remonetize gold as another expedient to meet competition from private currencies. They may well reason that they could gain higher seigniorage profits from a loosely controlled nineteenth-century gold standard than would be the case if they allowed their national currency to be displaced entirely by commercial cybermoney. But not all governments will respond in the same way. Those in regions where computer usage and Net participation are low may opt for old-fashioned hyperinflation in the early stages of the cybereconomy. This will not enable these governments to capture the cash balances of the rich, but it will wring resources from those with little wealth or access to the cybereconomy. Governments using such tactics might nonetheless borrow internationally in cybermoney.
Still other governments may adapt to the opportunities created by the information economy, and facilitate local transactions in cybermoney. Those jurisdictions that first recognize the validity of digital signatures and provide local court enforcement of repossession for nonpayment of cyberdebts will stand to benefit from a disproportionate surge in long-term capital lending. Obviously, no cybermoney would be available for long-term credits in territories where local courts imposed penalties or permitted debtors to default without recourse.
42收益率差距Yield Gap
信贷危机、各国货币当局的竞争性调整、早期网络货币贷款的过渡性障碍等等,这些因素综合在一起,会在信息经济初期形成收益率差距。网络货币的利率可能会低于国家货币,并且要求明确的交易成本。这显然是持有数字货币的劣势,但考虑到它可以加强保护资产免受掠夺性税收和通货膨胀的破坏,这些劣势也足以被抵消了。而且网络货币很可能会与黄金挂钩,它也将从黄金的升值中受益。
不管政府的哪一种替代性政策占据主导地位,黄金的价格相对其他商品都可以大幅上涨。为什么这么说?因为在通货紧缩时期,黄金的实际价格基本都会上涨。毕竟,通货紧缩反映了流动性的短缺;而黄金是流动性的终极形式。
The combination of credit crises, competitive adjustments by national monetary authorities, and early transitional obstacles to lending cybercurrency will lead to a yield gap in the early stages of the information economy. Cybermoney will pay lower interest rates than national currencies and will probably also carry explicit transaction costs. Offsetting these apparent drawbacks to holding balances in digital money will be enhanced protection against losses due to predatory taxes and inflation. Because it will probably be gold-linked, cybermoney will also benefit from the appreciation of gold. The price of gold will probably rise significantly relative to other commodities, no matter which of the alternative government policies predominates.
Why?
The real price of gold almost always rises in deflation. A deflation, after all, reflects a shortage of liquidity. Gold is the ultimate form of liquidity.
43工业时代的通货紧缩The Deflation of the Industrial Age
较高的实际利率将刺激高成本、非生产性的活动进入清算,并暂时减少消费。在《血流成河》与《大清算》中,我们探讨了信贷周期的逻辑以及应对的方法,这里不再赘述。可以说,通货紧缩的状况会持续一段时间,它所造成的不利影响,对于北美和西欧等高成本工业经济体更加严重,相比亚洲和拉美等低成本国家。
Higher real rates all around will spur liquidation of high-cost, unproductive activities, and temporarily reduce consumption. We explored the logic of the credit cycle and its unwinding in Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, so we will not rehearse those arguments here. Suffice it to say that the deflationary environment may drag on for some time, with more adverse consequences in the high-cost industrial economies of North America and Western Europe than in the low-cost economies in Asia and Latin America.
44长远来看,利率会更低Lower Rates Long-Term
网络经济的出现,在早期可能会促使提高利率,但长期来看,结果将正好相反。
随着资源摆脱政府的控制,储户的税后收益会大幅增加。资源的利用效率将急剧攀升,资本得到解放,可以在全球范围内寻求最高的回报,这将迅速弥补转型危机初期的产出损失。
While the early consequences of the emergence of the cybereconomy are likely to include higher interest rates, the longer-term consequence will be just the opposite. The after-tax returns to savers will sharply increase as resources escape the grasp of governments. Dramatic improvements in the efficiency of resource use, and the liberation of capital to find the highest returns globally, should rapidly compensate for the output lost early in the transition crisis.
