BILINGUAL READING · 第09章

民族主义与新卢德主义反弹

CHAPTER 9 NATIONALISM, REACTION, AND THE NEW LUDDITES

桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。

导读 本章论证

  • 旧制度的受益者和在转型中下行的群体不会被动接受变化。
  • 民族主义能够利用内群体认同,将资本或人才退出描绘为背叛。
  • 对技术的抵抗未必表现为砸毁机器,也可能表现为监管、税收、舆论和政治动员。

01开篇Opening

中文译本

当然,民族主义在本质上是荒谬的。为什么生而为美国人、阿尔巴尼亚人、苏格兰人或斐济人——无论幸与不幸,都要被强加一种忠诚;这种忠诚统治了个人的生活,构建了一种社会,并使之在形式上与其他社会相冲突。在过去,存在地方对家族、氏族和部落的忠诚,存在地方对领主或地主、对王朝或领土战争的义务,但主要的忠诚是对宗教、对上帝或神王,也可能是对皇帝,或对类似这样的文明。当时没有国家,有的是对乡土——祖宗之地——的依恋或情怀;但在现代之前,谈论民族主义是不合时宜的。 —— 威廉·普法夫(WILLIAM PFAFF)

IBM 的官方网站1说“世界正在变小”,是一个信息量很大的说法,像 IBM 的广告公司这样有声望的机构,又进一步加强了它。他们为 IBM网络创作的多元文化广告,“小小星球的解决之道”,提醒那些尚未觉察的体育迷们,分散在世界各国的人们,他们之间的关系已经被技术所改变。就这一变化的影响,我们参考了杰出的历史学家威廉·麦克尼尔(William McNeill)的一个脚注,很有价值。他说:“通信和运输的不断加强,不但不利于国家的巩固,反而开始起反作用;因为它们的运作范围超越了现有政治和民族的界限。”随着世界的“变小”和通信的变强,“偶然的”及“本质上荒谬的”国家和民族主义,都必将被削弱。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

“Nationalism, of course, is intrinsically absurd. Why should the accident—fortune or misfortune—of birth as an American, Albanian, Scot, or Fiji Islander impose loyalties that dominate an individual life and structure a society so as to place it in formal conflict with others? In the past there were local loyalties to place and clan and tribe, obligations, to lord or landlord, dynastic or territorial wars, but primary loyalties were to religion, God or god-king, possibly to emperor, to a civilization as such. There was no nation. There was attachment to patria, land of one’s fathers, or patriotism, but to speak of nationalism before modern times is anachronistic.”1 —WILLIAM PFAFF

http://www.ibm.com To say that the “world is getting smaller” is an informing figure of speech, reinforced by authorities as prestigious as IBM’s advertising agency. Their “Solutions for a small planet” multicultural commercials for the Internet remind sports fans who may fail to realize it on their own that the terms of relations between individuals in widely dispersed jurisdictions have been changed by technology. We refer to the distinguished historian William McNeill for a useful footnote on the implications. He writes, “Continuing intensification of communications and transport, instead of favoring national consolidation, has begun to work in a contrary sense, inasmuch as its range transcends existing political and ethnic boundaries.”2 As the world “becomes smaller” and communications improve, the accidental and “intrinsically absurd” claims of nations and nationalism are bound to weaken.

02大变革THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

中文译本

这种预期是合理,但问题在于,过去所有的历史告诉我们,它不可能以合理的方式得以实现。它所预示的转型涉及一场危机。应对这场危机,需要一种全新的思维方式,一种超越了民族主义和民族国家的、对社会的全新想象。正如迈克尔·比利格(Michael Billig)所强调的,“我们对民族性(nationhood)的信念,以及对属于一个国家的自然性(naturalness)的信念,”是“一个特定历史时期的产物”。

这个时期,即现代时期,可能已经失灵了。它的主要机构,即民族国家,则依然存在;但它们生存的地基已被严重侵蚀,摇摇欲坠。当另外一只靴子落地,当民族国家崩溃时,我们估计会产生可怕的后果,特别是富裕国家;在这些国家,20世纪的“国民经济”为非熟练工人提供了高收入。

我们相信,当一切进入轨道时,信息技术所引起的大政治条件的变化,会导致翻天覆地的制度变革。本书的论点是,民族国家所享有的大规模权力,注定将被私有化和商业化。和所有激进的制度变革一样,主权的私有化和商业化,关乎一场理解世界运作方式的“常识”革命。这样的革命,很少以渐进的、线性的方式发生。事实恰恰相反,几乎不存在这种可能,原因我们在《大清算》中讨论过。我们预计信息时代会导致突变——与过去的体制和意识的急剧决裂。以下是在此过程中需要关注的地方:

由于微处理技术的影响,经济组织发生了前面几章所描述的相关变化。

所有局限于地理边界以内,不能超越边界运作的组织,其重要性或多或少都将被迅速削弱。在信息时代,政府、工会、有执照的职业和游说者的重要性,都将低于工业时代。因为从政府手里争取的商贸利益,其价值将大打折扣;浪费在游说上的资源也将大幅减少。

更多人意识到民族国家已经过时,全球各地普遍上演要求独立的分离运动。

传统精英的地位和权力将下降;把民族国家合理化的符号与信仰,其受尊重的程度也将下降。

当那些丧失地位、收入和权力的人开始认为,他们的“日常生活”,被政治权力的下放和新型市场配置方式而破坏时,一场激烈甚至暴力的民族主义反应,就会以这些人为中心而爆发。这种反应包括: - 怀疑和反对全球化、自由贸易、“外国”所有权及其对当地经济的渗透。 - 敌视移民,尤其是与原民族群体明显不同的异族移民。 - 普通民众仇视信息精英、富人及受过良好教育的人,抱怨资本外逃与工作岗位的消失。 - 民族主义者采取极端措施,意图组织个人或地区从摇摇欲坠的民族国家中分离出去,包括诉诸战争和种族清洗,以加强对国家的民族主义认同,并把国家对人民和资源的占有合理化。

显然,信息技术有助于主权个人从国家权力下逃离,所以,对强制力崩溃的反应还包括,这些新技术以及使用新技术的人,将遭到新卢德主义的攻击。

在不同的地区和人口群体中,民族主义卢德分子的反应是不一样的: - 在快速增长的经济体中,反应将不那么强烈,因为在工业时代,这些经济体的人均收入较低,而市场的深化提高了所有技能群体的收入。 - 在目前的富裕国家,反动情绪会最为强烈,特别是在那些过去享受着高收入、但既不掌握什么技能又不贡献什么价值的群体占比较高的社会。 - 尽管会有“独行炸弹客”,但新卢德派的大部分追随者,将来自于先进民族国家中收入能力最低的三分之二人口中。 - 民族主义和卢德派中反应最为激烈的,不是那些穷困潦倒的人,而是掌握了中等技能的阶层,他们是在工业时代成长起来的,面临着向下流动的威胁。

随着新的大政治条件孕育出新的身份意识,以及与之配套的新的意识形态和道德观念,民族主义过时的要求就会失去吸引力。

民族主义的反动情绪会在新千年的早期几十年达到顶峰,然后随着事实证明,分散的主权在效率上远远优于民族国家的大规模权力运作,这种反动就会消退。我们相信,民族国家生性而来的对其他国家的霸凌行径,如俄罗斯入侵车臣,会使民族和民族主义的狂热者,失去在信息时代大政治条件下成长起来的新生代的同情。

民族国家最终会在财务危机中崩溃。当失败的机构不断面临支出上升和收入 下降时,通常都会爆发系统性危机。随着 21 世纪初退休福利和医疗支出的膨胀, 这种情况势必给领先的民族国家造成威胁。就在我们写作的时候,英国和美国都 背负着几十亿美元无准备金的养老金负债(在人均可比的基础上),且都无法收 拾。其他主要国家也面临着同样的破产负担。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The trouble with this reasonable expectation is that all previous history suggests that it cannot be accommodated in a reasonable way. The transition it implies will involve a crisis. It entails a radically new way of thinking, a new imagining of community that moves beyond nationalism and the nation-state. As Michael Billig has highlighted, “our beliefs about nationhood, and about the naturalness of belonging to a nation,” are “the products of a particular historical age.”3 That age, the Modern Age, may already be defunct. Its predominant institutions, nation-states, still endure, but they survive precariously upon an eroded foundation. As the other shoe drops, and nation-states collapse, we expect a nasty reaction, particularly in the wealthy countries where the “national economy” brought high income to unskilled work in the twentieth century.

We believe that when all is said and done, the change in megapolitical conditions occasioned by the advent of information technology will result in radical institutional change. The thesis of this book is that the massed power of the nation-state is destined to be privatized and commercialized. Like all truly radical institutional change, the privatization and commercialization of sovereignty will involve a revolution in the “common sense” of the way the world is comprehended. Such change seldom happens in a gradual, linear way. To the contrary. Indeed, for reasons we explored in The Great Reckoning, it is practically ruled out. We expect the Information Age to bring discontinuities—sharp breaks with the institutions and the consciousness of the past. Here is what to look for as the process unfolds:

Changes in economic organization of the kind described in previous chapters arising from the impact of microprocessing.

A more or less rapid falloff in importance of all organizations that operate within rather than beyond geographic boundaries. Governments, labor unions, licensed professions, and lobbyists will be less important in the Information Age than they became during the Industrial Age. Because favors and restraints of trade wrested from governments will be less useful, fewer resources will be wasted in lobbying.4

Wider recognition that the nation-state is obsolete, leading to widespread secession movements in many parts of the globe.

A decline in the status and power of traditional elites, as well as a decline in the respect accorded the symbols and beliefs that justify the nation-state.

An intense and even violent nationalist reaction centered among those who lose status, income, and power when what they consider to be their “ordinary life” is disrupted by political devolution and new market arrangements. Among the features of this reaction: suspicion of and opposition to globalization, free trade, “foreign” ownership and penetration of local economies;

hostility to immigration, especially of groups that are visibly different from the former national group;

popular hatred of the information elite, rich people, the well-educated, and complaints about capital flight and disappearing jobs;

extreme measures by nationalists intent upon halting the secession of individuals and regions from faltering nation-states, including resort to wars and acts of “ethnic cleansing” that reinforce nationalist identification with the state and rationalize the state’s claims on people and their resources.

Since it will be obvious that information technologies facilitate the escape of Sovereign Individuals from the power of the state, the reaction to the collapse of compulsion will also include a neo-Luddite attack on these new technologies and those who use them.

The nationalist-Luddite reaction will not be uniform across regions and population groups: The reaction will be less intense in rapidly growing economies where per capita income was low during the industrial era, and where the deepening of markets raises incomes among all skill groups.

Reactionary sentiments will be most intensely felt within the currently rich countries, and especially in communities with high percentages of the value-poor and skill-poor who previously enjoyed high incomes.I

The Unabomber notwithstanding, the neo-Luddites will attract most of their adherents among those in the bottom two-thirds of earnings capacity within the populations of leading nation-states.

The nationalist and Luddite reaction will be strongest, however, not among the very poor but among persons of middling skills, under-achievers with credentials, who came of age during the industrial era and face downward mobility.

As new megapolitical conditions give rise to a new consciousness of identity, along with new, complementary ideologies and morality, the old imperatives of nationalism will lose their appeal.

The nationalist reaction will peak in the early decades of the new millennium, then fade as the efficiency of fragmented sovereignties proves superior to the massed power of the nation-state. We suspect that the congenital bullying by nation-states of alternative jurisdictions, exemplified by the Russian invasion of Chechnya, will tend to deprive nations and nationalist fanatics of the sympathy of the new generations that come to maturity under the megapolitical conditions of the Information Age.

The nation-state will ultimately collapse in fiscal crisis. Systemic crises typically arise when failing institutions suffer from rising expenses and falling income—a situation that is bound to beset the leading nation-states as retirement benefits and medical outlays balloon early in the twenty-first century. As we write, both the United Kingdom and the United States are burdened with multitrillion-dollar unfunded pension liabilities (comparable on a per capita basis) that neither is likely to tame. Other leading nation-states face similarly bankrupting burdens.

03与文艺复兴的相似之处PARALLELS WITH THE RENAISSANCE

中文译本

保姆式国家崩溃的后果,与 500 年前圣母教会垄断体制的崩溃所产生的结果一样;在前面我们简要阐述过其中的原因。而与今天的民族国家不同,当时 的教会,在数百年的时间里,都处于不受挑战的优势地位。在某些方面,教会的 地位比 500 年后的国家更加稳固。长久以来,教会一直宣称自己是“基督社会之 首的普遍权威”;这是中世纪思想史学家约翰·莫拉尔(John B. Morrall)的描述。

然而,尽管在 1490 年的技术革命之前,很少有欧洲人质疑教会在基督教世界中 至高无上的地位;但在革命之后,教会的传统角色勉强生存了一代人的时间。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

We previously outlined reasons for thinking that the collapse of the nanny state will have consequences closely parallelling those associated with the collapse of the institutional monopoly of the Holy Mother Church five centuries ago. Not unlike the nation-state today, the Church then had been in a position of unchallenged predominance for centuries. In some respects, the Church was even more firmly established than the state became five hundred years later. The Church had long claimed to act as “the universal authority at the head of Christian society.”5 That is the characterization of medieval intellectual historian John B. Morrall. Yet while few Europeans would have disputed the Church’s claim to supremacy in Christendom before the technological revolution of the 1490s, the Church barely survived in its traditional role for another generation.

04良知的私有化The Privatization of Conscience

中文译本

到了 1520 年代初期,数百万善良的欧洲人已经拒绝了天主教会的普遍权威,而 在仅仅几十年前,这种异端行为是要受到酷刑惩罚的。事实上,欧洲许多中世纪的大教堂和普通教堂,都装饰着异教徒被恶魔拔掉舌头的雕像。这些酷刑所传达的教训,肯定给那些不识字的教徒留下了深刻的印象;仅仅通过惩罚他们就能认识到,那些受害者都是异教徒。这种惩罚尽管很严酷,但相比对异教徒的 终极惩罚——烤死在火刑柱上,它只能算是一种热身。

然而,令教会失望的是,这些教训并没有形成足够的威慑力。印刷机的出现,使 异端观点层出不穷,可怕的惩罚并不能阻止异端分子的涌现。实际上,在近代早期的欧洲,确实有不少追求宗教自由的先驱非常不幸地为他们精神独立的主张付出了代价,被割掉了舌头,或被烧死在火刑柱上。宗教裁判所中的反动分子, 仅仅因为有人说了一些我们认为是普通的良心话,就把他们烧死了。

总而言之,宗教改革和它所激起的反动行为,使数百万人付出了生命的代价。仅在三十年战争的最后半年,死在战场上的人数就达到 151,000 人。还有更多的人, 死于饥荒、疾病、宗教裁判所和其他权力当局手中,绝不是所有的暴力事件都是天主教会所为。后来人们在伦敦塔中发现了一千多具尸骨,普遍认为是英王亨利八世残忍杀害的英国重要的天主教徒。其中一些人,包括托马斯·莫尔爵士和圣 约翰·费舍尔主教,都是因为拒绝放弃旧信仰而被公开处决。亨利八世的天主教 女儿玛丽王后,因为从父亲那里遗传了梅毒而精神失常。在她统治的最后两年, 将 300 名新教异教徒烧死在了火刑柱上。当不同教派的信仰者坚持自己的信仰,选择自己支持的教会时——该权利被长期剥夺,这就是他们要付出的代价。

从我们 20 世纪末的角度来看,这些人对个人信仰的表达,完全在宗教自由和言论自由的范围内。但在十六世纪初,人们既没有宗教自由,也没有言论自由。当 时的权威,还在从日渐式微的中世纪世界观中汲取养分。在他们眼里,个人自治与权威相对抗的姿态,尤其是相对于教皇的“至上全权”(plentitude potestatis)是明显的颠覆,是无法容忍的。正如神学历史学家尤安·卡梅伦(Euan Cameron) 所说,像马丁·路德这样的宗教改革家的观点,“意味着与旧教会的制度和精神 连续性,进行了深思熟虑且坚决果断的分裂。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

By the early 1520s, millions of good Europeans had rejected the universal authority of the Catholic Church, a heresy punishable by torture and death just a few decades previously. Indeed, many medieval European cathedrals and churches were decorated with instructive carvings of heretics having their tongues torn out by demons.6 The lesson these tortures conveyed must have impressed many illiterate parishioners who could have recognized the victims as heretics simply by their punishment. The iconography was unambiguous: heretics were those whose tongues were mutilated. Yet harsh as this punishment was, it was merely the warm-up for the ultimate punishment for heresy: death at the stake.

To the Church’s dismay, however, the lesson was not sufficiently intimidating. The advent of the printing press inflated the supply of heretical arguments so dramatically that even the prospect of gruesome punishment ceased to deter would-be heretics. Indeed, not a few unlucky, pioneers of religious freedom in early modern Europe did pay for their assertions of spiritual independence by having their tongues cut out. Others were burned at the stake. The agents of reaction in the Inquisition literally incinerated people for uttering what we would consider ordinary expressions of conscience.

All told, the Reformation and the reaction it inspired cost millions their lives. Battlefield deaths in the final half of the Thirty Years’ War alone totaled 1,151,000.7 Many more died from famine, disease, and at the hands of the Inquisition and other authorities. By no means all the violence was perpetrated by Catholic authorities. The bones of more than a thousand leading English Catholics thought to have been brutally murdered by King Henry VIII have been uncovered at the Tower of London. Some, including Sir Thomas More and Bishop St. John Fisher, were openly executed for refusing to abandon the old faith.8 King Henry VIII’s Catholic daughter, Queen Mary, on the other hand, insane with syphilis inherited from her father, incinerated three hundred Protestant heretics at the stake in the last two years of her reign. Such was the price paid as individuals of different persuasions asserted their religious convictions and the long-denied right to choose the church they supported.

Seen from our vantage at the end of the twentieth century, these expressions of personal belief were well within the range that should be protected by freedom of religion and freedom of speech. But there was neither freedom of religion nor freedom of speech in the early sixteenth century. The authorities of the day still drew their bearings from the waning medieval worldview. To their eyes gestures of individual autonomy in opposition to authority, especially the plentitude potestatis (fullness of power) of the pope were outrageous and decidedly subversive. As theological historian Euan Cameron said, religious reformers like Martin Luther adopted views that “meant a deliberate and decisive break with the institutional and spiritual continuity of the old Church.”9

05异端与叛逆Heresy and Treason

中文译本

正是基于这种精神,我们预计民族国家的体制和意识形态的连续性,将被“深思熟虑且坚决果断地打破”。到下个世纪的前四分之一世纪末,数以百万计正直 的个人,将会被判以一种低级的叛国罪,相当于 16 世纪宗教异端的世俗版本。

他们要主张自己的主权,而不再效忠于摇摇欲坠的民族国家;而他们的权力,不是选择自己的主教或礼拜堂,而是作为客户选择合适的治理方式。主权的私有化就是五个世纪之前的良知私有化。二者都是统治机构以前的支持者进行的大规模反叛。阿尔伯特·赫希曼(Albert O. Hirschman),研究“对公司、组织和国家 衰退的反应”的专家,他写到,这种类型的退出困难重重,因为“退出常常被打上犯罪的烙印,它一直被贴有逃兵、变节、叛国的标签。” 主权个人不再接受作为国家的人力资源,以及被强加的一切。数百万人将摆脱公 民义务,成为政府提供的有价值服务的客户。他们甚至会创建和赞助相应的机构,把与公民身份相关的大部分服务,完全置于商业化的基础上。在 20 世纪的大部分时间里,生产者一直被国家当作资产,就像奶农对待奶牛一样,他们被压榨得越来越厉害。现在奶牛要长出翅膀了。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In that spirit, we anticipate “a deliberate and decisive break” with the institutional and ideological continuity of the nation-state. By the end of the first quarter of the next century, millions of upright individuals will have committed the secular equivalent of sixteenth-century heresy—a kind of low treason. They will have withdrawn allegiance from the faltering nation-state to assert their own sovereignty, their right to choose not their bishops or their house of worship but their form of governance as customers. The privatization of sovereignty will parallel the privatization of conscience of five centuries earlier. Both are the mass defection of former supporters of dominant institutions. As Albert O. Hirschman, an expert on “responses to decline in firms, organizations and states,” has written, this type of exit is difficult because “exit has often been branded as criminal, for it has been labelled desertion, defection and treason.”10

Sovereign Individuals will no longer merely accede to what is imposed upon them as human resources of the state. Millions will shed the obligations of citizenship to become customers for the useful services governments provide. Indeed, they will create and patronize parallel institutions that will place most of the services associated with citizenship on an entirely commercial basis. For most of the twentieth century, the productive have been treated as assets by the state, in much the way that the dairy farmer treats milk cows. They have been squeezed ever more vigorously. Now the cows will sprout wings.

06脱离公民身份Defection from Citizenship

中文译本

就像在 16 世纪,新的大政治条件打破了教会的垄断;我们认为,信息时代的大政治条件,最终将决定 21 世纪的治理方式,不管在那些被现代政治价值观洗脑的人看来,它的新规矩是多么的离谱。从“公民”身份到“客户”身份的演变, 意味着对过去的反叛;就像在现代早期,从骑士身份到公民身份的转变一样激烈。

信息精英对公民身份的抛弃,会产生一种刺激;而类似的刺激,在五百年前导致数百万欧洲人抛弃了教皇的绝对正确。

如果说与宗教改革的类比没有说服力,部分原因可能是,在今天很难直接看出, 放弃对宗教机构的忠诚曾经是非常严重的问题,就像 20 世纪的叛国罪一样。在 20 世纪末的今天,除了少数伊斯兰国家外,异端邪说只是一种精神不正常,对个人名誉的打击,跟一张在限速 30 英里的道路上开到 45 英里而吃到的超速罚单差不多。现在的异端,需要达到公然的魔鬼崇拜的程度,才会引起人们的注意。

在大多数西方国家,宗教教义的整理过于涣散和草率,以致于很少有人了解,过去成为异端争论焦点的神学观念。这反映出人们的注意力已经普遍从宗教上转移开了。

20 世纪末的宗教领袖,他们已不再把精力用于关注人们的精神问题,而是成为 了游说者和社会煽动者,这在某种程度上,确实帮助导演了人们对精神世界严肃性的反叛。宗教领袖像散落的铁屑一样,被权力的磁铁所吸引,把大部分的活动 用于向政治领导人施压,促使其采取对民族主义生存至关重要的收入再分配政策。在阿根廷,天主教会大声疾呼,向卡洛斯·梅内姆总统的政府施压,要求其放弃经济改革,转而支持严重通货膨胀的传统货币,并采用凯恩斯主义的财政政策。在新西兰和其他国家,宗教领袖也对削减臃肿预算的计划表达了类似的抱怨。天主教的主教还不遗余力地游说,反对美国的福利改革。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Just as new megapolitical conditions undermined the monopoly of the Church in the sixteenth century, we expect the megapolitics of the Information Age to ultimately dictate the terms of governance in the twenty-first century, no matter how outrageous its new terms may seem to those who incorporate the values of modern politics as their own. The evolution from the status of “citizen” to that of “customer” entails a betrayal of the past as sharp as the transition from chivalry to citizenship in the early modern era. The defection of the information elite from citizenship will have a stimulus much like that which led millions of Europeans five hundred years earlier to renounce the infallibility of the pope.

If the parallel with the Reformation is not compelling, it may be partly because it is not immediately evident today that renunciation of loyalty to religious institutions was ever the big deal that treason became in the twentieth century. Outside of a few Islamic countries, heresy at the end of the twentieth century is a spiritual misdemeanor, no more shattering to an individual’s reputation than a speeding ticket for driving forty-five in a thirty-mile zone.II Indeed, it is not uncommon in Europe and North America to find clergy and even bishops who do not believe in God or deny crucial tenets of the faith they espouse. Today, a heresy would almost need to be blatant devil worship to be noticeable. In most Western countries, religious doctrines are so ill-formed and sloppily held that few persons can identify the theological points that were the focus of controversy of heresies in the past.11 This reflects the general shift of attention away from religion.

To some extent, religious leaders have actually helped to lead the late-twentieth-century defection from seriousness about spiritual issues by deflecting their energies away from spiritual preoccupations to become lobbyists and social agitators. Drawn like loose filings to the magnet of power, they devote much of their activities to pressuring political leaders to adopt redistributive policies crucial to the nationalist bargain. Witness the loud efforts of the Catholic Church in Argentina to pressure the government of President Carlos Menem to abandon economic reforms in favor of conventional inflationary monetary and Keynesian fiscal policies. Similar complaints have been lodged by religious leaders against efforts to restructure bloated budgets in New Zealand and many other countries. Catholic bishops lobbied vigorously against the reform of welfare in the United States.

07财政裁判所?A Fiscal Inquisition?

中文译本

简单来说,当代的宗教领袖,正在把他们日益衰落的道德权威,主要用在世俗的救赎,以及对国家政治的影响和鼓动上,而不是精神救赎。鉴于他们的这种表现记录,可以预期,他们会作为帮凶参与到即将到来的对世俗改革的反动中去。

当民族国家受到挑战并风雨飘摇,它将不再能够履行对物质利益的承诺,而这正 是民众支持它的核心基础。在法国大革命时达成的事实交易,即将失效。国家无力再保证公民接受低成本或免费的教育,更不要医疗保健、失业保险和养老金, 而人们以此所交换的是质量极差的军事服务。虽然现在战争的条件已经发生了变化,政府不用再使用大规模的军队,也可以保卫自己及其统治下的领土,但这并 不能免除对政府打破交易承诺的批评,况且这种交易业已过时。

实际上,当新的大政治逻辑全面展开,它所产生的后果,在新型信息经济的失败者中间,将极不受欢迎。因此,完全可以肯定许多宗教领袖以及政府支出的既得利益者,将会站在怀旧与反动的最前线,试图重振民族主义的主张。他们会宣称,不能让任何美国人、法国人、加拿大人或其他任何民族的人,饥肠辘辘地上床睡觉。即使是那些一直处于改革前沿,并将从“市场友好型全球主义”中获得 巨大利益的国家,如新西兰,也会被反动的失败者所折磨。他们会想方设法,阻挠资本和人员的跨界流动。而且,他们不会就此善罢甘休。政治煽动家们,像新西兰第一党的领导人温斯顿·彼得斯(Winston Peters),懒得从原本去思考世界将如何运作。但是,等到适当的时候,温斯顿和他的手下会得知信息经济的逻辑。

他们就会设法阻止计算机、机器人、电子通讯、加密及其他信息技术的扩散;而这些技术正在全球经济的各个领域内代替人工。无论你在哪里,永远会有一群政客,为了阻挠个人从政治中宣布独立,不惜破坏长期繁荣的经济前景。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Simply put, contemporary religious leaders focus much of their declining moral authority on secular redemption and agitation to influence the state rather than on spiritual salvation. Given this record, they can be expected to participate as accomplices in the reaction against the coming secular reformation. As the nation-state is challenged and begins to wobble, it will no longer be able to fulfill the promises of material benefits that are central to popular support. The de facto bargain struck at the time of the French Revolution will lapse. The state will no longer be capable of guaranteeing its citizens low-cost or free schooling, much less medical care, unemployment insurance, and pensions in exchange for otherwise poorly paid military service. While the changing requirements of warfare will enable governments to defend themselves and territories under their dominion without fielding mass armies, this will hardly relieve governments of the criticism for breaking what has become an anachronistic bargain.

Indeed, as the new megapolitical logic takes hold, its consequences will prove wildly unpopular with the losers in the new information economy. It is therefore all but certain that many religious leaders, along with the primary beneficiaries of government spending, will be at the forefront of a nostalgic reaction seeking to reassert the claims of nationalism. They will claim that no American, Frenchman, Canadian, or other nationality—fill in the blank —should be allowed to go to bed hungry. Even countries that have been at the forefront of reform and stand to benefit disproportionately from “market-friendly globalism,” like New Zealand, will be tormented by reactionary losers. They will seek to thwart the movement of capital and people across borders. And they will not stop there. Demagogues, like Winston Peters, leader of the New Zealand First Party, are too lazy to think originally about how the new world will function. But, in due course, Winston and his crew will be tipped off to the logic of the information economy. They will seek to halt the diffusion of computers, robotics, telecommunications, encryption, and other Information Age technologies that are facilitating the displacement of workers in almost every sector of the global economy. Wherever you turn, there are politicians who will gladly thwart the prospects for long-term prosperity just to prevent individuals from declaring their independence of politics.

0820/20 愿景20/20 Vision

中文译本

到 2020 年,或者说在马丁·路德把他颠覆性的《九十五条论钢》,钉在威腾堡教堂大门上,大约 5 个世纪之后,人们对公民身份的成本收益比的认识,会经历类似的颠 覆性觉醒。能人和富人,即未来的主权个人,对民族国家看法的改变,相当于经历一场政治上的激光近视手术。他们将会看到 20/20。在 20 世纪,和整个现代时期一样,暴力回报的持续高涨,使大政府成为了一种赚钱的买卖。在经合组织国家,尽管存在对收入和资本的掠夺性税收,但大规模权力的决定性地位,依然左右了富有的、雄心勃勃的公民对国家的忠诚。在第二次世界大战后的十年里,每个经合组织国家的政客,都能够以接近甚至超过 90%的边际税率进行征税。

对此我们讨论过,富人别无选择,只能屈从。现实形势迫使他们不得不依靠政府来保护自己,因为后者掌握着大规模的暴力。除了有机会到香港任职的英国警察2 ,经合组织国家征收垄断性的税收,很少被当成一回事。在工业时代,任何有高收入能力的人如果想享受领先的经济机会,除了居住在高税率的经济体中几乎没有别的选择。这意味着他们要承受昂贵的税收负担,与政府服务的价值不成比例。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

By 2020, or roughly five centuries after Martin Luther nailed his 95 subversive theses on the church door at Wittenberg, the perception of the cost-benefit ratios of citizenship will have undergone a similar subversive clarification. The vision of the nation-state among persons of ability and wealth, the Sovereign Individuals of the future, will have undergone the political equivalent of laser surgery. They will be seeing 20/20. In the twentieth century, as throughout the modern era, persistently high returns to violence made big government a paying proposition. The decisiveness of massed power mobilized the allegiance of the wealthy and ambitious to OECD nation-states, notwithstanding predatory taxes imposed on income and capital. Politicians were able to impose marginal tax rates approaching or exceeding 90 percent in every OECD country in the decade immediately following World War II.

