BILINGUAL READING · 第08章

不平等与虚拟公司

CHAPTER 8 THE END OF EGALITARIAN ECONOMICS The Revolution in Earnings Capacity in a World Without Jobs

桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。

导读 本章论证

  • 信息经济提高认知能力、自我管理和创造力的回报,可能扩大收入差距。
  • 工业时代的大规模稳定职位会减少,工作转向围绕项目临时组织的“好莱坞模式”。
  • 传统公司的边界会随着信息和交易成本下降而缩小。

01开篇Opening

中文译本

神是不轻慢人的,人种的是什么,收的也是什么。 ——《加拉太书》6:7

以生产或防御为主导的发展模式,一旦发生巨大的变革,将改变社会的结构,以及财富和权力在不同群体间的分配比例。信息时代的意义,不仅在于强力计算机的广泛应用,它还意味着一场生活方式、机构组织和资源分配的全面革命。隐蔽的暴力对资源控制的能力将急剧衰减,一种新的财富配置模式将会兴起,20世纪那种强迫性的政府中介将被排除在外。因为在信息社会中,地理位置将变得无关紧要,所有在地理边界以内而不是以外运作的组织,在未来的作用都将被削弱。政客、工会、职业管制、说客乃至政府本身都将日落西山。因为费尽心机从政府那里争取到的商贸利益,其价值将大打折扣,浪费到游说和反游说方面的资源也会大幅减少。

利用强制力和地方优势进行收入再分配的人,势必将丧失大部分权力。资源的控制权将随之转移。由私人创造的财富,迄今为止一直遭到民族国家的强占,未来将由创造者本人所控制。越来越多的财富,会流入全世界最优秀的企业家和风险资本家手中。全球化,加上信息经济的其他特点,会使每个领域内最有才华的人收入大增。优异表现所产生的边际价值如此巨大,它将使全球经济中盈利能力的分布,呈现出类似今天的竞技体育和歌剧等表演行业的形式。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

“God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.” —GALATIANS 6:7

Great changes in the dominant forms of production or defense change the structure of society, and the proportion of wealth and power of different groups. The Information Age means more than just a growing use of powerful computers. It means a revolution in lifestyles, institutions, and the distribution of resources. Because the role of covert violence in controlling resources will be sharply diminished, a new configuration of wealth will develop, without the coercive mediation by government that characterized the twentieth century. Because location will mean much less in the Information Society, there will be a diminished role in the future for all organizations that operate within rather than beyond geographic boundaries. Politicians, labor unions, regulated professions, lobbyists, and governments per se will be less important. Because favors and restraints of trade wrested from governments will be less valuable, fewer resources will be wasted either to promote or resist lobbying.

Those who have employed compulsion and local advantage to redistribute income are destined to lose much of their power. This will alter the command of resources. Privately generated wealth that heretofore has been commandeered by the nation-state will be retained instead by those who earn it. Increasing amounts of wealth will find their way into the hands of the ablest entrepreneurs and venture capitalists worldwide. Globalization, along with other characteristics of the information economy, will tend to increase the income earned by the most talented individuals in each field. Because the marginal value generated by superlative performance will be so huge, the distribution of earnings capacity throughout the entire global economy will take much the shape it does now in the performance professions like athletics and opera.

02超越帕累托法则A MAGNITUDE BEYOND PARETO’S LAW

中文译本

帕累托法则指出,80%的利益取决于或归属于 20%的人。不过更惊人的是,1%的美国人支付了 28.7%的所得税。这也表明了,相对维尔弗雷多·帕累托在上个世纪末的观察,随着社会进入信息时代,人们的收入与能力分配曲线会更加倾斜。现在的人已经很习惯财富上的巨大不平等。在 1828 年,4%的纽约人被认为拥有该市全部财富的 62%。到 1845 年,前 4%的人拥有纽约市所有公司和非公司财富的 81%。在更大范围内,到 1860 年,前 10%的人拥有整个美国约 40%的财富。而到了 1890 年,记录显示,当时最富有的 12%的人拥有美国财富的 86%左右。

1890 年的数字很接近帕累托的法则。但它之所以不是二八比率,主要是因为在 19 世纪末,大量身无分文的移民涌入到了美国。移民在总财富中所占的份额可以忽略不计,因此,他们的加入自然使财富总量的分配更加不平等。这个例子也很好地说明了,在任何时候,当真正的机会爆发出来,总是不可避免地加剧社会的不平等,至少在一段时间内。到 1890 年,移民约占美国总人口的 15%,但在东北部的一些州则超过了 40%,大部分的收入和财富都是在那里创造的。把财富的占比根据移民激增的情况调整之后,19 世纪末的美国,就像帕累托生活的 19 世纪末的瑞士,一样符合他的公式。

信息时代已经改变了财富分配的法则,特别是在美国,并且成为了美国现代政治的痛点之一,对此我们会在下一章深入探讨。在信息时代要取得经济成功,需要很强的读写能力和计算能力。美国教育部进行过一项大规模的“美国成人识字率”调查,结果显示,多达 9000 万名 15 岁以上的美国人能力极差。对此,美国侨民比尔·布莱森的说法更加生动:“他们蠢得就像猪嘴边滴下来的口水。”具体来说,可以判定,9000 万美国成年人不会写信,不能理解公共汽车时刻表,不会做加减法,即使借助计算器的帮助。可想而知,连普通公交时刻表都看不懂的人,不可能在信息高速公路上有所作为。这 1/3 还没准备好进入电子信息世界的美国人,正在酝酿着一个愤怒的下层社会。而在社会顶层的一小群人,也许只占总人口的 5%,是受过高等教育的信息工作者或资本所有者;他们在信息时代的地位,相当于封建时代的土地贵族。二者的关键区别是,信息时代的经营是创富专家,而不是暴力专家。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Pareto’s law says that 80 percent of the benefit will depend on or go to 20 percent of those engaged. This may be approximately true, though, more strikingly, 1 percent of the population of the United States pays 28.7 percent of the income tax, suggesting that as societies advance into the Information Age they will experience an even more skewed distribution of incomes and abilities than Vilfredo Pareto observed at the end of the last century. People are quite accustomed to substantial inequalities of wealth. In 1828, 4 percent of New Yorkers were thought to have owned 62 percent of all the city’s wealth. By 1845, the top 4 percent owned about 81 percent of all corporate and noncorporate wealth in New York City. More broadly, the top 10 percent of the population owned about 40 percent of the wealth across the whole United States in 1860. By 1890, records suggest that the richest 12 percent then owned about 86 percent of America’s wealth.1

The 1890 numbers are close to what Pareto had in mind. They vary from his ratio of 80-20 percent mainly because a huge influx of penniless immigrants arrived in America at the end of the nineteenth century. The immigrants’ share of total wealth was negligible; therefore, their arrival automatically made the total holdings of wealth more unequal. In fact, this is a striking illustration of the fact that any genuine upsurge in opportunity is almost inevitably bound to lead to at least a brief surge in inequality. By 1890, immigrants accounted for about 15 percent of the total U.S. population, but more than 40 percent in some of the northeastern states, where much of the income and wealth were generated.2 Adjusting for the surge in immigration, late-nineteenth-century America fit Pareto’s formula about as well as late-nineteenth-century Switzerland, where he lived.

The Information Age has already changed the distribution of wealth, particularly in the United States, and is one of the reasons for the bitterness of modern American politics, which we explore further in the next chapter. The Information Age requires a quite high standard of literacy and numeracy for economic success. A massive U.S. Education Department survey, “Adult Literacy in America,” has shown that as many as 90 million Americans over the age of fifteen are woefully incompetent. Or in the more colorful characterization of American expatriate Bill Bryson, “They are as stupid as pig dribble.”3 Specifically, 90 million American adults were judged incapable of writing a letter, fathoming a bus schedule, or adding and subtracting, even with the help of a calculator. Those who cannot make sense of an ordinary bus timetable are unlikely to be able to make much of the Information Superhighway. From this third of Americans who have not prepared themselves to join the electronic information world, an angry underclass is being recruited. At the top of society is a small group, perhaps 5 percent, of highly educated information workers or capital owners who are the Information Age equivalent of the landed aristocracy of the feudal age—with the crucial difference that the elite of the Information Age are specialists in production, not specialists in violence.

03创新的大政治学The Megapolitics of Innovation

中文译本

20 世纪的大多数社会学家都认为,技术进步会自然而然地促成越来越平等的社会,但他们并没有令人信服的理由。在 1750 年之前,就不是这样。大概也是从那时起,工业技术的创新开始为非技术工人带来了工作机会,并扩大了企业的规模。工厂的新技术提高了穷人的实际收入,并不需要他们付出额外的努力;不仅如此,它还加强了政治系统的力量,使其更有能力重新分配收入,以及抵御社会动乱。长远来看,技术并不天生倾向于抑制人类在能力和动机方面的差异,也可能增强它。有些技术是相对平等的,众多独立的工人会做出大致相同的产出;但其他技术则会将权力和财富集中到少数能者手里,剩余的大多数人不过是农奴而已。历史和技术都以不同的方式,塑造了不同的国家。工业时代是一种形态,而信息时代正在孕育另一种形态,相比被它取代的旧制度,它将更少暴力,因而更加精英化,也更加不平等。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

For no very good reason, most twentieth-century sociologists have assumed that technological progress would naturally tend to produce increasingly egalitarian societies. This was not true prior to about 1750. Beginning around that time, innovative new industrial technology began to open job opportunities for the unskilled and increase the scale of enterprise. The new technology of the factory not only raised the real earnings of the poor without any effort on their part; it also tended to increase the power of political systems, making them more able to redistribute income as well as more capable of withstanding unrest. Taking a longer view, there is no inherent reason to suppose that technology always tends to mask rather than accentuate the differences in human talents and motivation. Some technologies have been relatively egalitarian, requiring contributions of many independent workers of approximately equal utility; others have put power or wealth into the hands of a few masters while most people were little more than serfs. Both history and technology have shaped different nations in different ways. The Factory Age produced one shape, and the Information Age is producing another, less violent, and therefore more elitist and less egalitarian than the one it is replacing.

04阿蒙的萝卜AMMON’S TURNIP

中文译本

19 世纪末,一些经济学家——其中威廉·斯坦利·杰文斯(William Stanley Jevons)是英国最杰出的一位,开始发展数学经济学。最早将概率理论应用于重大社会问题的,是德国的经济学家奥托·阿蒙(Otto Ammon),他的作品在 1899 年被卡洛斯·克劳森(Carlos C. Closson)首次译成英文,发表在《政治经济学杂志》(Journal of Political Economy)上。这篇文章的题目是“概率学说的一些社会应用”。今天的人们可能会觉得,这样的文章只有考古者才感兴趣;事实上,它所研究的经济问题已再次出现,而它的处理方式依然深具启发。

奥托·阿蒙感兴趣的是,社会中的能力分布以及它与收入和地位的关系。他以四个骰子为研究出发点,每个骰子有六个面,他统计了可能出现的总点数。在 1296种可能的点数组合中,有些总数出现的频率要高得多。

从上表(表略)可以明显看出,高总数和低总数都很少出现。有两种可能的总数,但其中前 4 大的总数,在 1296 种组合中只可能出现 35 次,后 4 名也只出现 35次。中间七组的总数则可能出现 884 次,中间三分之一总数出现的概率则超过其余三分之二的投掷结果。这就产生了概率论中心拥挤的特征。

奥托·阿蒙认为,掷骰子的随机分布与人类能力的分布状态是一致的。在他写作的时候,还没有智力测试和智商的概念,他靠的是弗朗西斯·高尔顿(Francis Galton)以前关于智力的研究。阿蒙并不认为,整个社会的效用或个人生活的成功仅仅取决于智力。他列举了“三组心理特征,它们在很大程度上决定了一个人在生活中能够达到的高度。”这三组特征是:

智力水平:其中包含了人类所有理性方面的能力,如理解力、记忆力、判断力、创造力,以及其他任何属于这一领域的素质。

道德能力:包括自控力、意志力、勤奋、毅力、节制、顾家、诚实等等。

经济能力:如商业才能、组织才能、技术能力、处世谨慎、精于计算、富有远见、勤俭节约等等。

在这些精神素质之外,他还增加了第 4 组:

身体条件:工作能力、耐力、抗压力、抵抗各种刺激的能力、活力、健康等等。

在奥托·阿蒙看来,这些智力、性格、才能和身体素质的分布概率,与骰子上的总分数类似。他还进一步指出,如果存在四个以上的变量,而且这些变量的变化程度超过了六度。比如,如果不是四颗骰子,而是扔八颗,那么就有不少于1,679,616 次可能的结果,但最高分 48 分,预期出现的概率仍然只有一次。

在决定人生成就的所有因素中,得分都很高的男人或女人,出现的概率比扔出四个六要小得多,可能和掷出八个六差不多。然而,阿蒙指出,如果这些素质高低失衡,就会出现“天赋不平衡、不和谐的人;尽管他们在某些方面非常出色,却无法成功应对生活的考验”。

像一座孤独的山峰,或者大教堂的尖顶,天赋异禀之人会从广大的平庸之辈中升起……天才的数量是如此稀少。要说因为社会制度不完备,导致‘众多’天才被耽误在下层阶级,几乎是不可能的。 —— 奥托·阿蒙

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In the late nineteenth century a number of economists, of whom William Stanley Jevons was the most distinguished in England, started to develop mathematical economics. One of the first to apply probability theory to a major social question was the German economist Otto Ammon, whose work was first translated into English by Carlos C. Closson in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1899. The article was entitled “Some Social Applications of the Doctrine of Probability.”4 One might suppose that such an article was now of purely antiquarian interest. In fact, it deals with an economic problem that is again coming to the fore, and deals with it in what is still a stimulating way.

Otto Ammon was interested in the distribution of ability in society, and its relationship to the distribution of income and status. He took as his starting point the probable occurrence of total scores from four dice, each with six sides. Out of 1,296 possible throws, some totals will occur much more often than others.

The sum of

spots will appear once.

"

"

"

times.

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

once.

It is immediately apparent that high and low scores are both comparatively rare. There are two possible totals, but the top four of these only occur thirty-five times out of the 1,296, and the bottom four only occur thirty-five times. The middle seven group of scores can be expected to occur 884 times; the middle third of possible scores is the result in more than two-thirds of all throws. This produces the characteristic crowding toward the center of probability theory.

Otto Ammon argued that this random distribution of throws of the dice was matched by the distribution of human abilities. He was writing before the development of intelligence testing and IQs, and relied on the earlier work on intelligence of Francis Galton. Ammon did not consider that social utility, or success in life, depended simply on intelligence. He listed “three groups of mental traits which are largely decisive in the place which a man will occupy in life.” These were:

1. Intellectual traits; among which I included all that belong to the rational side of man-power of quick comprehension, memory, power, of judgement, power of invention, and whatever also belongs to this field. 2. Moral traits; namely, self control, will power, industry, perseverance, moderation, regard for family obligations, honesty and the like. 3. Economic traits; such as business ability, organizing talent, technical skill, caution, clever calculation, foresight, thrift and so on.

To these mental traits he added:

4. Bodily traits; power to work, endurance, power of undergoing exertions and of resisting excitements of every kind, vigour, good, health, etc.

In Otto Ammon’s view, the probable distribution of these qualities of intelligence, character, talent, and body were similar to those of scores on the dice. He went further and argued that there were, in fact, many more than four variables, and that they varied in more than six degrees. If instead of throwing four dice, one throws eight, then there are no less than 1,679,616 possible throws, yet the highest score, forty-eight, can still only be expected to occur once. The man or woman who scores very highly in all the factors that determine the place in life is much rarer than the probability of throwing four sixes would suggest; perhaps as rare as throwing eight sixes. Yet, Ammon notes, a mixture of high and low scores in these human qualities may produce “persons of unbalanced, inharmonious gifts, who, in spite of some brilliant qualities, cannot successfully meet the tests of life.”