45投资者对资本的控制Investor Control over Capital
传统的思想家在审查我们的论点后,可能会得出这样的结论:如果主要民族国家的收入再分配系统崩溃,将会导致世界经济大崩盘。不要相信他们。我们并不否认转型危机很可能会发生。但是,认为国家可以通过大规模的资源再分配来改善经济,这样的观点已经不合时宜了。它是一种信仰,大致相当于中世纪末期普遍存在的迷信,认为禁食和鞭笞是利国利民的行为。请不要忘记,政府总是大规模地浪费资源,而浪费资源就会使你陷入贫穷。在历史上,每当政府占用的收入由真正的人才掌控时,资源的利用效率就会显著提高。
数百亿、数千亿美元的资产,将会控制在数十万、数百万主权个人的手里。实践将会证明,这些世界财富的新管家,在资源利用和投资配置方面,比传统的政客更有能力。在信息时代的大政治条件下,资本最终将由最具才干的投资者和企业家掌控,而不再是暴力专家,这是史无前例的。我们可以合理预期,这种分散的、由市场驱动的投资,相对民族国家时代由政治驱动的预算分配产生的微薄回报,前者的收益可能是后者的两倍或三倍。在 20 世纪的最后几十年里,政府投资收益为负数的例子非常普遍。在 1992 年 11 月出版的《大清算》修订版中,我们引用了俄罗斯的官方统计数字,表明俄罗斯的整个经济“只值 300 亿美元,还不到其原材料投入价值的 1/3。言下之意,如果彻底关闭国内的制造业和服务业,俄罗斯经济产出的价值将增加三倍以上。它们不但没有增加价值,反而还减损了。”诚然,共产主义崩溃后的俄罗斯是一个极端的例子,但有充分的证据表明,削弱国家对资源的控制,往往会提高经济的效率。《经济学人》杂志列举的增长率显示,经济的自由度与增长率密切相关,最自由的国家经济增长速度最快。而信息时代的网络经济,将比历史上的任何商业领域都更加自由。因此,我们有理由预期,网络经济很快将成为新千年里最重要的新型经济。它的成功将会吸引世界各地的新用户不断加入,就像传真机的广泛普及,使传真对那些没有用过的人越来越有吸引力。更加重要的是,摆脱了掠夺性暴力的侵扰,网络经济的复合增长率将远高于民族国家主导的传统经济。
如果要预测政府的垄断税收与通货膨胀崩溃之后,会对经济产生什么样的冲击,那么上述可能就是最重要的一点。抛开可能持续几十年的困难的过渡时期,全球经济的长期前景值得高度看好。每当条件允许,人们可以降低保护成本,并尽量减少给垄断暴力者的朝贡时,经济就会大幅增长。就像莱恩所说;“我认为,在大多数经济增长时期,如果说有一个因素起到了最重要的作用,那就是降低了用于战争和警察的资源比例。”减少被掠夺的资源,以及对这种掠夺的生存依赖,会释放出巨大的经济效益。如果在竞争的基础上对保护服务进行定价,地方垄断势力依靠价格和质量去争夺客户,也同样可能获得巨大的经济效益。我们可以预期,未来的税率会大大降低,政治活动损耗的资源和能量将减少,政客们也不会再享受以前的巨大红利。
选民们是否愿意放弃他们已经习惯的政治福利?这个问题我们会在其他地方详细讨论。一个简单的答案是,我们可能别无选择。没有人会抗议下雨,也没有人会抗议干旱,不管它们会对经济造成怎样的伤害。再丧心病狂的罪犯,也不会绑架一个乞丐,以死亡为要挟去索要巨额的赎金。当政客们不可能再攫取资源进行重新分配,也许公众会以理性的方式作出回应。他们会忘掉政治,就像中世纪结束之后,那些好心的人们也不再举行忏悔游行一样。
指自得自满的军官。
译注:艾伦·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)曾长期担任美国联邦储备委员会主席。
Conventional thinkers reviewing our argument at this point would conclude that the breakdown of income redistribution in the leading nation-states would doom the world to economic collapse. Do not believe it. We do not gainsay the fact that a transition crisis would be likely. But the view that the state improves the functioning of the economy by massive reallocation of resources is an anachronism, an article of faith roughly equivalent to the widespread superstitions at the close of the Middle Ages that fasting and flagellation were beneficial for a community. It should not be forgotten that governments waste resources on a large scale. Wasting resources makes you poor. A dramatic improvement in the efficiency of resource use will arise when revenues historically engrossed by governments come to be controlled instead by persons of genuine talent.