As we have explored, the rich had little choice but to accede to such impositions. Circumstances obliged them to rely for protection upon governments that could master violence on a large scale. It rarely mattered, except perhaps to British policemen with the chance to take a posting to Hong Kong, that OECD governments imposed monopolistic taxes. Anyone with high earnings capacity who wished to enjoy leading-edge economic opportunity during the Industrial Age usually had little option but to reside in a high-tax economy. This meant shouldering a tax burden out of proportion to services rendered.

09政治的算术The Arithmetic of Politics

中文译本

19 世纪的美国副总统约翰·卡尔霍恩(John C. Calhoun),曾经很精明地勾勒出现代政治的算术。卡尔霍恩的数学公式,将民族国家的全部人口分为两类:一类是纳税人,他们对政府服务成本的贡献大于消费;另一类是税收消费者,他们从政府获得的利益超出过成本的贡献。除了几个明显的例外,大多数经合组织国家的企业家,在 20 世纪结束时都是净纳税人,而且程度很夸张。例如,在 1996 年,前 1%的英国纳税人承担了所得税总额的 17%;他们比底层 50%的收入者支付的税款还多 30%,后者只贡献了 13%的所得税总额。在美国,富人的税负更夸张;1995 年,前 1%的人支付了总所得税的 30.2%。正如弗雷德里克·莱恩所提示的,富人不仅必须为那些“质量差劲但价格高得离谱”的服务付费,而且他们的付费价格与服务质量不成比例。上层纳税人付出的利益,基本完全流到了他人的口袋。在大多数情况下,富人根本不稀罕消费政府的服务,这些服务的质量一般都很差。几乎所有国家的政府,效率之低下都是出了名的,这主要因为它们控制在雇员手里,这些人欠缺提高生产率的动力。其实无论从哪个角度看,在工业时代,缴税最多的纳税人,他们为政府服务所支付的费用,是这些服务在竞争性市场上真实价值的许多倍。

这一点很少有人注意到。而不幸的是,用莱恩的话说,认识到为政府服务支付的费用,“按理想标准而言是一种浪费”;这样的洞察在 20 世纪中叶几乎没什么用处。相反,它只是一个可被接受的缺陷,是“社会组织必然的各种浪费之一。” 对此感到不满的人,他们的选择不是从英国搬到法国,或者从美国搬到加拿大。

这基本没什么区别;主要的民族国家都有同样的缺陷。或多或少,它们都采取了没收性的税收制度。你如果想大幅度地提高自己的自主权,就必须脱离欧洲和北美的核心国家,迁移到世界上的边缘国家。在亚洲部分地区、南美洲和一些偏远的岛国,税收负担明显低很多。但是,逃避掠夺性税收通常也要付出一些代价,如经济机会的丧失,生活水平一般也会下降。对此我们在前面分析过,在工业时代的条件下,除了那些肆意施加没收性税负的核心工业民族国家,其他大多数国 家的经济机会都非常有限,生活质量也往往低于平均水平。

以共产主义制度为例。与许多第三世界的政权一样,共产主义国家通常不征收高额的所得税,甚至根本不征收任何所得税。但是在苏联存在的四分之三个世纪里,几乎没有或很少有企业家去苏联寻求税收庇护。虽然苏联的所得税率不高,但它没有任何优势,因为苏联不承认财产权。这比税收负担更加糟糕。在共产主义制度下,人们基本不可能经营企业,并真正赚到什么大钱。就效果而言,共产主义没收了人们的税前收入。

此外,如果有人通过奇怪的方式获得了稳定的收入,然后选择住在莫斯科或哈瓦那时,他很难用钱买到体面的生活质量。除了上好的雪茄和鱼子酱、出色的交响 乐团和芭蕾舞之外,前共产主义制度下的生活几乎没什么可消费的乐趣。生活中大部分稀缺的好东西,用钱都无法买到,或者是基于政治的影响力而严格配给的。

后现代生活的批评者,往往会突出“消费在后现代经验中的重要性”,冒着证实这种刻板印象的风险,我们要指出,自共产主义垮台以来,全球范围内可获得的商品数量和服务质量不断提高,必将导致各国之间的竞争更加激烈,从而有利于削弱国家和地方之间的联系。

在旧的政权之下,消费者的选择如此有限,就连卡斯特罗本人,如果想清理牙齿上的高斯巴雪茄碎片也很难买到一包像样的牙线。一直到最近,甚至全世界许多地方的富人,都享受不到西欧或北美中产阶级日常的生活质量。看到这种悲惨的境况,大部分的杰出人士都感动地接受了工业时代的民族主义交易。他们待在原地,缴纳高到离谱的税款,与在他们出生的领土上垄断了暴力的那个民族国家, 交换质量低劣的保护服务。

现在,天堂已经被天使关上了,锁住了,所以我们必须向前走,踏遍世界,看看是否在某个地方,有一条后路可以进去。 —— 海因里希·冯·克莱斯特(HEINRICH VON KLEIST)

共产主义的垮台,拆除了“铁幕”,它曾经阻碍了旅行,阻断了商业的全球化,人为地维持着世界的“大”3。喷气式飞机,与破坏共产主义的信息技术相结合,加剧了对高端旅行消费的竞争。即使在最偏远的地区,也有银行家在进进出出,这对全世界的住宿和餐饮标准,都是一种极大的刺激。而我们所说的,并不是指麦当劳和肯德基,虽然它们的特许经营,在莫斯科和布加勒斯特等以前禁止的地方快速蔓延。更重要的,是领先的连锁酒店与高质量的餐厅的扩张,这一点很少人注意到。这些地方提供的是顶级波尔多红酒,而不是伏特加和可乐。这种转变意味着,任何有能力的人在地球上的任何地方,都可以享受到高标准的物质生活。事实上,现在很少有哪个国家没有一家一流的酒店,或一家能引起米其林调查员兴趣的餐厅。

正如赫希曼在四分之一个世纪前的预测,作为对政府服务的质量与价格感到不满的解决之道,退出离开——得益于技术的进步——其吸引力大大增加了。他写道: “另一方面,我们不需要对国家的忠诚,也可以生活……只有当国家因为通讯进 步与全面现代化而变得大同小异时,才会出现过早和过度退出的威胁,目前的‘人 才外流’就是一个例子。”请注意,我们在第 8 章指出过,赫希曼的“过早和过 度退出”的标准,是出于将被抛弃的民族国家的角度,而不是个人追求美好生活的角度。

尽管如此,他的结论是无可非议的,即国家之间的相似性会增加反叛与退出的吸引力。现在你去到任何地方,都比过去更容易生活得很好;在这种情况下,你会更愿意去生活成本最低的地方。更重要的是,现在你不仅可以在任何地方都过上好日子,你还可以在任何地方都获得更高的收入。不是非要住在高成本的国家,才能积累足够的财富,然后像凯恩斯勋爵所说的那样,过上“明智、愉快且美好的生活”。基于我们已经探讨过的原因,微技术正在改变民族国家赖以生存的大政治基础。在信息时代,全新的网络经济将会出现,它超越任何政府的垄断范围。

有史以来第一次,技术将使个人能够,在一个难以被系统性强制所征服的领域中,去积累自己的财富。

新的社会,也是新的文化,它的一端将由机器和自动化的作用来定义,机器会在某些事情上做得比人类更好,自动化将使越来越多的低技能工作消失;它的另一端,则由信息技术赋予真正能够利用它的人的力量来定义。这样的社会将产生更大的张力,一个小阶级4,和一个不断扩大的下层阶级5。他们之间的区别之一是,信息贫民要么被地理环境所束缚,要么无法从移动中获益。而信息贵族,就像我们在前面说过的,将会到处流动,因为他们有能力在任何自己想去的地方赚到钱;就像受欢迎的小说作家,一直以来都是这样。一百年前,罗伯特·路易斯·史蒂文斯6(Robert Louis Stevenson)可以在太平洋的一个小岛上谋生;信息贵族现在一样可以。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Nineteenth-century American Vice President John C. Calhoun shrewdly sketched the arithmetic of modern politics. Calhoun’s formula divides the entire population of the nation-state into two classes: taxpayers, who contribute more to the cost of government services than they consume; and tax consumers, who receive benefits from government in excess of their contribution to the cost. With a few conspicuous exceptions, most OECD entrepreneurs were net taxpayers to an exaggerated extent as the twentieth century wound down. For example, in 1996, the top 1 percent of British taxpayers shouldered 17 percent of the total income tax burden. They paid 30 percent more than the bottom 50 percent of earners, who contributed just 13 percent of income tax payments. In the United States, the rich shouldered an even more exaggerated burden, with the top 1 percent paying 30.2 percent of the total income tax receipts in 1995.12 Not only were the rich obliged to pay for service that, as Frederic C. Lane reminds us, “was of poor quality and outrageously overpriced,” but their payments were often not proportionate to any service whatever.13 The benefits for which the top taxpayers paid often went entirely to others. In most cases, the rich were glad to under-consume government services, which were typically of low quality. Government bureaus in almost every country were famously inefficient, largely because they tended to be controlled by employees who lacked an incentive to improve productivity. By practically any measure, the largest taxpayers during the industrial era paid many times more for government services than they would be worth in a competitive market.

This hardly went unnoted. Unhappily, however, the recognition that payments to government for protection were, in Lane’s words, “wasteful by ideal standards” was seldom an actionable insight in the middle of the twentieth century. Rather it was simply a defect to be accepted, “one of various kinds of waste built into social organization.”14

The alternative for the discontented was not to move from Britain to France, for example, or from the United States to Canada. Except in rare circumstances, that would have availed little. The leading nation-states all suffered from the same drawback. They all adopted more or less confiscatory tax regimes. To realize a significant increase in autonomy one had to escape the core countries of Europe and North America altogether and head for the periphery. Tax burdens were meaningfully lower in parts of Asia, South America, and on various remote islands. But there was usually a price to be paid for escaping predatory taxation—a loss of economic opportunity and, often, a decline in living standards. As we have explored, in the conditions of the Industrial Age, economic opportunity was constrained and living standards were subpar in most of the jurisdictions outside the core industrial nation-states that indulged in confiscatory taxation.

Consider the Communist systems as a paradigm. Along with many Third World regimes, they typically did not impose high income taxes—or even any at all.III Nonetheless, during the three-quarters of a century the Soviet Union existed, few, if any, entrepreneurs sought tax refuge there. While the Soviet income tax rates were not high, they afforded no advantage because the Soviets made a virtue of their refusal to recognize property rights. This imposed an even worse burden than taxation. The Communist systems made it all but impossible to organize a business and make any serious money. In effect, the Communist state confiscated pretax income.

Further, had anyone already possessing a secure income for some eccentric reason chosen to live in Moscow or Havana, he would have been hard-pressed to use money to purchase a decent standard of living. Outside of access to good cigars, caviar, excellent orchestras, and the ballet, life in the former Communist systems afforded few consumer pleasures. Most of the scarce good things of life were unavailable or were tightly rationed on the basis of political influence rather than open exchange. At the risk of validating the stereotype of critics of postmodern life who emphasize “the importance of consumption in the postmodern experience,” the rising standard of goods and services available worldwide since the fall of Communism has surely made competition between jurisdictions more lively, thereby helping to weaken ties to nation and place.15

Under the old regime, consumer choices were so limited that even Castro himself would have been hard-pressed to secure a packet of decent dental floss had he wanted to clean cohiba fragments from his teeth. Until recently, not even the rich in many parts of the globe could enjoy the quality of life that was common among the middle classes in Western Europe or North America. Faced with this doleful situation, most persons of outstanding talent were moved to accept the nationalist bargain during the Industrial Age. They stayed put and paid outrageously high taxes for the doubtful protection offered by the particular nation-state that monopolized violence in the territory in which they were born.

“Paradise is now shut and locked, barred by angels, so now we must go forward, around the world and see if somehow, somewhere, there is a back-way in.” —HEINRICH VON KLEIST

The fall of Communism removed an “Iron Curtain” that had impaired travel and effectively blocked the globalization of commerce, thereby keeping the world artificially “large.” The jet plane, in combination with the information technologies that undermined Communism, increased competition for high-end travel dollars. The parade of bankers trooping in and out of even the most remote provinces was a prodigious stimulus to the standard of accommodation and cuisine worldwide. By this, we are not referring to the spread of McDonald’s hamburgers and Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises, in even such formerly forbidding venues as Moscow and Bucharest. Less noticed, but more important, has been the spread of leading hotel chains, and high-quality sit-down restaurants serving grand cru clarets rather than vodka and Coke. Thanks to this transformation, anyone who can afford it can now enjoy a high material standard of life almost anywhere on the planet. Indeed, it is now a rare country where there is not a first-class hotel and at least one restaurant that would interest a Michelin inspector.

As Hirschman anticipated a quarter of a century ago, technological advance has significantly increased the appeal of exit as a solution to unsatisfactory provision and pricing of services. He wrote: “Loyalty to one’s country, on the other hand, is something we could do without.… Only as countries start to resemble each other because of the advances of communications and all-around modernization will the danger of premature and excessive exits arise, the ‘brain drain’ being a current example.”16 Note as we pointed out in chapter 8 that Hirschman’s standard of “premature and excessive exits” is seen from the perspective of the nation-state being deserted, not from the perspective of the individual seeking a better life.

Nonetheless, his conclusion that similarities between countries will increase the attraction of defection and exit is unimpeachable. The fact that it is now easier to live well anywhere makes living where the cost is least onerous appealing. Yet more important than the fact that you can live well almost anywhere is the fact that you can now earn a high income anywhere. It is no longer necessary to reside in a high-cost jurisdiction in order to accumulate sufficient wealth to live, as Lord Keynes advised, “wisely, agreeably and well.” For reasons we have already explored, microtechnology changes the underlying megapolitical foundation upon which the nation-state rests. In the Information Age, a new cybereconomy will emerge beyond the capacity of any government to monopolize. For the first time, technology will enable individuals to accumulate wealth in a realm that cannot be bent easily to the demands of systematic compulsion.

The new society, and therefore the new culture, will be defined at one end by what machines can do better than people, by automation that will do away with increasing numbers of low-skill tasks, and at the other by the power that information technology gives to people who actually have the talent to take advantage of it. Such a society will have greater tensions between a small class, who might be termed the information aristocracy, and a growing underclass, who might be termed the information poor. One of the differences between them will be that the information poor will either be tied by geography or will find little benefit from moving. The information aristocracy, as we discuss elsewhere, will be extremely mobile, since they will be able to earn money in any locale that is attractive to them, just as popular novelists have always been able to do. Robert Louis Stevenson could earn his living on an island in the Pacific a hundred years ago; now the information aristocracy can all do the same thing.

10管辖区之间的市场竞争Market Competition Between Jurisdictions

中文译本

由于信息技术超越了地方专制,自然而然地,它会使世界各地的管辖区,面临事实上的全球竞争,竞争的基础就是政府服务的质量与价格。换句话说,行使着地方领土垄断权的政府,就像大多数其他实体一样,最终会遭遇真正的市场竞争,就看它们怎么服务自己的客户。不可避免的结果是,很快人们就会发现以前有利于高成本制度的逻辑已经被逆转。领先的民族国家,因为它掠夺性的、再分配的税收制度及严厉的监管,将不再是居住地的首选。理性观察就会发现,它们以垄断性的价格,提供着劣质的保护,并减少了经济发展的机会。

未来的发展可能会证明,它们将比传统上收入更不平等的亚洲和拉美国家更不受欢迎,更加充满暴力。目前领先的福利国家,会因为遗弃逃离而失去最优质的公民。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Because information technology transcends the tyranny of place, it will automatically expose jurisdictions everywhere to de facto global competition on the basis of quality and price. In other words, governments exercising local territorial monopolies, like most other entities, finally will be subject to real market competition on the basis of how well they serve their customers. This will soon make it unavoidably obvious that the old logic that favored high-cost regimes in the industrial era has reversed. Leading nation-states, with their predatory, redistributive tax regimes and heavy-handed regulations, will no longer be jurisdictions of choice. Seen dispassionately, they offer poor-quality protection and diminished economic opportunity at monopoly prices. In the years to come, they may prove to be more socially unreceptive and violent than other regions such as Latin America where incomes have traditionally been more unequal. The leading welfare states will lose their most talented citizens through desertion.

11未来的“超国家”时代The “Extranational” Age Ahead

中文译本

随着“主权个人”时代的成型,许多最杰出的人士,不会再认为自己是任何一个 国家的人,不再是“英国人”、“美国人”或“加拿大人”。一种全新的“跨国 的”或“超国家的”世界观,以及确立自己在世界中的位置的新模式,在新的千年里等待着人们去发现。如前所述,这种心智模式的早期证据,就是在 MTV 的 青少年观众中,几乎一半人都想离开他们的国家,去追求自己想要的生活。未来 的身份形式,与国籍不一样,它不再是系统性强制的产物;这种强制在 20 世纪里导致民族国家和国家制度无所不在。

涵盖全球的事态发展通常被人们描述为“国际事务”,这一点本身就已经表明,民族主义的定式,已经深深地渗透到了构想世界的思维方式之中。经过两个世纪对“国际关系”和“国际法”奥秘的灌输,人们很容易忽视,“国际”并不是一个由来已久的西方概念。事实上,这个词是杰里米·本瑟姆(Jeremy Bentham) 在 1789 年发明的;在他的《道德与立法原则导论》(An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation)一书中首次被使用。本瑟姆写道:“必须承认,国际这个词是一个新词,希望它能有足够的可类比性,并且易于理解。”这个词现在非常流行,而且不仅在本瑟姆原本的狭义层面上。“国际”成了一个万用的近义词,可以指代全球范围内发生的任何事情。

国际时代开始于 1789 年,与法国大革命同年。它持续了两个世纪,直到 1989 年欧洲开始反抗共产主义。我们认为那第二次大革命7标志着国际时代的结束,这不仅仅是因为,已声名狼藉的共产主义的主题歌就叫 “国际歌”(The International)。国家所有制的计划经济,是民族国家最野心勃勃的表现。国家权力与民族主义的密切关系,也体现在语言上。现代时期最具侵略性的动词就是“国有化”,意思是将某样东西纳入到国家所有和控制之下。在国际时代,这个动词经常从世界各地的政治煽动家嘴里蹦出来。现在它已经是过去的词汇了。国有化已经不合时宜,因为国家权力已经不合时宜。

在现代时期的黄昏,国家的集权,正在被技术创新和市场力量间的互动所削弱。

现在,市场的下一个胜利阶段即将展开。在这个阶段,不仅单个的民族国家开始解体,在我们看来,就连民族国家的俱乐部——联合国,也注定要破产。如果联合国在千年之交后的某个时候被清算,我们一点也不会感到惊讶。如果“国际” 概念是一种股票,现在就是清仓的时候。在新的千年里这个概念可能会被取代, 或至少缩小回它原本的含义;因为未来的世界,不再由连在一起的主权国家的体系所主导。新的关系会呈现出一种“超国家”的形式,它将由日益重要的微型管辖区和主权个人说了算。拉布拉多海岸的一块飞地,与一个主权个人之间的争端, 不能再被称之为“国际”争端。它应该是超国家的。

在即将到来的新时代,社区和效忠不再与领土绑在一起。个人身份会更加确切地建立在真正的亲和关系、共同的信仰、共同的利益和共同的基因之上,而不是民族主义者特别强调的虚假亲缘关系。保护工作会通过新的方式组织起来,这些新方式,用六分仪、铅垂线或土地测量员工具箱中其他划定边界的早期现代工具,是解析不了的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

As the era of the “Sovereign Individual” takes shape, many of the ablest people will cease to think of themselves as party to a nation, as “British” or “American” or “Canadian.”’ A new “transnational” or “extranational” understanding of the world and a new way of identifying one’s place in it await discovery in the new millennium. As indicated before, early evidence of this emerging mind-set was provided in the finding that almost half of teenaged viewers of MTV expect to leave the country of their birth in order to achieve the life they want for themselves. This new equation of identity, unlike nationality, will not be a product of the systematic compulsion that made nation-states and the state system universal in the twentieth century.

The mere fact that developments embracing the whole globe are commonly described as “international” shows how deeply the nationalist paradigm has penetrated into our way of conceiving the world. After two centuries of indoctrination in the mysteries of “international relations” and “international law,” it is easy to overlook that “international” is not a longstanding Western concept. In fact, the word international was invented by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. It was first used in his book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Bentham wrote, “The word international it must be acknowledged, is a new one, though it is hoped sufficiently analogous and intelligible.”17 The word caught on, but not just in the narrow sense that Bentham intended. “International” came to be a sloppy synonym for anything that happens across the globe.

The International Age began in 1789, the same year as the French Revolution. It lasted for two centuries, until 1989, when the revolt against Communism in Europe began. We believe that that second revolution marked the end of the International Age, and not merely because the discredited Communist anthem was “The International.” The command economy with state ownership was the most ambitious expression of the nation-state. The close relationship between state power and nationalism was reflected in language. The most aggressive verb of the Modern Age was “to nationalize,” meaning to bring under state ownership and control. It was a word that tripped easily off the tongues of demagogues in most parts of the globe during the International Age. Now it is part of the vocabulary of the past. Nationalization has become anachronistic, precisely because state power has become anachronistic.

In the twilight of the modern era, the concentrated power of the state was undermined by the interaction between technological innovation and market forces. Now the next stage in the triumph of the market is about to unfold. Not only will individual nation-states begin to dissolve, but in our view even the club for nation-states, the United Nations, is destined to go bankrupt. We would not be surprised to see the UN liquidated sometime soon after the turn of the millennium.

If “international” were a stock, now would be the time to sell. The concept is likely to be supplanted in the new millennium, or at least narrowed to its original meaning for the compelling reason that the whole world will no longer be dominated by a system of interrelating sovereign nations. Relations will take on the novel “extranational” forms dictated by the growing importance of microjurisdictions and Sovereign Individuals. A dispute between an enclave on the coast of Labrador and a Sovereign Individual will not rightly be described as an “international” dispute. It will be extranational.

In the new age to come, communities and allegiances will not be territorially bounded. Identification will be more precisely targeted to genuine affinities, shared beliefs, shared interests, and shared genes, rather than the bogus affinities so prominent in the attention of nationalists. Protection will be organized in new ways that cannot be parsed by a sextant, a plumb line, or other early modern instruments in a surveyor’s kit that demarcate territorial borders.

12被发明的共同体和传统INVENTED COMMUNITIES AND TRADITIONS

中文译本

人类一生下来就被置于一个“发明”出来的共同体当中,这个共同体就叫做国家; 这种观念,在下个世纪里,会被世界主义的精英们认为很古怪,又不合理,和在人类生存的大部分时间里一样。社会学家安东尼·吉登斯(Anthony Giddens)写到,民族国家“在历史上没有先例”。研究民族主义的权威迈克尔·比利格(Michael Billig),进一步充实了这一说法: 在其他时代,人们并没有语言和方言的概念,更不用说领土和主权的概念了;而在今天它们是如此普遍,对“我们”来说,又是如此地真实。这些概念已经深刻地嵌入了当代常识之中,以致于人们很容易就忘记了,它们的永久性是被发明出来的。中世纪在蒙泰罗或圣马特奥的作坊里干活的鞋匠,在 700 年后的我们看来,也许是狭隘的、迷信的。但他们也会觉得,我们关于语言和民族的想法是奇怪的神秘主义,他们会搞不懂,为什么这种神秘主义会成为一个生死攸关的问题。我们猜测,在超国家的未来,有思考能力的人同样会感到困惑。本尼迪克特·安德森(Benedict Anderson)说过,国家是“想象中的共同体”。我们不是说想象中的东西就一定微不足道。正如约翰逊博士所言,要不是想象力作怪,一个男人就会很乐意“与侍女睡觉,就像和公爵夫人一样。”不过,对于那些从 20 世纪 走过来的人而言,“国家”好像是一个天经地义的组织单位;要让他们理解国家 是“想象的”而不是自然的,简直就不可能。为了更好理解,未来与我们熟悉的 现在会有多大的不同,有必要看一看,民族主义是如何被强加到工业时代的“常识”之上的。

人们很容易忽视,“民族共同体”在多大程度上是由持续的想象力加持形成的。要知道,并不存在什么客观的标准,可以准确界定哪些群体应该是一个“民族”,哪些不应该是。严格来说,也不存在什么“天然的边界”;就像著名历史学家欧文·拉蒂莫(Owen Lattimore)和查理斯·惠特克(C. R. Whittaker)所阐明的。

“帝国的主要边界”,拉蒂莫在写到中华帝国时说,“不仅是一条划分地理区域和人类社会的分界线,它还代表了一个特定社会所能增长的最大极限。”或者像哥伦比亚大学的经济学家罗纳德·芬德利(Ronald Findlay)所说,“只要在经济学中思考这些问题,一个特定的经济体或‘国家’的边界,通常被认为是既定的,生活在边界内的人口也是确定的。但是很明显,不管这些边界在国际法中变得多么神圣不可侵犯,它们都曾经在敌对的主张者之间发生过争夺,最终是由各方经济和军事力量的平衡所确定的。” 一个人即使拥有,世界上一半民族国家的所有数据和高清的卫星地图,也猜测不到其他民族国家的边界在哪里。也没有任何科学的方法,能够从生物学或语言学上区分开,一个民族和另一个民族的成员。无论多么先进的解剖技术,都无法从基因上,把飞机失事的美国人、加拿大人和苏丹人的遗体区分开。国家和民族之间的界限不是自然的,不像物种之间的界限,或动物品种之间的自然区别。相反,它们是过去和现在,为了实施权力而锻造的人工制品。

语言就是由陆军和海军护航的方言。 —— 马里奥·佩 MARIO PEI

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The idea that humans must naturally place themselves in an “invented” community called a nation will come to be seen by the cosmopolitan elite as eccentric and unreasonable in the next century, as it would have been through most of human existence. The nation-state, as sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote, has “no precedent in history.”18 Michael Billig, an authority on nationalism, amplified that point:

At other times people did not hold the notions of language and dialect, let alone those of territory and sovereignty, which are so commonplace today and which seem so materially real to “us.” So strongly are such notions embedded in contemporary common sense that it is easy to forget that they are invented permanencies. The mediaeval cobblers in the workshops of Montaillou or San Mateo might, with the distance of 700 years, now appear to us narrow, superstition-bound figures. But they would have found our ideas on language and nation strangely mystical; they would be puzzled why this mysticism could be a matter of life and death.19

We suspect that thinking people in the extranational future will be equally puzzled. As Benedict Anderson put it, nations are “imagined communities.”20 This is not to say that what is imagined is necessarily trivial. As Dr. Johnson observed, if not for imagination, a man would as gladly “lie with a chamber maid as a duchess.” Still, for those who came of age during the twentieth century, “nations” may seem so inevitable a unit of organization that it is difficult to grasp that they are “imagined” rather than natural. In order to understand how different the future may be from the world with which we are familiar, it is necessary to see how nationalism has been imposed upon the “common sense” of the Industrial Age.

It is easy to overlook the degree to which the “national community” is formed by a continuing investment of imagination. There are no objective criteria to define accurately which group should be a “nation” and which should not. Nor, strictly speaking, are there “natural frontiers,” as eminent historians Owen Lattimore and C. R. Whittaker have shown. “A major imperial boundary,” Lattimore said, writing of imperial China, “is not merely a line dividing geographical regions and human societies. It also represents the optimal limit of growth of one particular society.”21 Or as Columbia University economist Ronald Findlay put it, “Insofar as they are considered at all in economics, the boundaries of a given economic system or ‘country’ are generally regarded as given, along with the population living within those boundaries. Yet it is obvious that, however sanctified these boundaries may have become in international law, they were all at one time or another contested between rival claimants and determined ultimately by the balance of economic and military power between the contending parties.”22

Someone with all the data available on half the world’s nation-states and a collection of fine satellite maps would not be able to predict where the boundaries of the other nation-states would fall. Nor is there any scientific way of distinguishing biologically or linguistically the members of one nationality from those of another. No autopsy procedure, however advanced, could distinguish genetically among the remains of Americans, Canadians, and Sudanese after a plane crash. The boundaries between states and nationalities are not natural, like the boundaries between species or the physical distinctions between breeds of animals, Rather, they are artifacts of past and ongoing efforts to project power.

“A language is a dialect with an army and a navy.” —MARIO PEI

13语言是权力的人工产物LANGUAGES AS ARTIFACTS OF POWER

中文译本

令人惊讶的是,这种说法也适用于语言。

在民族国家统治世界几个世纪之后,如果说“语言”并不构成区分民族的客观基 础,似乎有点不恰当,甚至是荒谬的。但请再仔细看看。现代语言的历史,清楚 揭示了它们被塑造为加强民族主义认同的工具的程度。我们现在所理解和使用的 西方“语言”,不是自然而然地演变成了今天的形式。在客观上,它们也无法与 “方言”区分开来。在现代社会没有人愿意说“方言”,每个人都希望自己的 母语被认为是真正的正品,是一种“语言”。

现在,谁也不要再说,言语毫无用途。言语和行动是一体的。抚慰人心的积极话语,具有强大的能量,它创造了行动——也就是生育了。在此,行动是言语的仆人,顺从跟随其后。就像创世的第一天:神说了话,就有了世界。 —— 米什莱(MICHELET) 1792 年 8 月

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Surprisingly, much the same can be said of languages.