“Like a lonely mountain peak, or rather, like the spire of a cathedral, rise the men of high talent and of genius above the broad mass of mediocrity.…The number of the highly gifted is at all events so small that it is impossible that ‘many’ such can have been kept back in lower classes through the incompleteness of social institutions.” —OTTO AMMON

05素质与收入Traits and Incomes

中文译本

阿蒙接着谈到了收入分配的问题。当然 19 世纪 90 年代的统计数字远不如现在充分,但当时德国的官僚机构已经非常发达。在萨克森、普鲁士、巴登等德国其他州,奥托·阿蒙发现了一种收入曲线,既类似于他认为的人类能力分布状态,也和骰子点数出现的概率很接近。他还在查尔斯·布斯(Charles Booth)的《伦敦人的生活与劳动》(1892 年)一书中,找到了类似的数字。确实,布斯的社会分布与阿蒙的概率论推出的结果基本如出一辙。布斯发现,在伦敦 25%的人生活贫穷或者更差,51.5%的人感觉舒适,15%的人过着富裕或更好的生活。

如果把布斯分类中最差的两类人加起来,他们的比例就是 9.5%。而在 20 世纪福利国家出现之前,人们通常把那些最穷的人说成是“被淹没的十分之一”。另外,在布斯分类中生活最好的两类人加起来的比例则是 7%。

从这些数据汇总,奥托·阿蒙得出了很多有价值的结论。他认为广泛意义上的人类能力决定了一个人在社会中的地位和收入。能力强,收入和社会地位自然就会上升。“就像一座孤独的山峰,或者大教堂的尖顶,天赋异禀的人会从广大的平庸之辈中升起。”他还认为,“所谓的社会金字塔结构,其真实形态更像一颗被压扁的洋葱或萝卜。”这种萝卜最上面的茎和最下面的根都很细。用萝卜来比喻社会结构是说得通的,因为在现代工业社会中,多数人处于中间位置,而金字塔的多数则是在底层。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Ammon then turns to the distribution of incomes. Of course, the statistics of the 1890s were much less adequate than they would be now, but German bureaucracy was already well developed, and Otto Ammon found in Saxony, Prussia, Baden, and other German states income curves that he thought were similar, both to his perceived distribution of human ability and to the probabilities of the dice. He found similar figures in Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People of London (1892). Indeed, Booth’s social distribution does look much as one might expect from Ammon’s probability theory. Booth found in London 25 percent who were poor or worse, 51.5 percent who were comfortable, and 15 percent who were well-to-do, or better; if one takes the two lowest of Booth’s categories they come to 9.5 percent. It was common before the welfare states of the twentieth century to speak of those who were least well off as the “submerged tenth.”5 The two highest of Booth’s categories come to 7 percent.

From all this, Otto Ammon drew a number of interesting conclusions. He thought that people’s abilities, broadly defined, determined their place in society and their income. He believed that high abilities naturally result in people rising in income and social position. “Like a lonely mountain peak, or rather, like the spire of a cathedral, rise the men of high talent and of genius above the broad mass of mediocrity,…” He also believed that the “true form of the so-called social pyramid is that of a somewhat flat onion or turnip.” This turnip has a narrow stem above and a narrow root beneath. Such a social turnip is preferable as a metaphor to the social pyramid because, like modern industrial society, it has its mass in the middle while the pyramid has its mass at the bottom.

06萝卜状的社会The Shape of the Turnip

中文译本

现代工业社会确实都是萝卜状的,顶层是一小撮富人和高级职业群体,中间规模庞大,然后少数穷人处于底层。相对于中间,两头都很小。如果华盛顿不是这样的话,那么在现代的伦敦,百万富翁肯定比无家可归者要多。

所有这些都极具启发,但阿蒙的工作带来的最直接的好处,是使我们认识到,人类正在经历一场长期的重大转变,发生在社会上层和中层之间的政治与金融关系中。工业时代所需要的技能,正在成为过去时,而且毫无疑问,它不符合信息时代的要求。大部分人都能操作 20 世纪中期的机器,但这些工作现在已经被智能机器所取代。实际上,这些机器控制着人。整个需要中低技能的就业领域已经消失了。如果我们没错的话,这就是大部分就业岗位消失以及就业市场重新配置的前奏。

然而,大多数失业的年轻人都不满足任何工作的能力要求,这是官方私下承认的事实。 —— CLIVE JENKINS & BARRIE SHERMAN

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Modern industrial societies are indeed all turnips, with a small wealthy and upper-professional class at the top, a larger middle class, and a minority poor class at the bottom. Relative to the middle, both the extremes are small. In modern London, if not in Washington, there are certainly more millionaires than homeless.

All of this is intriguing, but the immediate interest of Ammon’s work lies in the major long-term shift we are experiencing in the relations, financial and political, between the top and the middle. The skills needed in the Factory Age, which is now passing, are undeniably different from those demanded by the Information Age. Most people could master the skills required for operating the machines of the mid-twentieth century, but those jobs have now been replaced by smart machines which, in effect, control themselves. A whole arena of low- and middle-skill employment has already disappeared. If we are correct, this is a prelude to the disappearance of most employment and the reconfiguration of work in the spot market.

“Yet it is a fact, acknowledged officially but quietly, that most of the unemployed youngsters have no qualifications whatsoever…”6 —CLIVE JENKINS AND BARRIE SHERMAN

07能者多劳FEWER PEOPLE WILL DO MORE WORK

中文译本

我们就用 4 个骰子来简单比拟人类的能力分布。假设在工厂时代,人们的得分可以达到 4 × 2 或者更高,那就意味着,95%以上的人都在查尔斯·布斯所说“最低限度的正面社会效用”之上。事实也确实如此,在 20 世纪 40 年代和 50 年代,3%就是当时设定的充分就业标准(即失业率)。假设信息时代要求的分数上升到 4 × 3 ,也就是最低分从 8 分涨到 12 分,那就意味着,近 24%的人将低于“社会效用”的极限。

在社会的顶端也是如此。工厂时代对高水平的能力要求也许是 4 × 4 ,而在信息时代,它可能上升到 4 × 5 ,这样的话,有资格从事顶级工作的人,比例将从 34%锐降到只有 5%。

这些数字纯粹是基于假设。当然,我们不知道技能要求的变化会去到什么程度——或者说已经达到了什么程度,但上升是肯定的。鉴于萝卜的形状,对最低技能要求很小幅度的提高,就会导致大量的人丧失工作机会。同样,较高技能要求的小幅升高,也会使符合高级职位的人数大大减少。这样的转变正在发生,我们还不知道它的规模和程度会有多大。

实际上,确实有社会和政治方面的证据表明,这种转变正在所有先进的工业社会中展开,其速度正在加快,其规模已经很明显。对稀缺技能的奖励已经增加,且还在持续增加。传统型思想家也注意到了这一点,并表示非常不满。例如,罗伯特·H·弗兰克和菲利普·J·库克(Robert H. Frank & Philip J. Cook)所著的《赢家通吃的社会》(The Winner-Take-All Society)一书,就指出了在美国社会的众多领域中,呈现出最具才华的竞争者获得超高收入的趋势。与此同时,中等技能者的机会在减少;而相当多的低技能者,虽然还能在小规模的服务业中找到一份活计,但已经掉出了舒适生活的社会圈层。

如果信息社会在高低两端都提出更高的技能要求,那么除了前 5%的人,其他人都会相对地处于劣势。前 5%将会获得超额收益,他们不仅赚得更多,而且能保留的比例也更大。不过,他们将完成的工作,在世界上也是前所未有的。主权个人将从他们中间崛起。在信息时代,收入分配的萝卜形状会更像 1750 年的,而不是 1950 年的。

那些中低技能的人群,在社会的灌输之下,期待更平等的收入与更高的消费水平,将会陷入挫折与焦虑。随着更多国家的经济更深入地吸纳信息技术,人们将会看到,一个基本无力就业的下层阶级将会出现——在北美已经很明显。这就是正在发生的现实。它将导致民族主义与反技术偏见的高涨,对此我们将在下一章中详述。

工业时代可能是一段特殊的历史时期,在此期间,半愚蠢的机器为无技能者留下了赚钱的空间。今天的机器已经可以自我管理了;奥托·阿蒙的萝卜顶端的 5% 将会得到信息时代的特别礼遇。对于前 10%的认知精英来说,信息时代已是无与伦比;而对于这前 10%中的前 10%,认知精英中的精英,这是最好的时代。

在封建时代,100 个半熟练的农民才能养活一个骑马的高技能军阀(或骑士)。信息经济中的主权个人不是军阀,而是掌握创业、投资等特殊技能的高端人才。但封建社会中 100:1 的比率或许将回归。好坏姑且不论,21 世纪的社会可能比我们生活的 20 世纪更加不平等。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

We can take the simple four-dice distribution of human ability and suppose that people could score in the Factory Age with a set of 4 X 2 or above. That would mean that over 95 percent of the population were above what Charles Booth called “the lowest limit of positive social usefulness.” Indeed, 3 percent was set as the full-employment standard of the 1940s and 1950s. Suppose that in the Information Age the required score has risen to a 4 X 3, and the required minimum has gone up from 8 to 12. That would mean that nearly 24 percent would fall below this limit of “social usefulness.”

Something similiar would happen at the top end of the scale. In the Factory Age, the required level of high ability was perhaps 4 X 4; suppose that in the Information Age it has risen to 4 X 5. In that case the proportion of people qualified for the top jobs, which are also the best paid, would fall from 34 percent to 5 percent.

These numbers are purely hypothetical. Obviously, we do not know what the shift in the skill requirements will be—or has already been—but there has certainly been a rise. Because of the shape of the turnip, a quite modest rise in the minimum skill requirement would put large numbers outside of a significant economic role. Equally, quite a small rise in the higher skill requirement would reduce the number of people qualified for the higher jobs very dramatically. Some shift is happening: we do not yet know how big it will be.

There is indeed no lack of social and political evidence that this shift is taking place in all advanced industrial societies, that its pace is accelerating, and that the movement is already a big one. The rewards for rare skills have increased and are increasing. This has been noted with displeasure by conventional thinkers. Consider, for example, The Winner-Take-All Society, by Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook.7 It documents the growing tendency for the most talented competitors in many fields in the United States to earn very high incomes. Equally, the opportunities for middle skills are falling; a substantial, number of low skills now fall outside the range that is rewarded with a comfortable living, though they may still find a place in small-scale services.

If the Information Age demands higher skills both at the top and bottom end, everyone except for the top 5 percent will be relatively at a disadvantage, but the top 5 percent will gain tremendously. They will both earn a higher share of income and keep a greater share of what they earn. At the same time, they will do a greater portion of the world’s work than ever before. Many will emerge as Sovereign Individuals. In the Information Age, the turnip of income distribution will look more as it did in 1750 than in 1950.

Societies that have been indoctrinated to expect income equality and high levels of consumption for persons of low or modest skills will face demotivation and insecurity. As the economies of more countries more deeply assimilate information technology, they will see the emergence—so evident already in North America—of a more or less unemployable underclass. This is exactly what is happening. This will lead to a reaction with a nationalist, antitechnology bias, as we detail in the next chapter.

The Factory Age may prove to have been a unique period in which semistupid machines left a highly profitable niche for unskilled people. Now that the machines can look after themselves, the Information Age is pouring its gifts onto the top 5 percent of Otto Ammon’s turnip. The Information Age was already looking far better for the top 10 percent, the so-called cognitive elite. Yet it will be the best of all for the top 10 percent of the top 10 percent, the cognitive double top. In the feudal age, it took one hundred semiskilled peasants to support one highly skilled warlord (or knight) on horseback. The Sovereign Individuals of the information economy will not be warlords but masters of specialized skills, including entrepreneurship and investment. Yet the feudal hundred-to-one ratio seems set to return. For better or worse, the societies of the twenty-first century are likely to be more unequal than those we have lived in during the twentieth.

08大部分人将从政治的死亡中获益MOST PEOPLE WILL GAIN FROM THE DEATH OF POLITICS

中文译本

平等主义经济及其所支撑的国家,不可能不经历危机就自动消失。根据字面定义,“危机”往往只持续很短的时间,但我们可以想象,国家灭亡的创伤会回荡很多年。这种创伤当然不容忽视,稍后我们会对它的各个层面进行详细分析;但更重要的是不要忘记,在全球的许多地区,向信息时代的转型会促使产出激增,各方面收入普遍上升。事实上,在那些从未充分享受过工业化的好处但现在向自由市场开放的地区,各阶层的收入都在上升或即将上升。

强迫性作为经济生活中的一个主要特征,在信息时代将被削弱,生产者将可以保留在过去一直遭到征收和再分配的财产。再分配通常意味着资产被拖入了低价值的用途,从而降低了资本的生产力。政客从最擅长投资管理的人那里攫取不成比例的财富,然后重新分配给那些不擅于投资的人。普遍来说,重新分配的收入都被投入到了低级的经济活动。将资源从系统的强制中解放出来,其效应在不同的国家会大不相同。这种资源的解封会导致福利国家的破产,会增强规模的不经济性,进而破坏大政府以及由大政府补贴的所有机构。而另一方面,在某些主权国家的统治下,一直饱受无法大规模组织之苦的人们,转入网络经济将减轻他们所承受的经济弊端。

如果世界以一个大市场来运作,每个雇员都将与世界各地具有同等工作能力的人竞争。那可是人数众多,而且其中很多人都充满渴望。 —— 安德鲁·格鲁夫 (英特尔总裁)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

It is unlikely that the egalitarian economy and the nations it supports can disappear without a crisis. While a “crisis” by definition can last only for a short while, we nonetheless imagine that the trauma of the end of nations could reverberate for years. Without ignoring that trauma, whose dimensions we explore in greater detail later, it is important not to forget that in many areas of the globe the transition to the information economy will lead output to surge, with higher incomes all around. Indeed, in those areas that never shared fully in the benefits of industrialism but are now open to the free market, incomes are rising or will rise among all classes of people.

The deflation of compulsion as a feature of economic life will allow producers to retain assets that heretofore have been seized and redistributed. Redistribution usually meant that assets were dragooned into lower-value uses, thus reducing the productivity of capital. Wealth taken disproportionately from persons who were most adept at investing resources was reallocated by politicians to those who were less adept. In most cases, redistributed income was employed in lower-order economic activities. The effects of freeing resources from systematic compulsion will vary greatly among jurisdictions. This freezing of resources will bankrupt welfare states, and enhance diseconomies to scale that are undermining large governments and all institutions subsidized by large governments. On the other hand, the shift to the cybereconomy will reduce the economic drawbacks suffered by people operating under sovereignties in regions that have traditionally suffered from the inability to organize on a large scale.

“If the world operates as one big market, every employee will compete with every person anywhere in the world who is capable of doing the same job. There are lots of them and many of them are hungry.”8 —ANDREW S. GROVE, PRESIDENT, INTEL CORP.