Tens of billions, then ultimately hundreds of billions of dollars will be controlled by hundreds of thousands, then millions of Sovereign Individuals. These new stewards of the world’s wealth are likely to prove far abler than politicians in utilizing resources and deploying investment. For the first time in history, megapolitical conditions will allow the ablest investors and entrepreneurs rather than specialists in violence ultimate control over capital. It is not unreasonable to expect that the rates of return on this dispersed, market-driven investment could be double or triple the meager returns from the politically driven budget allocations of the nation-state era. It was not uncommon in the final decades of the twentieth century to find examples in any country of government investment that were substantially negative. We cited official Russian statistics in the revised version of The Great Reckoning from November 1992, suggesting that the whole of Russia’s economy was “worth just $30 billion, less than a third of the value of its raw-material inputs. By implication, the output of Russia’s economy would more than triple in value if the domestic manufacturing and service economy were shut down completely. Instead of contributing value, they subtract it.”23
Admittedly, the example of Russia after the collapse of Communism is an extreme one, but there is ample evidence that reducing state control of resources tends to improve economic efficiency. Growth rates cited by the Economist suggest that economic liberty is strongly correlated with economic growth, with the most rapid rates of growth in the freest countries. The cybereconomy of the Information Age will be more free than any other commercial realm in history. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the cybereconomy will rapidly become the most important new economy of the new millennium. Its success will attract new participants from everywhere on the globe, in the same way that the wide use of fax machines made telecopying increasingly attractive for nonusers. But even more important, freedom from predatory violence will allow the cybereconomy to grow at far higher compound rates of growth than conventional economies dominated by nation-states.
That is perhaps the most important point to be made in anticipating the economic impact of the likely collapse of monopoly taxing and inflating capacities of government. Setting aside transition difficulties, which could last for decades, the long-term prospects for the global economy should be highly bullish. Whenever circumstances allow people to reduce protection costs and minimize tribute paid to those who control organized violence, the economy usually grows dramatically. As Lane said, “I would like to suggest that the most weighty single factor in most periods of growth, if any one factor has been most important, has been a reduction in the proportion of resources devoted to war and police.”24
There could be great efficiency gains arising from a reduction of the resources devoted to predation and living off the spoils of predation. If the pricing of protection were placed on a competitive basis, with local monopolies competing for customers on a basis of price and quality, potentially huge gains to efficiency would be possible. The result to be expected would be much lower rates of taxation and less loss of resources and effort in political activity, which would no longer pay its previously huge dividends.
Would voters willingly forgo political windfalls to which they have become accustomed? That is an issue we take up at length elsewhere. But a simple answer is that we may have no choice. No one now demonstrates against rainy weather, or draught, however economically damaging or unpleasant it may be. No one, however criminally inclined, holds a pauper to ransom demanding a huge payment on pain of death. If it becomes impossible for politicians to obtain resources to redistribute, the public may respond in a rational way and forget about politics, just as well-intentioned people ceased organizing marches of penitents when the Middle Ages came to an end.
I. Inflation had another lure during the industrial period when prices and wages were downwardly inflexible. Modest inflation increased output by reducing real wages and prices.