After centuries of nation-state dominance, the idea that “language” does not form an objective basis for distinguishing between peoples may seem ill-considered or even absurd. But look more closely. The history of modern languages clearly reveals the degree to which they were shaped to reinforce nationalist identification. Western “languages” as we now understand and speak them did not naturally evolve into their current forms. Nor are they objectively distinguishable from “dialects.” In the modern world, no one wishes to speak a “dialect.” Almost everyone prefers that his native tongue be considered the genuine article—a “language.”

“Let no man say that the word is of little use in such moments. Word and Action are together one. The powerful energetic affirmation that reassures hearts creates acts—that which is said is produced. Action here is the servant of the word, it fallows behind submissively, as on the first day of the world: He said and the world was.” —MICHELET, August 1792

14语言和行为是一体的“Word and Action Are Together One”

中文译本

例如,在法国大革命之前,法国南部使用的混合版本的拉丁语,即 la langued’oc,也就是奥克西坦语;与后来成为法语基础的巴黎方言 la langue d’oil 相比, 奥克语与西班牙北部加泰罗尼亚地区的方言有更多共同之处。事实上,当“人权宣言”以巴黎风格的语言发表时,生活在目前法国边界内的大多数人都是无法理 解的。法国革命者面临的挑战之一,就是要绞尽脑汁把他们的大字报和法令翻译 成无数村庄的土语;这些村庄之间,也很难理解对方的语言。

生活在后来的“法国”境内的人们,原本讲着各种差异很大的语言,作为一种政治策略,这些语言被有意识地异文合并,形成了一种官方语言。自 1539 年弗兰 西斯一世颁布《维勒-科特雷茨敕令》以来,书面法语一直是法院的官方语言, 但这并不意味它能被普遍地理解,就像在 1200 年后,“法律法语”在英格兰成 为了法院的官方语言,但能理解它的人不多。它们都属于一种“行政方言”,不 是在全国范围内为人们所使用和理解的标准化语言。

法国革命者希望创造更全面的东西,一种国家语言。历史学家杰尼斯·兰金斯 (Janis Langins)在《语言的社会历史》一书中评论到,“革命者中一个有影响力的意见团体认为,如果有意识地在共和国的土地上强行推广一种标准的法语,就会进一步推动大革命的胜利和启蒙运动的传播。”这种“有意识的努力”包括 在个别词语的使用上费尽心机。例如,米拉波在 1789 年首次使用“革命的” (revolutionary)这个词,就是一个很有说服力的例子。兰金斯指出,(“革命 的”一词)在经历了一段“广泛且不加区分的使用”之后,“在恐怖时期,被压 制和遗忘了一段时间,长达几十年……1795 年 6 月 12 日,国民公会决定改革语 言以及我们的前暴君8建立的机构,以在官方称谓中替 换‘革命的’一词。”这种语言工程的传统,在后来针对从英语转入法语的词汇 ——如“周末”等,法国当局的微妙反应中一直延续了下去。

然而,在两个世纪前,法国的国家语言工程师们,不只是歧视来自英吉利海峡对岸的词汇,他们面临着一项更大的工程,那就是消灭共和国领土内的地方语言变 体。这项工作不仅限于压制奥克西坦语。在当时的里维埃拉地区,人们说的“法语”比起巴黎的法语,更接近于东边的“意大利语”。同样,阿尔萨斯的语言可 以被归为德语的一种形式,而德语本身也有很多地方性变体。在比利牛斯山一带, 人们说的是巴斯克语。和在法国西北海岸使用的布列塔尼语一样,巴斯克语与作 为法语基础的拉丁语的任何地方土语都毫无共同之处。在法国东北地区,还有相 当数量的人,讲的是佛兰芒语。总之,就像迈克尔·比利格所提示的,“巴黎风格的法语”,不是通过自发的市场行为传播的,而是“作为‘法语国语’,在法律和文化上被强加的。” 法国如此,其他民族国家的构建也是如此。语言往往由军队携带,由殖民国家强 加。比如,非洲独立之后的地图,就是根据欧洲列强行政语言占主导地位的地区 来编制的。学校很少教授当地方言。被承认的“语言”和“方言”之间的区别, 在很大程度上是政治性的;前者主要用以界定“国家”,即使是任意划定边界的 殖民国家,后者则不是这样。

简而言之,在世界范围内,强加“民族语言”是巩固国家权力的一部分。在国家垄断暴力的领土上,鼓励或迫使每个人讲“母语”,对促进权力的行使大有裨益。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Prior to the French Revolution, for example, the version of mongrelized Latin spoken in southern France, la langue d’oc or Occitan, had more in common with the vernacular spoken in Catalonia in northern Spain, than with la langue d’oil, the speech of Paris that became the basis of “French.” Indeed, when the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” was published in the Parisian style, it was unintelligible to a majority living within the current borders of France.23 One of the challenges the French revolutionaries faced was calculating how to translate their broadsides and edicts into the patois of innumerable villages that were only vaguely intelligible to one another.

The people living within what became “France” had quite different ways of speaking that were consciously conflated into one official language as a matter of policy. Written French had been the official language of the courts of justice since François I issued the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539.24 But this did not mean that it was widely intelligible, any more than “law French” was widely intelligible in England after 1200, when it became the official language of the courts of justice. Each was an “administrative vernacular,” not a standardized language spoken and understood throughout the territory.

The French revolutionaries wanted to create something more comprehensive, a national language. Historian Janis Langins comments in The Social History of Language that “an influential body of opinion among the revolutionists believed that the triumph of the Revolution and the spread of enlightenment would be furthered by a conscious effort to impose a standard French in the territory of the Republic.”25 This “conscious effort” included a good deal of fussing over the use of individual words. Consider the telling example of the adjective “revolutionary,” first used by Mirabeau in 1789. After a period of “somewhat wide and indiscriminant use,” as Langins puts it, “during the Terror there followed a period of suppression and oblivion for several decades.… On June 12, 1795, the Convention decided to reform the language as well as the institutions created by our former tyrants [i.e., the vanquished Robespierrists] in replacing the word ‘revolutionary’ in official designations.”26 This tradition of language engineering survives in the finicky reception of the French authorities to words like “weekend” that have made their way into French from English.

Two centuries ago, however, the national language engineers in France were not discriminating merely against words from across the English Channel; they faced a much bigger job eradicating local variants of speech within the territory of the republic. This exercise was not merely confined to suppressing la langue d’oc. The “French” spoken on the Riviera then was closer to the “Italian” spoken farther to the east than to Parisian French. Equally, the language of Alsace could arguably have been categorized as a form of German, which itself had numerous local varieties. Basque was spoken in the Pyrenees. Like Breton, spoken along the northwest coast of France, Basque had little in common with any of the vernacular “dialects” of Latin that were the basis of “French.” There were also substantial numbers of Flemish speakers in the northeast. “The Parisian style of speech,” as Michael Billig reminds us, was not spread through spontaneous market processes, but “imposed, legally and culturally, as ‘French.’ ”27

What was true in France has been true elsewhere in the building of nation-states. Languages were often carried by armies and imposed by colonial powers. For example, the map of Africa after independence was defined according to the areas where the administrative languages of European powers predominated. Local dialects were seldom taught in schools. The distinctions between recognized “languages,” which tended to define “nations,” even nations with arbitrary colonial borders, and “dialects,” which did not, were in large measure political.

In short, the imposition of a “national language” was part of a process used worldwide to enhance the power of the state. Encouraging or obliging everyone within the territory where the state monopolized violence to speak “the mother tongue” conveyed significant advantages in facilitating the exercise of power.

15语言统一的军事好处The Military Dimension of Language Uniformity

中文译本

在一个暴力回报率不断上升的世界里,采用一种民族语言可以带来军事上的优势。民族语言,可以说是民族国家巩固中央权力的一个先决条件。中央当局鼓励 公民讲同一种语言,能够削弱地方豪强的军事力量。法国大革命之后,语言的标准化,使得最廉价、最有效的招募现代军力的形式——国家兵役——成为一种可行的制度。共同的语言,使来自“全国”各地的士兵可以顺畅地交流。这是大规 模兵役取代独立兵营的先决条件,后者通常是由地方豪强征集和控制的,而不是中央当局。

我们在第五章中讨论过,在法国大革命之前,军队是由地方豪强组建和指挥的。

他们可能响应,也可能不响应,来自巴黎或其他首都的战争号召。而无论响不响应,他们的立场都是经过慎重谈判后确定的。正如查尔斯·蒂利(Charles Tilly)所指出的,“给予或撤回支持的能力是……强大的讨价还价的能力。”此外,对中央当局而言,独立的军事力量还有一个缺点,就是能够抵抗政府对国内资源的征用。显然,所有的中央当局,无论是国王还是革命大会,都面临一个困难的挑战,就是从地方势力手中征税或以其他方式剥削资源,而地方势力控制着私人军队,有能力保护这些资源免受剥夺。

“国家军队”极大地增强了政府在整个领土范围内实施其意志的权力。而强制推行一种国家语言,对国家军队的构建起着决定性的促进作用。在国家军队 组建并运转之前,使各个成员能够流利地互相沟通,显然是很有用的。

因此,如果一个辖区内的每个人都能理解命令和指示,并能沿着官僚指挥链把 情报传递回去,是一个有利的军事条件。这一点的价值,得到了法国革命者立竿 见影的证明。除了开办相当于语言学校的课程班以外,他们还专门开设了为期一个月的“速成班”。在这些班里,就像兰金斯所写的,“来自法国各地的数百名学生,将接受火药和大炮制造技术的培训。” 法国人的做法所带来的军事优势,体现在拿破仑时期的成功,以及其他国家的反例之上。这些例子让人们看到,在战争期间,没有利用共同语言动员优势的政权, 遭到了什么样的下场。在第一次世界大战初期,造成俄军惨败和士气低落的诸多因素之一,就是沙皇的贵族军官喜欢用德语交流9,而普通士兵根本不懂德语,更不用说俄国公民了。

这点出了共同语言的另一个重要的军事优势:它减少了缺乏打仗动力的障碍。官方进行的宣传,如果人们无法理解,是没有用的。在这一点上,法国革命者也很 好地适应了新的可能性。按照兰金斯的说法,他们的“主导思想”是“人民的意志,因此,他们必须用人民特殊的语言去表达人民的意志,从而使自己认同人民的意志。”在 1789 年以前,“公民”之间无法理解彼此的语言,是表达“人民意志”的一大障碍,也是在国家层面行使权力的一种制约。在工业化时期,多语言国家或帝国在战争动员方面,面临着更多挑战。

因此在边缘地区,它们往往会被更善于激励公民作战和调动战争资源的民族国家所淘汰。民族主义的发展和巩固就是很好的例证,如 18 世纪末法国和法国人等概念的发明。而民族主义的分权也证明了这一点,如一战后奥匈帝国的崩溃。

哈布斯堡帝国分崩离析之后,出现的新民族国家,如奥地利、匈牙利、捷克斯洛伐克和南斯拉夫,用凯恩斯的话说,是“不完整与不成熟的”。但是,他们围绕着民族身份——至少部分是由语言定义的——建立独立的民族国家的主张,说服了伍德罗·威尔逊10和其他的盟国领导人,从而起草了《凡尔赛条约》。

第一次世界大战后中欧的分裂,说明语言在国家构建中是一把双刃剑。当暴力的 回报不断上升时,共同的语言促进了权力的行使和巩固。而当巩固权力的动力减 弱时,少数族裔围绕着语言争端会分帮立派,这往往会导致多语言国家的分裂。

19 世纪中叶的奥匈帝国,在一场流行病夺走了大量的德语人口之后,多个城市都掀起了分离主义的高潮。在 19 世纪的开端,布拉格还是一个德语城市。和其他欧洲城市一样,在进入 19 世纪后,它也迅速发展起来;主要是通过农村来的 移民,大量无地的讲捷克语的农民被同化。一开始,新来的移民觉得有必要学好 德语,以便更好地与人相处,于是他们就学了。但到 19 世纪中期,饥荒和瘟疫 带走了大量将德语的城市居民,取而代之的是讲捷克语的农民。突然之间,讲捷克语的人多了起来,新移民不用再学德语了。布拉格成了一个捷克语城市,也成 了捷克民族主义的温床。

当代的分离主义运动主要围绕着语言的争执在多语言国家展开,比利时和加拿大显然就是这样,我们在前面提到过。在新的千年里,这两个国家可能是经合组织中最早解体的。加拿大政府很难越过魁北克省的魁北克党,强行实施语言统一的高压行动。更出人意料的是,在意大利北部的分离主义的早期活动中,语言问题也是一大诱因,意大利同样面临着解体。1980 年代初,当时的伦巴第联盟“宣布伦巴第语是一种独立于意大利语的语言。”比利格评论说:“如果联盟的方案在 80 年代初获得成功,伦巴第从意大利分离出去并建立起自己的国家,那我们可以预测:越来越多的伦巴第人会认为他们不是意大利人。”这个说法并非毫无根据,历史上发生过类似的情况。例如在 1905 年挪威独立后,挪威民族主义者齐心协力,去划定并强调挪威语与丹麦语和瑞典语的不同之处。同样白俄罗斯的独立主义活动家,把路标都换成了“白俄罗斯语”;但显然,他们没能证明白俄罗斯语是一种独立的语言,而不是俄罗斯的方言。

现在,有利于语言统一的军事需求基本不存在了,我们预计国家语言将逐渐消失,但一场恶战是免不了的。可以想见,“战争使国家强健”这句被反复打磨过的俗语,会重新复辟,考验着人们的选择。随着民族国家变得无足轻重,煽动者和反动分子会鼓动战争和冲突,掀起种族和部落战争,就像在前南斯拉夫,以及从布隆迪到索马里等很多非洲国家一样。冲突将是很容易挑起的,因为它可以为那些想 要阻止主权商业化趋势的人提供借口。战争有利于维持更严苛的税收,并对那些逃避公民义务的人施加严厉的惩罚。战争还有助于加强民族主义“他们,和我们” 的维度区分。对于系统性强权的支持者来说,主权商业化,个人可以根据质量和价格选择主权服务,简直罪恶深重。其罪不亚于在宗教改革期间,个人主张否决教皇的判决,并要自己选择救赎之道。

这两种罪之间的相似性,也基于这一事实:15 世纪末的印刷术和 20 世纪末的信息技术,都解放性地将以前神秘的知识交到了个人手里。印刷术将圣经和其他圣典直接带到了个人身边;而在那之前,人们必须依靠牧师及教会上层,由他们来解释上帝的话语。同样信息技术使任何有电脑联网的人都可以获得关于商业、投资和时事的信息,而在过去只有政府和企业高层才能获得这些信息。

印刷术和出版业的发展,使新的民族意识成为可能,促进了现代民族国家的兴起。 —— 杰克·韦瑟福德(Jack Weatherford)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In a world where returns to violence were rising, the adoption of a national language conveyed military advantages. A national language was almost a precondition to consolidation of central power in nation-states. Central authorities that encouraged their citizens to speak the same tongue were better able to weaken the military power of local magnates. The standardization of language after the French Revolution made the cheapest and most effective form of modern military force—national conscript armies—feasible. A common language enabled troops from all regions of the “nation” to communicate fluently with one another. This was a prerequisite before massed conscript armies could displace independent battalions mustered and controlled not by the central authorities but by powerful local magnates.

Prior to the French Revolution, as we discussed in Chapter 5, troops were raised and commanded by local potentates who might or might not answer calls to battle issued from Paris or another capital. In either event, their stance was determined after careful negotiation. As Charles Tilly notes, the “ability to give or withhold support afforded… great bargaining power.”28 Furthermore, independent military units had the additional drawback, as far as the central authorities were concerned of being capable of resisting government efforts to commandeer domestic resources. Clearly, central authorities, whether King or Revolutionary Convention, had a difficult challenge to collect taxes or otherwise strip resources from local potentates who commanded private armies capable of defending those assets.

“National armies” greatly enhanced the power of the national government to impose its will throughout a territory. Imposition of a national language played a decided role in facilitating the formation of national armies. Before national armies could form and function effectively it was obviously useful that their various members be able to communicate fluently.

It was therefore a military plus if everyone within a jurisdiction could comprehend orders and instructions, as well as convey certain intelligence back along the bureaucratic chain of command. The French revolutionaries demonstrated the value of this almost immediately. In addition to running the equivalent of a language school, they also set up special monthlong “crash courses” in which, as Langins writes, “hundreds of students from all over France would be trained in the techniques of gunpowder and cannon manufacture.”29

The military advantage of the French approach was shown by their successes in the Napoleonic period, as well as by contrary examples of what happened to regimes that could not depend upon the mobilization benefits of a common tongue during war. One of many factors that contributed to the disastrous defeats and demoralization of the Russian forces in the early days of World War I was the fact that the czar’s aristocratic officer corps tended to communicate in German (the other court language of the Romanovs was French), which the rank-and-file troops, not to mention the citizenry, did not understand.

This points to another important military advantage of a common language. It reduces the motivational hurdles to fighting a war. Propaganda is useless if incomprehensible. In this respect as well, the French revolutionaries were also well attuned to the possibilities. Their “dominant idea,” according to Langins, was “the will of the people.… They therefore had to identify themselves with the popular will by expressing it in its own particular language.”30 Prior to 1789, mutual incomprehensibility among “citizens” was a drawback in expressing the “will of the people” and thus a check on the exercise of power at the national level. In more ways than one, multilingual states and empires faced higher obstacles in mobilizing for war during the industrial period.

At the margin, therefore, they tended to be supplanted by nation-states that were better able to motivate their citizens to fight and mobilize resources for war. This is exemplified by nationalist consolidation, such as the invention of France and the French at the end of the eighteenth century. It is also illustrated by cases of nationalist devolution, such as the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I. The new nation-states that emerged in the wake of the Hapsburg Empire—Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—were, as Keynes said, “incomplete and immature.” Yet their claims to form independent nation-states grouped around national identities at least partly defined by language persuaded Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders drawing up the Treaty of Versailles.

The carving up of Central Europe after World War I illustrates what a double-edged sword language became in state-building. When returns to violence were rising, a common tongue facilitated the exercise of power and consolidated jurisdictions. However, when incentives to consolidate were weaker, factions formed by minorities around language disputes also tended to fracture multilingual states. The surge of separatist sentiment in the cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century followed epidemics that devastated the German-speaking populations. Prague was a German-speaking city when the nineteenth century opened. Like other cities, it grew rapidly as the century unfolded, mostly by migration, as vast numbers of landless Czech-speaking peasants were assimilated from the countryside. In the beginning, the newcomers found it necessary to learn German in order to get along, so they did. But when famine and disease carried away large numbers of German-speaking urban residents in midcentury, they were replaced by Czech-speaking peasants. Suddenly there were so many Czech speakers that it was no longer essential for the new residents to learn German. Prague became a Czech-speaking city and a hotbed of Czech nationalism.

Contemporary separatist movements now frequently form around language disputes in multilingual countries. This is evidently the case in Belgium and Canada, two nations that, as we noted earlier, will probably be among the first in the OECD to dissolve in the new millennium. Few governments can top the heavy-handed actions to enforce language uniformity imposed by the Parti Québecois in Quebec.31 More surprisingly, language grievances also played a role in launching the early activities of the northern separatists in Italy, which also faces disintegration. In the early 1980s, the Lombard League, as it was then known, “declared Lombardian to be a separate language from Italian.” Billig comments, “Had the League’s programme been successful during the early 1980s, and had Lombardy seceded from Italy, establishing its own state boundaries, a prediction might be made: increasingly Lombardian would have come to be recognized as different from Italian.”32 This is not an arbitrary assertion. It reflects what has happened in similar cases. For example, after Norway became independent in 1905, Norwegian nationalists set about a concerted effort to identify and underline features of the “Norwegian language” that were distinct from Danish and Swedish. Similarly, activists favoring an independent Belarus changed road signs into “Belarusian,” but apparently failed to make the point that Belarusian is a separate language rather than a dialect of Russian.

Now that the military imperatives favoring language uniformity have largely been outstripped, we expect the national languages to fade, but not without a fight. It is to be expected that the well-rehearsed adage that “war is the health of the state” will be tested as a recuperative. As the nation-state slides into irrelevancy, demagogues and reactionaries will foment wars and conflicts, along the lines of ethnic and tribal fighting that has racked the former Yugoslavia and numerous jurisdictions in Africa, from Burundi to Somalia. Conflicts will prove convenient for the pretexts they provide for those seeking to arrest the trend toward commercialization of sovereignty. Wars will facilitate efforts to sustain more exacting regimes of taxation and impose more severe penalties for escaping the duties and burdens of citizenship. Wars will help undergird the “them, and us” dimension of nationalism. To the proponents of systematic coercion, commercialized sovereignty, which gives individuals a choice of sovereignty services based upon price and quality, will seem no less a sin than the assertion by individuals of the right to veto the judgments of the pope and choose their own path to salvation during the Reformation.

The parallel is underscored by the fact that both the new technology of printing at the end of the fifteenth century and the new information technology at the end of the twentieth place formerly occult knowledge at the disposal of individuals in a liberating way. The printing press brought the Scriptures and other holy texts directly within the reach of individuals who previously had to rely upon priests and the church hierarchy to interpret the Word of God. The new information technology brings within the reach of anyone with a computer hook-up information about commerce, investment, and current events that previously was available only to persons at the pinnacle of government and corporate hierarchies.

“[T]he development of printing and publishing made possible the new national consciousness and promoted the rise of modern nation states.”33 —JACK WEATHERFORD

16赛博空间的摇滚Rock and Roll in Cyberspace

中文译本

毫无疑问,互联网对民族主义的破坏力,与火药和印刷术对民族主义的促进作用一样强大。全球计算机的互连,不会使拉丁语重新成为一种通用语言,但它有助于把商业从地方方言的范畴,转移到新的、互联网时代的全球语言中去,那是奥迪斯·雷丁11和蒂娜·特纳12教给世界的语言,那是摇滚乐的语言,那就是英语。

新的网络媒体,可以创造超越地理界限的新型亲和关系,从而削弱民族主义。它们将吸引分散在世界各地的受众,无论这些人在哪里,只要他们受过教育,在网上碰巧发现了彼此,就会形成这种关系。这些新的、非地域性的亲和关系将会蓬勃发展。在发展过程中,它们可能会创造一个关于“爱国主义”的新视点。或者说,它们会形成一种新的“内群体”(ingroup),个人可以在不牺牲经济理性的情况下认同这些团体。犹太人在过去两千年的历史表明,在长期面对敌对的地方条件下,这种团体是有可能达成的。正如本章开头引用的威廉·普法夫的评论所说,认为忠于自己祖先的土地,必然意味着要忠于类似民族国家这样的结构,这种认识既不符合历史也是错误的。杰弗里·帕克(Geoffrey Parker)和莱斯 利·史密斯(Lesley M. Smith),在《十七世纪的普遍危机》(The General Crisis of the 17th Century)一书中,更清楚地阐明了这一点。他们指出,那些看似是早期民族主义的例子,其实更多的是爱国者13在捍卫一块有限的家园(patria),而且往往是为了抵抗国家的吞并。他们写道:“很多时候,所谓的对一个民族共同体的忠诚,仔细考察后就会发现并非如此。家园本身和整个国家一样,完全有可能是故乡的一个城镇 (hometown)或省份。” 在《野蛮人与文明》(Savages and Civilization)一书中,杰克·韦瑟福德(Jack Weatherford)清晰地解释了,印刷术作为第一种大规模生产的技术出现后对政治的诞生发挥了巨大的作用,而政治要求人们效忠于一个更宽泛的民族国家。到 1500 年欧洲 236 个地方都有印刷厂,“它们总共印刷了 2000 万本书。” 古腾堡14印刷的第一本书,是一本拉丁文的《圣经》。随后,他又用拉丁文出版其他流行的中世纪书籍。韦瑟福德解释说,印刷术的发展方向打破了一些人早期的期望,他们本以为随手可得的书籍会使拉丁文甚至希腊文得到普及。事实却恰恰相反,印刷术没有促进拉丁文的使用,有两个重要的原因。

首先,印刷术是一种大规模生产的技术。正如本尼迪克特·安德森所指出的,“如果说手稿知识追求的是稀缺的、高深的学问,那么印刷知识的生存之道,则是可复制性和传播性。”在 1500 年的欧洲没有多少人能使用多种语言;这意味着拉丁文作品的受众不是大众读者。当时绝大多数人都只懂一门语言,他们构成了一个更大的潜在阅读市场。此外,读者如此,作者更是如此。而出版商需要能卖得出去的作品。在十五或十六世纪,当时的作家很少能用拉丁文创作出令人满意的新作品,出版商在市场需求的趋势下,开始出版地方语言的作品。因此印刷术帮助把欧洲区分成了不同的语言区。它的促进作用不仅是通过出版新的作品, 确立新语言的独特性,如西班牙语和意大利语;而且通过采用特色的字体,如罗马体、斜体,以及直到 20 世纪初德国出版业普遍采用的厚重的哥特体。新的方言出版业,即安德森所说的“印刷资本主义”大获成功。最值得注意的是,印刷术对异端思想的传播起了决定性的推进作用。我们期待互联网对个人去国家化的进程,也会产生同样的推进力。尤其是,“路德成为了第一个为大众所知的畅销书作家,或者说他是第一个能凭自己的名字‘卖’出新书的作家。”令人震惊的是,路德的作品占到了“1518 年到 1525 年间所有德语书籍销量的 1/3 还多。” 在很多方面,信息时代的新技术将会对抗 15 世纪的新技术——印刷术,后者对刺激和支持民族国家崛起发挥了部分大政治影响。万维网创造了一个商业场所, 它使用一种全球语言,即英语。它最终会被同声传译软件所加强,几乎人人都将可以顺利地使用多种语言;这也有助于语言和想象力的去国家化。印刷术破坏了对中世纪的统治机构——圣母教堂的忠诚,同样我们期待信息时代的新技术摧毁保姆国家的权威。当时机成熟,基本每个地区都会成为多语言的地区;方言的重要性将上升。来自中央的宣传将失去大部分的凝聚力,因为移民和讲少数民族语言的人敢于抵抗国家的同化。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Make no mistake, the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web will be as destructive to nationalism as the advent of gunpowder and the printing press was conducive to nationalism. Global computer links will not bring back Latin as a universal language, but they will help shift commerce out of local dialects, like French in Quebec, into the new global language of the Internet and World Wide Web—the language that Otis Redding and Tina Turner taught the world, the language of rock and roll, English.

These new media will undercut nationalism by creating new affinities that supersede geographic boundaries. They will appeal to widely dispersed audiences that form wherever educated persons happen to find themselves. These new nonterritorial affinities will flourish, and in so doing help to create a new focus for “patriotism.” Or rather, they will form new “ingroups” with whom individuals can identify without necessarily sacrificing their economic rationality. The history of the Jews during the past two thousand years shows that this is possible over the long term and in the face of hostile local conditions. As the comment from William Pfaff quoted at the head of this chapter suggests, it is ahistorical and wrong to think that loyalties to the land of one’s fathers, the patria, necessarily entails loyalty to an institution resembling a nation-state. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith make this even more clear in The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, showing that what appear to be examples of early modern nationalism are more often instances of patriots defending a much narrower patria —often against the encroachment of a state. They write, “All too often a supposed allegiance to a national community turns out, on inspection, to be nothing of the kind. The patria itself is at least as likely to be a home town or province as the whole nation.”34

As Jack Weatherford lucidly explains in Savages and Civilization, the rise of the printing press, the first mass-production technology, had dramatic effects in contributing to the creation of politics, with its demands for allegiance to a broader nation-state. By the year 1500, there were printing presses operating in 236 places in Europe. “and they had printed a combined total of some 20 million books.”35 Gutenberg’s first printed book was an edition of the Bible in Latin. He followed it with editions of other popular medieval books in Latin. As Weatherford explains, printing meandered in a direction that defeated early expectations that the ready availability of texts would spread the use of Latin and even Greek. To the contrary. There were two important reasons why the printing press did not reinforce the use of Latin. First, the printing press was a mass-production technology. As Benedict Anderson points out, “[I]f manuscript knowledge was scarce and arcane lore, print knowledge lived by reproducibility and dissemination.”36 Very few Europeans were multilingual in 1500. This meant that the audience for works in Latin was not a mass audience. The vast majority who were monoglot made up a much bigger market of potential readers. Furthermore, what was true of readers was even more true of writers. Publishers needed products to sell. Because there were few contemporary fifteenth- or sixteenth-century authors who could compose satisfactory new works in Latin, publishers were driven by market necessity to publish works in the vernacular. Printing thus helped to differentiate Europe into linguistic subsets. This was encouraged not only by the publication of new works that established the identity of new languages, like Spanish and Italian, but also by the adoption of characteristic typefaces, such as Roman, Italic, and the heavy Gothic script that was common to German publishing until well into the twentieth century. The new vernacular publishing, what Anderson describes as “print capitalism,” was very successful. Most notably, the printing press gave heresy the kind of decisive boost that we expect for the denationalization of the individual from the Internet. In particular, Luther became “the first best-selling author so known. Or to put it another way, the first writer who could ‘sell’ his new books on the basis of his name.”37 Astonishingly, Luther’s works accounted for “no less than one third of all German-language books sold between 1518 and 1525.”38

In many respects, the new technology of the Information Age will counter part of the megapolitical impact of fifteenth-century technology, the printing press, in stimulating and underpinning the rise of nation-states. The World Wide Web creates a commercial venue with a global language, English. It will eventually be reinforced with simultaneous-translation software, making almost everyone effectively multilingual, and helping to denationalize language and imagination. Just as the technology of the printing press undermined allegiance to the dominant institution of the Middle Ages, the Holy Mother Church, so we expect the new communications technology of the Information Age to undermine the authority of the nanny state. In due course, almost every area will become multilingual. Local dialects will rise in importance. Propaganda from the center will lose much of its coherence as immigrants and speakers of minority tongues are emboldened to resist assimilation into the nation.