09地理优势将不复存在SHIFTING LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGES

中文译本

由于暴力的回报率不再上升,继续生活在一个可以掠夺他们的政府之下,对人们来说没有任何的好处。曾经很能干的政府,不再是积累财富的朋友,而只是敌人。

高额税收、繁重的监管成本,以及雄心勃勃的收入再分配计划,使得政府控制下的领土,将成为人们避而远之的商业环境。

在工业时期一直贫穷落后的地区,当经济从地理的限制中被解放以后,这里的人们将获得最大的利好。这与你听到的说法会正好相反。围绕着信息经济的到来与主权个人的崛起,主要的争议将集中在政治的死亡对“公平”产生的所谓不利影响。毋庸讳言,全球信息经济的出现,将给大规模收入再分配的制度造成沉重的打击。在工业时代,收入再分配的主要受益者是富裕国家的居民,这些国家的消费水平是世界平均水平的 20 倍。也只是在那些经合组织国家,收入再分配在提高非技术工人的收入方面,产生了明显的效果。

最大的收入不平等发生在各个国家之间;收入再分配对缓解这种不平等毫无作用。事实上,我们认为,外国援助和国际发展计划通过补贴不称职的政府,产生了降低穷国穷人实际收入的反作用。在我们分析信息革命对道德造成的冲击时,这是一个更需要深入考虑的问题。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Because there will no longer be rising returns to violence, there will be no advantage to living under a government that could capture them. Once-competent governments will no longer be the friends of wealth accumulation, but their enemies. High taxes, burdensome regulatory costs, and ambitious commitments to income redistribution will make territories under their control uninviting settings in which to do business.

Those who live in jurisdictions that remained poor or underdeveloped during the industrial period have the most to gain by the liberation of economies from the confines of geography. This is contrary to what you will hear. The main controversy surrounding the advent of the information economy and the rise of the Sovereign Individual will focus on the allegedly adverse effects on “fairness” arising from the death of politics. It is certainly true that the advent of the global information economy will deal a mortal blow to large-scale income redistribution. The main beneficiaries of income redistribution in the Industrial Age have been inhabitants of wealthy jurisdictions whose level of consumption is twenty times higher than the world average. Only within the OECD countries has income redistribution had noticeable effects in raising incomes of unskilled persons.

The greatest income inequalities have been observed among jurisdictions. Income redistribution has done little to alleviate them. In fact, we believe that foreign aid and international development programs have had the perverse effect of lowering the real incomes of poor people in poor countries by subsidizing incompetent governments. This is an issue we consider in more depth in analyzing the impact of the Information Revolution on morality.

10收入不平等加剧的一个世纪A Century of Rising Income Inequality

中文译本

在工业时期,决定普通人一生收入高低的最大因素,是他碰巧出生和居住的政治管辖区。与今天富裕国家人们的普遍印象相反,收入不平等在工业时期其实是迅速加剧的。世界银行引用的一项估计表明,最富裕国家的人均收入,在 1870 年是最贫穷国家人均收入的 11 倍;到 1985 年已经猛增到了 52 倍。在全球层面,收入不平等在急剧扩大,但对于那些生活在富裕工业国家的人,情况并非如此。

所以,相比于国家内部,收入不平等在各国家之间上升得更严重。

在那些政府能力稀松而又可以大规模行使权力的国家,工业技术本身的特点,有助于削弱这些国家内部的收入差距,其原因我们在前面分析过。当暴力的回报率上升时,例如在工业时期,大规模运作的政府往往控制在其雇员手里。在这种情况下,要控制政府对资源的索取几乎是不可能的。只要权力的规模优于效率,政府对资源不受遏制的控制就会获得重大的军事优势。而政府由雇员控制的一个必然结果,就是收入再分配的急剧加速。几乎每个社会都有关于收入再分配的法规,至少也有一些临时性的、适用于某些特殊情况的。然而,如果仔细阅读这些向穷人提供援助的历史,你就会发现:当社会的贫困程度最低时,政府的“福利”往往更慷慨;而当大批人收入减少时,收入再分配更可能被削减。在 20 世纪后半叶,富裕工业社会的条件对实行收入再分配几乎是完美的。这就导致了在那些条件有利的国家,非熟练工获得了更高的报酬。不久之后,甚至是那些根本不工作的人,也获得了高水平的消费。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

During the industrial period, the factor that contributed most to determining the ordinary person’s lifetime income was the political jurisdiction in which he happened to reside. Contrary to the common impression in rich economies today, income inequality rose rapidly during the industrial period. An estimate cited by the World Bank suggests that average per capita income in the richest countries ballooned from eleven times that in the poorest countries in 1870 to fifty-two times in 1985.9 While inequality increased dramatically on a global basis, it often appeared otherwise to the fraction of the world inhabiting the wealthy industrial countries. Income inequality rose among jurisdictions rather than within them.

For reasons we have already explored, the character of industrial technology itself helped assure that income gaps would narrow within jurisdictions where halfway competent governments mastered the exercise of power on a large scale. When returns to violence were rising, as they were during the Industrial Age, governments that operated on a large scale tended to be controlled by their employees. This made it effectively impossible to impose controls on the claims these governments made over resources. Their unchecked control over resources conveyed an important military advantage so long as magnitude of power predominated over the efficiency with which it was used. A not-incidental corollary of government controlled by its employees was a sharp acceleration of income redistribution. Almost every society has some provision for income redistribution, at least on a temporary basis in extraordinary circumstances. However, a close reading of the history of the provision of aid to the poor shows that “welfare” benefits tend to be more generous when poverty is minimal. Income redistribution is more likely to be curtailed when incomes for large numbers weaken. Conditions in the wealthy industrial societies in the last half of the twentieth century were almost perfect for redistributing income. This led to much higher rewards for unskilled work within these favored jurisdictions. In due course, it even provided high levels of consumption for those who did not work at all.

11工业财富的悖论The Paradox of Industrial Wealth

中文译本

讽刺的是,也正是在这些国家,更多的人变得富有起来。不过,一旦你理解了前几章探讨的大政治动态,这个明显的悖论就顺理成章了。工业经济的主要部门需要大规模地维持秩序,以实现最佳的运作效果;这使得它们特别容易受到工会和政府的勒索——这些暴力组织急于使其支配的人数最大化。但普遍实施的收入再分配,并没有完全扼杀工业经济的发展能力。所以,任何有幸在工业化高峰之前出生在西欧、前英国殖民地和日本的人,都可能比生活在南美、东欧、前苏联、非洲及亚洲大地上具有同等技能的人要富裕得多。由于种种障碍,世界上的大多数人口在现代时期的大部分时间里,没有享受到自由市场的各种好处。而信息技术强大的正向作用,就包括克服这些障碍。

穷国的地方性特色,明显不适合大规模组织的有效开展,特别是那些必须在广大地理区域内运作的大规模组织(如政府)。 —— 曼瑟·奥尔森(MANCUR OLSON)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The irony is that it was also in these jurisdictions that more people became wealthy. This apparent paradox makes perfect sense once you understand the dynamics of megapolitics explored in previous chapters. Leading sectors of the industrial economy required the maintenance of order on a large scale to function optimally. This made them particularly vulnerable to extortion by unions and governments eager to maximize the number of persons under their sway. Yet widespread redistribution of income did not totally stifle the ability of the industrial economy to function. Anyone lucky enough to be born in Western Europe, the former British settlement colonies, or Japan during the high-water period of industrialism was therefore likely to be far richer than a person of equivalent skills in South America, Eastern Europe, the late Soviet Union, Africa, and the landmass of Asia. The beneficial impact of information technology will include helping to overcome many of the obstacles to development that prevented the majority of the world’s population from enjoying many of the benefits of free markets during much of the modern period.

“The indigenous characteristics of poor countries are strikingly inhospitable to effective large-scale organization, especially to large-scale organizations that have to operate (as governments do) over a large geographical area.”10 —MANCUR OLSON

12规模不经济与增长迟缓DISECONOMIES OF SCALE AND RETARDED GROWTH

中文译本

正如曼瑟·奥尔森所证明的,20 世纪落后的国家,本身并不是因为缺乏资本或专门的技能。在 1987 年,即柏林墙倒塌前两年,奥尔森发表了一篇文章《规模不经济与发展问题》(Diseconomies of Scale and Development)。文中写道:“如果资本供应在穷国确实是不足的,那么它的‘边际生产力’和利润率就应该比富国的高。但许多接受了大量外国援助的国家,经济增长率依然很低;在穷国建造的现代化工厂,生产率同样很低;这些事实都削弱了‘资本稀缺’导致不发达的说法的可信程度。”的确如此。如果资本或技术稀缺是主要的不足,那么在穷国的管辖范围内,这两者所获得的回报应该比发达国家高。熟练工人和资本会涌入这些地区,直到收益趋于平稳。而事实却恰恰相反。受过教育的人会从落后的国家大量外流。少数幸运儿想方设法在这里积累了资本,也会尽快转移到瑞士和其他先进国家。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

As Mancur Olson has demonstrated, backwardness in the twentieth century was not due to lack of capital or specialized skills per se. In “Diseconomies of Scale and Development,” an essay published in 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Olson wrote, “If capital had in fact been in scarce supply in the poor countries, its ‘marginal productivity’ and so the profitability of its use ought to be greater than in the prosperous countries. The low growth rates of many countries that received nonnegligible amounts of foreign aid and the low productivity of some modern factories that were built in poor countries have further lessened the credibility of the ‘scarcity of capital’ explanation of underdevelopment.”11 This must be right. Had capital or skill scarcity been the main deficiency, the returns earned by both in poor jurisdictions would have been higher than in developed countries. Both skilled personnel and capital would have flooded into these regions until the returns leveled out. In fact, the opposite was often the case. There was a substantial outmigration of educated people from backward jurisdictions. And the lucky few who did manage to accumulate capital in such places exported it as rapidly as possible to Switzerland and other advanced countries.

13好政府无法被进口Better Government Could Not Be Imported

中文译本

我们同意奥尔森的一个观点,他认为落后国家真正的发展障碍,是一个无法从国外简单借入或进口的生产要素,那就是政府。随着 20 世纪的发展,这个问题更加严重。在 1900 年,英国、法国以及欧洲其他一些国家,都在向那些本土势力无法有效大规模运作的地区,输出合格的政府。但是,20 世纪大政治条件的变迁,提高了这种活动的成本,降低了其回报。殖民主义,或者说帝国主义,到处都不受人待见,也不再是一件划算的买卖。技术的转变,提高了将权力从中心推行到外围的成本,并降低了对其进行军事抵抗的成本。因此,帝国主义列强纷纷退出,或仅保留着百慕大及开曼群岛等小块飞地。

如果说后殖民时代的民族国家已经成为了进步的桎梏——在 1980 年代末,非洲越来越多的批评家认同这一观点,这其中的主要原因是非常明显的。不管国家如何宣传,它们并没有解放和保护公民;相反,其总效用是限制和剥削,或者说,它们没有任何社会意义上的正向价值。 —— 巴泽尔·戴维森(BASIL DAVISON)

在没有欧洲人定居的国家,取代殖民统治的本土政府,其领导人和行政人员大多来自缺乏大型组织管理经验和技能的人群。在很多情况下,特别是在非洲,殖民国家离开以后,当地继承下来的基础设施很快就遭到抢夺、破坏,或者任其失修。电话线被拾荒者拆毁,砸成手镯;道路无人维护;由于路基崩塌和机车故障,铁路线变得毫无用处。在扎伊尔(非洲中西部国家),比利时人精心设计和建造的交通基础设施,到 1990 年几乎全部消失。只有几艘吱吱作响的河船还在继续飘荡,其中一艘被独裁者接管,改成了浮动的宫殿。

破败的通讯和交通,反映出落后民族国家在维持秩序方面的无能。它们使物价居高不下,又将世界上大多数人口的发展机会丧失殆尽。对此,奥尔森特别强调:

首先,交通和通讯的不畅,往往迫使企业主要依靠当地的生产要素。当一个企业的规模扩大时,它不得不到更远的地方去获取生产要素,而交通和通讯系统越差,这些要素的成本随着产量增加而上升的速度就越快。其次,糟糕的交通和通讯系统之所以不利于大型企业,更重要的原因是,它们使有效协调这些企业的难度大大增加。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Olson argues, and we agree, that the true obstacle to development in backward countries has been the one factor of production that could not be easily borrowed or imported from abroad, namely government. This is a problem that worsened as the twentieth century unfolded. In 1900, Great Britain and France, along with some other European countries, were in the business of exporting competent government to regions where indigenous powers were incapable of functioning effectively on a large scale. But shifting megapolitical conditions in the twentieth century raised the costs and lowered the returns for this activity. Colonialism, or imperialism, as it was less fondly known, ceased to be a paying proposition. Shifts in technology raised the costs of projecting power from the center to the periphery and lowered the military costs of an effective resistance. Consequently, imperial powers withdrew, or stayed on only in tiny enclaves, like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands.

“If the postcolonial nation-state had become a shackle on progress, as more and more critics in Africa seemed to agree by the end of the 1980s, the prime reason could appear in little doubt. The state was not liberating and protective of its citizens, no matter what its propaganda claimed; on the contrary, its gross effect was constricting and exploitative, or else, it simply failed to operate in any social sense at all.”12 —BASIL DAVIDSON

The indigenous governments that replaced colonial rule in the countries that were not settled by Europeans drew their leaders and administrators from populations who had little experience or skill at running any type of large-scale enterprise. In many cases, especially in Africa, infrastructure inherited from the departing colonial powers was rapidly looted, destroyed, or allowed to fall into disrepair. Telephone lines were torn down by scavengers and hammered into bracelets. Roads were no longer maintained. Rail lines became useless as roadbeds fell apart and locomotives broke down. In Zaire, the elaborate transportation infrastructure installed by the Belgians had almost totally disappeared by 1990. Only a few creaky riverboats continued to function, one of which was taken over as a kind of floating palace by the dictator.

Undependable communication and transport reflect the incompetence of backward nation-states at maintaining order. They have kept prices high and minimized opportunities for most of the world’s population. As Olson emphasizes:

First, poor transportation and communication tend to force a firm to rely mainly on local factors of production. When a firm’s scale increases, it will have to go further afield to obtain factors of production, and the poorer the transportation and communications systems the faster these factor costs will rise with expanding output. The second and more important reason why poor transportation and communication systems work against effective large-scale enterprises is that they make it far more difficult to coordinate such enterprises effectively.”13

14减轻不良政府带来的负担Lightening the Burden of Bad Government

中文译本

当信息技术将收入能力从人们居住的地理位置解脱出来,全世界富有进取心的穷人,将是最大的受益者。像数字移动电话这样的新技术,可以独立地发挥通信功能,不再依赖于地方警察能否保护好辖区内的电线杆,使铜线不被人偷走的能力。

随着无线传真和互联网的普及,穷困潦倒的邮政员工是否会为了一张邮票而偷藏信件,也不再那么重要了。

在很多情况下,有效的通讯甚至可以取代货物和服务的物理运输。良好的通讯系统,以及大幅提升的计算能力,不仅可以使人们更便宜高效地协调复杂的活动,还将降低规模经济的效益,消解大型组织。这些变化都有利于落后国家的人民,可以减轻他们因生活在无能政府治下而长期承受的代价。信息革命将使政府是否称职变得无足轻重。因此,生活在传统贫穷国家的人们,将更容易克服其政府对经济增长造成的阻碍。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The ambitious poor of the world, more than anyone, stand to benefit as information technology disconnects the capacity to earn income from the locale in which one lives. New technologies, such as the digital cellular telephone, allow communications to function independently of the ability of the local police to defend every telephone pole in a jurisdiction from copper thieves. As wireless fax and Internet connections become available, it no longer matters so much whether desperately poor postal employees will pilfer mail just to steal the stamp.

In many cases, effective communications are even replacing the need for the physical transport of goods and services. Better communications and vastly increased computational power not only make coordination of complex activities cheaper and more effective; they also lower scale economies and dissolve large organizations. These changes all tend to reduce the penalty that persons in backward countries have suffered for living under incompetent governments. The Information Revolution will make it much less important whether governments are able to function capably. It will therefore be easier for persons living in traditionally poor countries to surmount the hurdles that their governments have heretofore placed in the path of economic growth.

15信息时代的机会平等Equal Opportunity in the Information Age

中文译本

在信息时代,人们熟悉的地理优势将很快被技术所改写。具有同等技能的人,不管生活在什么地方,他们的收入能力将变得更加平等。这种现象正在发生。那些利用强制力和地方优势进行收入再分配的机构,将逐渐式微,国家内部的收入不平等会不断扩大。全球性的竞争,会使各个领域内最有才华的人收入大涨,就像现在的职业运动员一样,不管他住在哪里。在全球市场上,卓越表现产生的边际价值是难以置信的。

公众辩论的焦点,虽然还集中在经合组织国家日益严重的“不平等”,但世界各地的个体,将会享有更多平等的机会。人们无需再生活于一个大规模运作良好的国家,才能够获得成功。在一个更加平等的竞争环境里,先天的能力以及发展这些能力的意愿,会更加被看重。工业时代的管辖优势,曾导致贫富之间的差距不断扩大,在信息时代它将发生重大的变化。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In the Information Age, familiar locational advantages will rapidly be transformed by technology. Earnings capacity for persons of similar skills will become much more equal, no matter in what jurisdiction they live. This has already begun to happen. Because institutions that have employed compulsion and local advantage to redistribute income are losing power, income inequality within jurisdictions will rise. Global competition will also tend to increase the income earned by the most talented individuals in each field, wherever they live, much as it does now in professional athletics. The marginal value generated by superior performance in a global market will be huge.

While public debate will focus on growing “inequality” in the OECD countries, individuals everywhere will enjoy far more nearly equal opportunity. They will no longer need to live in a jurisdiction that functions well on a large scale in order to succeed. Innate abilities and the willingness to develop them will be measured on a more equal playing field than ever before. Jurisdictional advantages that led to widening inequality between rich and poor economies during the industrial period will change dramatically.

16贫穷地区将获得更高回报Higher Returns in Poor Areas

中文译本

随着网络经济的发展,贫穷地区的政府对自由市场形成的阻碍,将被大面积瓦解。

相应地,在这些地区,稀缺的资本和技能会得到更高的回报;正如 1950 年代的发展理论家的设想。而且,外来的资本和技术会很容易获得。新兴经济体将不再像工业时代那样,严重依赖本地的生产要素;它们更有能力利用远方的资本和专业技术,从而获得更高的经济增长。不管今天无能的政府是否会变得更加诚信,或者更好地保护产权,这样的改变都将发生。网络空间鞭长莫及,腐败政府将无法阻止其治下人民追求经济自由和美好生活。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The obstacles that governments in poorer regions place in the way of functioning free markets will be much diminished as the cybereconomy comes on line. As a consequence, capital and skills in short supply will in fact earn higher returns in many currently poor areas, much as the development theorists of the 1950s postulated they should. And both capital and skills will be far more readily importable. Emerging economies will no longer need to rely as much as during the Industrial Age upon local factors of production. Their enhanced ability to draw upon capital and expertise at a distance will lead to higher rates of growth. This will happen whether or not incompetent governments become more honest or better able to protect property rights. Lacking power over cyberspace, bad governments will simply be less able to stop people in their jurisdictions from benefiting from economic freedom.

17正向强化Positive Reinforcement

中文译本

在新型的网络经济中,信息技术几乎完全可以移植,这会遏制工业时代兴起的集中管辖优势的做法。当越来越多的国家之间竞争愈加强烈,地方优势会演变出新的形式。国家主权将被商业化,而不再是掠夺性的。在竞争的压力下,各国政府不得不制定政策,去吸引能对经济发展做出最大贡献的客户,而不是那些主要依赖补贴、却难以创造价值的人。

这与 20 世纪的普遍做法有云泥之别。按照民族国家的意识形态,生活可以而且应该被积极地调节,通过补贴不理想的结果,惩罚理想的结果。成为穷人是不好的,因此要对穷人进行补贴;成为富人是好的,因此要对富人征收惩罚性税收,以此使社会更加“公平”。

这整套的方针政策根植于一种大政治基础,它经得起各种反对意见,所以,补贴所导致的不良后果根本不重要。那些被重新分配的财富,其中所包含的技能、勤劳和聪明才智,也没得到多少应有的解释。20 世纪的政治观点认为,“公平”的结果必须是平等的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In the new cybereconomy, the almost total portability of information technology will prohibit the hoarding of many of the jurisdictional advantages that arose in the Industrial Age. Enhanced competition between increasing numbers of jurisdictions will turn on new types of local advantage. Sovereignty will be commercialized rather than predatory. Governments will be obliged by the force of competition to set policies to appeal to those of their customers who make the greatest contributions to economic well-being, not to those who contribute little or whose economic contributions are negative.

This will represent a tremendous change from the common practice of the twentieth century. The ideology of the nation-state was that life can and should be regulated in a positive way by subsidizing undesirable outcomes and penalizing desirable ones. To be poor is undesirable; therefore, the poor were subsidized. To become rich is desirable; therefore, punitive taxes were laid on the rich to make life more “fair.”

Because this whole policy approach was rooted in a megapolitical foundation that withstood all appeal, it mattered little what the perverse consequences of subsidizing dysfunction were. Nor was there much accounting for the skill, hard work, or ingenuity that went into earning the wealth that was redistributed. Outcomes were measured in terms of entitlements. The twentieth-century political view assumed that in order for outcomes to be “fair” they had to be equal.

18新样板The New Paradigm

中文译本

在 21 世纪新的大政治条件下,可以通过市场去调节过去由政治主导的领域。市场模式假定,奖励理想的结果,惩罚不理想的结果,就可以更好地进行调节。贫穷不可取,富裕是可取的。因此,激励机制应该奖励致富,并鼓励人们为消耗的资源付费。当人们能够留住更多自己创造的收入时,生活就更加“公平”。

相比正在结束的这个世纪,这种观点在新的千年里会非常流行。而且,它被接受的程度,也将是前所未见的,因为它具备深厚的大政治基础。在信息时代,资本的流动性越来越强。赚大钱的能力不再受制于特定的地理位置,不再像过去那样,只有通过操纵自然资源才能创造大量的财富。随着时间发展,利用高度便携的信息技术,人们创造资产会越来越容易。而且,这些资产受暴力杠杆的影响,也远远小于以往任何形式的财富。

武断的政策法规,如果创造的市场利益不能抵消其增加的成本,很快就会行不通。强大的竞争,正在使全球范围内的商品、服务、劳动力和资本的价格趋于平等。

政府任意实施各种政策的自由,不会再像它们习以为常的毫无制约。任何一个政府,如果它对某项经济活动施加的规定,比其他主权国家更繁琐;结果很简单,这项活动将从其统治下流走。当然,在某些情况下,把不受欢迎的活动驱逐出去,会增加市场的满意度,提升该地区的吸引力,促进繁荣。从这个意义上说,这种规定类似于连锁酒店在内部实行的“堂训”。酒店老板如果禁止顾客在大堂内光脚或吸烟,肯定会失去一些顾客;但拒绝某些素质差的人,不会在整体上减少酒店的客人,甚至也不会影响其收入。衣着整洁的不吸烟者,可能会支付更高的费用,因为酒店把光脚吸烟客排除在了外面。同样,如果某地区的法规使渲染厂的经营成本高到无利可图,渲染厂就可能搬往其他地区,但这并不一定会减少该地区的总体收入。

这些例子表明,在少数情况下,法律法规可能具有积极而非消极的市场价值,特别是在未来的世界,管辖区数量将迅速增加的情况下。在很多地方,制定高标准的规则,以维护公共卫生、清洁的空气和水源,会受到高度重视。在某些领域,也许还会出现具有异国情调的法规和另类的契约,是房地产开发商或酒店为了迎合特定的细分市场而实施的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The new megapolitical conditions of the twenty-first century will allow market tests to regulate outcomes in areas formerly dominated by politics. The market paradigm presupposes that results can be better regulated by rewarding desirable outcomes and penalizing undesirable ones. To be poor is undesirable, and to become rich is desirable. Therefore, incentives should reward wealth creation and encourage people to pay for the resources they consume. Life is more “fair” when people get to keep more of what they earn.

This is a view that will be heard more frequently in the new millennium than it was in the century now ending. Furthermore, it will be compelling as never before because it will be megapolitically founded. Capital in the Information Age is growing more mobile by the moment. The capacity to earn high income is no longer tied to residence in specific locations, as was the case when most wealth was created by manipulating natural resources. With every day that passes, it becomes easier for people using highly portable information technology to create assets that are far less subject to the leverage of violence than any form of wealth has ever been before.

Arbitrary political regulations that impose costs without creating offsetting market benefits will soon be nonviable. Powerful competitive forces are tending to equalize the prices of goods, services, labor, and capital across the globe. Governments will have less latitude to impose arbitrary policies than they are accustomed to enjoy. Any government that attempts to impose more burdensome regulations on an activity than other sovereignties will simply drive that activity away. In some cases, of course, driving away unwanted activities will please the market and make those jurisdictions all the more popular and prosperous. In this sense, certain regulations may be compared to the house rules imposed by the proprietors of a hotel chain. If they prohibit people from walking barefoot or smoking in the lobby, they will no doubt lose certain customers. But turning away those customers may not cost the jurisdiction customers overall, or even reduce its total revenues. Well-shod nonsmokers may pay more precisely because barefoot smokers are excluded. Equally, regulations that make it costly or impossible to operate a rendering plant in a certain jurisdiction may drive the rendering elsewhere without depriving the jurisdiction as a whole of income.

These examples demonstrate how regulations may in rare circumstances have a positive rather than a negative market value, especially in a world with a rapidly multiplying number of jurisdictions. Rules that preserve high standards of public health, clean air, and clean water will be highly valued in many locales. So will other, sometimes more exotic regulations and covenants of the kind that might be imposed by real estate developers or hotels catering to certain market segments.

19网络空间没有海关大楼No Customs House in Cyberspace

中文译本

我们预计,主权的商业化,很快将导致许多重大的领土主权被下放。如边境管制,至今还在制约着制成品和农产品的贸易,信息技术不会受它的管制。这样的发展影响深远。它意味着随时间推移,贸易保护主义将逐渐失效,因为相比实物产品,信息交易对于创造财富更加重要。它还意味着,小地方想要进入市场赚取收入,将越来越不依赖于大规模的政治管辖。

在服务部门工作的人,以前一直受到保护,信息技术将把他们暴露在全世界的竞争当中。20 年前,如果多伦多的一家公司想要雇用一名会计,这个人必须在多伦多,在附近的社区,在通勤范围内。在信息时代,位于布达佩斯或印度班加罗尔的会计,都可以胜任这项工作,而且是以加密的方式,通过互联网下载所需要的材料。有了卫星链路的即时通讯,通过调制解调器和传真,与世界任何地方的沟通,都只在弹指一挥间。一个人如果需要股票分析师,以华尔街请 1 个的价格,他可以在印度请 27 个。根据摩尔定律,信息技术每 18 个月可以提高一个量级,甚至更高;在这种趋势下,越来越多的服务人员将面临价格竞争,政客们恐怕也无力阻止。这种竞争不仅适用于会计,最终它将全面适用于高学识的职业;数字律师和网络医生会在信息时代大量涌现。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

We expect the commercialization of sovereignty to rapidly lead to the devolution of many large territorial sovereignties. The very fact that information technology cannot be subjected to border controls of the kind that can still impede the trade of manufactures and farm goods has important implications. It means that protectionism will be less effective over time as trade in information displaces physical products in the generation of wealth. It also means that smaller regions will be ever less dependent upon the maintenance of extensive political jurisdictions in order to assure access to markets in which they can earn income.

Information technology exposes people working in formerly protected service sectors to foreign competition. If a firm in Toronto wished to hire a bookkeeper twenty years ago, that person had to be physically located in Toronto, or in a nearby community within commuting distance. In the Information Age, a bookkeeper in Budapest or Bangalore, India, could do the job, and download all the material needed in encrypted form over the Internet. Instant communication through satellite links makes any part of the world only a moment away by modem and fax. Someone in need of stock analysts could hire twenty-seven in India for the price of one on Wall Street. As information technology improves by a magnitude or more every eighteen months (Moore’s Law), ever-greater numbers of service-sector workers will be exposed to price competition that is essentially beyond the capacity of politicians to impede. This competition will eventually apply as fully to the learned professions as to bookkeepers. Digital lawyers and cyberdoctors will proliferate in the Information Economy.

20民族国家的死亡警报Death Watch for Nation-States

中文译本

民族国家,随着过去在其领土范围内攫取的经济利益的丧失,最终会在自身沉重的债务下崩溃。但是,所有民族国家都处于死亡警戒状态,并不等同于它们注定要在同一时刻消亡。远不是这回事。在那些多数人口的收入都停滞不前甚至下降的大型政治实体中,要求权力下放的压力往往最为激烈。而在拉丁美洲和亚洲,那些人均收入迅速增加的国家,可能还会存续几代人的时间,或者直到那里的终身收入前景相当于以前富裕的工业国家。到那个时候,就很难再找到成本替代型的便宜果实,经济增长将对政治提出更强的挑战。

我们也不太相信,只有一个大都市的民族国家,会比拥有几个大城市的存续更长时间,因为后者拥有多个利益中心和可回旋的腹地。

另一个刺激刺激权力下放的因素,是中央政府的高负债率。加拿大、比利时和意大利,相对负债率最高的三个富裕工业国家,也是独立主义运动高涨的国家,这绝不是巧合。这三个国家都拥有长期的预算赤字,当前的国债已经超过了 GDP的 100%。随着国债的增加,独立运动的吸引力也在增加。在意大利,北方联盟已经成为一个充满活力并广受欢迎的地区政治运动。它的纲领基于一个简单的数学计算:对于意大利北部或“帕多尼亚”地区来说,如果它们的大部分收入不被抽走去补贴罗马和贫穷的南部,那么它们将比瑞士还要富有。北方联盟提出了一个显而易见的解决方案:从意大利独立,从而摆脱复利损失的可能后果。同样,在比利时,国债超过 GDP 的 130%。弗拉芒人和瓦隆人,就像离婚前充满敌意的夫妻一样,上演这各种算计和缠斗。弗拉芒人中的少数派认为,他们在不公平地补贴瓦隆人,把比利时一分为二,会大大改善他们的经济状况。持这种观点的弗拉芒人正越来越多。

加拿大的情况在细节上有所不同。现在要求独立的地区主要是法属加拿大,在历史上一直受英属加拿大补贴。随着联邦债务和财政赤字的增加,魁北克省逐渐意识到,这种形式的收入再分配将会衰减。因此,魁北克开始玩弄其它十年前尚欠缺的吸引力——承诺取消支付加拿大联邦税来提高其境内居民的税后收入。独立派领导人还提出,魁北克不应承担自己那一份联邦债务,应该从加拿大分离出去。

英属加拿大地区的人们抵制这种主张,并且反感它造成的不良影响,因为他们深知,多年以来向魁北克转移了大量的财富。尽管如此,魁北克党的号召力依然很强,公投脱离加拿大,看上去只是时间问题。当其他民族国家的财政状况恶化时,等待它们的将是类似的命运。

另一个不利于加拿大联邦长期存续的因素是,加拿大人口稀少,但又庞大的工业基础设施需要维护。向信息时代的转型必然使这些物理基础设施贬值。随着远程办公取代工厂雇员和办公室人员,高速公路和其他交通要道能否得到重建和妥善维护,就没有那么重要了。当财政危机全面爆发,会有越来越多的加拿大各省,会回归到亚当·斯密在 18 世纪提出的排他性公共产品观念。他在《国富论》中写道:“伦敦街道的照明和铺设,如果是由国库出资的,能造得像现在这么妥帖,同时价钱还这么低吗?况且,这笔费用如果不是来自于伦敦特定街区、教区或社区缴纳的地方税,那势必要从国家一般收入项下开支;这样的话,国内不能受到这街道利益的大部分居民,就要无端分担这个负担了。” 如果把伦敦换成多伦多,你就会发现,阿尔伯塔省和卑诗省等很多地方的人,都会在脑子里算这个账。权力下放的逻辑是可以传染人的。

加拿大解体以后,美国西北太平洋地区的独立活动将会明显增加。阿拉斯加州、华盛顿州、俄勒冈州、爱达荷州和蒙大拿州的居民会发现,与成为独立主权的阿尔伯塔省和卑诗省进行竞争,他们处于明显的劣势。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

With the economic benefits formerly captured within the boundaries of nation-states falling away, the nation-states themselves will eventually collapse under their weighty liabilities. But the fact that all nation-states are on a death watch does not mean that they are all destined to expire at the same moment. Far from it. Devolutionary pressures will tend to be most intense in large political entities where incomes for most of the population are stagnant or falling. Jurisdictions in Latin America and Asia where per capita income is rising rapidly may endure for generations, or until lifetime income prospects there equate with those in the formerly rich industrial countries. At that point, there will no longer be easy cost-substituting gains to be had, and the politics of growth will become more challenging.