17军事神秘主义MILITARY MYSTICISM

中文译本

从同样的角度看,“狩猎采集部落”是客观的共同体,而国家则远远不是;国家是在一种神秘主义的启发下被想象出来的,而这种神秘主义又是由一种已经不复存在的军事需求激发出来的。那是一种被认为比生命本身还重要的身份需求,它将生活在同一领土内的每个人联系起来。康托洛维茨(Kantorowicz)说,“在历 史的某一时刻,抽象的国家或作为公司运营的国家,成为了一种神秘主义的团体;而为该团体牺牲,其价值简直相当于为上帝而死的十字军战士!”从这个意义上可以把民族国家理解为一种神秘的构建。不过,正如比利格所指出的,民族主义是“一种平庸的神秘主义,而且它是如此平庸,似乎所有的神秘色彩早就蒸发了”。

它“把‘我们’与祖国绑在一起,祖国是如此的特殊,它不仅仅是一个地方,地球上的一块物理区域。通过这一切,祖国被赋予一种家国情感,它不容质疑,当有需要的时候,完全值得为之而牺牲。而男人,尤其是男人,收到了特别的、充满快感的提示,提示他们可能的牺牲。” 民族主义者只要一有机会,就会强调国与家之间的想象性联系。就像比利格所说的,国家被“想象成温馨的空间,人们在边界内舒适、安全地生活,并把危险的世界挡在外面。而‘我们’这个在祖国内的民族,可以很容易地把‘我们自己’ 想象成某种家庭。”民族主义者不知疲倦地重复着这些陈词滥调,还有许多关于亲情和身份的庸俗隐喻。他们把国家与个人的一种“整体适应性”(inclusive fitness)意识联系在一起,这种意识会激发强大的利他主义和牺牲动机。

牺牲性的利他主义,确实存在于社会性昆虫、其他非人类动物和人类当中,这意味着自我利益的最大化,不能仅由单个有机体的欲望和需求来定义。事实上,利他主义的存在,尤其是对亲属的利他主义,要求人们对生物科学中传统的适者生存观念,进行全面的重新思考。这也使得越来越多的人相信,自然选择的法则最终不会适用于个人。 —— 保罗·肖、王玉华15R. PAUL SHAW & YUWA WONG

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Far from being objective communities, in the same sense that, for example, “hunting-gathering bands” are objective, nations are imagined out of a mysticism inspired by a defunct military imperative. That was the imperative to link every person living within a territory through a sense of identity that can be made to seem more important than life itself. As Kantorowicz noted, it is not a coincidence that “at a certain moment in history the state in the abstract or the state as a corporation appeared as a corpus mysticism and that death for this new mystical body appeared equal in value to the death of a crusader for the cause of God!”39 In this sense, the nation-state can, be understood as a mystical construct. Yet as Billig notes, nationalism is “a banal mysticism, which is so banal that all the mysticism seems to have evaporated long ago.” It “binds ‘us’ to the homeland—that special place which is more than just a place, more than a mere geophysical area. In all this, the homeland is made to look homely, beyond question and, should the occasion arise, worth the price of sacrifice. And men, in particular, are given their special, pleasure-saturated reminders of the possibilities of sacrifice.”40

The imaginative link between the nation and home continues to be highlighted by nationalists at every opportunity. As Billig suggests, the nation is “imagined as homely space, cozy within its borders, secure against the dangerous outside world. And ‘we’ the nation within the homeland can so easily imagine ‘ourselves’ as some sort of family.”41 The clichés of nationalism, tirelessly and routinely repeated, include many commonplace metaphors of kinship and identity. They associate the nation with an individual’s sense of “inclusive fitness,” a powerful motive for altruism and sacrifice.

“That sacrificial altruism does exist in social insects, other nonhuman animals, and humans implies that maximization of self-interest cannot be solely defined in terms of an individual organism’s wants and needs. Indeed, the presence of altruism, particularly toward fan, has required a whole rethinking of traditional notions of survival of the fittest in the biological sciences. This has resulted in a growing conviction that natural selection does not ultimately operate on the individual.…”42 —R. PAUL SHAW AND YUWA WONG

18民族主义与整体适应性NATIONALISM AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS

中文译本

在本书中,我们主要关注的是改变人类选择的成本与回报的客观“大政治”因素。分析的预测能力,依据的基本前提是个人会追求回报而规避成本。这是查尔斯·达尔文所说的“自然经济”的一个基本真理,但这并不是全部的真理。简单的回报优化并不能解释生活中的一切。不过,它确实阐明了人类社会三种互动方式中的两种,皮埃尔·范登伯格(Pierre Van Den Berghe)称之为“互惠和胁迫”。范登伯格所说的“互惠”是指“互利合作”,最复杂、影响最深远的例子就是市场互动:交易、买卖、生产和其他经济活动。“胁迫”则是为了单方面的利益,即为了同物种间的寄生或掠夺而使用暴力。正如在本书及前两本书中所论述的,我们认为胁迫是人类社会活动中的一个关键因素,它比人们通常所认为的要更加重要。胁迫可以决定财产的安危,可以限制个人进行互利合作的能力。

胁迫是某些政治的基础。范登伯格的人类社会类型学中的第三种互动方式,是“亲缘选择”(kin selection),即动物与它们的亲属之间展开的合作行为。下文会更详细地阐述亲缘选择,它也是“自然经济”的一个重要特征。

杰克·赫舒拉发(Jack Hirshleifer)写到,“达尔文的进化论被复兴,被应用于社会行为问题的研究,已经形成了一门社会生物学”,它具有“明显的经济学属性”;而且纵观所有的生命领域,社会生物学试图找到决定生物体之间种种联系的一般规律。例如:为什么某些生物有性别有家庭,有的只有性别没有家庭,有的既没有性别也没有家庭?为什么有的动物成群结队,有的则单独活动?为什么在有的群体中,我们可以观察到等级支配模式,有的却没有?为什么有些生物会划分地盘,而另一些则不会?是什么决定了社会性昆虫的无私奉献,为什么这种模式在自然界非常罕见?在哪些情况下,资源的分配是和平的,什么时候是通过暴力的手段?这些问题都是用公认的经济学术语提出和解答的。

社会生物学家问的是,观察到的这些关联模式,对呈现相应模式的生物体的净优势是什么,这些模式在社会平衡状态下持续存在的机制又是什么?社会生物学认为人类与其他生物之间,存在经济行为的一致性。可能正是因为这种主张(被一位反对者称为“遗传资本主义”),让一些意识形态者对社会生物学充满敌意。 我们将把社会生物学引入到对民族主义的分析中去,因为它提供了一种视角可以帮助我们理解,为什么人性会促进系统性的胁迫。我们同意自然科学家科林·塔吉(Colin Tudge)的观点,他是《历史以前的时间》(The Time Before History)一书的作者;他认为在我们理解当前的世界之前——先不要说对未来有什么看法,我们需要了解历史的前言部分。

这意味着我们必须“在宏大的时间尺度上审视自己”。塔吉提醒我们,“在我们动荡的生活表层之下,有更深层、更强大的力量在发挥作用,最终影响到我们所有人和所有的同类……”。我们怀疑在这些“更深层、更强大的力量”中,可能有一部分是受基因影响的动机力量,为民族主义提供了支撑。正如赫舒拉发所指出的,套用亚当·斯密与罗纳德·科斯(R. H. Coase)的话说,“人类的欲望, 最终是由人类的生物本性和在地球上的处境所形成的适应性反应。”在大多数关于民族主义的讨论中,这一观点因为明显的生物学意味而引人注目。毕竟即使在美国这个显而易见的多民族国家,政府也被人格化为家族式的“山姆大叔”。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Our main focus in this book is on objective “megapolitical” factors that alter the costs and rewards of human choices. The underlying premise upon which the predictive power of the analysis rests is that individuals will seek rewards and shun costs. This is an essential truth of what Charles Darwin called “the economy of nature.” But it is not the whole truth. Simple reward optimization does not explain everything in life. However, it does illuminate two of the three main forms of human sociality, identified by Pierre Van Den Berghe as “reciprocity and coercion.”43 By “reciprocity” Van Den Berghe means “cooperation for mutual benefit.”44 The most complex and far-reaching examples of reciprocity are market interactions: trading, buying, selling, producing, and other economic activities. “Coercion is the use of force for one-sided benefit, that is, for purposes of intra-specific parasitism or predation.” 45 As we have explored in this volume and two previous books, we believe that coercion is a crucial element in human society, a larger one than is usually recognized. Coercion helps determine the security of property and limits the ability of individuals to enter into mutually beneficial cooperation. Coercion underlies all politics. The third element in Van Den Berghe’s typology of human sociality is “kin selection,” the cooperative behavior that animals undertake with their kin. Kin selection, which is described more fully below, is also a crucial feature of the “economy of nature.”

As Jack Hirshleifer has written, “[T]he revival of Darwinian evolutionary selection theory as applied to problems of social behaviour, which has come to be known as sociobiology,” has “a distinctly economic aspect.” And:

Looking over the whole realm of life, sociobiology is attempting to find the general laws determining the multifarious forms of association among organisms. For example, Why do we sometimes observe sex and families, sometimes sex without families, sometimes neither sex nor families? Why do some animals flock, others remain solitary? Within groups, why do we sometimes observe hierarchical dominance patterns, sometimes not? Why do organisms in some species partition territories, others not? What determines the selflessness of the social insects, and why is this pattern so rare in Nature? When do we see resources allocated peacefully, when by means of violence? These are questions both posed and answered in recognizably economic terms. Sociobiologists ask what are the net advantages of the observed association patterns to the organisms displaying them, and what are the mechanisms whereby these patterns persist in social equilibrium states. It is perhaps this assertion of economic-behavioural continuity between man and other life-forms (termed “genetic capitalism” by one detractor) that explains the hostility of some ideologues to sociobiology…46

We introduce sociobiology into our analysis of nationalism because it provides perspective on aspects of human nature that help facilitate systematic coercion. We agree with natural scientist Colin Tudge, author of The Time Before History, that before we can understand the current world, much less gain a perspective on that to come, we need to understand the preface to history. That means we must “look at ourselves on the grand scale of time.”47 Tudge reminds us “that beneath the surface tremors of our lives there are much deeper and more powerful forces at work that in the end affect us all and all our fellow creatures.…”48 We suspect that among “these deeper and more powerful forces” is a genetically influenced motivational component undergirding nationalism. As Hirshleifer points out, paraphrasing Adam Smith and R. H. Coase, “human desires are ultimately adaptive responses shaped by man’s biological nature and situation on earth.”49 This comes to the fore with the obviously biological allusions in most discussions of nationalism. Even in the United States, a conspicuously multiethnic nation, the government is personified in familial terms as “Uncle Sam.”

19生物学遗传The Biological Inheritance

中文译本

简单来说,在理解人类社会的持续演化时,要考虑到人性、物种起源以及它们在自然选择下的发展等因素。在当前的情况下,我们思考的是对信息技术带来的新环境,人类可能做出的反应。我们尤其关注人们对网络经济及其后果的反应,包括前所未见的经济不平等。在这些预期可能发生的反应中,至少有一部分,其关键在于我们遗传的基因。

当一个新的物种形成时,它并不会抛弃在以前结构中携带的所有基因,而是会增 加它。人类和黑猩猩之间的全部差别,只包含在各自不到 2%的 DNA 里,超过 98%的 DNA 是两者共同的,其中一些 DNA 可以追溯到非常原始的早期生物,比历史发展的链条要远得多。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In short, human nature, the origin of species, and their development by natural selection are elements to be considered in understanding the continuing evolution of human society. In the present case we are considering the likely human response to new circumstances occasioned by information technology. Particularly, we are focusing on the reaction to the advent of the cybereconomy and its many consequences, including the emergence of economic inequality more pronounced than anything seen in the past. Keys to at least some of the expected response lie in our genetic inheritance.

When a new species is formed, it does not discard all the DNA that it carried in its previous form, but adds to it. The whole difference between a human being and a chimpanzee is contained in less than 2 percent of the DNA in each species; slightly over 98 percent of their DNA is common to both, and some of it can be traced back to very primitive early organisms, far down the historic chain of development.

20遗传惰性GENETIC INERTIA

中文译本

人类文化同样包含着普遍的因素,其中一些确实可以是遗传自人类的祖先。我们如何寻找事物,如何交配,如何组成家庭,如何与陌生群体打交道,如何保护 自己,这些都是本能与文化的复杂混合物,有着非常原始的根源。它们也能够进行现代化的调整,比如现在时期民族国家的特点。如果从这个角度思考文化,我们可以把它看作是与遗传平行发展的。但它们之间有三个重大的区别:文化是通过人与人之间的信息链传播的,而不是通过代际之间的基因链。文化在一定程度上——可能比我们想象的要容易——可以通过有意识的智能活动来改变。文化会随着决定成本与回报的环境条件发生改变,这比基因变化要快得多。从生理上看,我们与三万年的祖先还非常相似;但从文化上,我们离他们已经很远了。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Human cultures similarly contain elements that are universal, some of which are indeed inherited from prehuman ancestors. How we seek food, how we mate, how we form families, how we relate to strange groups, how we defend ourselves are all complex mixtures of instinct and culture, with very primitive roots. They are also all capable of modern adaptations, such as those that have characterized the nation-state in the modern period. If we think of cultures in this way, we shall see them as parallel to genetic development. The three great differences are that cultures are transmitted by the information chain between human beings, not by the genetic chain between generations; they can to some extent—perhaps less than we think—be changed by conscious intelligent action; they change with the prevailing environment of costs and rewards, which mutates much faster than genetic change. Physically we are very similar to our ancestors of thirty thousand years, ago; culturally we have moved quite far away from them.

21进化模式Evolutionary Models

中文译本

关于物种的进化,有两种生物学模式。科学的正统观念是新达尔文主义。按照这种理论,随机的基因变化产生出不同的自然种类。大多数种类不具备生存优势,如白化黑鸟,它们往往会消亡。少数对生存有帮助的,会在物种间传播。这个理论还面临着很多难题,也许会在下个世纪被科学家们解决,但随机性和有利于生存的适应性,是目前科学界的正统观念,具有一定的解释力。另一种模式是 20 世纪初法国哲学家亨利·伯格森(Henri Bergson)理论的一些变体,他认为自然界的创造具有一些非随机性的目的,是一种寻求解决方案的智能力量。这一理念在当代权威人士如大卫·雷泽(David Layzer)和斯蒂芬·古尔德(Stephen Jay Gould) 的工作中得到了回应。他们强调遗传变异不是简单随机性的,而是呈现出明确 的倾向性。这不是严格意义上的圣经创造论,但它避免了正统达尔文主义的许多问题。

社会生物学理论的重大贡献,是将适应性(fitness)的概念扩展为了“整体适应性”。动物的确可以通过自身的繁殖,直接复制其基因;也可以通过与它共有特定比例基因的亲属进行繁殖,来间接复制其基因。因此,我们可以预料,动物之间会有合作行为,从而在其基因相关的范围内增强彼此的适应性。这就是亲属选择的涵义。简而言之,动物具有裙带关系,它们喜欢亲属而不是非亲属,喜欢近亲而不是远亲。这可能是有意识的,像人类就是;但更多的是无意识的。 —— 皮埃尔·范登伯格(PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

There are two biological models of the way in which species evolve. The scientific orthodoxy is neo-Darwinist. Random genetic changes produce different physical forms. Most of these forms have no advantage to survival, as for instance the albino blackbird, and these tend to the out. A small number of them are helpful to survival and spread through the species. There are still many difficulties in this theory, which may be sorted out by scientists in the next century, but randomness and the survival of favorable adaptations are the current scientific orthodoxy and have some explanatory power. The alternative is some variant of the theory of the early twentieth century French philosopher Henri Bergson, who believed that nature had some nonrandom creative purpose, an intelligent force seeking solutions. This concept has echoes in the work of such contemporary authorities as David Layzer and Stephen Jay Gould, who have stressed that genetic variation is not simply random but shows definite propensities.50 This is not creationism in its strict biblical sense, but it avoids many of the problems of orthodox Darwinism.

“The great theoretical contribution of sociobiology has been to extend the concept of fitness to that of ‘inclusive fitness.’ Indeed, an animal can duplicate its genes directly through its own reproduction, or indirectly through the reproduction of relatives with which it shares specific proportions of genes. Animals, therefore, can be expected to behave cooperatively, and thereby enhance each other’s fitness to the extent that they are genetically related. This is what is meant by kin selection. Animals, in short, are nepotistic, i.e., they prefer kin over non-kin, and close kin over distant kin. This may happen consciously, as in humans, or more commonly, unconsciously.”51 —PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE

22受基因影响的动机因素GENETICALLY INFLUENCED MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

中文译本

1963 年威廉·汉密尔顿(W.D.Hamilton)在他的论文“利他行为的演化研究”中提出了“整体适应性”的概念,为人类行为的研究增加了生物学视角。汉密尔顿认识到,虽然人类被赋予的行为模式,从根本上是自我导向的,但他们偶尔也会从事一些利他主义或自我牺牲的行为,这些行为并不能给个人生活带来什么直接的好处。汉密尔顿试图调和这些明显的矛盾,他提出来,寻求利益最大化的基本单位不是生物个体,而是基因。任何物种中的个体都会寻求利益最大化,但不仅仅是为了它们自身的福祉,而是汉密尔顿所说的“整体适应性”。他认为 “整体适应性”不仅包括达尔文意义上的个体生存,还包括可以增强具有相同基因的近亲属的繁衍和生存。汉密尔顿的“整体适应性”理论有助于解释人类社会中许多奇怪的特征,包括民族国家的政治表现。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The biological perspective on human behavior was enhanced by the introduction of the concept of “inclusive fitness” in 1963 by W. D. Hamilton in “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior.” Hamilton recognized that while humans are fundamentally given to self-oriented behavior, they also undertake occasional acts of altruism or self-sacrifice that offer no apparent benefits in terms of the life of the individual. Hamilton sought to reconcile these apparent contradictions by positing that the fundamental maximizing unit is not the individual organism but the gene. Individuals in any species will seek to maximize not simply their own personal well-being but what Hamilton called their “inclusive fitness.” He argued that “inclusive fitness” involves not only personal survival in the Darwinian sense, but also the enhanced reproduction and survival of close relatives who share the same genes.52 Hamilton’s “inclusive fitness” thesis helps illuminate many otherwise curious features of human societies, including aspects of politics in nation-states.

23利他主义:是误会还是顽固不化的亲属选择?Altruism: Misnomer or Fossil Kin Selection?

中文译本

范登伯格认为:“利他主义主要适用于亲属,尤其是近亲属,所以,事实上它是一个错误的说法,用词不当。它其实代表了终极的基因自私性;只是人们没有认识到最大化的整体适应性,所以使用了一种盲目的叫法。”不过这也不等于说,如果不存在汉密尔顿和范登伯格所说的近亲遗传关系,就不存在利他主义。

人类是有性繁殖的,而不是无性克隆,这本身所带来的不确定性,在“整体适应性最大化”的遗传倾向下,几乎肯定会激发大量的利他主义行为,使“自私的基因”以外的等位基因获益。首先来说,有一种情况总是有可能发生的,就是有些人在帮助他人时,他可能是误以为是在帮助自己的近亲属。为后代而牺牲的父亲,可能并不是他们的生父,只是自己不知道。这不仅是一个肥皂剧题材,它还解释了一个原始的谜题:如果每一个表面上的父亲,表现得“好像”是真正的父亲——即使它可能不是,这也很可能促进“自私的基因”的幸存。

不过,正如赫舒拉发所指出的,从正确的角度看“利他主义”的诸多悖论,都是由于语义上的模糊,它们经常迷惑或误导人们忽视竞争的背景,在这种背景下实施“帮助”更有助于生存:“在生存的竞争当中,如果利他主义的策略选择要胜过非利他主义,那么利他主义对自我生存的贡献就要超过非利他主义,这样的话它就不可能真的是利他主义。这真的是一团浆糊。但是如果我们抛掉‘利他主义’这个词,转而问道:可以被完全客观地称之为‘帮助’的现象,它的决定因素是什么?这一切就清晰多了。” 可能在“帮助亲属”时,问这个问题最有意思。在汉密尔顿关于整体适应性的基本表述中,涉及到一种生物学上的成本效益分析。根据这种分析,一个个体,或 者说“控制帮助行为的基因”,会把一个与自己相同的副本的生存,放在与自己的生存同等重要的位置。因此一个个体是否愿意提供帮助,甚至为他人牺牲,它的意愿程度会随着另一个个体拥有相同基因的比例而变化。“具体来说,负责亲属帮助的基因,会指示一个人。如果他能拯救两个兄弟姐妹、四个同父异母的兄弟姐妹、八个堂兄弟姐妹,他就会献出自己的生命。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

According to Van Den, Berghe, “Altruism, then, is directed mostly at kin, especially at close kin, and is, in fact, a misnomer. It represents the ultimate genetic selfishness. It is but the blind expression of inclusive fitness maximization.”53 This is not to say, however, that there is no altruism absent the close genetic relationship referred to by Hamilton and Van Den Berghe. The uncertainties introduced by the fact that humans reproduce sexually rather than through asexual cloning all but guarantee that an inclination to “inclusive fitness maximization” would stimulate a good deal of “altruism” rebounding to the benefit of alleles other than the “selfish gene.” In the first instance, there is always the possibility that some persons who undertake helping actions may do so in the mistaken assumption that they are helping close kin. The father who undertakes a sacrificial action for his offspring may not, in fact, be the progenitor but may merely think he is.IV This is not merely a theme for soap operas; it is illustrative of a primordial puzzle— that survival of the “selfish genes” is probably facilitated if each apparent father behaves “as if” he actually is the father, despite the possibility that he is not.

Seen in their proper light, however, as Hirshleifer points out, many of the paradoxes of “altruism” are semantic muddles that frequently confuse or mislead people into losing sight of the context of competition in which “helping” could convey a survival advantage: “ ‘If an altruism choice of strategy is to be viable in competition with non-altruism, altruism must contribute to self-survival more than non-altruism does, and therefore it can’t really be altruism.’ All such muddles could be avoided if we drop the term ‘altruism’ and ask instead: What are the determinants of the entirely objective phenomenon that can be called helping?”54

This question is perhaps most interesting in the case of “kinship helping.” Hamilton’s basic formulation of inclusive fitness involved a biological cost-benefit analysis in which an individual, or “the gene controlling helping behaviour,” values the survival of an identical copy of itself equally to its own survival. Therefore, the willingness to undertake helping, let alone sacrifice, varies with the chance that another individual has an identical gene. “Specifically, a gene for kinship helping instructs a man (other things equal) to give his life if he can thereby save two siblings, four half-siblings, eight cousins, etc.”55

24整体适应性的概率问题PROBABILITY PROBLEMS OF INCLUSIVE FITNESS

中文译本

这种生物逻辑在原则上好像很清楚,但仔细研究后会发现它掩盖了一些问题。例如,一个人的兄弟姐妹和他的子女,可能有 50%的概率具有相同的基因,但按照严格的逻辑,这并不意味着这种情况会真的在他们身上发生。每个人身上都携 带有两套基因,一套来自父亲,一套来自母亲。当然这意味着,但也只意味着,父亲或母亲个体所携带的基因,只有一半会必然遗传给后代。另外,生殖过程中也一直存在着基因突变,虽然概率不大,但也降低了基因成本效益分析的确定性。

所以,如果认真思考“基因是优化器”这个隐喻,就会意识到它存在很多方面的问题,那种不是后代父辈的繁衍,就是一个再清楚不过的例子。如果“自私的基 因”确实可以通过为近亲牺牲而优化生存,那么任何导致另一个等位基因替代 “自私基因”的相同拷贝的可能性,都可以看做是大自然母亲对自己玩的复杂戏法之一。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

While this biologic seems clear in principle, upon closer examination it disguises a number of difficulties. For example, the fact that one’s siblings or children may have a 50 percent probability of sharing an identical gene does not, in strict logic, mean that it is actually expressed in them. Every individual carries two sets of each gene, one from, the father and one from the mother. But this, of course, means that only half of the genes carried by an individual parent are necessarily present in offspring. Furthermore, there is always the risk of mutation in reproduction, which, unlikely though it may be, reduces the certainty of genetic cost-benefit analysis. So if the metaphor of “gene as optimizer” is taken seriously, the case of the pater who is not the progenitor is only the most clear-cut example of a broader problem. If it is indeed the survival of the “selfish gene” that is optimized by sacrificing for near-relatives, then any possibility that results in the substitution of another allele for the identical copy of the “selfish gene” may be considered one of those intricate tricks that Mother Nature plays on herself.

25不确定的后果Uncertain Consequences

中文译本

因此,针对亲属的利他主义是有问题的。对于“自私的基因”来说,不仅存在着概率的问题,也就是说,它的宿主表面上的亲属,事实上可能并不具有相同的基因副本。还有一个问题是,在不确定的条件下如果做出特定的牺牲,怎么确定最终的实际受益人主要是自己的亲属,而不是其他人。(如果主要受益人是其他人,那这样的牺牲实际上可能会损害自私基因的整体适应性,因为它降低了自己 在后代族群中出现的可能性。)举一个可怕的例子,这是我们在写作的时候,受到新闻的启发而想到的。假设苏格兰邓布兰地区的一位家长,接到了紧急通知, 有一个武装分子冲进了当地一所学校,显然是要搞伤害活动。如果这个家长立刻行动,他或她可以采取英勇但也许注定会失败的行动,与疯子对抗,从而有可能 救出他们在学校的孩子。也可能救不出。即使是一个残忍的变态,想要杀死地球上所有的孩子,但他也可能打光弹药,或被他人制服,在此之前他所能造成的杀伤也是有限的。不管怎样,如果做出牺牲的父母决定不去救,他的孩子也很有可能活下来,就像学校里大多数孩子一样。

在这里,勇敢的牺牲行为所避免的伤害,可能主要使其他孩子受益。所以当事的父亲或母亲冒着生命危险,主要是为了他人的孩子,这实际上降低了他们自己 的“整体适应性”。由于葬送了他们所有孩子的父母之一,可能会让这些孩子在达尔文式的竞争中处于更不利的位置。

显然这是一个很压抑的例子,但它也是现实的。它反映了一个事实:在生活中无数的情况下,大大小小的帮助行为都会产生有益的影响。在很多时候,这些行为的直接受益者,都无法被局限在关系密切的亲属身上。而讽刺的是这可能会使那些具有较少歧视性帮助基因的人,获得部分生存利益,使他们能够经受得住迄今为止数千年来的所有磨难,我们会在下文对此进行阐述。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Altruism directed toward kin therefore involves problems. Not only is there the probability problem for the “selfish gene” that apparent relatives of its host may not, in fact, share its identical copies. There is also the difficulty of determining under conditions of uncertainty whether any given gesture of sacrifice will, in fact, primarily benefit relatives rather than others. (Sacrifice that primarily benefits others may actually harm the inclusive fitness of the selfish gene by reducing the prospects that it will be represented in succeeding populations.) Consider an awful example inspired by the news while we were writing. Suppose a parent in Dunblane, Scotland, learned on short notice that an armed lunatic was heading into a local school with the apparent intention of doing harm. By acting instantly, he or she could undertake the heroic but possibly doomed gesture of confronting the lunatic, and thereby possibly save his or her children at the school.

Or possibly not.

Even a ruthless lunatic intent on killing every child on the planet would be limited in the harm he could do before running short of ammunition or being subdued by others. Had the sacrificing parent decided not to intervene, more likely than not his children would have survived in any event, as most children at the school did. All the harm that a gallant act of sacrifice would have prevented probably would otherwise have fallen on the children of others. So by risking his or her life, primarily for the children of others, the father or mother in question might actually have reduced his “inclusive fitness.” By depriving all his children of one of their parents, he would probably have left those children in a worsened position in the Darwinian struggle.

While this is admittedly a strained example, it is also realistic. It reflects the fact that there are countless circumstances in life in which large or small acts of helping have beneficial effects. In many cases, the direct beneficiaries of such actions cannot be easily isolated to closely related kin. And ironically, as we consider below, this may be part of the survival benefit that enabled those with less discriminate helping genes to endure all the millennia of unpleasantness until now.