We also suspect that nation-states with a single major metropolis will remain coherent longer than those with several big cities, which imply multiple centers of interest with their various hinterlands.

Another spur to devolution will be high indebtedness of the central government. The three wealthy industrial countries with the highest relative indebtedness—Canada, Belgium, and Italy—are not coincidentally nations with advanced separatist movements. All three countries have suffered from chronic budget deficits and now have national debts that exceed 100 percent of GDP. As the national debt has mounted in each country, the appeal of separatist movements has grown as well. In Italy, the Northern League has emerged as a dynamic and popular regional political movement. Its platform is based upon a simple mathematical observation: northern Italy, or “Padonia,” would be richer than Switzerland if large portions of its income were not siphoned off to subsidize Rome and the poorer south. The Northern League proposes an obvious solution: secede from Italy, and thus escape from some of the dire consequences of compound interest. Likewise, in Belgium, where the national debt exceeds 130 percent of GDP, the Flemings and Walloons are maneuvering like a hostile couple before a divorce. A growing minority among the Flemings argue that they are unfairly subsidizing the Walloons, and could improve their economic condition by splitting Belgium in two.

Canada’s case differs in the detail that French Canada, the main region now agitating for separatism, has historically been subsidized by English Canada. But as the federal debt and deficit mount, the realization is dawning in Quebec that this form of income redistribution will decline. The Bloc Québecois is therefore flirting with an appeal that it lacked a decade ago—the promise to raise after-tax income by abolishing the payment of Canadian federal tax. Separatist leaders also suggest that Quebec should leave Canada without shouldering a proportionate burden of the federal debt.

English Canadians resist this argument and tend to resent its implications because they are keenly aware of the large transfers made to Quebec over the years. Nonetheless, the appeal of the Parti Québecois is strong, and it seems only a matter of time until a secession referendum dissolves Canada. A similar fate awaits other nation-states when their financial circumstances deteriorate.

Another factor that bodes ill for Canada’s long-term survival is the fact that it is a thinly populated country with a sprawling industrial-era infrastructure to maintain. The transition to the Information Age is inevitably depreciating physical infrastructure. As telecommuters replace factory employees and office workers, it will matter less whether freeways and other transportation thoroughfares are rebuilt and well-maintained. With fiscal crises pinching on all sides, more and more factions in Canadian life will retreat to the eighteenth-century exclusionary view of the financing of public goods advocated by Adam Smith. He wrote in The Wealth of Nations:

Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of the [national] treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expense. The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particlar street, parish or district in London would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derived no sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the streets of London.14

For London, substitute Toronto, and you are inside an equation that will be running in the minds of many in Alberta and British Columbia. The logic of devolution will prove infectious.

When Canada breaks apart, this will lead to a marked increase in secessionist activity in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Residents of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana would find themselves at a distinct disadvantage in competition with Alberta and British Columbia as independent sovereignties.

21民族国家之后AFTER THE NATION-STATE

中文译本

取代民族国家的,首先是省一级较小的管辖区,最终是小型的主权形式,各种飞地,类似中世纪被其腹地围绕的城邦。在那些头脑被灌输、认为政治是头等大事的人看来,这种现象可能很奇怪。但一般而言,这种新型迷你国家的政策,更多是基于企业式的定位,而不是政治斗争。这些新式的、碎片化的主权国家,就像酒店和餐馆,将迎合不同口味的需求,在其公共空间内执行具体的规定,以吸引其细分市场内的顾客。这当然不等于说,这种游牧形式的组织,在保护方面,就没有自己的问题。下一章我们会对此进行讨论。

城镇空气带来自由。 —— 中世纪俗语

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In the place of nation-states you will see, at first, smaller jurisdictions at the provincial level, and ultimately, smaller sovereignties, enclaves of various kinds like medieval city-states surrounded by their hinterlands. As strange as it may seem to people, inculcated with the importance of politics, policies of these new ministates will in many cases be informed more by entrepreneurial positioning than by political wrangling. These new, fragmented sovereignties will cater to different tastes, just as hotels and restaurants do, enforcing specific regulations within their public spaces that appeal to the market segments from, which they draw their customers. This is not to say, of course, that there are not special problems arising from the organization of protection on a nomadic basis. We address these in the next chapter.

“Town air brings freedom.” —MEDIEVAL ADAGE

22帕勒地区的非公民们Noncitizens of the Pale

中文译本

尽管有种种困难,但以人类的聪明才智,总会找到方法去创建机构,以抓住繁荣昌盛的机会,即使此种需求是来自支付能力低下之人。可想而知,当潜在的客户是地球上最富有的群体时,这种趋势会多么明显。当过时的产品、组织甚至政府失去吸引力,并且看不到将有所改善的前景时,退出或“用脚投票”终归是一种选择。例如,想一想中世纪城镇的发展,它们就是农奴逃避封建奴役的避难所。

在即将到来的退出民族国家的变迁中,它们将扮演顺应变化的新型管辖区的角色。在中世纪,接受“帕勒地区的公民”(the citizens of the Pale),即逃离某些领主的外地人,是违反封建法律和主教权威的普遍惯例的。尽管如此,对于那些逃离的人来说,往往是一种成功的选择,并为削弱封建主义的控制做出了重大的贡献。正如中世纪历史学家弗里茨·罗里格(Fritz Rorig)所说,逃离世俗领主的农奴“在一年零一天后,就会成为城镇的自由市民。”我们有理由期待,未来会冒出新的庇护机构,根据“新的法律原则”,为民族国家的公民提供财务庇护;就像中世纪的城镇,庇护生活在其屋檐下的封建居民一样。

经济学家阿尔伯特·赫希曼(Albert O. Hirschman),在 1969 年首次出版的《退出、发声与忠诚》(Exit, Voice, and Loyalty)一书中,探讨了“用脚投票”理论的微妙之处。他预见到,技术发展将增加退出的可能,作为应对国家衰退的一种策略。他写道:“只有当各国因为通信和全面现代化的进步,而开始变得相似时,过早或过度退出的危机才会出现……”而这正是当前发生的情景。信息技术在极速削减各国之间的种种差异,使退出的选择更具吸引力。当然,赫希曼的“过早和过度退出”的措辞,是出于被抛弃的国家的理想角度。毫无疑问,中世纪的领主们会认为,他们的农奴“过早或过度退出”,逃到可成为自由民的城镇,给他们造成了极大的伤害。

回到我们前面的例子,假如出现一些迷你国,为来自垂死民族国家的流亡者提供庇护,并非天方夜谭。这些国家甚至会在庇护的条件上进行竞争。有些国家,也许位于北美的西海岸,会更努力争取那些不吸烟的人,以及难以容忍二手烟的人。这种制度显然不受吸烟者的青睐;对他们来说,禁止吸烟的规则是一种武断的强制。

在大众政治的工业时代,这种意见分歧会导致互相斗争的政治运动,最终迫使一个或另一个群体遵守更强大的意愿。其实,当人们的选择互相排斥时,并不是非要压制很多人的偏好,才能解决相关的争论。

就像有人喜欢吃鹅肝,有人喜欢热狗,还有人喜欢吃豆腐。通常情况下,他们不会为自己的饮食偏好而争论不休,因为他们的饮食选择并没有捆绑在一起。没人强迫所有人吃同样的食物。然而,工业时代的大政治条件,确实迫使大众共同消费政府提供的各种公共甚至私人用品。原因何在呢?因为大规模经营有利于获得巨大的经济利益。因此,在工业时代,把庞大的管辖区划分为飞地,让每个人都能各得其所,即使重要事项也可以自选自决,是不切实际的。只有当管辖区的数量达到十倍或百倍之多时,亚当·斯密的排他性公共用品供给方式,才更容易被接纳。在信息时代,越来越多的主权国家会是小型飞地,而不是大陆帝国。有些可能是北美的印第安部落,他们将有权在自己的保留地和自然保护区内行使税收管辖,就像现在有权经营赌场或不受限制地捕鱼一样。

信息技术可以减少贸易区衰解的诸多弊端,因此,新型的主权国家,会更多以俱乐部或亲和团体的原则去运作,而不再依照民族国家管理领土的方式。就像在今天,每个潜在的客户,是否具有同样的服装品位,或是否看同样的电视节目,对商家来说并不重要;在未来,是否每个人都符合同样的亲和喜好,对于界定分散型主权国家的治理风格,也没有想象得那么重要。

各种各样的品位选择,会使分散型主权的风格大相径庭,就像服装风格或电视节目,选择越来愈多。一些微型国家,可能会像特许经营的酒店集团一样联结在一起,或者共同经营,在警察服务或其他政府残余职能上,实现竞争优势。喜欢干净的街道、反感在桌板下找到口香糖的人,可能会对新加坡情有独钟,而“瘪四和大头蛋1”的拥趸肯定就不会。喜欢狂野夜生活的人,会选择澳门或巴拿马,或其他类似的地方。在一个管辖区感觉不舒服的客户,其他地方会很欢迎他搬过去。盐湖城也许是禁止吸烟的,但哈瓦那的新城邦——可能改名为基督山,则会笼罩在雪茄的烟云之中。

这意味着,随着智能被不断分发到所有网络的边缘,工业社会所有的垄断、等级制度、金字塔结构和权力格局,都将在这种持续的压力之下土崩瓦解。最重要的是,摩尔定律将推翻关键的中心,也是当今美国力量的关键物理集合,那就是大城市。那一大批工业城市,正依赖着生命支持系统在运转,每年吸走我们所有人大约 3600 亿的直接补贴。大城市,是工业时代留下来的包袱。 —— 乔治·吉尔德(GEORGE GILDER)

特别讽刺的是,微型主权或“城邦”国家的重新出现,可能会伴随着城市的空洞化。在很大程度上,大城市是西方工业主义的产物。它因工厂系统而崛起,目的是在制造高自然资源含量的产品时,获得规模经济的优势。

在 19 世纪的开端,10 万人以上的城市就属于超级城市;在亚洲以外,没有超过百万人口的城市,而亚洲的人口统计值得怀疑。1800 年,美国最大的城市是费城,人口为 69403 人;纽约只有 60489 人;巴尔的摩是美国第三大城市,有 26114名居民。大多数后来成为欧洲大都市的城市,以 20 世纪的标准看,当时的人口都是很少的。伦敦的人口为 864,845 人,可能是世界上最大的城市。1801 年,巴黎的人口为 547756 人,是欧洲唯一一个人口超过 50 万的城市。里斯本的人口为35 万。维也纳的人口为 25.2 万。柏林到 1819 年才勉强超过 20 万人。马德里的居民为 156,670 人。1802 年,布鲁塞尔的人口为 66,297 人。布达佩斯的人口只有 61,000 人。

显然,人们很容易认为,大城市的发展是人口增长的直接结果。事实上,并不一定。如果地球上的所有人,都挤到德克萨斯州,每家每户都有独立的房屋,而且带院子,也填不满德克萨斯。在经典的研究报告《论 19 世纪城市的成长》(The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century)中,阿德娜·韦伯(Adna Weber)论述到,仅凭人口增长并不足以解释,为什么人们都生活在城市环境中,而不是分散在乡村。1890 年,孟加拉的人口密度和英国差不多;然而,孟加拉的城市人口仅占 4.8%,而英国则是 61%。

历史上,城市都用围墙与农村隔离开,以防止掠夺者和下层阶级进入。在 19 世纪和 20 世纪,工业就业的增长,创造了大城市。现在,随着工业主义开始消退,大城市已经脆弱不堪。这种变迁的最佳参照,就是 20 世纪中期的工业城市底特律。曾几何时,世界工业产值的很大一块都要经过底特律。如今,它已经被掏空,只剩下一个外壳,充满了犯罪和混乱。在底特律市中心的许多街区,一栋栋废弃的建筑被烧毁或拆掉,给人的印象是,这座城市好像经历了二战轰炸机的一些列空袭。

底特律矗立在那里,提醒着世人,工业城市已经时日不多。随着价值更多地来自于信息和思想,而不再是自然资源,它们都将崩溃消失。很多城市已经过于庞大,无法支撑自身的重量。要维系一个大都市的运转,需要大量的支持系统,能够有效地大规模运行。数百万人挤在一起,意味着更多犯罪、破坏及随机暴力的威胁,城市的脆弱程度大幅增加。在工业时代,对这些风险的治安管理,其代价是由大规模的经济生产来偿还的。

在信息时代,只有能提供高质量的生活,并以此支付其维护成本的城市,才能够保持活力。住在远方的人,不再承担对其进行补贴的义务。要衡量一个城市的生存能力,一个很好的标志是:生活在城市核心区的人,是否比生活在外围的人更加富有。即使南本德2、路易斯维尔和费城的最后一家好餐厅关了门,布宜诺斯艾利斯、伦敦和巴黎依然是众人向往的生活和经商胜地。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

These difficulties notwithstanding, human ingenuity usually finds a way to create institutions to capture profitable opportunities, even where the demand arises from persons who can pay little. Where the potential customers are among the wealthiest persons on earth, that tendency should be all the more emphatic. Exit, or “voting with your feet,” is always an option when dated products, organizations, or even governments lose their appeal and seem to offer little prospect of immediate improvement. Consider, for example, the growth of medieval towns that served as safe havens for serfs escaping feudal subjugation. Their role may prove analogous to the role of new jurisdictions in accommodating the coming exit from nation-states. The acceptance of aliens escaping from some lord as “citizens of the pale” defied the prevailing conventions of feudal law and episcopal authority. But nonetheless it was a generally successful alternative for those who employed it, contributing importantly to weakening the grip of feudalism. As medieval historian Fritz Rorig put it, the serf of a secular lord would be “a free burgher of the town after a year and a day.”15 It is reasonable to expect new institutional refuges to spring up, upon “new legal principles,” to provide fiscal refuge to citizens of the state, much as the medieval town offered refuge to feudal subjects who lived within the shadows of its walls.

Economist Albert O. Hirschman, who explored the theoretical subtleties of “voting with your feet” in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, first published in 1969, foresaw that technological advances would increase the likelihood of exit as a strategy for dealing with states in decline. He wrote, “Only as countries start to resemble each other because of the advances in communication and all-round modernization will the danger of premature and excessive exits arise.…”16 That is precisely what is happening. Information technology is rapidly diminishing many of the differences among jurisdictions, making exit a much more attractive option. Of course, “premature and excessive exits” in Hirschman’s vocabulary are understood from the point of view of what is optimal for the state being deserted. No doubt lords in medieval Europe believed that they suffered from “premature and excessive exits” of their serfs into towns where they achieved freedom.

To return to our earlier example, it is not as far-fetched as it might seem to suppose that there will be a number of ministates offering refuge to exiles fleeing the dying nation-states. These sovereignties will compete on terms and conditions of exile. Some, perhaps on the West Coast of North America, may well cater to people who do not smoke and are intolerant of secondhand smoke from those who do. Obviously, such regimes would not be popular with smokers. Rules banning their habit will seem an arbitrary imposition to many smokers.

In the industrial era of mass politics, such differences of opinion were fought out in political campaigns that ultimately forced one group or the other to abide by the wishes of the more powerful. But it is by no means essential that contentions about mutually exclusive choices be settled in a way that requires that the preferences of large numbers of people be suppressed.

Some individuals like to eat foie gras and others like hot dogs, and others still eat soya curd. They usually do not have to argue about their diet preferences because their culinary choices are not bound together. No one forces all to consume the same meal. Megapolitical conditions did, however, force common consumption of many kinds of collective and even private goods provided by governments in the industrial era. Why? Because there were great economic advantages to be captured by operating at a large scale. It was therefore impractical to divide sprawling jurisdictions into enclaves where everyone could have his own way, even on important items. The exclusionary approach to the provision of public goods argued by Adam Smith can be far more easily accommodated when the number of jurisdictions multiplies by ten or even a hundred times over. In the Information Age, growing numbers of sovereignties will be small enclaves rather than continental empires. Some may be North American Indian bands who will claim tax jurisdiction over their reservations and reserves much as they now claim the right to operate gambling casinos or to fish in defiance of limits.

Because information technology eliminates many of the drawbacks of devolving trading areas, it will be practical for the new sovereignties to operate more on the principles of clubs or affinity groups than those that governed territorial nation-states. Just as it is not crucial that every potential customer share the same taste in clothes, or watch the same television programs, it will be less important than it may seem that everyone agree with affinity points that define the governing style of fragmented sovereignties.

Widely dispersed tastes will result in widely divergent styles of fragmented sovereignty, much as there are increasingly wide choices in clothing style or television broadcasts. Some microstates may even be linked like hotel groups in franchises, or operate together to achieve advantages in police functions and other residual services of government. Those who like clean streets and resent finding gum under tabletops will find Singapore fetching. Fans of Beavis and Butthead won’t. Those who like wild nightlife will prefer Macao or Panama, or some similar place. Customers uncomfortable with mores in one jurisdiction will be welcomed in others. While Salt Lake City may be smokeless, the new city-state in Havana, perhaps renamed Monte Cristo, will probably be shrouded in a cloud of cigar smoke.

“It means that all of the monopolies and hierarchies and pyramids and power grids of industrial society are going to dissolve before this constant pressure of distributing intelligence to the fringes of all networks. Above all, Moore’s Law will overthrow the key concentration, the key physical conglomeration of power in America today: the big city—that big set of industrial cities that now lives on life-support systems—some $360 billion of direct subsidies from all the rest of us every year. Big cities are leftover baggage from the industrial era.”17 —GEORGE GILDER

A peculiar irony of the re-emergence of micro-sovereignties or “city-states” is that it may coincide with the emptying out of many cities. The large city was largely an artifact of industrialism in the West. It arose with the factory system to capture scale economies in the manufacture of products with high natural resource content.

When the nineteenth century opened, cities of more than 100,000 were considered huge, and outside of Asia, where population statistics were doubtful, there were no cities of more than a million persons. The largest city in the United States in 1800 was Philadelphia, with a population of 69,403. New York had just 60,489. Baltimore was the third largest city in America with 26,114 inhabitants.18 Most of what were to become the great metropolitan cities of Europe had populations that are tiny by twentieth-century standards. London, with a population of 864,845, was probably the biggest city in the world. Paris, with 547,756, was the only other city in Europe with more than half a million inhabitants in 1801.19 Lisbon’s population was 350,000.20 Vienna had a population of 252,000.21 Berlin had barely poked above 200,000 by 1819.22 Madrid was home to 156,670.23 The population of Brussels in 1802 was 66,297. Budapest had a population of just 61,000.24

There is an obvious temptation to think that the growth of big cities is a direct function of population growth. But this is not necessarily so. Every human on earth could be packed into Texas, with each family living in its own detached house with a yard, and still have some of Texas left over. As Adna Weber argued in the classic study The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century, population growth alone does not explain why people live in urban settings rather than dispersed in the countryside. In 1890, Bengal had about the same population density as England. Yet Bengal’s urban population was just 4.8 percent, while England’s was 61.7 percent.25

Historically, cities were walled off from the countryside to keep marauders and the lower classes out. The growth of industrial employment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries created big cities. Now the big city has become highly vulnerable to breakdown as industrialism has begun, to fade. The perfect marker of this development is Detroit, the leading industrial city of the mid-twentieth century. At one time, a large fraction of the world’s industrial output passed through Detroit. Now it is a hollowed-out shell, ridden by crime and disorder. In many blocks of downtown Detroit, one or more derelict buildings have been burned to the ground or torn down, leaving the impression that the city has survived a series of raids by World War II bombers.

Detroit stands as a reminder that many industrial cities are no longer viable. They will crumble away as information and ideas become more important factors imparting value than fabricating from natural resources. In many cases, the large city has already grown too large to support its own weight. To keep a metropolis functioning requires that a substantial number of support systems operate effectively at large scale. The very crowding together of millions of people implies a huge jump in vulnerability to crime, sabotage, and random violence. During the industrial era, the price of policing against these risks was repaid by the high-scale economies of production.

In the Information Age, only cities that repay their upkeep costs by offering a high quality of life will remain viable. Persons at a distance will no longer be obliged to subsidize them. A good marker for the viability of cities is whether those living at the core of the city are richer than those on its periphery. Buenos Aires, London, and Paris will remain inviting places to live and do business long after the last good restaurant closes in South Bend, Louisville, and Philadelphia.

23乡村国家Country States

中文译本

一些城邦可能仅仅是一块飞地,并没有附属的城市。所以,把它们看作是村庄国家或者乡村国家,可能更加合适。自然资源的天赋价值,将以新的方式体现出来。

如果你可以在任何地方做生意,那你很可能会选择风景优美的地方;在哪里你可以尽情地深呼吸,而不用担心致癌污染物。通讯技术将语言沟通的困难降到了最低,搬到任何环境宜人的地方,你都可以很容易在那里生活下去。人口稀少、气候温和、人均耕地资源丰富的地区,如新西兰和阿根廷,会比较有优势;因为它们的公共卫生标准很高,并且可生产低成本的食品与可再生产品。随着东亚和拉丁美洲数十亿人生活水平的提高,对这些产品需求的增加,会使这两个国家进一步受益。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Some city-states may prove to be merely enclaves with no cities attached. Perhaps they might be better thought of as village states or country states.

Natural resource endowments will be valued in different ways as well. When you can do business anywhere, you may well choose to do business in a beautiful place where you can breathe deeply without inhaling too much carcinogenic pollution. Communications technologies that minimize language difficulties will make it ever easier to abide almost anywhere that the environment is attractive. Thinly populated regions with temperate climates, and a large endowment of arable land per head, like New Zealand and Argentina, will also enjoy a comparative advantage because they enjoy high standards of public health and are low-cost producers of foods and renewable products. Such products will benefit from increased demand as the living standards of billions of people in East Asia and Latin America rise.

24不等价定理The Inequivalence Theorem

中文译本

经济学家关于人类行为的许多假设,都根植于地方的专制。一个明显的例子是李嘉图的“等价定理”,该定理认为,在一个存在巨额赤字的国家,公民会调整自己的预期,以备将来出现更高的税率去偿还债务。从这个意义上说,通过税收和通过债务为支出融资,二者具有“等价性”。至少在 19 世纪李嘉图写作时,具有这样的等价性。不过,在信息时代,面对为赤字融资而加税的前景,理性的人不会存更多的钱,他会转移自己的住所,或者把交易安排在其他地方。就像生产商会将供应商分类,以寻求最低的成本;同样的道理,这些人更有动力去寻找其他的供应商。这样做的好处,比起更换一个塑料管供应商获得的利润提升,简直是天上地下。可想而知,主权个人和其他具有理性的人,会从背负着巨额无准备金债务的国家中逃离。

在信息时代,负债少、要求客户支付的成本少,这样的廉价政府,将成为创造财富的首选之地。也就是说,在负债率低、政府已经重组过的地区,开展业务的商业前景更加有吸引力,如新西兰、阿根廷、智利、秘鲁、新加坡以及亚洲和拉丁美洲其他地区。与北美和西欧尚未改革、成本高企的经济体相比,这些地方是创业致富的优越平台。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Many of the assumptions of economists about behavior are rooted in the tyranny of place. A distinct example is Ricardo’s “Equivalence Theorem,” which suggests that citizens in a country that runs huge deficits will adjust their expectations in anticipation of higher tax rates needed in the future to retire the debt. In this sense, there is an “equivalence” between financing spending by taxation and through debt. At least there was such an equivalence in the early nineteenth century when Ricardo wrote. In the Information Age, however, the rational person will not respond to the prospect of higher taxes to fund deficits by increasing his savings rate; he will transfer his domicile, or lodge his transactions elsewhere. For the same reason that producers sort among suppliers in search of the lowest costs, they will be even more strongly motivated to seek alternative suppliers of protection. The benefits of doing so will dwarf the margins to be realized by shifting to a new supplier of plastic tubes. The result to be expected is that Sovereign Individuals and other rational people will flee jurisdictions with large unfunded liabilities.

Cheap governments that have few liabilities and impose low costs on customers will be the domiciles of choice for wealth creation in the Information Age. This implies much more attractive prospects for doing business in areas where indebtedness is low and governments have already been restructured, such as New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Singapore, and other parts of Asia and Latin America. These areas will also be superior platforms for doing business to unreformed, high-cost economies in North America and Western Europe.

25地方性价格异常将遭到侵蚀The Erosion of Local Price Anomalies

中文译本

信息成本的大幅下降,会使大部分的地方价格优势荡然无存。买家不仅可以搜索对比大量的商家,以寻找最低的价格;他们还可以通过远程服务,跨越国界去购物。即使那些很难分析的产品,人们也可以轻易地比较它们的特点,如保险。而且,它还可以规避当地许可程序对贸易的限制。因此,在任何的领域,只要它地方性的价格异常,可能被外来的信息和竞争所侵蚀,那么它的利润率都会下降。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Greatly reduced information costs will obviate most local pricing advantages. Not only will buyers be able to scan an immense number of outlets in search of the lowest prices on tradable goods; they will also be able to employ remote services to shop across jurisdictional boundaries. This will allow people to much more easily compare features of difficult-to-analyze products like insurance. And it will bypass restraints of trade imposed by local licensing procedures. Consequently, profit margins are likely to fall in any field where local price anomalies can be eroded by additional information and competition.

26新的组织要件NEW ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES

中文译本

在参与者之间的互动方式上,信息经济将与工业经济截然不同。企业利用高昂的交易和信息成本,而形成的长期组织优势,很多都将被信息技术所消解。信息时代将是“虚拟公司”的时代。

很多分析家,比我们更了解信息技术,但他们还完全没有看到,信息技术注定要变革经济组织的逻辑。这种新技术,不仅打破了边界和壁垒,它还彻底改变了计算的“内部”成本。少数企业,没有暴露在大规模的跨境竞争中,因而受到的影响较小。但即便如此,它们也会因为信息和通信技术的改进,而面临新的组织要求。迅速下降的信息和交易成本,将决定性地降低规模经济的效益;工业时代催生出长寿企业和终身雇佣制的激励机制,也将因此而失效。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The cybereconomy will significantly differ from the industrial economy in the way its participants interact. Information technology will dissipate many of the long-term organizational advantages of firms that arise from high transaction and information costs. The Information Age will be the age of the “virtual corporation.”

Many analysts more knowledgable than we are about information technology have utterly failed to see that it is destined to transform the logic of economic organization. Not only does the new technology transcend borders and barriers; it also revolutionizes the “internal” costs of computation. Even the few businesses that will not be affected by exposure to greater cross-border competition because of improving information and communication technology will be exposed to new organizational imperatives. Rapidly falling information and transaction costs will decisively lower economies to scale, voiding many of the incentives that gave rise to long-lived firms and career employment during the industrial period.

27为什么开公司?Why Firms?

中文译本

亚当·斯密等古典经济学家,在公司规模的问题上,几乎都保持着沉默。他们没有讨论过,什么影响了公司的最佳规模,为什么公司采取这样的形式,乃至公司为什么会存在。为什么企业家要雇佣员工,而不是把每一项工作任务放到拍卖市场,在独立承包商之间进行招标?诺贝尔经济学获奖者罗纳德·科斯3通过追问这些重要的问题,帮助开创了经济学的新方向。他提出的答案,暗示了信息技术对商业结构的革命性后果。科斯认为,公司是克服信息不足和交易成本高昂的有效途径。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The classical economists like Adam Smith were almost silent on the question of firm size. They did not address what influences the optimal size of firms, why firms take the form they do, or even why firms exist at all. Why do entrepreneurs hire employees, rather than placing every task that needs doing out to bid among independent contractors in the auction market? Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase helped launch a new direction in economics by asking some of these important questions. The answers he helped to frame hint at the revolutionary consequences of information technology for the structure of business. Coase argued that firms were an efficient way to overcome information deficits and high transaction costs.26

28信息和交易成本Information and Transaction Costs

中文译本

要理解这其中的原因,请想一下,在工业时代,你要运营一条流水线,如果没有公司协调各种活动的话,会面临重重障碍。原则上,不在单一公司的监制下集中生产,汽车也是造出来的。经济学家奥利弗·威廉姆森(Oliver Williamson),与科斯相并肩,是创新公司理论的另外一位先驱。威廉姆森定义了六种不同的公司经营与控制方式。其中一种是“企业家模式”,在这种模式下,每个工作站都由专家控制和运作。还有一种,威廉姆森称之为“联合工作站”,在这种模式下,“各种中间产品由每个工人跨越不同的阶段进行转移。”没有什么实际的理由可以说明,为什么成千上万的雇员不能被一群独立的承包商所取代,然后承包商在工厂里租下车间,竞标零件或其他服务,如组装车桥,或者把挡泥板焊接到底盘上。但是,如果你想找一家由独立承包商组织和经营的工业主义汽车厂,你肯定找不到。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

To see why, consider the obstacles you would have faced in trying to operate an industrial-era assembly line without a single firm to coordinate its activities. In principle, an automobile could have been produced without production being centralized under the oversight of a single firm. Economist Oliver Williamson, along with Coase, is another pioneer in developing the theory of the firm. Williamson defined six different methods of operation and control. Among them is the “entrepreneurial mode,” “wherein each workstation is owned and operated by a specialist.”27 Another is what Williamson calls the “federated workstations” in which “an intermediate product is transferred across stages by each worker.”28 There is no physical reason why the thousands of employees could not have been replaced by a gaggle of independent contractors, each renting space on the factory floor, bidding for parts, and offering to assemble the axle or weld the fenders onto the chassis. Yet you would look in vain for an example of an industrial-era automobile factory organized and run by independent contractors.

29协调问题Coordination Problems

中文译本

如果没有一家单独的公司进行协调,就开展大规模工业生产的话,会使经营所得的大部分经济利益消耗殆尽。要在许多家拼凑起来的小公司之间进行协调,会产生大量的交易问题,致使生产线失灵和停摆。这样一个系统要正常运作,各承包商之间必须不停地进行谈判。如此一来,大量的承包商和企业家将无心专注生产,不得不把时间和注意力浪费到确定零部件的价格,以及制定朝三暮四的交易条件上。就连监督生产这样简单的事,也会成为一个难题。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Operating an industrial facility without the benefit of coordination through a single firm would have dissipated most of the economies to be realized by operating on a large scale. Massive transaction problems in coordinating a patchwork quilt of small firms would have effectively deautomated the assembly line. To work at all, such a system would have necessitated nonstop negotiation among the individual contractors. Instead of focusing on production, the multitude of contractors or entrepreneurs would have had to divert time and attention to fixing prices of components and working out the terms of their own constantly changing interactions. Simply monitoring production would have been a difficult problem.