26利他主义与遗传惯性Altruism and Genetic Inertia

中文译本

我们认为,如果“自私的基因”理论是对人类行为动机的准确模拟,那么认为由它所引起的帮助或牺牲行为,可以狭隘地仅仅为了实际亲属的利益而实施,就未免太简单了。在某些情况下,由于不完全知情,区分亲属是一门不确定的艺术。而且即使亲属是已知的,对于特定的“自私的基因”,它在亲属人群中的实际分布也不能确定,这不仅仅是个概率问题。直到最近,还无法区分出个体之间真实的遗传标记。而要在实践中区分出,哪些近亲属代表了哪种正在优化生存的“自私的基因”,我们距此还有一段距离。除此之外,要将利益限制在亲属而非他人身上,是一个更大的难题。

还有,从经验中也可以看出,如果没有合适的亲属,人类有时候会把自己的“养育本能”转移到非亲属的利益上。最明显的例子就是父母领养孩子的行为,或者某些人(通常无子女)对家中宠物的行为。这些人为了营救困在树上的猫咪不惜受到重伤甚至死亡,这样的事时有发生。在每一年中也有不少人因为家庭事故而丧失,这些事故都是由掉入险境中的宠物,以某种方式造成的。对宠物如此,对养子女更是如此。可以肯定地说,领养孩子的父母对待他们的方式就“好像” 对待亲属一样;这就赋予了“亲属选择”的概念另一种含义。

这样的例子并不像一些批评者所希望的那样,会否定“自私的基因”理论。恰恰相反,我们看到人们通过“好像”是为近亲属做牺牲的行为,增加了自己的整体适应性;这些例子说明了“基因惯性”的现象。换句话说,它们反映了,霍华德·马格里斯(Howard Margolis)在《自私、利他主义和理性》(Selfishness,Altruism,and Rationality)一书中所指出的事实,即“人类社会的变化”比人类基因的进补(makeup)要快。因此,现在人们的行为方式仍然“像是生活在一个小型的狩猎采集群体当中。”就像范登伯格所说,这类群体的一个主要特征就是:“他们是由几百人组成的、近亲繁殖的小规模团体。部落的成员虽然被细分为较小的亲属群体,但他们把自己看成一个单一的种族,团结在一起抵御外面的世界;他们通过亲属关系和婚姻网络互相联系,使部落成为了一个事实上的超级家庭。高度的近亲繁殖率,保证了大多数配偶也是亲属。” 简而言之,在农业出现之前的所有人类历史中,族群(ethic groups)都是“近亲繁殖的超级家庭”。由于过去的家庭与族内人16之间的认同感,很可能存在一种受基因影响的行为倾向,就是把族内人当成亲人。

不难想象,在古时候当“近亲繁殖的超级家庭”中的每个成员都是亲属时,这种行为是具有生存价值的。正如马格里斯提到的,很容易想象对于“这样小型的狩猎采集群体,彼此之间关系密切,只靠这种整体性的自私(不存在互惠或复仇的问题),就可以独立支撑起对群体利益的保障。那么我们可以认为,某些幸存至今的倾向于群体利益的动机,其实是一种化石化的亲属利他主义(fossil kin-altruism)。”换句话说,由于我们保留了狩猎采集者的基因构成,我们对内群体的行为反映了一种“利他主义”,这种利他主义有望优化由“近亲繁殖的超级家庭”组成的内群体的生存与成功。

马格里斯推测,这种为群体利益付出的行为倾向——起因于“化石化的亲属利他主义(fossil kin-altruism)”或基因惯性,很可能帮助了智人的生存,“而其他的类人物种则灭绝了。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

If, as we believe, the “selfish gene” thesis is an accurate approximation of what motivates human action, it would be too simple to suppose that the helping or sacrificial behavior it engenders could operate narrowly and solely for the benefit of actual relatives. Imperfect knowledge makes distinguishing kin an uncertain art in some circumstances. And even assuming that kin were known, actual representation of any given “selfish gene” in the population of kin could not be ascertained as more than a matter of probabilities. Until recently, it would have been impossible to distinguish actual genetic markers among individuals. And we are still some distance from being able to practically distinguish which near-relatives actually express whatever “selfish gene” is optimizing its survival. Beyond that is the greater difficulty of confining benefits to kin rather than others.

Furthermore, it is also obvious from experience that humans sometimes divert their “nurturing instincts” for the benefit of nonkin if appropriate kin are unavailable. The most clear-cut example of this is the behavior of parents toward adopted children, or even the behavior of certain persons, usually childless, toward their household pets. It is not unheard of for such individuals to court serious injury and even death to rescue cats trapped in a tree. Certainly, in any given year, a not-insignificant number of persons perish in household accidents precipitated in some fashion by pets who find their way into jeopardy. What is true of pets is more true of adoptive children. It is certainly not a stretch to say that parents of adopted children often treat them “as if” they were kin, thus giving the concept of “kin selection” another meaning.

Such cases do not discredit the “selfish gene” theory as much as some critics would wish. To the contrary. We see examples of people behaving “as if” they were sacrificing for close relatives to advance their own inclusive fitness, as instances of “genetic inertia.” In other words, they reflect the fact, noted by Howard Margolis in Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality, that “human society changed faster” than human genetic makeup. People, therefore, continue to act “substantially as if living in a small hunter-gatherer group.”56 A crucial characteristic of such groups was, as Van Den Berghe put it, that

They were small in-bred populations of a few hundred individuals.… Members of the tribe, though subdivided into smaller kin groups, saw themselves as a single people, solidary against the outside world, and interlinked by a web of kinship and marriage making the tribe in fact a superfamily. A high rate of inbreeding assured that most spouses were also kinsmen.”57

In short, for all of human existence prior to the advent of agriculture, ethnic groups were “inbreeding superfamilies.” Given this past identity between the family and the in-group, there could well be a genetically influenced tendency to treat the in-group as kin. It is easy to imagine that such behavior could have had survival value in the past when every member of the “inbreeding superfamily” was kin. As Margolis suggests, it is easy to imagine that for “such small bands of hunter-gatherers, closely related, that inclusive selfishness (aside from any prospect of reciprocity or vengeance) would alone support a measure of commitment to group-interest. One can then argue that some tendency to group-interested motivation survives as a kind of fossil kin-altruism…”58 In other words, because we retain the genetic makeup of hunter-gatherers, our behavior toward in-groups reflects the kind of “altruism” that would be expected to optimize the survival success of in-groups comprised by “inbreeding superfamilies.”

Presumably, as Margolis speculates, this tendency for group-interested behavior, arising from “fossil kin-altruism” or genetic inertia, contributed to the survival of Homo sapiens “while other humanoid species went extinct.”59

27表观遗传学(Epigenesis)Epigenesis

中文译本

我们认为这种“好像”的行为是“表观遗传”的一个典型例子,或者说受到遗传影响的动机因素,会使人先天性地倾向于某些选择而非其他选择。换言之, 人类的心智并不是一块白板或白纸,而是一个带有预设电路的硬盘,它使某些反应比其他反应更容易被学习和受欢迎。因此,有一种说法认为人类的心智倾向于从两个角度思考问题:一个是能激发敌意或敌视的外群体;一个是让人感到友好或忠诚的内群体,而这种忠诚通常是留给亲属的。

这种对待内群体就像对待近亲属一样的表观遗传倾向,使人类非常容易受到操纵的影响,而这一点又往往会被民族主义者所利用,去鼓动人们支持国家甚至不惜付出生命。由此来看民族主义的宣传到处都在用充满亲情的词汇来装扮,绝不是一个巧合。

炮声惊天动地,美丽的法兰西呼唤她的孩子们奋起。周围的士兵正武装起来,呐喊吧,呐喊吧,我们的母亲在呼唤。 —— 法国士兵的军歌

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

We see this “as if” behavior as a prime example of “epigenesis,” or the tendency of genetically influenced motivational factors to innately bias humans to favor certain choices over others. In other words, the human mind is not a tabula rasa, or blank slate, but a hard drive with prewired circuits that make certain responses more readily learned and attractive than others. Thus the proposition that the mind is disposed to think in terms of an out-group that excites enmity or hostility and an in-group to which one feels great amity or loyalty usually reserved for kin.60

This epigenetic tendency to behave with an in-group as if it comprised close relatives creates a vulnerability to manipulation that has commonly been exploited by nationalists to engender sacrificial support for the state. In that sense, it is not a coincidence that nationalist propaganda everywhere is dressed up in the vocabulary of kinship.

“By the voice of her cannon alarming, fair France bids her children arise. Soldiers around us are arming. On, on, ’tis our mother who cries.”61 —CHANT OF FRENCH SOLDIERS

28虚假的亲属关系Bogus Kinship

中文译本

世界各地的政客,都有一种强烈的偏好,就是喜欢用亲属关系的术语来描述国家。

国家是“我们的父土(fatherland)”或“我们的母国(motherland)”。它的公民是“我们”,是“家庭成员”,我们的“兄弟姐妹”。像法国、中国和埃及这样的国家,文化千差万别,但都使用这样的比喻;在我们看来这可不是修辞上的巧合,而是“表观遗传”的一个典型例子,或者说受遗传影响的动机因素会使人类先天地倾向于某些选择。

表观遗传是如何操作的?民族国家为了驾驭人民的情感忠诚,通过各种方式建立起了身份识别机制;这些方式在原始社会原本属于亲属关系的象征,却被用来将 “个人对整体适应性的关切”与国家的利益联系在一起。例如,肖和王通过深入研究,总结了现代民族国家用来动员民众对抗外族的五种识别方式,它们是:

共同的语言

共同的祖国

共同的外形特征

共同的宗教遗产

共同血统的信念

当然,通过这些特征在原始时代就可以区分出核心的民族群体。而民族主义的吸引力,在很大程度上可以归因于这些识别手段被运用的方式以及亲属语言的乔装改扮,像上文引用的法国军歌。把国家称为“父亲”或“母亲”的动员手段在世界范围内都很普遍,因为它效果卓著。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Consider the strong tendency of politicians everywhere to describe the state in terms borrowed from kinship. The nation is “our fatherland” or “our motherland.” Its citizens are “we,” “members of the family,” our “brothers and sisters.”62 The fact that states as culturally different as France, China, and Egypt employ such similes is not a rhetorical coincidence, as we see it, but a prime example of “epigenesis” or the tendency of genetically influenced motivational factors to innately bias humans to favor certain choices.

How does this epigenesis work? The identification mechanism employed to harness emotional loyalty to the nation-state makes use of various devices that would have been markers of kinship in the primitive past “to link the individual’s inclusive fitness concerns” with the interests of the state.63 For example, Shaw and Wong focus on five identification devices used by modern nation-states to mobilize their populations against out-groups. These are:

a common language

a shared homeland

similar phenotypic characteristics

a shared religious heritage and

the belief of common descent64

Such characteristics, of course, would have distinguished the nucleus ethnic group in the primitive past. Much of the appeal of nationalism can be traced to the way that these identification devices have been adopted and dressed up in the language of kinship, as illustrated in the French soldiers’ chant quoted above. Such mobilization devices, which refer to the state as the “fatherland” or the “motherland,” are common worldwide because they work.

29基因计算Genetic Accounting

中文译本

这种涉及国家的亲属关系是凭空虚构出来的,因为它根本不具备实际亲属关系所具有的那种亲疏远近。即使是一个很大的家庭里,每个人都是亲戚,但他们之间的亲近程度是不一样的。父母和兄弟姐妹是最亲的,祖父母和表兄弟姐妹就没那么亲了,远亲的、联系稀疏的表兄弟姐妹关系已经非常遥远,他们之间拥有共同基因的可能性跟陌生人差不多。丈夫和妻子之间的基因联系也不再像石器时代那样密切。不管怎么样,所有真实的亲属关系都可以用一个“亲缘系数”(coefficient of relatedness)的数学术语来定义,汉密尔顿把它作为计算和衡量基因重叠程度的标准。

相比之下,想象中的民族“大家庭”与国家的领土范围完全重合,并且是弹性的。国籍就像液体一样,均匀地渗透到严格限定边界内的每一条缝隙。本尼迪克特·安德森写道:“在现代的概念中,国家主权在法定领土的每一平方厘米上的运行,都是完全的、绝对的、均匀的。”当然,在需要为国家做出牺牲时想象出来的亲缘系数永远是 1。

整体适应性与民族国家的密切关联,这种现象很有意思,因为它可以帮助我们了解,面对即将到来的新千年的变革,人们的意愿取向是怎么样的,是欢迎还是抵制?我们在前面说过,在信息时代之前所有类型的社会都是以领土为基础的。

它们要么是围绕着核心族群的家乡领土而形成;要么是像民族国家一样,利用群体团结的共同动机,动员力量保护地方领土,抵抗外来者。不管是哪种情况,领土一步之遥外的陌生人,都被视为可怕的敌人。考虑到原始时代亲属选择的设想,这也不无道理。毕竟当人类以目前的基因类型出现时,部落里的成员都是近亲,他们都归属于一个核心的种族群体,一个“近亲繁殖的超级家庭”。

此外,关于亲属选择的必要性,即个人将直系亲属的生存与繁荣,与部落或超级家庭的繁荣昌盛捆绑在一起,确实有实际的经济意义。狩猎采集部落的成员,确实要依靠这个部落的成功来实现自己的繁荣。他们没有独立的财产,个人或家庭如果脱离部落,根本没有办法生存与繁衍。在这种情况下个体利益与群体利益就紧密地捆绑在了一起。用赫舒拉发的话说,“只要一个群体内的成员承担着共同的命运或结果,互助就成了自助。”

显然,原始人——洛夫图人可被视为数百个类似民族的代表——认为一个社会的标准应该是任何人在任何时候的处境都是完全平等的。 —— 赫尔穆特·舍克(Helmut Schoeck)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The imaginary character of these kinship links as far as the state is concerned is evidenced by the fact that they possess none of the degrees of variability that characterize actual kinship. Even in extended families, where everyone is related, not everyone is related to the same degree. Parents and siblings are the closest relations, grandparents and cousins are less close, with distant, kissing cousins so remote that they are barely more likely than complete strangers to share any given gene in common. Husbands and wives generally are no longer closely related, as they tended to be in the Stone Age. In any event, all actual kinship is definable in mathematical terms as the “coefficient of relatedness,” which Hamilton calculated as a measure of genetic overlap.65

By contrast, the national “family” is imagined to be totally and elastically coincident with the state’s territorial dimensions. Nationality extends uniformly, like a liquid, into every crevice within the strictly defined boundaries. Benedict Anderson writes, “In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory.”66 And, of course, when it comes to sacrifice for the state, the coefficient of imaginary relatedness is always one.

This identification of inclusive fitness with the nation-state is interesting because it could help inform the disposition of humans to welcome or resist the changes of the new millennium. As we have explored earlier, prior to the Information Age all types of society were territorially based. They either formed around the home territory of the nucleus ethnic group, or, as with the nation-state, played upon the same motives of group solidarity to mobilize force for defense of a local territory against outsiders. In every case, it was the stranger outside of one’s immediate territory who was feared as the enemy. Given the assumptions of kin selection in the primordial past, this made sense. When humanity emerged in its current genetic form, members of the tribe were close kin. They were members of a nucleus ethnic group, “the inbreeding superfamily.”

Furthermore, there really was a practical economic reason, given the imperatives of kin selection, for the individual to identify the prosperity and survival of immediate kin with that of his tribe, or superfamily. A member of a hunter-gatherer tribe really did depend for his prosperity upon the success of the whole tribe. There was no independent property, nor any way that an individual or family could plausibly have hoped to survive and prosper if detached from the tribe. This strongly linked the individual’s self-interest to that of the group. In Hirshleifer’s words, “To the extent that members of a group share a common fate or outcome, helping one another becomes self-help.”67

“Evidently primitive man—and the Lovedu can be regarded as representative of hundreds of similar peoples—considers as the norm a society in which, at any one moment of time, everyone’s situation is precisely equal.” —HELMUT SCHOECK

30新环境,老基因New Circumstances, Old Genes

中文译本

在当今时代,微处理技术正在加速创造新的环境条件,与人类在石器时代的基因所处理的条件大不相同。信息技术导致的收入不平等,远非我们在平等的石器时代的原始祖先所能想象。信息技术也正在创造超地域的资产,这有助于颠覆内群体的现代化身——民族国家。具有讽刺意味的是,新的网络资产可能具有更高的价值,而这正是因为它们建立在离家很远的地方。如果在富裕的工业国家,出现我们所预期的那种对信息技术日益渗透导致的经济不平等的反击,上述发展只会更加强烈。这个事实本身,就会使远程持有资产变得更有价值。这种做法不仅不会遭人嫉妒,还可以将资产置于民族国家控制的范围之外,而民族国家是个人必须应对的最具掠夺性的群体。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Now microtechnology is facilitating the creation of very different conditions from those to which we were genetically disposed by the conditions of the Stone Age. Information technology is creating economic inequality magnitudes outside the range of anything experienced by our ancestors in the pristinely egalitarian Stone Age. Information technology is also creating supraterritorial assets, which will help to subvert the embodiment of the in-group, the nation-state. Ironically, these new cyberassets will probably be of higher value precisely because they are established at a distance from home. All the more so if there is an invidious backlash of the kind we expect against the economic inequality arising from increasing penetration of information technology in the rich industrial countries. That very fact would tend to make assets held at long distance more valuable. They would not only be less exposed to envy, they would be more likely to be put beyond the reach of the most predatory group with which an individual must cope—his own nation-state.

31大自然与民族主义的不经济性Diseconomies of Nature and Nationalism

中文译本

很少有人注意到,把对内群体的认同与民族国家联系起来,是多么的讽刺。而这种忽视,可能也是表观遗传在影响态度方面的重要性的一个标志。现代时期的暴力逻辑,往往从一开始就混淆,那种激发了认同内群体适应性的倾向的冲动。此话怎讲?因为在一个敌对的世界里,将个人的“整体适应性”与一个国家级内群体认同放在一起,不仅无法促进近亲属的生存与繁荣,反而会把个人牺牲的价值稀释到对亲属无足轻重的程度。一个典型的现代民族国家,实在过于庞大,这种国家的公民,与任何向他提出要求的其他公民之间,都不太可能具有统计学意义上的“亲缘系数”。国家内群体中的近亲比例,从石器时代的几乎全部都是,到20 世纪已经锐减至用化学痕迹法基本检测不到了。不仅如此,个人与国家其他公民之间的“亲缘系数”,在大多数情况下都不会比他与整个人类的系数更高。

一个拥有数千万甚至数亿(中国甚至有十几亿)成员的内群体,使任何人做出的牺牲或利益付出,相比它的超级体量,不过是沧海一粟。因此,从严格的逻辑上讲,现代的民族主义者与石器时代的狩猎采集者不同,他不可能合理地期望,通过牺牲或帮助内群体的行为,得以切实提升其家庭的生存前景。

在现实时期,尽管国家经济已经成为衡量社会福祉的基本单位,但是对有才华的个体的成功——也是其亲属的成功,最大的障碍却是以国家(内群体)的名义强加给他的负担。至少对那些主要从事互惠性,而非胁迫性社会活动的人来说是这样——重温一下范登伯格的人类行为类别。

民族国家的逻辑表明,公民身份的终极代价是牺牲和死亡。吉恩·艾尔斯坦(Jean Bethke Elshtain) 观察到,民族国家对公民的教化更多是为了牺牲而不是侵略。

“年轻人上战场与其说是为了杀戮,不如说是为了死亡,为了大的政治实体而放弃自己的身体。”在纳税方面,做出牺牲的冲动同样强烈。纳税就像携带武器一样是一种义务,而不是一种交换,因为在交换当中,一个人付出金钱可以得到某种价值相等或者更大的产品或服务。这一点从日常对话中就可见一斑。谈到纳税时,人们总是说“税收负担”,但是他们不会说“食品负担”,买汽车不会说“汽车负担”,出去旅游也不会说“度假负担”,就是因为商业买卖一般都是公平交易,不公平的话人们就不会进行交易。

在这方面,民族主义展示了表观遗传能够以及如何扭转达尔文的“自然经济”理论。民族国家加强了系统性的、基于抵御的掠食。与石器时代狩猎采集者的遭遇不同,20 世纪末的个人遭受的主要寄生虫和掠食者,不可能是“外人”或外敌,而是想象的内群体的化身,既民族国家本身。因此,信息时代出现的超越地域性的资产,其主要优势在于这种资产可以被安置在民族国家所动员的系统性强迫的范围之外,而那就是未来的主权个人居住的领域。

如果我们的思路是对的,借助微处理技术,个人很可能在技术上摆脱公民身份的负担。在未来的“虚拟城市”中,他们将成为自己的超国家主权者,而不是臣民;他们通过合同或私人条约来定义效忠,这种方式让人更多地联想到前现代的欧洲。在那里商人通过商业条约和宪章保护自己的“财产不被任意扣押”,并获得对“领主法的豁免”。在网络文化中,成功人士将会被免除因出生而产生的公民义务。他们不会再认为自己主要是英国人或美国人,而是成为整个世界的超国家公民,只是碰巧住在其中一个或多个地方而已。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

It is perhaps a mark of the importance of epigenesis in informing attitudes that so little notice has been taken of the ironies of in-group identification as it relates to the modern nation-state. The logic of violence in the modern period tended to confound the very impulse that gave rise to the tendency to identify fitness with the in-group in the first place. Why? Because rather than facilitating the survival and prosperity of near-relatives in a hostile world, the identification of the individual’s “inclusive fitness” with a national in-group diluted the value of any act of sacrifice the individual might have made to the level of insignificance for his kin. The typical modern nation-state was simply too large to allow for a statistically significant “coefficient of relatedness” between the individual and other citizens of the nation that laid claim to him. Not only was the proportion of close relatives within the in-group sharply diminished from almost unity in the Stone Age to a bare chemical trace in the twentieth century; the “coefficient of relatedness” between the individual citizen and the rest of the nation would not, in most cases, have been significantly higher than with the whole human race. An “in-group” with tens of millions or even hundreds of millions (or in the case of the Chinese, more than a billion members) became so gigantic as to dilute the inclusive fitness effect of any sacrifice or benefit conveyed to the scale of a spit in the ocean. In strict logic, therefore, the modern nationalist, unlike the hunter-gatherer of the Stone Age, could not reasonably expect any gesture of sacrifice or helping for his “in-group” to enhance the survival prospects for his family in a meaningful way.

Notwithstanding the fact that national economies became the fundamental units of account in which well-being was measured in the modem era, the largest obstacle to the talented individual’s success, and therefore to that of his kin, became the burdens imposed in the name of the nation, the in-group itself. This, at least, was true for those primarily engaged in reciprocal rather than coercive sociality—to revisit Van Den Berghe’s categories of human behavior.68

The logic of the nation-state suggests that the ultimate price of citizenship is sacrifice and death. As Jane Bethke Elshtain observed, nation-states indoctrinate citizens more for sacrifice than aggression: “The young man goes to war not so much to kill as to die, to forfeit his particular body for that of the large body, the body politic.”69 The impulse to sacrifice is no less active where the taxpayer is concerned. Paying taxes, like bearing arms, is a duty, rather than an exchange in which one forgoes money to obtain some product or service of an equal or greater value. This much is acknowledged in common speech. People speak of a “tax burden” as they do not speak of the “food burden” of shopping for nutriments, or the “car burden” of purchasing an automobile, or a “vacation burden” for traveling, precisely because commercial purchases are generally fair exchanges. Otherwise, the buyers would not make them.

In this respect, nationalism shows how epigenesis can reverse the logic of the Darwinian “economy of nature.” The nation-state facilitated systematic, territorially based predation. Unlike the situation faced by hunter-gatherers in the Stone Age, the main parasite and predator upon the individual at the end of the twentieth century was not likely to be the “outsider,” the foreign enemy, but rather the presumed embodiment of the “in-group,” the local nation-state itself. Thus the main advantage offered by the advent of assets that transcend territoriality in the Information Age is precisely the fact that such assets can be placed beyond the reach of the systematic coercion mobilized by the local nation-state in whose territory the would-be Sovereign Individual was resident.

If our view is correct, microtechnology will make it technically feasible for individuals to largely escape from the burdens of subordinate citizenship. They will be extranational sovereigns over themselves, not subjects, in the new “Virtual City,” owing allegiance by contract or private treaty in a fashion more reminiscent of premodern Europe, where merchants secured commercial treaties and charters to protect themselves “from arbitrary seizures of property” and to obtain “exemption from seigneurial law.”70 In the cyberculture, successful persons will gain exemption from duties of citizenship arising from an accident of birth. They will no longer tend to think of themselves primarily as British or American. They will be extranational residents of the whole world who just happen to abide in one or more of its localities.

32网络经济与遗传基因THE CYBERECONOMY AND OUR GENETIC INHERITANCE

中文译本

然而,这个技术奇迹与它孕育的经济奇迹——摆脱地方专制,它所面临的主要障碍,在于个人是否愿意把自己的大部分财富和未来委托给陌生人。当然,如果按照严格的基因计算,这些陌生人并不一定比我们大都数的“同胞”在基因上更陌生;而近几个世纪以来,我们都一直在依赖着所谓的同胞。

问题在于,当民族国家的内群体友好行为收获到违反常理的结果,这对网络经济来说是积极的还是消极的指标。当那些“被甩在后面的人”(left-behinds)面临失去从强制再分配中所获得的利益,他们会不会把民族国家的死亡看作是对亲属关系的攻击?新千年的第一个四分之一世纪将证明这一点。人类的情绪反应是很复杂的。要知道,在 20 世纪有 1.15 亿人为民族国家献出了生命。这个数字残酷地证明了表观遗传的力量。它说明了确实有很多人认为国家的存在是生死攸关的事情。现在的问题是,这种态度会不会延续到一个具有不同大政治规则的新时代。

其实,受基因影响的为民族国家而牺牲的行为与亲属选择的进化目的是相悖的;这一点也说明了,人类有足够的适应能力,可以适应很多在石器时代条件下没有被基因编程过的环境。塔吉(Tudge)在描述人类的“极端普遍性”(extreme generalness)时说,“我们是相当于图灵机的动物,是可以专用于任何任务的通用设备。”在即将到来的转型危机中,哪种倾向会浮出水面呢?可能二者皆有。

主权的商业化,本身取决于数十万主权个人和数百万的其他人,是否愿意把他们的资产存入“第一无地银行”(first bank of Nowhere),从而确保不受直接的强制征收。这种类型的信托,在原始的过去找不到明显类似的存在。石器时代的人们资产很少,确实有一些的话也是囤积在部落的控制之下;而部落是一个“近亲繁殖的超级家庭”,对外人充满着疑虑和不信任。不过,尽管网络经济在进化上看起来很新奇,但它也给人类带来一个机会,去表现我们最新奇的基因遗传,那就是伴随我们超级容量的大脑而来的智慧。信息时代的精英肯定具有足够的智慧,当他们看到一个好东西时就能够识别出来。

此外,创造出不受掠夺的资产,反过来也可以切实地增加主权个人的“整体适应性”。虽然网络经济的逻辑颠覆了民族国家存在的理由,但这种逻辑是令人信服的,特别是对高技能人士而言。

为了优化在不同管辖区之间选购服务的优势,个人必须愿意退出民族国家,把对自己的人身保护委托给其他管辖区的警察,或者委托给基于市场激励的安保人员,而这些人所在的地方,可能距离自己出生和长大的地方非常遥远。这意味着,会多门语言和热爱全球文化会有更大的优势,而不是极端的爱国主义。它还意味着,任何真正想要实现网络经济的潜力,为自己和家庭带来解放的人,都应该开始在他商业生涯中主要居住的地区以外寻找几个管辖区,为自己打下坚实的基础。要了解这方面的更多细节,可以参考我们在附录中对实现财务独立的战略讨论。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The hitch, however, is that this technological miracle and the economic miracle it implies—escaping the tyranny of place—depend upon the willingness of individuals to entrust much of their wealth and futures to strangers. In strict genetic accounting, of course, those strangers would not necessarily be less genetically close than most of our “fellow citizens” upon whom in recent centuries we have been bound to depend.

The question is whether the perverse results of in-group amity in the case of the nation-state are negative or positive indicators for the cybereconomy. Will the “left-behinds” who stand to lose the benefits of coercive redistribution treat the death of the nation-state as as if it were an attack on kin? The first quarter century of the new millennium will tell. The emotional reactions could be complex. The fact that 115 million persons gave their lives fighting for nation-states in the twentieth century is stark evidence of the power of epigenesis.71 It shows that many did consider the survival of their nations to be matters of life-and-death importance. The question is whether that attitude will carry over into a new age with different megapolitical imperatives.

The fact that genetically influenced sacrifice on behalf of the nation-state often militated against the evolutionary purpose of kin selection also tells you that humans are adaptable enough to adjust to many circumstances for which we were not genetically programmed in the conditions of the Stone Age. As Tudge elaborates in describing the “extreme generalness” of human beings: “We are the animal equivalent of the Turing machine: the universal device that can be turned to any task.”72 Which tendency will come to the surface in the coming transition crisis? Probably both.

The commercialization of sovereignty itself depends upon the willingness of hundreds of thousands of Sovereign Individuals and many millions of others to deploy their assets in the “First Bank of Nowhere” in order to secure immunity from direct compulsion. This type of trust has no obvious analogue in the primordial past. There were few assets in the Stone Age. Those that did exist were hoarded under the control of a tribe, an “inbreeding superfamily” that was paranoid about outsiders. Yet notwithstanding the evolutionary novelty of the cybereconomy, it gives humans the chance to express our most novel genetic inheritance—the intelligence that comes along with our outsized brains. Those among the information elite will certainly be smart enough to recognize a good thing when they see one.

Further, the creation of assets that are largely immune to predation should actually rebound in a practical way to increase the “inclusive fitness” of Sovereign Individuals. While the economic logic of participating in the cybereconomy turns the rationales of the nation-state upside down, it is compelling, especially for persons of high skills.

In order to optimize their advantage in shopping among jurisdictions, individuals must be willing to exit the nation-state and entrust their personal protection to police in another jurisdiction, or in some cases, to security personnel motivated mainly by market incentives in areas that may be distant from where they were born and reared. This implies a significant advantage in being multilingual and cosmopolitan in culture rather than jingoistic. And it further implies that anyone who is serious about realizing the liberating potential of the cybereconomy for himself and his family should begin to stake out a welcome for himself in several jurisdictions other than that in which he has resided during his main business career. For more details, see our discussion of strategies for achieving independence in the appendices.

33真正的亲和关系Genuine Affinities

中文译本

一种新的对于世界的超国家理解,以及一种确认自己在世界中位置的新方式,如果说这不能改变我们天生的行为倾向,至少可以改变人类文化所塑造的习惯。我们期望看到,新的身份方程式将在新的千年里生根发芽,并能比预期更好地适应新世界。新的身份认同与国籍不同,它不是系统性强制的产物,这种强制使得民族国家及其体系在 20 世纪无所不在。在未来的新时代,共同体和效忠不再依附于领土。身份认同会更加精准地建立在真正的亲和关系、共同的利益或真实的亲属关系之上,而不是传统政治不厌其烦地宣传的、公民身份中虚假的亲缘关系。未来的保护服务,会以新的方式组织起来,而这些方式,都是过去划定边界的勘测工具所无法比拟的。越来越多的资产将存放在网络空间,而不是某个特定的地点;这种安排将促进新的竞争,可以减少“保护成本”或大多数领土管辖区内的税收。

所以,有雄心壮志的都明白,迁徙的生活方式是获得成功的代价。 —— 克里斯托弗·拉什(Christopher Lasch)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

A new extranational understanding of the world and a new way of identifying one’s place in it could change the habits of human culture, if not our inbred inclinations. The new extranational equation of identity that we expect to see take hold in the new millennium could make it easier to adopt to the new world than may seem likely. Unlike nationality, the new identities will not be a product of the systematic compulsion that made nation-states and the nation-state system universal in the twentieth century. In the new age to come, communities and allegiances will not be territorially bounded. Identification will be more precisely targeted to genuine affinities, shared interests, or actual kinship, rather than the bogus affinities of citizenship so tirelessly promoted in conventional politics. Protection will be organized in new ways that have no analogue in a surveyor’s kit that demarcates territorial borders. Assets will increasingly be lodged in cyberspace rather than at any given place, a fact that will facilitate new competition to reduce the “protection costs” or taxes imposed in most territorial jurisdictions.

“Ambitious people understand, then, that a migratory way of life is the price of getting ahead.”73 —CHRISTOPHER LASCH

34逃离民族国家ESCAPE FROM THE NATION-STATE

中文译本

作为“内群体”的民族国家,尽管还牢牢地控制着现代人的想象力,但是加入这样一个代价高昂的“想象的共同体”到底效用几何?那些从未对此产生过怀疑的能人很快就会发出疑问了。事实上,民族国家的拥护者已经开始抱怨,认知精英们正在与国家日益疏离。已故的克里斯托弗·拉什17,在他的檄文《精英的反叛与民主的背叛》18中,抨击了那些(精英),“与其说他们是靠财产所有权发财,不如说是靠对信息的操纵。”拉什对新兴信息经济的超国家性表示遗憾。他写道:“新式精英们所经营的市场,现在是全球性的了。他们的财富与跨国企业联系在一起。他们更关心的是整个系统的平稳运行,而不是其中的某一部分。他们的忠诚——如果这个词用在这里还没过时的话——是国际性的,而不是区域性的,不是全国性或地方性的。他们与布鲁塞尔或香港的同行之间的共同之处,相比于尚未接入互联网的广大美国同胞,要多得多。” 尽管拉什远非一个冷静的观察家,而且他的描绘显然是想对信息精英进行抹黑;但是他对那些从地方专制中解放出来的人的蔑视,是建立在本书重点关注的相同的发展基础之上的。当我们在阅读拉什的批评,或米奇·考斯(Mickey Kaus)的《平等的终结》(The End of Equality),或迈克尔·瓦尔泽(Michael Walzer)的《正义的领域》(Spheres of Justice),或罗伯特·莱克(Robert Reich)的《国家的工作》(the Work of Nations)等批评时,我们看到我们的分析被部分证实了,这些作者都是极不高兴的,他们强烈反对市场深化带来的种种结果,更不用说主权个人的去国家化了。拉什痛斥那些怀着“觊觎新的头脑贵族的成员资格”的人,怀着超国家的野心,“在快速流动的金钱、魅力、时尚和流行文化中,培养与国家市场的联系。”他继续写道:“他们是否还把自己当成美国人,这真的是一个问题。爱国主义,当然在他们的美德等级中排名不高。另一方面,‘多元文化’则非常适合他们。这个词让人联想到一种全球集市的惬意场景,在那里异国美食、异国服饰、异国音乐、异国的部落习俗都可以肆意品尝,没有任何问题,也不需要什么承诺。新精英们的家只存在于旅途中,在去参加高级别的会议、出席新的特许经营权开幕典礼、参加国际电影节或去往未被发现的独家胜地的途中。本质上,他们的世界观是游客式的,持有这种观念的人,你不太可能激发他们对民主进行激情的投入。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Notwithstanding the firm grip the nation-state as the “in-group” has had on the modern imagination, able people who do not already doubt the utility of affiliating with a grossly expensive “imagined community” soon will. Indeed, the partisans of the nation-state have already begun to complain of the growing detachment of the cognitive elites. The late Christopher Lasch, in his diatribe The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, assails those “whose livelihoods rest not so much on the ownership of property as on the manipulation of information.”74 Lasch laments the extranational character of the emerging information economy. He writes:

the markets in which the new elites operate is now international in scope. Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across national boundaries. They are more concerned with the smooth functioning of the system as a whole than with any of its parts. Their loyalties—if the term is not itself anachronistic in this context—are international rather than regional, national or local. They have more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the network of global communications.75

Although Lasch was far from a dispassionate observer, and he obviously meant his portrait of the information elite to be unflattering, his contempt for those who are liberated from the tyranny of place rests on a perception of some of the same developments that are the focus of this book. When we read Lasch’s critiques or those of Mickey Kaus (The End of Equality), Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice), or Robert Reich (The Work of Nations), we see parts of our analysis confirmed, often unhappily, by authors who are deeply unsympathetic to many of the consequences of the deepening of markets, much less the denationalization of Sovereign Individuals. Lasch lambastes those with extranational ambitions “who covet membership in the new aristocracy of brains” for “cultivating ties with the international market in fast-moving money, glamour, fashion and popular culture.” He continues:

It is a question whether they think of themselves as Americans at all. Patriotism, certainly, does not rank very high in their hierarchy of virtues. “Multiculturalism,” on the other hand, suits them to perfection, conjuring up the agreeable image of a global bazaar in which exotic cuisines, exotic styles of dress, exotic music, exotic tribal customs can be savored indiscriminately, with no questions asked and no commitments required. The new elites are at home only in transit, en route to a high-level conference, to the grand opening of a new franchise, to an international film festival or an undiscovered resort. Theirs is essentially a tourist’s view of the world—not a perspective likely to encourage a passionate devotion to democracy.76

35经济民族主义Economic Nationalism

中文译本

正是这些“过客”构成了信息时代的虚拟社区,对他们的批评背后,其实隐含着一种判断,那就是对许多精英阶层来说,成为过客的收益已经超过了他们付出的成本。像拉什和瓦尔泽这样的批评者并没有争论,在清醒的成本收益分析下公民身份对高技能人士来说已经过时了。他们也没有提出,被他们鄙视的信息精英,算错了自己的最大利益之所在。他们也没有假装复利表真的表明继续把钱注入到国家社保计划——更不用说所得税中,产生的回报比私人投资更高。恰恰相反,他们很懂算术。他们已经看到了这些明显的结论加在一起意味着什么。但是他们不承认经济理性的颠覆性逻辑,而是退避三舍,认为信息精英们超越地方专制、抛弃“未开窍者”是一种“背叛”。

与帕特·布坎南(Pat Buchanan)一样,社会民主党人也是经济民族主义者,他们不满于市场对政治的胜利。他们谴责“新的头脑贵族”脱离地方,不热衷他们对群众最大利益点的看法。虽然他们还没有明确认识到个人的去国家化,但他们抨击其早期的苗头和表现,即瓦尔泽所说的“市场帝国主义”,或金钱“跨界渗透”的趋势,以及购买那些如拉什所谓的“不应该被出售的东西”,如兵役豁免权。需要注意的是,反动派把民族国家的军事要求,看作是货币和市场不可侵犯的神圣领地。

这些对信息精英的批评,预示了在下一个千年人们对主权个人崛起的反应及说辞。随着新型的、更加市场化的保护方式的出现,大量有能力的人,会越来越清楚地看到,大部分所谓的国籍利益都是虚构的。这不仅使人们有机会,更好地去核算公民身份的机会成本,还将创造出新的方式去构建所谓的“政治”甚至“经济”问题。正如弗雷德里克·莱恩对一个古老两难问题的表述,有史以来第一次,“一个为自己、并自主行事的企业家个人”,可以通过在不同管辖区之间的迁移,来调整自己的保护成本,而无需再等待“群体决策和群体行动”去达成它们。

当为保护付出的代价开始受制于“替代原则”19,强制行为背后的算术就会赤裸裸地暴露出来,而这将激化信息时代新的全球主义精英与“信息贫民”之间的冲突,后者基本上只会一种语言,不擅于解决问题,也不具备什么可在全球市场销售的技能。这些“失败者”或“被遗弃者”,正如托马斯·弗里德曼所说,无疑将继续把他们的福祉与现有民族国家的政治生活联系在一起。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Lurking behind criticisms of the “transients” who make up the virtual communities of the Information Age is a recognition that for many in the elite the benefits of transience already exceed their costs. Critics like Lasch and Walzer do not dispute that clearheaded cost-benefit analysis makes citizenship obsolete for persons of high skills. They do not propose that those among the information elite whose attitudes they despise have miscalculated where their best interests lie. Nor do they pretend that the compound-interest tables really show that continuing to pump one’s money into a national social security program, much less income taxes, produces a better return than private investment. To the contrary, they understand arithmetic. They have seen the sums to their obvious conclusions. But rather than acknowledge the subversive logic of economic rationality, they recoil from it, counting it as “betrayal” for the information elite to transcend the tyranny of place and abandon “the unenlightened.”77

Like Pat Buchanan, the social democrats are economic nationalists who resent the triumph of markets over politics. They denounce “the new aristocracy of brains” for being detached from place and not caring passionately about their view of where the best interests of the masses lie. While they do not explicitly recognize the denationalization of the individual as such, they rail against its early hints and manifestations, what Walzer describes as “the imperialism of the market,” or the tendency of money to “seep across boundaries” in order to buy things which, as Lasch elaborates, “should not be for sale,” such as exemption from military service.78 Note the reactionary harking to the military demands of the nation-state as a sacred ground upon which money and markets should not trespass.

These criticisms of the information elite anticipate the terms of a popular reaction against the rise of Sovereign Individuals in the next millennium. As new, more market-driven forms of protection become available, it will become increasingly evident to the large numbers of able persons that most of the supposed benefits of nationality are imaginary. This will lead not only to better accounting of the opportunity costs of citizenship, it will also create new ways of framing allegedly “political” and even “economic” questions. For the first time, “an individual entrepreneur acting for and by himself” will be able to vary his own protection costs by moving between jurisdictions, without waiting for them to be effected by “group decision and group action,” to quote Frederic C. Lane’s formulation of an old dilemma.79

As the price paid for protection becomes subject “to the principle of substitution,” this will lay bare the arithmetic of compulsion, intensifying conflict between the new cosmopolitan elite of the Information Age and “the information poor,” the remainder of the population who are largely monoglot and do not excel in problem-solving or possess some globally marketable skill. These “losers” or “left-behinds,” as Thomas L. Friedman describes them, will no doubt continue to identify their well-being with the political life of existing nation-states.80

36大部分政治议程都将是反动的MOST POLITICAL AGENDAS WILL BE REACTIONARY

中文译本

随着 21 世纪的到来,大多数热衷于搞政治的人,无论是民族主义者、环保主义者、还是社会主义者,都会团结起来维护摇摇欲坠的民族国家。渐渐地,一个事实将变得越来越明显,即民族国家和民族主义情感的生存是维护政治强制力的前提条件。正如比利格所指出的,“民族主义是常见(政治)战略的运作条件,不管在什么政治环境中。”因此,可以想见在未来的岁月里,所有政治议题中的民族主义含量,都会像贪吃蛇的肚子一样迅猛膨胀。例如,环保主义将不太注重保护“地球母亲”,而是更关心“祖国”。比起他们现在的理解,他们可能会更加同意克里斯托弗·拉什的观点,他跟随汉娜·阿伦特宣传:“是公民身份创造了平等,而不是平等创造了公民权利。”主权私有化将切断财富创造者与国家和地方之间的联系,从而降低工业时代那种对平等的重视程度。公民身份不再是这样一种机制,即在限定的领土内,根据选票平等的原则强制进行收入再分配。这种变革会对进步史观造成又一次的挫伤。

因为,与 20 世纪开始时那些被认为富有远见的人士所预期的相反,经过几十年的时间考验,自由市场并没有被摧毁,反而是在胜利中脱身而去。马克思主义者预测资本主义将会消亡,并导致民族国家的超越,工人之间会出现普遍的阶级意识,而这从未发生。事实上,国家将会消亡,但方式截然不同。即将发生的事情,与马克思主义者的期望几乎正好相反。资本主义的胜利会使资本家中间出现一种全新的、全球性的,或者说是超国家的意识,很多人将成为主权个人。最有能力、最富有的人根本不像马克思主义者所想象的那样,依靠国家来约束工人,他们其实是民族国家操作下的净输家。显然,随着市场战胜强制,超越民族主义对他们来说才是最有利可图的。

很快,也许不是马上,但肯定在一代人的时间内,几乎每一位信息精英都会选择把他的营收活动安排在低税或无税的管辖区内。随着信息时代改变全世界,它会给人们上一堂明白无误的复利实战课程。在几年内,更不用说几十年内,人们将普遍认识到,任何有才能的人都可以通过放弃高税率的民族国家积累更高的净资产,享受更好的生活。我们在前面已经提示过,先进的民族国家所施加的惊人成本,但由于这是一个鲜为人知的问题的核心,值得再次强调一下国籍的机会成本。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Most of those who harbor an ardent political agenda, whether nationalist, environmentalist, or socialist, will rally to defend the wobbling nation-state as the twenty-first century opens. Over time, it will become ever more obvious that survival of the nation-state and the nationalist sensibility are preconditions for preserving a realm for political compulsion. As Billig points out, nationalism “is the condition for conventional (political) strategies, whatever the particular politics.”81 Therefore, the nationalist content in all political programs will swell like a glutton’s paunch in the years ahead. Environmentalists, for example, will focus less on protecting “Mother Earth” and more on protecting the “motherland.” For reasons we explore later, the nation and citizenship will be especially sacred to those who value equality highly. More than they may now understand, they will come to agree with Christopher Lasch, who followed Hannah Arendt in proclaiming, “It is citizenship that confers equality, not equality that creates a right to citizenship.”82

The privatization of sovereignty will deflate the industrial-era premium on equality by severing ties of the creators of wealth to nation and place. Citizenship will no longer serve as a mechanism for enforcing income redistribution based upon the equality of the vote within a confined territory. The consequences will include another bruising for the progressive view of history. Contrary to the expectations of supposedly forward-thinking people when the twentieth century opened, the free market was not destroyed by the decades but left triumphant. The Marxists anticipated the eclipse of capitalism, which never happened, to lead to the transcendence of nation-states and the emergence of a universal class consciousness among workers. In fact, the state will be eclipsed, but in a very different way. Something more nearly the opposite to their expectation is happening. The triumph of capitalism will lead to the emergence of a new global, or extranational, consciousness among the capitalists, many of whom will become Sovereign Individuals. Far from depending upon the state to discipline the workers, as the Marxists imagined, the ablest, wealthiest persons were net losers from the actions of the nation-state. It is clearly they who have the most to gain by transcending nationalism as markets triumph over compulsion.

Perhaps not immediately, but soon, certainly within the span of a generation, almost everyone among the information elite will elect to domicile his income-earning activities in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. As the Information Age transforms the globe, it will impress an unmistakable object lesson in compound interest. Within years, let alone decades, it will be widely understood that almost anyone of talent could accumulate a much higher net worth and enjoy a better life by abandoning high-tax nation-states. We have already hinted at the staggering costs that the leading nation-states impose, but as this is the crux of an issue that is little understood, it is worth reemphasizing the opportunity costs of nationality.

37机会成本Opportunity Costs

中文译本

信息精英们退出民族国家,非但不会因为失去或削减由高税收资助的政府服务而受到影响,反而他们会以前所未有的方式蓬勃发展。只是摆脱现有的超额税负这一项,就会让他们获得巨大的利润空间,可以改善家庭的物质福利。

如前所述,如果你每年能从投资中赚取 10% 的收益,那么缴纳 5000 美元的税款,就会让你一生的净资产减少 240 万美元。而如果你能赚到 20% 的收益,每年多缴纳 5000 美元的税,会让你在四十年里少赚 4400 万美元。累计而言,每年缴纳 5000 美元会使你每年损失超过 100 万美元。按照这个比例计算,每年 25 万美元的税,很快就相当于每年 5000 多万的损失,算下来一生中损失 22 亿美元。当然,中间可能有零星的更高的收益,哪怕只有几年,特别是在人生的早期阶段,就意味着掠夺性税收导致的财富损失更加惊人。

高于 20% 的收益是可能的,你们的作者自己已经实现了。在我们撰写本书的几年里,我们在百慕大的莱恩斯(Lines)海外资产管理公司的同事,实现了三位数的回报,平均每年为 226%。他们的经验突出了复利表所说明的,即对于高收入者和资本所有者来说,掠夺性税收所导致的终身成本相当于一笔巨额财富。

一个高收入者按照香港税率纳税,另一个具有同等收入的人按照北美或欧洲的税率纳税,前者最终拥有的财富,可能是后者的一千多倍。如果你的资本不断受到高税收管辖区的侵犯,那就像在赛跑中,你每跑一步都有人朝你开枪。如果能在有适当保护的情况下参加同样的比赛,并且不受伤害地奔跑,显然你会跑得更远、更快。

未来的主权个人,会利用克里斯托弗·拉什及其他信息精英批评者所不满的“过客”偏好,他们会选择最有利的管辖区居住。虽然这与民族主义的逻辑相悖,但却符合令人信服的经济逻辑。10% 更不要说 10 倍的收益差距,就会促使追求利润最大化的人们改变他们的生活方式和生产技术,以及他们的居住地。

西方文明的历史,原本就是一系列不安分的变动记录,在曲折迂回的大政治条件刺激下,人口与繁荣总是一再迁徙到新的机会之地。基础收益的千倍之差匹配最有力的刺激措施,将让理性的人们行动起来。或者换句话说,大多数人,即使是托马斯·弗里德曼所说的“失败者和被遗弃者”,如果有机会也会很高兴为了 5000 万美元离开任何一个民族国家;更不用说那前 1% 的纳税人,民族国家仍然在从他们身上榨取更大的价值。因此,选购管辖区的主权个人之崛起,是关于信息时代的最可靠的预测之一。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Far from suffering from the loss or curtailment of government services currently financed by high taxes, the information elite will flourish in an unparalleled fashion. Simply by escaping the excess tax burden they now pay, they will gain a tremendous margin for improving the material well-being of their families. As previously indicated, each $5,000 in tax paid annually reduces your lifetime net worth by $2.4 million if you can earn 10 percent annually from your investments. But if you could earn 20 percent, each $5,000 in annual tax payments would leave you $44 million poorer over a period of forty years. Cumulatively, paying $5,000 per year would therefore cost you more than a million dollars per year. At that rate, $250,000 per year in tax would soon translate to an annual loss of more than $50 million, or $2.2 billion in a lifetime. And, of course, sporadically higher earnings, for even a few years, especially early in life, imply a still more startling loss of wealth to predatory taxation.

Your authors have seen to our own satisfaction that higher than 20 percent returns are possible. Our colleagues at Lines Overseas Management in Bermuda earned triple-digit returns, averaging 226 percent per annum, during the years when we were writing this book. Their experience underscores what the spreadsheet suggests, that for many high-income earners and owners of capital, predatory taxation imposes a lifetime cost equivalent to a large fortune.

An individual with high earnings capacity paying taxes at Hong Kong rates could end up with a thousand times more wealth than someone with the same pretax performance paying taxes at North American or European rates. To subject your capital to recurring invasion by a high-tax jurisdiction is like running in a race and having someone shoot you every time you take a stride. If you could enter the same race with proper protection and run unhobbled, you would obviously go much farther, more quickly.

The Sovereign Individuals of the future will take advantage of the “transient” inclinations that so offend Christopher Lasch and other critics of the information elite, and they will shop for the most profitable jurisdictions in which to domicile. While this is contrary to the logic of nationalism, it accords with a compelling economic logic. A 10 percent, let alone a tenfold, bottom-line difference will frequently motivate profit-maximizing individuals to alter their lifestyles and production techniques, as well as their place of abode. The history of Western civilization is a record of restless change in which people and prosperity have repeatedly migrated to new areas of opportunity under the spur of meandering megapolitical conditions. A thousandfold difference in bottom-line returns would match the most potent stimulus that has ever put rational people in motion. Or put another way, most people, particularly those Thomas L. Friedman calls the “losers and left-behinds,” if given a chance, would gladly leave any nation-state for $50 million, not to mention the still greater costs that nation-states impose in tax extracted from the top 1 percent of taxpayers. The rise of Sovereign Individuals shopping for jurisdictions is therefore one of the surest forecasts one can make.

38主权的商业化THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

中文译本

从成本收益的角度看,在 20 世纪行将结束时,公民身份已经是一个赔钱的买卖。澳大利亚议会研究处的伊恩·艾尔兰,在 1995 年 8 月编写的题为《女王是澳大利亚公民吗?》的研究报告中就强调了这一点。艾尔兰对 1948 年的《澳大利亚公民法》进行了梳理,并回顾了人们获得澳大利亚公民身份的四种途径,与其他主要民族国家的获得方式差不多,即:出生,收养,血统,授予。

这些方式原本都没什么,但它使人们注意到主权与公民权之间的区别。正如艾尔兰所说,“根据传统的法律和政治概念,君主是主权者,人民是他或她的臣民。臣民通过效忠和服从而受制于君主。”显而易见女王伊丽莎白二世是主权者。看到这一点,艾尔兰得出结论:“有一种说法认为,女王不是澳大利亚公民。”的确她不是。愿女王长命百岁;幸运的是,她已经不在乎自己是否是个公民了。她是主权者,是她臣民们的君主。和世界上其他少数几个君主一样,女王是天生的主权者,她的地位是通过现代以前的习俗继承下来的。君主制的观念很古老,可以追溯到人类生活的最早历史记录。那些保留了君主制的国家,将其形成归因于古老的历史,但它仍然有助于决定其社会的形态,即使不是政治权力,也是阶级威望。后现代的个人没有女王的先发优势,将不得不发明新的法律依据,作为信息技术赋予他们事实上的主权地位的基础。

主权个人还将不得不应对嫉妒的腐蚀性后果,这个难题有时候让君主们都感到束手无策;但对于那些非传统的尊贵人士,比如自我创造主权的人,它的难度无疑更大。正如赫尔穆特·舍克在他的综合调查报告《嫉妒》中所写的:“在只有一个国王、一个美国总统的情况下,或者说在特定地位上只有一个成员,那么他可以过着相对免责的生活;而他的那种生活方式,如果被该社会中更大的职业或社会团体的成功人士所采用,即使是在一个很小的圈子里,也会引起极大的愤慨。”所以,君主作为国家的化身,享有一定的嫉妒豁免权,而这种豁免不会延续到主权个人身上。

信息社会中的“失败者和被遗弃者”肯定会羡慕和怨恨成功者;特别是随着市场的深化,未来将越来越是一个“赢家通吃”的世界。现在的奖励已经更多的基于相对表现,而不是工业生产中的绝对表现。打工者的工资要么是根据考勤表记录的时间,要么是根据某些产出标准,如制造的件数、组装的单位数或其他类似的衡量标准。因为使用同样的工具,每个人的产出都差不多,所以才可能实行标准化的薪酬。但是,创意财富的创造就像艺术表现一样,使用同样工具的人表现有云泥之别。从这个角度来看,未来的整体经济会越来越像歌剧行业,最高的报酬给那些嗓音最好的人,而那些唱歌走调的人,无论多么认真也不可能获得很高的收入。随着各种领域的开放,迎接真正的全球化竞争,普通表演者的回报率必然会下降。中等人才将大量涌现,其中一些人还能以先进工业国家主流价格的一部分出租自己的时间。失败者将是那些拿着“滑球速度棒”(slider speedbats)的小联盟外野手,他们的反应速度距离打出大联盟的快球差上半秒钟;没有全垒打,没有年薪百万,也没有明星代言的补充收入,他们一年只挣 25000美元。剩余其他人将完全被三振出局。

一旦一个国家向全球市场开放,那些有能力利用它的公民就会成为赢家,而没有能力的则成为失败者或被遗弃者。通常会有一方……宣称自己能够对抗或减轻全球化的痛苦。那就是美国的帕特·布坎南,俄罗斯的共产党,以及现在土耳其的伊斯兰福利党。……因此,土耳其发生的事情比原教旨主义的接管要复杂得多。当全球化的扩大使越来越多的失败者被淘汰,当民主化的扩大使他们都有了投票权,而宗教党派却有效地利用这种巧合来夺取政权时,就会发生这样的现象。 —— 托马斯·弗里德曼(Thomas Friedman)

谁将是信息时代的输家?一般而言,税收消费者会是输家。他们通常没能力转移到另一个管辖区来增加自己的财富。他们的大部分收入,是存放在一个国家的政治规则之中,而不是通过市场估值来传递的。因此,取消或大幅减少税收,会对他们的净资产产生负的复利影响,他们的生活不会变得更好,因为降低收税的代价是转移支付的削弱。他们可能会失去收入,因为他们无法再依靠政治强制力,从比自己更具生产力者的口袋里掏钱。那些没有储蓄而依靠政府支付退休福利和医疗费用的人,生活水平有很大可能会下降。这种收入损失会转化为金融作家斯科特·伯恩斯(Scott Burns)所说的“超验的”或政治的资本大贬值。这种“超验的”或想象中的资本并不是基于经济上的财产所有权,而是对一种收入流的事实性(de facto)拥有,这种收入流是由政治规则和条例所建立的。例如,政府转移计划的预期收入,可以转化为按现行利率计算的债券资本。这种由想象中的共同体资助的想象中的债券,就是“超验”资本。它将因“大转型”而突然贬值,这种转型必将削弱政府对现金流的控制,使之无法兑现承诺。

在边境和公海上,没有人能够长久地垄断暴力,商人们不会支付高额的苛捐杂税,因为通过其他方式可以更便宜地获得保护。 —— 弗里德里克·莱恩

显而易见,未来的信息精英会利用网络新经济的机会,追求自我解放与个人主权。同样可以预料随着信息技术在新千年的影响越来越大,那些“被遗弃者”会越来越愤怒和具有攻击性。场面会在什么时候变得丑陋,很难给出精确的时间点。但我们估计,当西方国家像前苏联那样,解体的前景一目了然时,攻击将会加剧。

但同时,每当一个民族国家崩溃,都会促进权力进一步下放,激励主权个人的自治。我们预计,主权实体的数量将大幅增加,因为从国家的废墟中,会出现许多类似于城邦的飞地和管辖区。不乏有新的实体,将提供高度竞争性的保护服务定价,对收入和资本征收极低的税收,甚至根本不征税。在保护服务的定价上,新世纪必然会比经合组织的主要民族国家更具吸引力。可以把这看成一个简单的市场细分问题;市场上服务最差的领域,一般都是在高效率、低成本的那一端。谁要是想缴纳高额的税收,去交换一系列复杂的政府安排,那他有充分的机会可以做到。因此,对于一个新型的迷你主权来说,最有竞争优势也最有利可图的战略,应该是提供高效率、低成本的替代方案。毕竟,微型主权要想提供比现有民族国家更全面的服务,是不太现实的。考虑到所有的民族国家肯定不会马上就崩溃,所以,替代国家主义的方案会有充足的供应,这是很可能的,特别是在早期过渡阶段。另外来说,一个拥有过得去的法律和秩序、能满足基本需求的政权,也可以相对便宜地先推出来。如果社会动荡和犯罪活动在旧的核心工业国加剧到我们预期的程度,那么,一个有基本法律和秩序的管辖区,比国家太空计划、国家赞助的妇女博物馆,或为失业管理人员提供补贴的再培训计划,都要有吸引力得多。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Seen in cost-benefit terms, citizenship was already a dreadful bargain as the twentieth century drew to a close. This was highlighted by an unconsciously funny Parliamentary Research Note entitled “Is the Queen an Australian Citizen?” produced by Ian Ireland of the Australian Parliamentary Research Service in August 1995.83 Ireland canvasses the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, reviewing the four means by which one can obtain Australian citizenship. These are similar to the options for citizenship in other leading nation-states, namely:

citizenship by birth

citizenship by adoption

citizenship by descent

citizenship by grant

This is all unremarkable except that it focuses attention upon the distinction between sovereignty and citizenship. As Ireland says, “Under traditional legal and political concepts, the monarch is sovereign and the people are his/ her subjects. Subjects are bound to the monarch by allegiance and subjection.” Noting the obvious fact that Queen Elizabeth II is sovereign, he concludes that “there is an argument that the Queen is not an Australian citizen.”84

Indeed, she is not. The Queen, long may she live, is fortunate to be beyond caring about being a citizen. She is sovereign, the Sovereign over her subjects. Like a handful of other monarchs in the world, the Queen is sovereign by birth, having inherited her status as a matter of custom that predates modern times. The idea of monarchy is ancient, going back to the earliest historic records of human life. Those countries that have retained their monarchy owe their constitution to their ancient history, but it still helps to decide the shape of their society, in terms of class prestige if not of political power. Postmodern individuals, without the Queen’s head start, will be obliged to invent new legal rationales upon which to base the de facto sovereignty that information technology will hand them.

Sovereign Individuals will also have to cope with the corrosive consequences of envy—a difficulty that sometimes detains monarchs, but which will be more intensely felt by persons who are not traditionally venerated but invent their own sovereignty. As Helmut Schoeck wrote in his comprehensive survey, Envy, “Where there is only one king, one president of the United States—in other words, one member only of a particular status—he can live with relative impunity the kind of life which, even on a much smaller scale, would arouse indignation in the same society were it to be adopted by successful members of larger professional or social groups.”85 Monarchs, as embodiments of the nation, enjoy a certain immunity to envy that will not carry over to Sovereign Individuals.

The “losers and left-behinds” in the Information Society will surely envy and resent the success of winners, especially as the deepening of markets implies that this will be increasingly a “winners take all” world Increasingly, rewards are already coming to be based upon relative performance, rather than absolute performance as was the case in industrial production. A factory worker was paid either on the basis of hours in attendance as measured by the time clock, or according to some criterion of output, such as pieces made, units assembled or some similar measure.86 Standardized pay was made possible by the fact that output was similar for everyone using the same tools. But the creation of conceptual wealth, like artistic performance, varies dramatically among persons using the same tools. In this respect, the whole of the economy is becoming increasingly like opera, where the highest rewards go to those with the best voices, and those who sing out of tune, however earnestly, do not normally attract large rewards. As many fields are opened to truly global competition, the return for ordinary performance is bound to fall. Middle talents will be in vast supply, some originating with persons who can rent their time for a fraction of the rates that prevail in the leading industrial countries. The losers will be the minor-league outfielders with “slider speed bats” whose reflexes are half a second shy of hitting a major league fastball. Instead of making a million dollars a year banging out home runs, they will make $25,000, with no supplementary income from celebrity endorsements. Others will strike out altogether.