30行动的批准The Authority to Act

中文译本

这样一伙互相独立的组织,要是由他们来组装一台车,开发或重新设计汽车模型的话,只能是一场噩梦。可想而知,当设计师推出一种新的造型,他要说服数百家独立承包商接受零部件上的改变,要费多大的气力。在实践中,这基本需要全体一致的同意。任何人提出或反对修改产品规格,都会阻碍车型的改进,或提高车型导入成本,进而损害大规模经营的收益。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

With such a set of independent organizations struggling to assemble a car, creation and re-engineering of the models would have been a nightmare. You need only imagine the difficulty facing the designer in attempting to convince the hundreds of independent contractors on changes required to introduce a new model. In practice, almost unanimous consent would have been needed. Anyone holding out or objecting to any change in the specification of the product could either have effectively killed the model improvement or raised the cost of introducing it, thus further jeopardizing the gains from operating on a large scale.

31不必要的谈判Unnecessary Negotiation

中文译本

由独立承包商租用(或单独拥有)的装配线有很多弱点,而通过一家公司来进行运作,则可以有效地避免。数千人聚集在同一屋檐下,互相合作去制造某款产品,在这个过程中,个体承包商发生死亡、疾病或财务失败,都是司空见惯的事情。

当然,通过市场竞标,可以找到替代的承包商。但是,每一次替代都需要进行协商,例如,继任者要买断前任的业务等。此外,还要谈判工厂车间的租金并达成协议,或许还需要重新租赁焊接机或用于冲压尾灯插座的压力机。这些工作繁琐至极。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

An assembly line rented (or owned separately) by independent contractors would have been subject to numerous vulnerabilities avoided by operating within a single firm. The death, illness, or financial failure of individual contractors would have been an altogether too common occurrence in operations requiring the cooperation of thousands of people to build a single product under one roof. The auction market would certainly have been able to replace these contractors. But each succession would have required a negotiated settlement, such as a buyout of the previous operator by his replacement. It also would have required an agreement on assumption of the rental of the factory space, and perhaps a new lease on the welding machine or the press used for stamping out the taillight sockets. All of this would have been complicated.

32激励陷阱Incentive Traps

中文译本

在工业时代的生产条件下,独立承包商组成的装配线,还面临另外一个致命的难题,那就是各承包商的资本需求差别巨大。例如,生产仪表盘开关的塑料模具,就很便宜;而铸造发动机缸体或冲压金属挡泥挡的设备,则可能需要数百万美元。

在上一章我们分析过,流水线生产的资源含量占比高,而且特别强调顺序性,这不可避免会给高资本成本带来问题。承担资本密集型任务的承包商,基本需要依赖他方的合作来摊销投资成本。高资本要求的承包商能否筹集到资金,投入运营并获得盈利,主要取决于他们能否确保,会得到低资本要求参与者的合作。而在很多时候,他们得不到合作。

小公司有很强的动机去敲诈大公司。某些在流水线上操作特殊功能的承包商,投入的资金可能很少;在关键的时候,他们就会采取不合作的态度以谋取利益。就像罢工的工人一样,他们会以这样或那样的借口关闭生产线;自己付出的代价很小,但会给那些高资本投入者制造很大的痛苦。在整个生产过程中,会不断地发生这样的博弈,小本承包商利用阻挠产出的能力,向高资本承包商勒索赎金。小承包商从大承包商那里榨取附加费用的手法,会大大降低系统的效率。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Another crucial difficulty with an assembly line of independent contractors under the conditions of the Industrial Age was that capital requirements for the individual contractors would have differed dramatically. A plastic mold needed to produce a dashboard switch, for example, might have been relatively cheap, while the equipment needed to cast an engine block or stamp out the sheet metal on a fender could have cost millions. The high resource content and sequential nature of assembly-line production made problems arising from high capital costs inevitable, for reasons analyzed in the last chapter. Contractors with, capital-intensive tasks would have essentially been dependent upon the cooperation of others to amortize their investments. The ability of the contractors with higher capital requirements to raise money and operate at a profit would have depended upon their securing the cooperation of many other participants in the process whose capital costs were far lower. In many cases, they would not have gotten it.

There would have been a substantial incentive for the small to exploit the great. Those who required less money to operate their particular function on the assembly line would have gained by failing to cooperate at crucial times. Like striking workers, they could have closed down the assembly line on one pretext or another, imposing little cost on themselves but much grief to those with larger capital investments. The production process would have been subject to constant gaming, with small-scale contractors exposing those with higher capital costs to ransom through their ability to thwart output. The maneuvering of smaller contractors to extract side payments from the large would have reduced the efficiency of the system.

33公司的解决方案The Firm Solution

中文译本

总而言之,在工业时代,如果把生产分解给众多的个体承包商,那么,通过大规模的流水线经营所能收获的经济利益,大部分都会被消耗掉。单一的大企业可以有效克服这些弱点,尽管它也有自身的局限性。大企业充满官僚主义。但在某种程度上,官僚主义和等级制度正是工业时代所需要的。行政和管理团队负责生产监督与协调工作;大量的中层管理人员,将上级的命令向下传递,将其他信息向指挥系统反馈。公司的官僚体制还产生了簿记员和会计控制,并最大限度减少委托代理的问题——即员工未按公司的最佳利益行事。要在工业时代的条件下实现复杂的会计系统,需要很多人的工作。这样一套行政官僚机构,成本是惊人的;而且,无论生产是红火还是低迷,这个费用都要支付。所以,由于这些行政人员掌握着公司经营所需的关键知识,他们所获得的报酬,往往高于其技能在现货市场上的价格。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In short, many of the economies to be achieved during the industrial era by operating an assembly line on a large scale would have been dissipated if the production had been divided among multitudes of individual contractors. The single large firm was an efficient way of overcoming these drawbacks, notwithstanding its other limitations. Big business was bureaucratic. But to some extent bureaucracy and hierarchy were precisely what were required during the Industrial Age. Administrative and management teams monitored and coordinated production, with numerous middle managers passing orders down the hierarchy and other information back up the chain of command. The corporate bureaucracy also provided bookkeeping and accounting controls and minimized principal-agency problems, in which employees fail to act in the best interest of the firm that employs them. To achieve sophisticated accountancy under conditions of the Industrial Age required the work of many people. Having such an administrative bureaucracy in place was costly. It had to be paid whether production was active or slack. Because such administrators held crucial knowledge necessary to operate the business, they were usually paid a premium above what their skills would have commanded in the spot market.

34“组织性松懈”“Organizational Slack”

中文译本

大量的职业经理人和行政人员,都有一个问题:他们总想“俘虏”公司,以自己的利益为出发去经营公司,而不是为了股东的利益。例如,在工业时代,公司在置办高档办公家具、入会高级俱乐部等福利上,大手大脚的现象并不少见;这些福利往往由管理层享受,却未必能给投资者带去什么直接的回报。在一个复杂的企业中,很难通过外部监督发现,哪些间接开支属于必要,哪些属于员工的放纵和享受。此外,也很难防止相当一部分企业员工推卸责任。正是由于很难在技术上监督员工的表现,才产生了庞大的中层管理人员;但与此同时,监督监督者又成了一个难题。

这些问题造成了所谓的“组织性松懈”。这个词是理查德·赛特和詹姆斯·马奇(Richard Cyert & James March)发明的,出自 1963 年出版的《公司的行为理论》(A Behavioral Theory of the Firm)一书。

不管你有没有产出,报酬都是一样的。 不管你卖不卖力,报酬都是一样的。 不管你上不上心,报酬都是一样的。 —— 克里斯·德雷(CHRIS DRAY)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The large numbers of professional managers and administrators also had the drawback of tending to “capture” the firm and operate it in their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. It was not uncommon in the industrial era, for example, to find firms spending lavishly on office furnishings, club memberships, and other perks that could be enjoyed by management but that might not have generated a direct return to investors. In a complicated business, it was impossible to easily monitor from the outside which overhead expenditures were essential and which were indulgences for the employees. It was also difficult to prevent a sometimes considerable fraction of corporate employees from shirking. The fact that it was technologically difficult to monitor performance made a large middle management necessary, and at the same time made it difficult to monitor the monitors.

These conditions all contributed to what became known as “organizational slack,” a term coined in 1963 by Richard Cyert and James March in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.29 Careful examination suggested that numerous real firms were underperforming their potential substantially.

“Whether you produce results or not, the pay is the same. “Whether you work hard or not, the pay is the same. “Whether you care or not, the pay is the same.”30 —CHRIS DRAY

35那不是我的工作“That’s Not My Job”

中文译本

作为一种渴望永续经营的实体,大型工业企业有一个缺点,我们在前面讨论过,那就是容易受到工会的敲诈。它还有一些官僚主义的特征,虽然不像政府办公室里的那么夸张。在这些企业里,命令从高层向下流转,工作任务刻板陈腐并分门别类,每种任务都有严格的定义。各个工作种类之间的界限分明,简直就像管理高学识职业的卡特尔4所划定的。在工业时代,指望一个簿记员更换他桌上烧坏的灯泡,在很多人看来,就好像请律师帮你治感冒一样奇怪。人们不期望,在很多情况下甚至也不允许员工跨越严格划定的职能界限。

“那不是我的工作”,是一句广为流传的口号,它凸显了工业时代的“组织松懈”。

每个人的工作,都被精确为一种刻板陈规,绝不容僭越;即使这种僭越可能大幅提高生产效率。公司官僚机构中的每个雇员,都是根据一种“资格”被聘用的;据说这种“资格”可以预测员工特定的职能表现。除了少数人例外,员工的工资标准一般基于工作类别而制定,在整个组织里差不多都是统一的。而在大企业的行政管理阶层,工作业绩往往无法具体衡量,所以,他们的工作节奏非常休闲,和国家官僚机构一样。总之,企业确实获得了大规模生产的经济效益,但它在其他方面也付出了低效率的代价。

在市场中,你采取某些行动,不会是因为某些人告诉你要这样做,或者是因为战略计划书第 30 页上这么说。市场中是没有工作边界的……没有命令,也没有来自高层的信号翻译,没有人把工作分门别类,拆成几块。在市场中,你有的就是顾客;而供应商和顾客之间的关系,从根本上说是非组织性的,因为它发生在两个独立的实体之间。 —— 威廉·布里奇斯(WILLIAM BRIDGES)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

As an entity aspiring to permanence, the large industrial firm had the drawback we have already explored of being exposed to shakedowns by labor unions. It also shared some of the characteristics of bureaucracy seen in a more exaggerated form in government offices. Orders flowed from on high. Tasks were stereotyped and compartmentalized. These tasks were often rigidly defined. Boundaries emerged among job categories, akin to those enforced by the cartels regulating the learned professions. To have expected a bookkeeper to change a burned-out lightbulb in a lamp on his desk seemed as strange to many during the Industrial Age as calling on a lawyer to help cure your flu. Employees were neither expected, nor in many cases even permitted, to cross the compartmentalized boundaries between rigidly defined functions.

“That is not my job” was a widely heard slogan that underscored the “organizational slack” of the Industrial Age. Everyone’s job was precisely defined in terms of stereotyped tasks that were not to be trespassed upon, however much that might improve productivity. Each employee in the corporate bureaucracy was hired according to “qualifications” deemed likely to predict performance in his specific function. With few exceptions, everyone was paid based upon a job classification, with more or less uniform pay throughout the organization. Because specific performance in the administrative hierarchies of Big Business often went unmeasured, as in state bureaucracies, work proceeded at a leisurely pace. So while the firm did capture the scale economies of mass production, it did so at the cost of other inefficiencies.

“In a market, you don’t do something because somebody tells you to or because it is listed on page thirty of the strategic plan. A market has no job boundaries.… There are no orders, no translation of signals from on high, no one sorting out the work into parcels. In a market one has customers, and the relationship between a supplier and a customer is fundamentally nonorganizational, because it is between two independent entities.”31 —WILLIAM BRIDGES

36新的组织形式New Imperatives

中文译本

信息时代的大政治条件,将彻底地改变企业组织的逻辑。这其中的一部分是显而易见的。即使不论其他方面的作用,信息技术也将大幅降低信息处理、计算和分析的成本。它带来的影响之一,就是将降低雇佣大量中层管理人员进行生产监督的必要性。而事实上,先进的计算能力,会在很多方面,使自动化的机器工具取代小时工。即使在那些还离不了人的生产阶段,控制与协调的操作也基本实现了自动化。比起管理人员,安装了微处理器的设备能更好地监督流水线的作业。这些新型设备,不仅可以测量人们工作的速度和准确度,还可以自动编制账目,在零部件从库存中取出的那一刻,就可以同时下单订购。今天最小规模的企业,也用得起财务控制软件;这些软件核算财务的速度和精确程度,是那些经营数十年的大型企业,倾尽其等级制度的全力也难以达到的水平。

我们在前面讨论过,信息技术减少了产品中的自然资源含量,并有利于分散的、非顺序性的生产输出,这将大大降低企业面临敲诈博弈时的脆弱程度。信息技术的这些特点,会使企业更乐意将以前雇员的职能,给外包出去。除此之外,资本成本更低,产品周期更短,独立承包商本身——包括一人公司,都拥有自己可支配的超级信息网络,都将加强这种趋势。不用多久,他们将使用一系列数字助理来执行办公职能,从接电话到秘书服务。数字仆人将扮演秘书、广告代理人、旅行社助理、银行出纳及政府官僚的角色。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The new megapolitical conditions of the Information Age will significantly alter the logic of business organization. Part of this is obvious. If information technology does nothing else, it dramatically lowers the cost of processing, computing, and analyzing information. One effect of such technology is to reduce the necessity of hiring large numbers of middle managers to monitor production processes. Indeed, automated machine tools made possible by advanced computational power are in many cases replacing hourly workers. And where the production process continues to be manned, the control and coordination process has largely been automated. Equipment fitted with microprocessors can monitor the progress of the assembly line much more effectively than managers ever could. Not only can the new equipment measure the speed and accuracy with which people work, it can also automatically compile accounts, and reorder components the moment they are taken out of inventory. The smallest operations can now afford financial control programs that account for their finances with greater speed and sophistication than even the largest corporations could have achieved through their production hierarchies a few decades ago.

The fact that information technology allows for dispersed, nonsequential output of products with reduced natural resource content dramatically reduces the vulnerability to gaming and extortion, as we have already explored. However, these are not the only characteristics of information technology that make it ever more attractive to contract out functions formerly done by employees. Capital costs are lower. Product cycles are shorter. The independent contractors themselves, including the one-person firms, have vastly more sophisticated information networks at their disposal. Soon they will be able to rely upon an array of digital servants to perform a wide variety of office functions, from answering the phone to secretarial services. Digital servants will be secretaries, advertising agents, travel agents, bank tellers, and bureaucrats.

37好工作的消失The Disappearance of Good Jobs

中文译本

在信息时代,能够创造重大经济价值的人,越来越有能力保留自己创造的大部分财富。大多数从事辅助支持工作的雇员,过去吸收了企业中主要收入创造者贡献的大部分收入,将来会被低成本的自动代理和信息系统所取代。这意味着,一个企业不在内部保留某些职能,而是将其外包出去,更能够保证他们提供的服务质量是最好的。因为在企业内部,要对某些表现出色的员工进行奖励,相对来说更加困难。通过消除组织,虚拟公司将消除大部分的“组织性松懈”。

“好工作”将成为明日黄花。所谓的“好工作”,就像普林斯顿大学的经济学家奥利·阿森费尔特(Orly Ashenfelter)所说,就是报酬高于价值的工作。在工业时代,大量“好工作”的存在,是因为信息与交易的成本都很高。公司越来越大,其职能范围也越来越广,因为这样有利于获得规模经济效益。公司的膨胀,也得到了税法的补贴。在工业时代后期,高税收占据了主导地位,这人为地放大了长寿公司以及终身雇员制的优势。在大多数国家,税法以及相关的规章制度,大大提高了以项目为基础去组建和解散公司的成本。它们还往往迫使企业家,把独立承包商也归为企业的雇员。法律的干预,使得解雇一名员工的成本很高,也很难,不管他对企业的贡献多么微不足道;这进一步暂时性地扩大了“好工作”的供应。

这几乎是必然的,因为工业时代企业组织的特性,那些最具才华和能力的员工,虽然为组织创造了超额的增值收入,但他们所获得的报酬比例,肯定远低于其贡献的价值。这种情况在信息时代将发生改变。

微处理革命,正在急剧增加信息的可获得性,并大幅降低交易成本。这将使企业的职能分解。公司不再是长久性的官僚机构,而是将围绕着项目进行组织,就像电影公司在运用的方式。以前属于公司“内部”的大部分职能,都将外包给独立承包商。工业时代那些占据着“好工作”职位,但毫无建树,主要靠同事“掩护”的员工,很快就会发现,他们要在现货市场上进行工作竞标。很多忠诚、勤奋的员工也面临同样的命运。好工作将会过时,因为工作本身都将成为不合时宜的东西。

日本的大公司有一些极端的现象,员工会得到一份终身的工作。即使没有什么生产任务,他们也会被留用,有时候只是到“工厂角落里一张光秃秃的桌子边”坐着。不过,即使在日本,臃肿的白领劳动力也正在被裁减。《国际先驱导报》一篇报道的标题,点出了这一点:《酸楚悲哀的分离:日本终身职位的文化在痛苦中到头了》。

在后工业时代,工作就是你做的任务,而不是你“拥有”的什么东西。在工业时代以前,长久职业是闻所未闻的。就像威廉·布里奇斯所说:“1800 年以前,在很多情况下,工作指的都是一些特定的任务或项目,从来不是指一个组织中的角色或职位……在 1700 年到 1890 年之间,《牛津英语词典》中有很多术语的用法,像车夫工作(JOB)、医生工作、花匠工作,都是指一次性雇佣的人。而另一个经常使用的词汇‘工作’(WORK),是指偶尔的工作,也不是固定的就业。”所以,以前的大部分任务,变成了企业内部的职位,作为一种降低信息和交易成本的权宜之计;到信息时代,这些任务将迁移回现货市场。由于信息技术的发展,“及时地”控制库存和外包,是完全切实可行的。这是工作岗位走向死亡的起始步骤。像 AT&T 这样的大公司,已经取消了所有固定的工作种类,它的很多职位现在都是临时性的。用布里奇斯的话说,“就业又变得临时性了,工作因情景而定,工种间的界限正在消失。”在网络经济的新天地,“独立承包人”将跨越各大洲远程办公,在信息时代的流水线上协同工作。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

To an increasing degree, individuals capable of creating significant economic value will be able to retain most of the value they create for themselves. Support staff that previously absorbed a large part of the revenue generated by the principal income creators in an enterprise will be replaced by low-cost automated agents and information systems. This implies that an organization will be better able to assure itself of the highest quality of service by contracting it out, rather than by keeping the function within the firm, where it will be relatively more difficult to reward individuals for performing a task well. A virtual corporation will eliminate most “organizational slack” by eliminating the organization.

“Good jobs” will be a thing of the past. A “good job,” as Princeton economist Orly Ashenfelter put it, “is a job that pays more than you are worth.”32 In the Industrial Age, many “good jobs” existed because of high information and transaction costs. Firms grew bigger and internalized a wider range of functions because doing so allowed them to capture scale economies. Corporate bloat was also subsidized by tax laws. The high taxes that predominated in the late stages of the industrial era artificially magnified the advantages of forming a long-lived firm and hiring permanent employees. In most nations, tax laws and regulations substantially raised the costs of forming and dissolving firms on a project basis. They also have tended to force entrepreneurs to subsume independent contractors as employees. Legal interventions further temporarily inflated the supply of “good jobs” by making it costly and difficult to dismiss an employee, however little he might be contributing to the productivity of the firm.

Inevitably and logically, the character of business organization in the industrial era assured that the most highly skilled and talented people who created a disproportionate share of the value-added in an organization were paid proportionately less than their contribution was worth. This will change in the Information Age.

The microprocessing revolution is sharply increasing the availability of information and reducing transaction costs. This is devolving the firm. Instead of permanent bureaucracy, activities will be organized around projects, in much the way that movie companies already operate. Most of the formerly “internal” functions of the firm will be outsourced to independent contractors. The industrial-era employees who held “good jobs” but who contributed little and relied upon fellow workers to “cover” for them will soon find themselves bidding for contracts in the spot market. And so will many loyal, diligent employees. “Good jobs” will be an anachronism because jobs in general will be anachronistic.

In the extreme case of big Japanese corporations, employees expected to have a job for life. Even where they had no productive task to perform, they would be retained, sometimes merely showing up to sit at “a bare desk in the corner of a factory.” Now even in Japan, the bloated white-collar workforce is being downsized. The headline of a story in the International Herald-Tribune told the tale: “Parting Is Such Sour Sorrow: Japan’s Job-for-Life Culture Painfully Expires.”33

In the postindustrial period, jobs will be tasks you do, not something you “have.” Before the industrial era, permanent employment was almost unknown. As William Bridges put it, “Before 1800—and long after in many cases—job always referred to some particular task or undertaking, never to a role or position in an organization.… Between 1700 and 1890, the Oxford English Dictionary finds many uses of terms like job-coachman, job-doctor, and job-gardener—all referring to people hired on a one-time basis. Job-work (another frequent term) was occasional work, not regular employment.”34 In the Information Age, most tasks that were formerly captured within firms as an expedient to reduce information and transaction costs will migrate back to the spot market. “Just in time” inventory control and outsourcing are both practical because of information technology. They are steps toward the death of jobs. Already, major corporations such as AT&T have eliminated all permanent job categories. Positions in that large firm are now contingent. In Bridges’s words, “Employment is becoming temporary and situational again, and categories are losing their boundaries.”35 In the new cybereconomy, “independent contractors” will telecommute across continents to nest together on the Information Age equivalent of the assembly line.

38好莱坞模式接管Hollywood Takes Over

中文译本

在未来的信息经济中,企业组织的典范可能是电影制作公司。这种公司会非常复杂,运营预算高达数亿美元。虽然它们操作的都是大型业务,但其实它们也是临时性的组织。一家电影公司制作一部上亿美元的电影,整个团队也许只在一起工作一年的时间,然后就解散了。参与制作的尽管都才华横溢,但他们不会认为,参与项目就等于找到了一份“长期工作”。项目结束后,灯光师、摄像师、音响师、服装师将各奔东西。他们也许会在下一个项目中重逢,也许不会。

随着规模经济效应的下降,很多信息密集型的商业活动,所要求的运营资本也同时下降,如此一来,企业会有强烈动机进行职能分解。公司运营会变得更加专项性与暂时性;更多企业会趋向于短期存在。为特定的目的把人才集结到一起的虚拟公司,会比长期存续的公司更有效率。随着加密技术的普及,资本税在竞争下被迫降低,维持公司“长久”存续的人工规模经济将不复存在。不管减税的速度是快还是慢,这种趋势无可阻挡。如果减得快,以项目为基础的运作方式的人为成本也会很快消失;如果减得慢,已经不合时宜的高额税负,将主要落在现有企业身上。而新型企业将以虚拟公司的形式运作,它们可以更好地逃避,垂死民族国家所施加的沉重负担。

在信息经济中,特殊的技能与天赋将前所未有地重要,但是大部分职业间的人为界限也将被打破。在先进的信息检索和存储技术下,法律、医学和会计等行业的商业秘密和专业信息,将为所有人所用。记忆作为一种技能的经济价值将下降,而信息的综合与创造性应用将更加重要。

这种变革的全部影响,会被陈腐的监管所延缓。但长久来看,政府对网络经济的监管将不断枯萎,直至消失。任何人为的职业垄断和监管,提高了经营成本又未能创造市场价值,最后会遭到人们的唾弃。信息经济的变革还有其他诸多层面的影响:

那些施加过高成本的地方性法规,将被迫转向更市场化的基础。

高附加值的商业活动,原则上可以在任何地方开展;这会使各管辖区之间展开激烈的竞争。更好的落脚点,总会是下一个。

商业关系的开展,会更依赖于“信任圈”。有了加密技术,个人有能力在不被发现的情况下进行偷窃,所以,诚实会成为商业伙伴倍加重视的个人品质。

由于某些信息更加容易获得,专利和版权制度会发生革新。

保护会越来越倚重于技术,而不是司法。下层阶级会被隔离在围墙之外,封闭式社区的兴起将不可避免。在中央权威薄弱的时代,把麻烦制造者挡在墙外,是一种传统的也是有效的保护方式,可以尽量降低暴力犯罪的威胁。

大宗商品会像中世纪那样被课以重税,并主要在本地范围内运输;而奢侈品的税收则很轻,可以运到很远的地方。

警察的职能将越来越多地由私人安保团队承担,后者往往会与商人协会建立联系。

在过渡阶段,私营公司相较上市公司可能更具优势,因为在逃避政府强制征收方面,私营公司享有更大的回旋余地。

“工作”会越来越多地成为任务或“计件工作”,而不再是组织内一个职位;相应地,终身雇佣的现象将消失。

经济资源的控制权,会从国家转移到能力超群的人手里;因为向产品中注入知识,会使创造财富越来越容易。

许多高学识职业的从业者,将被交互式信息检索系统所代替。

智力较低的人会慢慢发展出新的生存策略,包括更加集中发展休闲技能、体育技能和犯罪技能,以及为越来越多的主权个人进行服务,因为各管辖区内部的收入不平等会愈加严重。

在暴力回报率不断上升时期成长起来的政治体系,必将经历痛苦的调整。在今天,对于一个系统,相比它所掌握的权力的规模,效率越来越重要。小规模、高效率的主权国家,能以较低的成本为客户提供更多的保护,将更具有可持续性。和中世纪时期一样,暴力组织中的规模不经济现象,正再次加剧。在共产主义垮台后,主权实体的数量不断增加,已经证明了这一点。我们预计随着信息时代的逻辑被经验所证实,世界上的主权数量会暴涨。

权力将再次回归小规模运行。飞地和省区会发现,在为“客户”提供主权服务方面,它们甚至比那些跨越大洲的国家更具竞争优势。这种情形与已经时日不多的现代时期截然不同。在现代时期,任何实体,除非它掌握了足以控制一个王国的军事力量,否则绝不可能生存。在过去,当权力的形式存在规模不经济时,那些从保护中获益最多的人,如中世纪晚期城邦中的富商,确实控制了政府。在我们看来,你可以再次找到这样的形式。随着掠夺性税负的降低,加上资源的高效配置,那些确实由客户控制地方主权的地区,数量应会迅速增加。

接下来我们将会探讨,面对大批失利者的反对,这些变革究竟能否、或是否应该继续推进。这将是信息时代最大的争议之一。

Beavis and Butthead,MTV 卡通剧。

译注:南本德(South Bend)是美国印第安纳州北部城市,曾是典型工业城市,后长期经历人口流失与产业转型。

译注:罗纳德·科斯(Ronald Coase)是新制度经济学的重要代表人物,以“科斯定理”著称。

译注:卡特尔(cartel)指企业通过协定限制竞争、操纵价格或产量的垄断联盟。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The model business organization of the new information economy may be a movie production company. Such enterprises can be very sophisticated, with budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars. While they are often large operations, they are also temporary in nature. A movie company producing a film for $100 million may come together for a year and then dissolve. While the people who work on the production are talented, they have no expectation that finding work on the project is equivalent to having a “permanent job.” When the project is over, the lighting technicians, cameramen, sound engineers, and wardrobe specialists will go their separate ways. They may be reunited in another project, or they may not.

As scale economies fall, and capital requirements for many types of information-intensive activities fall simultaneously, there will be a strong incentive for firms to dissolve. Business operations will be more ad hoc and temporary. Firms will tend to be more short-lived. Virtual corporations that assemble talents for specific purposes will be more efficient than long-standing companies. As encryption becomes widespread and the taxation of capital is forced down by competition, artificial scale economies that sustain the existence of “permanent” firms will fall away. This will happen whether taxes are reduced rapidly or slowly. If rapidly, the artificial costs of functioning on a project basis will disappear more quickly. If slowly, the main burden of paying the anachronistically high taxes will fall upon existing firms, while new enterprises will operate as virtual corporations, better enabling them to escape costly burdens imposed by the dying nation-state.

While special skills and talents will be more important than ever in the information economy, most of the artificial boundaries between professions will dissolve. Advanced information and retrieval storage technologies will make the trade secrets and specialized information of professions such as law, medicine, and accounting available to anyone. The economic value of memorization as a skill will fall, while the importance of synthesis and creative application of information will rise.

The full implications of this change will be retarded by antiquated regulation. But over the longer term, the power of governments to regulate the cybereconomy will wither to the vanishing point. Any artificial regulation of professional monopolies that raises costs without benefits that are valued in the market will ultimately be ignored.

There are other implications of the shift to an information economy:

Local regulations that impose higher costs will be transformed to a market footing.

There will be intensified competition among jurisdictions to domicile high value-added activities that in principle could be located anywhere. No stopping place is necessarily more compelling than the next.

Business relations will gravitate toward reliance upon “circles of trust.” Due to encryption, which gives individuals an ability to steal undetected, honesty will be a more highly valued characteristic of business associates.

Patent and copyright regimes will change, due to ease of access to certain information.

Protection will become increasingly technological rather than juridical. The lower classes will be walled out. The move to gated communities is all but inevitable. Walling out troublemakers is an effective as well as traditional way of minimizing criminal violence in times of weak central authority.

Bulk goods will be heavily taxed and shipped locally, as in the Middle Ages, while luxury goods will be lightly taxed and shipped a great distance.36

Police functions will increasingly be taken up by private guards linked to merchant associations.

There may be a transitional advantage to private over publicly traded firms because private firms will enjoy greater leeway in escaping costs imposed by governments.

Lifetime employment will disappear as “jobs” increasingly become tasks or “piece work” rather than positions within an organization.

Control over economic resources will shift away from the state to persons of superior skills and intelligence, as it becomes increasingly easy to create wealth by adding knowledge to products.

Many members of learned professions will be displaced by interactive information-retrieval systems.

New survival strategies for persons of lower intelligence will evolve, involving greater concentration on development of leisure skills, sports abilities, and crime, as well as service to the growing numbers of Sovereign Individuals as income inequality within jurisdictions rises.

Political systems that grew up at a time when there were rising returns to violence must undergo wrenching adjustments. Now that efficiency is growing in importance relative to the magnitude of power commanded by a system, small, efficient sovereignties, which produce more protection for their customers at lower cost, will be increasingly sustainable.

As in the medieval period, there are once again growing diseconomies of scale in the organization of violence. This is already reflected in the growing number of sovereign entities since the fall of Communism. We expect the number of sovereignties in the world to multiply rapidly as the logic of the Information Age is confirmed by experience.

Power will once again be exercised on a small scale. Enclaves and provinces may even find that they have substantial advantages over nations spanning continents in offering competitive terms to their “customers” for sovereignty services. This will be very different from the rapidly dying modern period, in which no entity could survive unless it could control military force sufficient to control a kingdom. In the past, when there were diseconomies of scale in exercising power, those who benefited most from the protection, like the wealthy merchants in the late medieval city-states, did control the government. In our view, you can look for something like this again. The lowering of predatory burdens and more efficient disposition of resources should result in rapid growth in areas where customers do exercise control over the local sovereignties.

As we explore next, whether these developments can or should proceed in the face of opposition from legions of losers will be among the more important controversies of the Information Age.