“Once a country opens itself up to the global market…, those of its citizens with the skills to take advantage of it become the winners, and those without become losers or left-behinds.…[U]sually one party… claims to be able to defy globalization or ease its pain. That is Pat Buchanan in America, the Communists in Russia and now the Islamic Welfare Party here in Turkey.… So what is happening in Turkey is much more complicated than just a fundamentalist takeover. It is what happens when widening globalization spins off more and more losers, when widening democratization gives them all a vote, while religious parties effectively exploit this coincidence to take power.”87 —THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Who will the losers be in the Information Age? In general terms, the tax consumers will be losers. It is usually they who could not increase their wealth by moving to another jurisdiction. Much of their income is lodged in the rules of a national political jurisdiction rather than conveyed by market valuations. Therefore, eliminating or sharply reducing the taxes that are negatively compounding against their net worths may not appear to make them much better off—the price of lower taxation is a diminished stream of transfer payments. They will lose income because they will no longer be able to depend upon political compulsion to pick the pockets of persons more productive than themselves. Those without savings who rely upon government to pay their retirement benefits and medical care will in all probability suffer a fall in living standards. This loss of income translates into a depreciation of what financial writer Scott Burns has dubbed “transcendental” or political capital.88 This “transcendental” or imaginary capital is based not upon the economic ownership of assets but upon the de facto claim to the income stream established by political rules and regulations. For example, the expected income from government transfer programs could be converted into a bond capitalized at prevailing interest rates. This imaginary bond funded by the imagined community is transcendental capital. It will be suddenly depreciated by the “great transformation” that is destined to reduce the grip of political authorities upon the cash flow required to redeem their promises.

“On frontiers and on the high seas, where no one had an enduring monopoly in the use of violence, merchants avoided payment of exactions which were so high that protection could be obtained more cheaply by other means.”89 —FREDERIC C. LANE

It does not take a giant stretch of the imagination to see that the information elite are likely to take advantage of the opportunities for liberation and personal sovereignty offered by the new cybereconomy. Equally, it is to be expected that the “left-behinds” will become increasingly jingoistic and unpleasant as the impact of information technology grows in the new millennium. It is difficult to guess at precisely what point the reaction will turn ugly. Our guess is that the recriminations will intensify when Western nations begin to unambiguously crack apart in the manner of the former Soviet Union.

Equally, every time a nation-state cracks up, it will facilitate further devolution and encourage the autonomy of Sovereign Individuals. We expect to see a significant multiplication of sovereign entities, as scores of enclaves and jurisdictions more akin to city-states emerge from the rubble of nations. These new entities will include many that will offer highly competitive pricing of protection services, imposing low taxes or none at all on income and capital. The new entities are almost bound to price their protection services more attractively than do the leading OECD nation-states. Seen simply as a matter of market segmentation, the area of the market that is most poorly served is the high-efficiency, low-cost end. Anyone who wishes to pay high taxes in exchange for a complicated array of state spending has ample opportunity to do so. Therefore, the most advantageous and profitable strategy for a new minisovereignty is almost bound to lie with a high-efficiency, low-price alternative. Such a minisovereignty could only with great difficulty expect to provide a more complete array of services than those on offer from the surviving nation-states. Since all nation-states will certainly not collapse at once, the statist alternative is likely to be well supplied, especially early in the transition. On the other hand, a no-frills regime of tolerable law and order can be provided relatively cheaply. If social unrest and crime spread in the old core industrial countries to the degree that we expect, tolerable law and order will be far more appealing in a jurisdiction than a national space program, a state-sponsored women’s museum, or subsidized retraining schemes for displaced executives.

39个人的去国家化THE DENATIONALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

中文译本

随着新实体的出现,公民身份的魅力将日益消退,其逻辑也不再令人信服;因为新实体允许公民对政府现在提供的服务进行选择,首先就是保护服务。这样一来,个人不再以国家名义来确定自己的身份,将成为现实。不过,公民身份的祛魅是一个漫长的过程。在日常生活中,你会不断接触到各种无聊的信息,这些信息都旨在加强你对民族国家的认同。在这些信息的熏染下,你不可能忘记“你的国籍”。对很多人而言,国籍是重要的身份徽章。“我们”被教导以国籍来看待世界。这是我们的国家,我们的运动员在奥运会上竞争,当他们获胜时,颁奖仪式上飘扬的是“我们”的国旗,我们的国歌让裁判和其他国家的选手肃然起敬。“我们”被引导,相信这是“我们”的胜利;尽管我们从来也没搞清楚“我们”是如何参与其中的,除了作为同一领土内的一个公民。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Citizenship will become less attractive and tenable as new institutions emerge to facilitate choice in the services governments now engross, be-gining with protection. This will make it practical for individuals to cease to identify themselves in national terms. Yet the demystification of citizenship will be a slow process. You are constantly exposed to a barrage of banal messages in the routines of daily life designed to reinforce your identification with your local nation-state. These messages make it highly unlikely for you to forget “your nationality.” For many people, nationality is a crucial badge of identity. “We” are taught to see the world in terms of nationality. It is “our” country, “our” athletes compete in the Olympics. When they win, it is “our” flag that waves in the ceremony. “Our” anthem brings the judges and other competitors to attention in the awards ceremony. “We” are led to believe that it is “our” victory, although it is never quite clear how “we” participated, other than by being within the same territory as a citizen.

40从第一人称复数到单数From First Person Plural to Singular

中文译本

随着信息技术走上前台,它将促进全球视野的形成,这种趋势在 MTV 观众的态度中已经明显流露出来;它还将创造各种条件和潜在的可能,使主权个人可以借之摆脱民族主义的沉重负担。举例来说,在今后的几十年内,窄播将取代广播,成为个人获取新闻信息的方式。这一点意义重大。它相当于把千百万人的想象力,从第一人称的复数调频为单数。当个人开始担当自己的新闻编辑,选择自己感兴趣的话题和新闻报道时,他就不太可能再去选择那些灌输为国牺牲的必要性的内容。事实上,相比他们订阅的高度个人化的“窄播”新闻,他们的态度更可能受到自己消费的全球文化的影响。同样,在技术的推动下教育的私有化也会产生类似的效果。在中世纪时期,教育牢牢地控制在教会的手里。在现代时期,教育一直在国家的控制之下。用埃里克·霍布斯鲍姆(Eric Hobsbawm)的话说,“国家教育把人变成了特定国家的公民,‘把农民变成了法国人’。”在信息时代,教育将被私有化与个性化。它不会在像工业时代那样,背负着沉重的政治抱负。民族主义被灌输到灵魂生活每个角落的日子,将成为过去。

向互联网的转移,还将降低区位在商业种的重要性。不受地域限制的个人地址将会出现。基于卫星的数字电话服务,将超越基于地理位置的固定线路系统,后者只能共享一个国际拨号代码。在未来,个人将拥有自己独一无二的全球电话地址,就像互联网网址一样;无论他身处何地,你都联系得到。到了一定的时候,国家邮政系统的垄断地位将崩溃;与现有民族国家毫无联系的私人邮递系统,将在全球内提供服务。

这里一步,那里一步,虽然是一些明显的小步骤,但有助于使普通消费者以及认知精英摆脱对民族国家的刻板认同。当国家垄断的领土上出现切实可行的主权替代方案,公民身份的祛魅化将大大加速。网络经济的基石——网络货币、网络银行及不受监管的全球证券网络市场,必将大规模涌现。它们的出现将使贪婪的政府没收“公民”财富的能力日趋萎缩。

当然,先进国家肯定会尝试合作,建立垄断联盟,限制加密技术,并防止公民逃离自己的领地,以维护它们的高税收和通胀的法币,但它们最终会一败涂地。地球上最有生产力的人,会找到通往经济自由的道路。国家甚至没办法有效地在物理上把人关起来,用以敲诈和收税。禁止非法移民的措施往往都会失效,这已经令人信服地说明了,民族国家想封锁边界以防成功人士逃跑是不可能的。富人逃跑时,就像未来的出租车司机和服务员想逃进来一样,充满魄力和开拓精神。

自从主权分散的中世纪以来,又一次,边界将无法被明确地划分。正如我们前面所探讨的,未来大量的金融交易,都不会发生的确定的领土内。越来越多的主权个人,不会因为出生的巧合而继承国家的债务,他们会利用这种模糊性,摒弃其纳税义务,超越公民身份,成为政府的客户。就像我们在第 8 章所分析的,他们将作为客户与瑞士谈判私人税收条款。一份典型的与瑞士法语区各州达成的私人税收协定,允许个人或家庭每年固定缴纳 5 万瑞士法郎的税款为交换,在瑞士境内居住。请注意,这不是统一的税率,而是不考虑收入的固定税额。如果你的年收入是 5 万瑞士法郎,你就应该签这样的私人税收条约,因为你的税率是 100%。但如果你的收入是 50 万瑞士法郎,你的税率就是 10%。如果是 500 万,税率就只有 1%。如果是 5000 万,那就是 0.1%。与纽约市 58%的边际税率相比,如果你觉得这个条件好得难以置信,那只说明了工业时期的政府服务定价,其掠夺性和垄断性是多么地凶残。

事实上,对于政府提供的必要且有用的服务来说,5 万瑞士法郎已经是一笔充裕的年费。每一位移居瑞士的百万富翁每年都为他们获得的特权缴纳 5 万瑞士法郎,瑞士人从中肯定没少赚。而且在很多时候,多接收一个百万富翁,其边际成本基本为零。因此,相当于瑞士政府在一笔交易中的年净利润接近 5 万瑞士法郎。

任何服务,如果可以被压低价格,还能让低成本的供应商获得约 100%的利润,那就是垄断性的,其定价过高超越了极点。让人吃惊的并不是像瑞士这种情况,征收的税率会随着收入的增长而降低;而是在 20 世纪,不同的人为政府支付天差地别的税额,看上去居然是“公平”的。这真的是奇怪得很,因为使用政府服务最多的人缴的费用最少,而使用最少的人却缴得最多。所有这些都证明了,对于一个高收入的美国人来说,在瑞士居住相比美国国籍的优势,相当于一生数千万美元的收入差别。所以,除非美国进行税收改革,相比其他国家更具竞争力,并且不再以国籍为基础进行征收,否则,即使克林顿设置了离境税的障碍,有头脑的人还是会放弃美国身份,去获得税负较轻管辖区的护照。

工业时代的政府是根据纳税人的成功来为其服务定价,而不是根据其服务的成本或价值。当政府的服务被转向商业定价,人们就能以远低于传统民族国家的价格获得更加满意的保护服务。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

As information technology comes to the fore, it will help facilitate the global perspective already evident in the attitudes of MTV viewers, as well as create ways by which Sovereign Individuals can harness the latent possibilities of information technology to escape from the nationalist burden of taxation. Within the next few decades, for example, narrow-casting will replace broadcasting as the method by which individuals obtain their news. This has significant implications. It amounts to a change in the imaginations of millions from first personal plural to singular. As individuals themselves begin to serve as their own news editors, selecting what topics and news stories are of interest, it is far less likely that they will choose to indoctrinate themselves in the urgencies of sacrifice for the nation-state. Indeed, their attitudes are more likely to be informed by the global culture to which they relate as consumers, of entertainment than by the highly personal “news” narrow-casts to which they may subscribe. Much the same effect will arise from the privatization of education, again facilitated by technology. In the medieval period, education was firmly under the control of the Church. In the modern age, education has been under the control of the state. In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, “state education transformed people into citizens of a specific country: ‘peasants into Frenchmen.’ ”90 In the Information Age, education will be privatized and individualized. It will no longer be lumbered with the heavy political baggage that characterized education during the industrial period. Nationalism will not be constantly massaged into every corner of the mind’s life.

The move to the Internet and the World Wide Web will also reduce the importance of location in commerce. It will create individual addresses that are not bounded territorially. Satellite-based digital telephone services will evolve beyond location-based land-line systems sharing a common international dialing code. The individual will have his own, unique global telephone address, like an Internet address, that will reach him wherever he happens to be. In due course, national postal monopolies will collapse, allowing privatized mail delivery by worldwide services with no particular ties to any existing nation-state.

These and other apparently small steps will help free the ordinary consumer, as well as the cognitive elite, from rote identification with the nation-state. The demystification of citizenship will be most dramatically accelerated by the emergence of practical alternatives to dealing within bounded territories monopolized by states. The building blocks of the cybereconomy—cybermoney, cyberbanking, and an unregulated global cybermarket in securities—are almost bound to come into existence on a large scale. As they do, the capacity of greedy governments to confiscate the wealth of “citizens” will shrivel.

While the leading states will no doubt attempt to enforce a cartel to preserve high taxes and fiat money by cooperating to limit encryption and prevent citizens from escaping their domains, the states will ultimately fail. The most productive people on the planet will find their way to economic freedom. It is unlikely that the state will even be effective at keeping people penned up where they can be physically held to ransom. The ineffectiveness of efforts to bar illegal immigrants convincingly shows that nation-states will be unable to seal their borders to prevent successful people from escaping. The rich will be at least as enterprising in getting out as would-be taxi drivers and waiters are at getting in.

For the first time since the medieval period of fragmented sovereignty, borders will not be clearly demarcated. As we explored earlier, there will be no distinct territory in which many future financial transactions will occur. Instead of accepting an inheritance of liabilities on the basis of an accident of birth, increasing numbers of Sovereign Individuals will take advantage of this ambiguity to desert their tax liabilities, moving beyond citizenship to become customers. They will negotiate private tax treaties as customers, along the lines now available in Switzerland, as analyzed in Chapter 8. A typical private tax treaty negotiated with the French-speaking Swiss cantons allows an individual or family to reside in exchange for a fixed annual tax payment of 50,000 Swiss francs (currently about $45,000). Note that this is not a flat-rate tax, but a flat amount of tax fixed without respect to income. If your annual income is 50,000 Swiss francs ($45,000), you should not enter into such a private tax treaty because your tax rate would be 100 percent. At an income of 500,000 Swiss francs, your rate is 10 percent. At SF5,000,000, the rate is just 1 percent. At SF50 million, your tax rate is just 1/10th of 1 percent. If this seems an incredibly good deal compared to a marginal rate of 58 percent in New York City, that is merely a measure of how predatory and monopolistic the pricing of government services generally became during the industrial period.

In fact, 50,000 Swiss francs is an ample annual payment for the necessary and useful services of government. The Swiss surely make a large profit from serving every millionaire who moves in and pays them 50,000 Swiss francs annually for the privilege. In many cases, the government’s marginal cost to have another millionaire living in the jurisdiction is approximately zero. Therefore, its annual profit on the transaction will approach 50,000 Swiss francs. Any service that can be undercut and still allow the low-cost provider approximately a 100 percent profit is monopolized and overpriced to an extreme. What is remarkable is not that the rate of tax charged should fall as a percentage of income in this particular case, but that it should ever have seemed “fair” that different persons should pay wildly different amounts for the services of government during the twentieth century. This is particularly odd in that those who use government services the most pay the least, and those who use them least pay the most. All of them will provide an advantage as a domicile over the United States worth tens of millions over a lifetime to any high-income American. Unless U.S. taxes are reformed to become more competitive with those of other jurisdictions, and are no longer levied on the basis of nationality, thinking persons will renounce U.S. citizenship, notwithstanding the obstacles imposed by Clinton’s exit tax, to take up passports that entail less onerous liabilities.

Governments in the industrial era priced their services on the basis of the success of the taxpayer, rather than in relation to the costs or value of any services provided. The movement to commercial pricing of government service will lead to more satisfactory protection at a far lower price than that imposed by conventional nation-states.

41公民身份走上骑士身份的老路Citizenship Goes the Way of Chivalry

中文译本

简而言之,公民身份注定要走上骑士身份的老路。随着提供保护的制度基础再次被重组,与该制度相配套的合理化叙事以及激励的意识形态,也将不可避免地发生改变。500 年前,在中世纪结束时,当以服务去换取保护不再是一个划算的买卖时,人们的反应是可以预见的。他们摒弃了骑士精神,宣誓和忠诚不再像过去五个世纪那么重要。今天,信息技术有望同样颠覆公民身份。民族国家和民族主义的理念将被祛魅,就像 500 年前处于垄断地位的教会一样。

虽然反对派会通过诋毁创新者,以及重振民族主义情绪来负隅顽抗,但我们怀疑在大政治层面已经死亡的民族国家,还能够召唤起足够强大的忠诚度去抵御信息技术释放出来的竞争压力。在一个政府纷纷破产的世界里,大多数有头脑的个人,都宁愿作为客户享受良好的保护服务,而不是作为民族国家的公民被掠夺。

富裕的经合组织国家对其境内的商人施加了沉重的税收和监管负担。在以前,当经合组织国家是仅有的、可以相对舒适地经商和居住的管辖区时,这些费用还可以忍受。但那一天已经过去了。最富有国家的居民为税收和监管支付的溢价,永远也不可能得偿其成本。随着各管辖区之间的竞争加剧,这种情况越来越无可忍受。有资本、有能力应对信息时代挑战的人,会选择到任何地方居住和经营。

在有选择的情况下,只有最爱国或最愚蠢的人,才会继续住在高税率的国家。出于以上原因可以预见,一个或多个民族国家会秘密行动,破坏过客生活方式的吸引力。生物战可以有效地阻断旅行,例如引爆致命的流行病。这不仅会打击人们对旅行欲望,还会给世界各国提供封锁边界、限制移民的借口。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In short, citizenship is destined to go the way of chivalry. As the basis upon which protection is provided is reorganized once again, the rationalizations and motivating ideologies that complement the system will also inevitably change. Half a millennium ago, at the close of the Middle Ages, when the provision of protection in return for personal service generally ceased to be a paying proposition, people responded in the predictable way. They abandoned chivalry. Sworn oaths and personal fealty ceased to be taken as seriously as they had been for the previous five centuries. Now information technology promises to be equally subversive of citizenship. The nation-state and the claims of nationalism will be demystified just as the claims of the monopoly Church were demystified five centuries ago.

While reactionaries will respond by attempting to vilify innovators and revive nationalist sentiment, we doubt that the megapolitically defunct nation-state can exert a sufficiently strong tug of loyalties to withstand the competitive pressures unleashed by information technology. Most thinking individuals in a world of bankrupt governments will prefer to be well treated as customers of protection services, rather than be plundered as citizens of nation-states.

The wealthy OECD countries impose heavy tax and regulatory burdens upon individuals doing business within their borders. These costs may have been tolerable when the OECD nation-states were the only jurisdictions in which one could do business and reside at a reasonable level of comfort. That day has passed. The premium paid to be taxed and regulated as a resident of the richest nation-states no longer repays its cost. It will be ever less tolerable as competition between jurisdictions intensifies. Those with the earnings ability and capital to meet the competitive challenges of the Information Age will be able to locate anywhere and do business anywhere. With a choice of domiciles, only the most patriotic or stupid will continue to reside in high-tax countries.

For this reason, it is to be expected that one or more nation-states will undertake covert action to subvert the appeal of transience. Travel could be effectively discouraged by biological warfare, such as the outbreak of a deadly epidemic. This could not only discourage the desire to travel, it could also give jurisdictions throughout the globe an excuse to seal their borders and limit immigration.

42国籍税的弊端The Drawback of Nationality Taxation

中文译本

除非政策发生惊人的、近乎奇迹般的变化,否则,信息时代成功的投资者或企业家将因为居住在某些国家,而在一生中支付数千万、数亿、甚至数十亿美元的罚款;因为这些国家的财政政策,类似于 20 世纪生活水平最高的那些国家。

如果不发生彻底的改变,美国人受到的惩罚将是最严重的。美国是世界上仅有的三个根据国籍而非居住地征税的国家之一。另外两个,一是菲律宾,前美国殖民地;二是厄立特里亚,它的一位流亡的领导人,在长期反抗埃塞俄比亚统治的过程中,受到了美国国税局的蛊惑。厄立特里亚现在征收 3%的国籍税。虽然这只是对美国税率的苍白模仿,但这样的税负,也使厄立特里亚的公民身份在信息时代成为累赘。而美国的现行法律,使其公民成为更大的麻烦。国税局已经成为美国主要的出口产品之一。因为相比其他国家,美国更有能力把手伸到地球上的任何角落,从它的国民身上榨取财富。

如果一家波音 747 喷气式客机,满载着来自世界每个国家的一名投资者,在一个刚刚独立的国家降落,每个投资者在新的创业冒险中投入 1000 美元,那么美国人将面临比其他任何人都高得多的收益税。包括针对在外国投资的特殊惩罚性税收,如所谓的 FPIC 税,再加上美国国籍税,可能导致在美国境外持有长期资产,将遭到200%甚至更高的税负。一个成功的美国人如果成为全球其余 280多个国家任何一国的公民,都可以大大减少他一生中的总税收负担。

美国拥有全球最具掠夺性的、吃大户(soak-the-rich)的税收制度。与其他所有国家的公民相比,生活在国内或国外的美国人更多地被视为国家的财产,而不是客户。因此,美国的税制,甚至比臭名昭著的斯堪的纳维亚福利国家的税制更加不合时宜,更不符合信息时代的要求。丹麦或瑞典公民,如果要实现他们日益提升的技术自治权,几乎没有什么法律障碍。如果他们想要谈判个人税率,他们可以自由地通过私人条约在瑞士交税;或者搬到百慕大,完全不用缴纳所得税。一个瑞典人或者丹麦人,如果相信斯堪的纳维亚国家的福利制度,值得并且愿意支付高额税款,那他其实是做出了选择。他有能力选择文明或不文明世界里任何国家的任何税率。要改变税率,他只需要搬家即可。科技让这种选择变得越来越容易。然而,美国人却被剥夺了这个选项。

要实现信息革命带来的个人自治,持有美国护照注定将成为一大绊脚石。在工业时代生而为美国人,是一个幸运的意外;而在信息时代,即使是在早期阶段,它也已经成为了一个数百万美元的包袱。

要想搞清楚这个包袱有多大,可以做一个比较。在合理的假设下,一个新西兰人的税前收入与美国前 1%纳税人的平均收入相同,那么他缴的税要少得多,但是节税产生的复利,就会使他比美国人更富有。在一生结束时,这位新西兰人会比美国人多留给子孙 7300 万美元。然而,新西兰还不是一个公认的避税天堂。还有其他 40 多个管辖区,其收入税和资本税比新西兰还要低。在我们看来,低税率管辖区的数量应该会增加,而不是减少。所有这些地区都将提供比美国更多的居住地优势,其价值即使达不到数亿美元,终生算下来也有几千万。除非美国进行税制改革,相比其他管辖区更具优势,并且不再根据国籍征税,否则,尽管克林顿设置了离境税障碍,有头脑的人还是会放弃美国身份。

信息时代的竞争条件,几乎可以使人们在任何地方获得高收入。民族国家赖以征收超额税负的地域垄断将被打破,实际上它们正在被打破。随着垄断被进一步削弱,竞争的压力必将驱使最具进取心、最有能力的人,逃离高税率的国家。而这些国家,就像《经济学人》的前编辑诺曼·麦克雷(Norman Macrae)所说,“将主要由傻瓜居住”。

到 2012 年,预计用于福利和国债利息的支出将耗尽联邦政府的所有税收收入。……将不会有一分钱留给教育、儿童项目、高速公路、国防或其他任何可自由支配的项目。 —— 美国两党权利与税收改革委员会

富人从先进福利国家逃离的时间,恰好是人口统计学上的不利阶段。到 21 世纪初,欧洲和北美大量的老龄人口将会发现自己没有足够的储蓄来支撑医疗费用及退休后的生活方式。例如,65%的美国人完全没有退休储蓄金,一点也没有。

而那些有储蓄的,则存得太少。普通的美国人到了 65 岁,在去世之前预计还将面临超过 20 万美元的医疗费用;而他们的净资产不足 7.5 万美元。即使拥有私人养老金的少数人也不可能过上舒适的生活;他们的养老金,平均只能替代退休前收入的 20%。典型的退休人员,他们的大部分资产并不是真正的财富,而是“超验资本”,即转移支付的预期价值。大多数人已经习惯于,依赖这些转移支付来弥补个人财务的缺口。问题是这些钱很可能会收不到。现收现付制度将缺乏现金流或资源去兑现它们。尼尔·豪(Neil Howe)进行的一项研究表明,即使美国的税前收入比过去 20 年增长得更快,但到 2040 年,美国的平均税后收入将不得不下降 59%,以资助当前水平的社会保障和政府医疗项目。这个问题没有回旋的余地。福利国家正面临破产。欧洲的财政困境比北美更严重。

意大利可能是最糟糕的,紧随其后的是瑞典和其他北欧福利国家,它们为收入支持计划设定了慷慨的标准。《金融时报》估计,如果“将意大利国家养老金的现值计算在内,该国公共部门的债务将超过 GDP 的 200%。”这种程度的负债从数学上讲是没有希望了。几年前,针对在多伦多证券交易所上市的公司,就其商业负债状况进行过一次全面的调查。研究表明,面临当今主要福利国家的那种极端负债率,只有四分之一的企业活了下来。简单地说,这些国家已经破产了,数万亿没有资金支持的福利承诺将被一笔勾销。面对这个现实吧,即使不情愿但也无可避免。

这就是网络经济的逻辑。它面临的一个障碍,可能只是简单的惯性,即人类不愿意承担风险去移动的筑巢本能。如果说还有其他的障碍,那可能是人类本性中的硬伤。在网络空间部署资产的经济逻辑,与根深蒂固的怀疑外人的生物逻辑相违背。在每一种文化中,儿童都会表现出对陌生人的厌恶。主权商业化的反对者,会竭尽全力地煽动人们的怀疑情绪,反对信息时代带来的新的全球文化,并拒不接受它将导致的民族国家的消亡。另外一个障碍可能来自表观遗传,或受基因影响的动机因素;受此影响,“失败者或被遗弃者”对于破坏民族国家的发展,可能会做出像狩猎采集者保护家庭式的愤怒反应。当迷失方向和被疏离的个体拥有越来越强大的破坏力,在这样的环境中,对信息技术的反击可能将充满暴力与痛苦。

从历史上看,集体暴力经常从西方国家的中央政治进程中流泻出来。想要夺取、掌控或重整权力杠杆的人们,在其斗争过程中总是会诉诸集体暴力。被压迫者以正义的名义发起攻击,特权阶级则以秩序的名义进行镇压,而中间阶层则因为恐惧而陷入骚乱。权力局势的巨大转变通常就发生在——而且往往依赖于——集体暴力的特殊时刻。 查尔斯·蒂利(Charles Tilly)

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Unless there is an astonishing and almost miraculous change in policies, the successful investor or entrepreneur in the Information Age will pay a lifetime penalty of tens of millions, hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars to reside in the countries with fiscal policies like those that have enjoyed the highest living standards during the twentieth century.

Absent a radical change, the penalty will be highest for Americans. The United States is one of just three jurisdictions on the planet that impose taxes based upon nationality rather than residence. The other two are the Philippines, a former U.S. colony, and Eritrea, one of whose exiled leaders fell under the spell of the IRS during its long rebellion against Ethiopian rule. Eritrea now imposes a nationality tax of 3 percent. While that is a pale imitation of the U.S. rates, even that burden makes Eritrean citizenship a liability in the Information Age. Current law makes U.S. citizenship even a larger liability. The IRS has become one of America’s leading exports. More than any other country, the United States reaches to the corners of the earth to extract income from its nationals.

If a 747 jetliner filled with one investor from each jurisdiction on earth touched down in a newly independent country, and each investor risked $1,000 in a start-up venture in the new economy, the American would face a far higher tax than anyone else on any gains. Special, penal taxation of foreign investment, exemplified by the so-called PFIC taxation, plus the U.S. nationality tax, can result in tax liabilities of 200 percent or more on longterm assets held outside the United States. A successful American could reduce his total lifetime tax burden as a citizen of any of more than 280 other jurisdictions on the globe.

The United States has the globe’s most predatory, soak-the-rich tax system. Americans living in the United States or abroad are treated more like assets and less like customers than citizens of any other country. The American tax regime is therefore more anachronistic and less compatible with success in the Information Age than those of even the notoriously high-tax welfare states of Scandinavia. Citizens of Denmark or Sweden face few legal obstacles in realizing their growing technological autonomy as individuals. Should they wish to negotiate their own tax rates, they are free to elect to pay taxes in Switzerland by private treaty, or move to Bermuda and pay no income taxes at all. A Swede or a Dane who wishes to pay high taxes because he believes the Scandavian welfare state is worth what it costs is actually making a choice. He can elect to be taxed at any rate that prevails in any other jurisdiction in the civilized or uncivilized world. To change his tax rate, he need only move. Technology makes such a choice easier by the moment. Yet that option is denied to Americans.

Holding a U.S. passport is destined to become a major drawback to realizing the opportunities for individual autonomy made possible by the Information Revolution. Being born an American during the industrial period was a lucky accident. Even in the early stages of the Information Age, it has become a multimillion-dollar liability.

To see how great a liability, consider this comparison. Under reasonable assumptions, a New Zealander with the same pretax performance as the average of the top 1 percent of American taxpayers would pay so much less in taxes that the compounding of his tax savings alone would make him richer than the American would ever be. At the end of a lifetime, the New Zealander would have $73 million more to leave to his children or grandchildren. And New Zealand is not even a recognized tax haven. More than forty other jurisdictions impose lower income and capital taxation than New Zealand. If our argument is right, the number of low-tax jurisdictions is likely to rise rather than fall. All of them will provide an advantage as a domicile over the United States, worth tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, over a lifetime. Unless U.S. taxes are reformed to become more competitive with those of other jurisdictions, and are no longer levied on the basis of nationality, thinking persons will renounce U.S. citizenship, notwithstanding the obstacles imposed by Clinton’s exit tax.

The competitive conditions of the Information Age will render it possible to earn high incomes almost anywhere. In effect, the locational monopolies that nation-states exploited to impose extremely high taxes will be broken by technology. They are already breaking down. As they erode further, competitive pressures are almost bound to drive the most enterprising and able to flee countries that tax too much. As former Economist editor Norman Macrae put it, such countries “will be inhabited residually, mainly by dummies.”

“[B]y the year 2012, projected outlays for entitlements and interest on the national debt will consume all tax revenues collected by the federal government. … There will not be one cent left over for education, children’s programs, highways, national defense, or any other discretionary program.” —BIPARTISAN U.S. COMMISSION ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM

The flight of the wealthy from advanced welfare states will happen at just the wrong time demographically. Early in the twenty-first century, large aging populations in Europe and North America will find themselves with insufficient savings to meet medical expenses and finance their lifestyles in retirement. For example, fully 65 percent of Americans have no savings for retirement at all. None. And those who do save save far too little. The average American will reach sixty-five facing expected medical bills of more than $200,000 before death and with a net worth of less than $75,000. Even the minority with private pensions are unlikely to be comfortable. The average pension will replace only 20 percent of preretirement income. Most of the assets of the typical retiree are not real wealth but “transcendental capital,” the expected value of transfer payments. Most people have been conditioned to rely upon these transfer payments to make up the gap in their private resources. The catch is that they are unlikely to be forthcoming. Pay-as-you-go systems will lack the cash flow or resources to make good on them. A study conducted by Neil Howe showed that even if pretax incomes in the United States were to rise faster than they have over the past twenty years, average after-tax incomes in America would have to be pushed down by 59 percent by 2040 in order to finance Social Security and government medical programs at current levels.

This is not a problem that can be manipulated around the margins. The welfare state faces insolvency. Its financing predicament is even more acute in Europe than in North America. Italy is perhaps the worst case, followed closely by Sweden and the other Nordic welfare states that set the standard for generous terms in income-support programs. The Financial Times estimates that if “the present value of Italian state pensions is included, the country’s public sector debt would rise to more than 200 percent of GDP.”91

Indebtedness at such levels is all but mathematically hopeless. A comprehensive study of commercial indebtedness of Toronto Stock Exchange companies undertaken a few years ago showed that few survive debt ratios one-quarter as extreme as those facing the leading welfare states today.92 Put simply, they are broke. As this reality is faced, grudgingly but inevitably, literally trillions in unfunded entitlement obligations will be written off.

Such is the logic of the cybereconomy. One possible hitch may be simple inertia, the nesting instinct that makes humans reluctant to pick up stakes and move. If there are other hitches, they may be hardwired into human nature. The economic logic of deploying assets in cyberspace could run counter to the biologic expressed in the ingrained suspicions of outsiders. Children in every culture show an aversion to strangers. Opponents of the commercialization of sovereignty will do their best to inflame doubts about the new global culture of the Information Age and the demise of the nation-state that it implies. Another possible hitch arising from epigenesis, or genetically influenced motivational factors, is the prospect that the “losers and left-behinds” will respond to developments that undermine the nation-state with the fury of hunter-gatherers protecting their families. In an environment where disoriented and alienated individuals will have increased power to disrupt and destroy, a backlash against the information economy could prove to be violent and unpleasant.

“Historically, collective violence has flowed regularly out of the central political processes of Western countries. People seeking to seize, hold, or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggles. The oppressed have struck in the name of justice, the privileged in the name of order, those between in the name of fear. Great shifts in the arrangements of power have ordinarily produced—and have often depended on—exceptional moments of collective violence.”93 —CHARLES TILLY

43暴力行为透视VIOLENCE IN PERSPECTIVE

中文译本

在变革的环境下,是什么引发了暴力?关于这个问题,至少有两种不同的理论。

历史学家查尔斯·蒂利总结了其中一种。他认为,“激发集体暴力的源头主要在于人们对既定体制崩溃的焦虑感。如果又叠加了痛苦与危险,那么理论认为人们的反应会更加残暴。”不过,在蒂利看来,与其说暴力是“焦虑”的产物,不如说它是一种更为理性的企图,即出于“正义感被剥夺”的动机压迫当局“履行其责任”。根据蒂利的解释,“重大的结构性变化”往往会刺激“政治”性质的集体暴力。“此外,暴力斗争非但不会形成与‘正常’政治生活的急剧决裂;它反而是伴随、补充和扩展了同一批人,为实现目标而进行的有组织的、和平的抗争。暴力与非暴力的斗争属于同一个世界。”无论哪种暴力理论更正确,大变革期间的社会和平前景都是很有限的。显然,民族国家的崩溃肯定算得上是“既定体制崩溃”的典型例子。因此,人们的焦虑情绪很可能全面爆发,政治上的暴力刺激也会随之而来。先进的福利国家可能会尤其严重,因为那里的人已经习惯了相对的收入平等。生活在信息经济早期的民众都是在工业时代长大的,而当时的政府确实有能力,用物质利益堵住人们的不满;考虑到这一点,可以预期“被遗弃者”会继续要求物质利益。经合组织国家的人民,要在网络经济的现实中,经过漫长而痛苦的教育,才能摆脱对大规模强制性的收入再分配的期待。总之,无论由于什么原因,是出于“焦虑”也好,还是为了利用系统性强制的好处而进行的更有心机的争抢也好,在大变革的环境条件下,暴力基本是无可避免的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

There are at least two contending theories about what precipitates violence in conditions of change. Historian Charles Tilly summarizes one theory: “[T]he stimulus to collective violence comes largely from the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart. If misery or danger compounds the anxiety, runs the theory, the reaction becomes all the more violent.” In Tilly’s view, however, violence is not so much a product of “anxiety” as it is a far more rational attempt to bully authorities into “meeting their responsibilities” motivated by a “sense of justice denied.” According to Tilly’s interpretation, “large structural changes” tend to stimulate collective violence of a “political” nature. “Instead of constituting a sharp break from ‘normal’ political life, furthermore, violent struggles tend to accompany, complement, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives. They belong to the same world as nonviolent contention.”94

Whichever theory of violence is more correct, prospects for social peace during the Great Transformation would appear to be limited. The collapse of the nation-state surely counts as a conspicuous example of an “established institution falling apart.” Therefore, anxieties are likely to be in full flower, as will the political inspiration for violence. This could be especially true in the leading welfare states, where populations are accustomed to relative income equality. Given that populations in the early stages of the information economy will have come of age during the industrial period, when political authorities did have the capacity to answer grievances with material benefits, it is reasonable to expect the “left-behinds” to continue to demand material benefits. It will probably take a slow, painful tutorial in the realities of the cybereconomy before OECD populations are weaned away from expectations of being able to compel income redistribution on a large scale. In either case, whether violence arises from “anxiety” or as a more calculating effort to harness the benefits of systematic compulsion, conditions would appear to make violence likely.

44失败者的选区Constituencies of Losers

中文译本

强制性收入再分配系统的崩溃,必然使那些寄希望于数万亿转移支付的人陷入不安。这些人基本上都是“失败者或被遗弃者”,他们缺乏在全球市场上竞争的技能。前苏联的养老金领取者,构成了久加诺夫20的共产主义核心支持群体;同样,垂死福利国家失望的养老金领取者,将形成一个反动的选区,他们将致力于阻止民族国家的主权被私有化;而正是这种私有化,剥夺了国家盗窃的资格。当他们意识到,他们以前控制的政府正在失去对资源享有的主权,以及强制进行大规模收入转移的能力时,他们会变得像法国公务员一样坚定地与算法作战。

你可能还记得,法国总理阿兰·朱佩曾经提出要削减国家工作人员“在人口统计学意义上不可持续的”退休福利,以及节约国有化铁路系统的运营成本;尽管他的提议相当温和,但还是激起了强烈的反对。法国人称他们的制度为“福利国家”(État-Providence),其荒谬程度的一个象征是,法国规定允许“在计算机化的高速 TGV 列车上工作的工程师可以在 50 岁时退休,就像在燃煤机车上辛苦工作的前任一样。”显而易见的是,在任何一个经合组织国家要减少不可持续的福利,都很可能遭到暴力的回应。即使在有些国家,民众的反应没那么强烈,你也可以预料未来的失败者会竭尽所能地阻止对国家强制力的瓦解。

整个过程可能会出人意料地曲折。例如,在美国历史上本土主义情绪就一直带着浓厚的种族主义色彩。这个传统始于 19 世纪的“白帽运动”(White Caps)和三 K 党。然而作为一个群体而言,黑人其实是收入转移、平权运动和其他政治强制成果的主要受益者。他们在美国军队中的比例也非常高。因此,黑人很可能与蓝领白人一道,成为美国民族主义最狂热的支持者。

那些处于阿蒙的萝卜模型底端的人将充满不安全感;而刻意迎合这些人的政客,不管在哪个国家,都会在一篇聒噪中走上政治的前台。从塞尔维亚的斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇,到美国的帕特·布坎南,到新西兰的温斯顿·彼得斯,再到土耳其原教旨主义的伊斯兰福利党的领袖内吉梅丁·埃尔巴坎,这些煽动家都在大力抨击市场全球化、移民和投资自由。

那些认为自己是“经济全球化牺牲品”的人,将对富人和移民产生特别的敌意。用安德鲁·希尔的话说,他们会“仇视移民的加入,因为移民的准入标准好像就是财富,或者说是缺乏财富21,而按照他们似是而非的逻辑,后者会成为他们的福利负担。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The collapse of coerced income redistribution is bound to upset those who expect to be on the receiving end of the trillions in transfer programs. Mostly, these will be “the losers or left-behinds,” persons without the skills to compete in global markets. Like the pensioners of the former Soviet Union who formed the core of Zuganov’s Communist support, the disappointed pensioners of the dying welfare states will form a reactionary constituency keen to prevent the sovereignty of the nation-states from being privatized, thereby depriving the state of its license to steal. As they realize that governments they formerly controlled are losing their sovereignty over resources and the ability to compel large-scale income transfers, they will become as adamant as French civil servants in fighting arithmetic.

You may remember the violent reaction that greeted Prime Minister Alain Juppe’s quite modest proposals to scale back “demographically unsustainable” retirement benefits of state workers and economize the operations of the nationalized railroad system. Symbolic of the absurdity of the État-Providence, as the French call their social welfare system, is the rule that allows “engineers on the computerized, high-speed TGV trains to retire at age fifty, just like their predecessors who toiled on the coal-fired locomotives.…”95 A rowdy reaction to cutbacks of unsustainable benefits is a distinct possibility in any OECD country. And even where populations respond less angrily, you can expect the probable losers to do whatever is within their power to forestall the erosion of state compulsion.

This will lead to some surprising twists. In the United States, for example, nativist sentiment has historically been tinged with more than a slight tincture of racism. This is a tradition that began with the nineteenth-century “White Caps” and Ku Klux Klan. Yet blacks, as a group, are major beneficiaries of income transfers, affirmative action, and other fruits of political compulsion. They are also disproportionately represented in the U.S. military. Therefore, they are likely to emerge, along with blue-collar whites, as among the most fervent partisans of American nationalism.

Politicians willing to cater to the insecurities of those whose relative talents fall well down on Ammon’s turnip will come noisily to the fore in almost every country. From Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia to Pat Buchanan in the United States to Winston Peters in New Zealand, to Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey’s fundamentalist Islamic Welfare Party, demagogues will rail against the globalization of markets, immigration, and freedom of investment.

Particular animus will be directed toward the rich and immigrants by those who imagine themselves to be the “global economy’s casualties.” In the words of Andrew Heal, they will “depise the entry of immigrants whose main entry criterion appears to be their wealth—or their lack of it, which, the specious logic goes, makes them welfare burdens.”96

45对自由的恐惧Fear of Freedom

中文译本

民族国家可能会在新千年的初期退出历史舞台,那些容易受此影响的人的生活将天翻地覆。社会将因此而充满戾气。已经有不少的观察家注意到了一种反应模式,这种模式普遍存在于那些感觉被无边界的未来所抛弃的人中间。当更广大、更具包容性的国家群体开始瓦解,同时伴随着更具流动性的“信息精英”进行业务全球化,“失败者和被遗弃者”将回归到某个种族亚群、部落、帮派、宗教或语言上的少数群体中。在某种程度上,这也是在过去由国家提供的服务(包括法律与秩序)崩溃之后,而产生的一种实际又实用的反应。对于那些没有多少市场资源的人来说,往往很难买到什么机会和渠道,去替代已经崩溃的公共服务。

而对于那些有足够资源购买高质量私人替代品的人而言,把以前被视为公共产品的东西,如教育、清洁的水源或社区治安,转换成私人产品显然更容易管理。不过,需要现金的话,最实际的替代方案还是依靠亲属,或者加入一个按种族身份组织起来的互助团体,比如东南亚古老的华裔“福建人”,或者是通过宗教组织。

世界上那些宗教有力、传教活跃的地区,宗教活动之所以受欢迎,部分原因在于它们往往有能力回归到提供社会福利和公共服务的前现代机制。例如,在南非开普敦,由穆斯林领导的民团就在打击暴力帮派方面发挥了主导作用。然而,尽管这些种族和宗教团体的互助切实有用,但未来的反动行为更多是由于国家的萎缩。另外,在对全球化的反对中好像也存在某种强烈的心理因素。

这种论点,与埃里希·弗洛姆(Erich Fromm)在 1942 年首次出版的著名作品《对自由的恐惧》(Escape from freedom)中,对法西斯主义的吸引力所做的心理学解释不谋而合。弗洛姆认为,资本主义带来的社会流动性,破坏了传统乡村生活的固定身份。农民的儿子不确定他必将成为一个农民,他也不必在父亲耕种的贫瘠土地上面朝黄土背朝天。他现在有了广泛的职业选择,他可以成为教师、商人、军人;也可以做医生,当海员。即使身为农民,他也能移民到美国、加拿大或阿根廷,在远离故乡的地方生活。然而事实证明,资本主义带给人们的这种“创造自我身份”的自由,对于那些不准备创造性利用它的人来说是相当可怕的。正如比利格所言,很多人渴望“固定身份的安全感”,并且“被民族主义和法西斯主义宣传的简单性所吸引。”同样,比利格在谈到工业时代的黄昏时写道:“有一种全球性的心理因素,它在从上面打击国家,用身份的自由消灭传统的忠诚。

另外,还有一种源于种姓的或部落的炙热心理,它以一种强大到偏执的承诺和激烈的情感,从下面攻击国家的软肋。”安德鲁·海尔(Andrew Heal)从另一个角度看待这个现象。他认为有两个重大的“全球性政治和经济趋势……趋势一是全球经济的增长。……趋势二是民族主义、种族主义和地区主义情绪的上升。无论是毛利人、苏格兰人、威尔士人还是反移民的团体,即使政府在把他们推向无边界的新未来,他们自己却一直在奋力地往相反的方向回撤。”总之,无论你怎么看待这种现象,是一种主要的“趋势”,还是一个“心理课题”;显而易见的是一股强烈的支持民族主义、反对边界消失和市场深化的反动情绪,正在世界范围内集结声势。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

The prospect of the disappearance of the nation-state early in the new millennium seems timed to effect the maximum disruption in the lives of suggestible people. This will lead to widespread unpleasantness. More than a few observers have recognized a pattern of reaction that is common among those who feel left out by the prospect of a borderless world. As the larger, more inclusive national grouping begins to break down, with the more mobile “information elite” globalizing their affairs, the “losers and left-behinds” fall back upon membership in an ethnic subgroup, a tribe, a gang, a religious or linguistic minority. Partly, this is a practical and pragmatic reaction to the collapse of services, including law and order, formerly provided by the state. For persons with few marketable resources, it often proves difficult to purchase access to market alternatives to failed public services.

The transformation of what were formerly treated as public goods, such as education, provision of clean water, and neighborhood policing, into private goods is obviously easier to manage for those with sufficient resources to purchase high-quality private alternatives. For those wanting cash, however, the most practical alternative is often to depend upon kin, or join a mutual-aid group organized along ethnic lines, like the old ethnic Chinese “Hokkien” of Southeast Asia, or through a religious congregation. In those parts of the world where dynamic, proselytizing religions are active, part of the popularity of their programs depends on the fact that they tend to hark back to premodern mechanisms for providing social welfare and public goods. For example, Moslem-led vigilante groups have played a leading role in combating violent gangs in Cape Town, South Africa.97 But as practical and pragmatic as such ethnic and religious organization of help can be, more is involved in the reactionary response to the withering of the state. There also seems to be a strong psychological component in the reaction against globalization.

The argument is not dissimilar to the psychological explanation for the appeal of fascism developed by Erich Fromm in his famous work Escape from Freedom, first published in 1941.98 According to Fromm, social mobility introduced by capitalism had destroyed the fixed identities of traditional village life. The son of a farmer no longer knew that he would inevitably be a farmer, or even that he would be bound to live scrabbling to harvest a crop on the same poor ground that his father tilled. He now had a broad choice of occupation. He could become a schoolteacher, a merchant, a soldier; study medicine or take to the sea. Even as a farmer, he could emigrate to the United States, Canada, or Argentina and make a life far from the home of his forebears. This freedom that capitalism provided to people “to create their own identities” proved scary to those who were not prepared to make creative use of it. As Billig said, they yearned “for the security of a solid identity,” and were “drawn towards the simplicities of nationalist and fascist propaganda,”99 Equally as Billig writes of the twilight of the industrial era, “There is a global psychology, which strikes the nation from above, withering loyalties with a free play of identities. And then, there is the hot psychology of caste or tribe, which hits at the soft underbelly of the state with a powerfully intolerant commitment and emotional ferocity.”100

Andrew Heal views the same phenomenon from another perspective. He sees two great “global political and economic trends.… Trend one is the growth of the global economy.… The second is the rise of nationalist, ethnic and regionalist sentiment, whether it be Maori, Scottish, Welsh or from anti-immigrant factions, who even as their governments push them towards new, borderless horizons, pull themselves ever so hard the opposite way.”101 However you choose to look at them, whether as major “trends” or “psychological themes,” it is clear that a strong reactionary sentiment in favor of nationalism and against the fall of borders and the deepening of markets is gathering its voice worldwide.

46文化多元主义与被害者MULTICULTURALISM AND VICTIMIZATION

中文译本

在落幕时分,福利国家要从空空如也的口袋中兑现不劳而获的承诺,已经力有不逮;这时它会发现,继续编造、发动其新的歧视策略只能是一个权宜之计。

官方会指定出各种类型的“被压迫者”,特别是在北美地区。还有被指定为“受害者”的群体,官方会告诉他们,生活中的不如意不是他们自己的错。相反,这一切都是因为欧洲后裔的“死去的白人男性”,以及操纵剥削被排斥群体的压迫性权力结构。黑人、女性、同性恋者、拉丁裔、法语裔、残疾人等等,都有权为过去受到的压迫和歧视而获得补偿。

按照拉什的观点,强化受害感的目的是要破坏国家,这会让新兴的、可自由流动的信息精英更容易逃避公民的责任与义务。我们并不确信新精英们,尤其是来自大众媒体的大多数人,有足够的精明可以理智地采取这种行动。要是他们有这样的本事,那就令人放心了。在我们看来,受害学的兴盛,主要是为了买一个社会和平,手段不仅有拉什所说的扩大英才制度的成员,还包括重新构建收入再分配的合理性。新一轮的受害学运动,会在北美表现得最为夸张,因为信息技术在那里渗透得最深。但是,我们相信,虚构新的歧视叙事在所有衰落的工业社会中或多或少都会发生。北美的多民族福利国家只是更容易受到诱惑,把收入再分配的成本强加给私营部门。它们通过把社会中各种亚文化的经济缺陷,归咎于整个社会结构以及普通的白人男性,激起人们的不满与被亏欠的感觉,就有能力做到这一点。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In its twilight, with a faltering capacity to redeem promises of something for nothing from an empty pocket, the welfare state found it expedient to foster new myths of discrimination. Many categories of officially “oppressed” people were designated, especially in North America. Individuals in groups with designated status as “victims” were informed that they were not responsible for shortcomings in their own lives. Rather, the fault was said to lie with “dead white males” of European descent, and the oppressive power structure allegedly rigged to the disadvantage of the excluded groups. To be black, female, homosexual, Latino, francophone, disabled, etc. was to be entitled to recompense for past repression and discrimination.

If Lasch’s argument is to be believed, the purpose of heightening a sense of victimization was to undermine nations, making it easier for the new, footloose information elite to escape the commitments and duties of citizenship. We are not entirely convinced that the new elite, especially most of those in the mass media, are cunning enough to reason to such a posture. It would almost be reassuring to feel that they were. We see the growth of victimization as mainly an attempt to buy social peace by not only widening membership in the meritocracy as Lasch argues, but also by reconstituting the rationalizations for income redistribution. The new sport of victimology emerged in its most exaggerated form in North America because information technology penetrated more deeply there. We suspect, however, that new myths of discrimination will be common, to one degree or another, in all industrial societies in their senile state. The multiethnic welfare states in North America were simply more vulnerable to the temptation to foist the costs of income redistribution on the private sector. They were able to do this, while inflaming a sense of grievance and entitlement, by blaming the structure of society as a whole, and white men in general, for the economic shortcomings of various subcultures within society.

47创新的大政治学The Megapolitics of Innovation

中文译本

其实,在信息技术对工业经济的“创造性破坏”形成威胁之前,它就已经使马克思主义者和社会主义者所膜拜的许多神话明显过时了。我们在前一章中研究了创新的大政治学,其中我们强调了一点,对正确认识信息革命的社会影响具有重要意义。从近几个世纪的发展来看,技能进步能够扩大社会就业,好像已成为经济生活中一条可靠的法则,但它未必就靠得住。社会收入完全有可能集中在少数富人手里。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Even before information technology began to threaten “creative destruction” of the industrial economy, it had clearly antiquated much of the cherished myth of Marxists and socialists. We examined the megapolitics of innovation in a previous chapter. The point we emphasized there is of importance in placing the social impact of the Information Revolution into perspective. The precedent of technology expanding employment opportunities in recent centuries seems like a dependable rule of economic life, but it need not be. It is possible for earnings to be concentrated in the hands of a prosperous minority.

48实际工资下降 50%REAL WAGES DROP BY 50 PERCENT

中文译本

这种情形,确实发生在近代时期的头两个世纪甚至更长的时间里。从 1500 年左右的火药革命到 1700 年,在西欧的大部分地区60-80%底层人口的实际收入下降了 50%或更多。在很多地方实际收入的下降持续到 1750 年,而且直到 1850年才恢复到 1500 年的水平。

与最近 250 年的经验不同,在近代的前半个阶段,即西欧经济急剧扩张的时期,收入的增加是集中在少数人身上的。当前的信息技术创新,与近几个世纪以来世界所经历的工业技术创新大相径庭。其不同之处在于当前的大部分技术创新具有节省劳动力的特点,它创造的是需要技能的工作任务,它会削弱规模经济的效应。而这与 1750 年左右迄今的发展经验正好相反。

工业创新为无技能的人提供了工作机会,并提高了企业的经济规模。这不仅使穷人不费气力地就提高了收入,而且还增强了政治体制的力量,使其更有能力控制社会动荡。在工业革命的早期,被机械化和自动化所取代的人,往往是熟练的工匠、手艺人和熟练工,而不是无技能的劳动力。纺织业尤其如此,它是最早大规模采用机械和动力设备的行业;这导致了卢德分子的暴力反动,在 19 世纪初的一次暴动中,他们砸毁了纺织机器,并杀害了工厂主。在另一个战场上,1830年在英国东南部发生了一场骚乱,其领袖是神秘的斯温上尉,他的追随者则主要是干农活的日工(day laborer)。他们的诉求包括:向当地富人征税,然后给他们发钱或提供啤酒;要求雇主提高日工的工资;以及“摧毁或要求摧毁新的农业机械,特别是脱粒机”,以减少农民对农村日工的需求。

马克思主义者与其他一些人编造出充满浪漫主义的呓语,把节省劳力技术的暴力反对者给美化成了英雄;而事实上,他们只是一群令人不齿的暴徒,他们反对提高了全世界生活水平的新技术,纯粹是出于自私。

内德·卢德和斯温上尉的暴力追随者,虽然在英国危害了好几个月的公共秩序,然而一旦中央当局开始镇压,其运动的流产是必然的。大部分穷苦的、没有技能的人不可能长期投入到一项事业中去,因为这项事业追求的是摧毁供他们养家糊口的机器;这些机器不仅给他们提供了工作,还降低了他们生活必需品的成本,如保暖衣物和面包,从而提高了他们的生活质量。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

That is indeed what happened during the first two centuries or more of the modern period. From the time of the Gunpowder Revolution around 1500 until 1700, real incomes for the bottom 60-80 percent of the population in most of Western Europe fell by 50 percent or more.102 In many places, real income continued to fall until 1750, and did not recover to 1500 levels until 1850.

Unlike the experience of the past 250 years, the income gains of the first half of the modern period, a time of dramatic expansion of Western European economies, were concentrated among a small minority. The current innovation of information technologies is quite different from the innovation of industrial technologies that the world experienced in recent centuries. The difference lies in the fact that most current technological innovations with labor-saving characteristics tend to create skilled tasks and reduce scale economies. This is the opposite of the experience since about 1750.

Industrial innovation tended to open job opportunities for the unskilled and increase the scale economies of enterprise. This not only raised the earnings of the poor without any effort on their part, it also tended to increase the power of political systems, making them more capable of withstanding unrest. Those who were displaced by mechanization and automation in the early phases of the Industrial Revolution tended to be skilled artisans, craftsmen and journeymen, rather than unskilled labor. This was certainly true in the textile industry, the first to employ mechanization and power equipment on a large scale, which led to a violent reaction by Luddites, who destroyed textile machinery and murdered factory owners during a rampage in the early nineteenth century. On the other hand, the followers of Captain Swing, the mythical leader of an 1830 rebellion in southeastern England, were day laborers. Their demands included imposing a levy on the local rich to provide them with money or beer, imposing a wage increase upon the local employers of day labor, and “destroying, or demanding the destruction of, new farm machinery, especially threshers” that reduced the call among farmers for rural day labor.103

Contrary to the romantic jabberings of Marxists and others who have transformed the violent opponents of labor-saving technology into heroes, they were an unpleasant and violent lot who opposed the introduction of technology that raised living standards worldwide for purely selfish reasons.

While the violent followers of Ned Ludd and Captain Swing jeopardized public order for many months in England, once suppressed by central authority their movements were bound to miscarry. The poor, unskilled majority were unlikely to be long attracted to a cause that promised to destroy machinery that offered them jobs and also raised their living standards by lowering the cost of items they needed, such as warm clothing and bread.

49无技能者获得了高收入Higher Incomes for the Unskilled

中文译本

很快,工业和农业的自动化就对一无所有的人产生了吸引力,因为这给他们创造了赚钱的机会,并降低了他们的生活成本。新工具使那些身无长技的人,也能够生产出与高技能者同等质量的产品。在流水线上,一个天才和一个白痴生产同样的产品赚取同样的工资。

在过去的两个世纪里工业自动化极大地提高了无技能者的工资,特别是在资本主义蓬勃兴起的一小部分地区。而先进工业企业的大规模发展,不仅使无技能劳动力获得了前所未有的工资回报,还促进了收入的再分配。

福利国家的产生是符合工业主义技术发展逻辑的必然结果。领先的工业雇主,因为规模大、资本成本高,成为了最容易被征税的目标。而且政府可以要求他们保存会计记录及扣押工资,这就使个人所得税成为了实际可行的税收技术;在之前几个世纪,经济比较分散的时候这是不可能的。这一切的最终效果是,工业创新促进了规模经济的发展;政府变得更加富有,当然也更有能力维持秩序了。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Over time, industrial and agricultural automation was attractive to the have-nots because it created earnings opportunities for them and lowered their cost of living. New tools allowed those without skills to produce goods of quality equal to those made by persons of high skills. A genius and a moron on the assembly line would both produce the same product, and earn the same wage.

Over the past two centuries, industrial automation dramatically raised wages for unskilled work, especially in the small part of the world where conditions first allowed capitalism to flourish. The large scale of advanced industrial enterprise not only rewarded unskilled labor with unprecedented wages, it also facilitated income redistribution.

The welfare state arose as a logical consequence of the technology of industrialism. Because of their large scale and high capital costs, the leading industrial employers were the easiest targets to tax. And they could be relied upon to keep records and enforce the garnishment of wages that made the income tax technologically feasible as it had not been in previous centuries when economies were more decentralized. The net effect was that the growth of scale economies promoted by industrial innovation made governments richer, and presumably better able to maintain order.

50历史进程被逆转The Process Is Reversed

中文译本

根据我们的判断,今天的形势则正好相反。信息技术正在提高有技能者的收入,并破坏大规模运作的组织,包括民族国家。

这也指出了信息时代另一件讽刺的事情,那就是自由市场的批判者对于工业主义工作的兴衰,持有的精神分裂般及根本性的阻挠态度。在工业主义的早期,他们对工业企业的所谓罪恶感到窒息,因为那些工作把无地农民从“我们已经失落的世界”中引诱了出来。根据批判者的说法,工厂的工作岗位是前所未有的罪恶,是对工人阶级的“剥削”。但如今看来,唯一比工厂工作的出现更糟糕的是它的消失。那些曾经为工厂工作的出现而哀嚎的人,今天是他们的曾孙辈,又要为低技能技能、高收入回报的工厂工作的短缺而哀嚎。

贯穿这些抱怨的一条主线,是对技术创新与市场变革的坚决抵制。在工厂制度的早期阶段,抵制导致了暴力事件。在信息时代,这可能会重演。

而这次不是因为资本家在“剥削工人”。计算机作为一种技术典范,揭示了这种说法的荒谬性。对于某些思维涣散的人来说,假设一个几乎不识字的汽车工人,在生产过程中被那些构建工厂并出资雇人的企业主所“剥削”,可能还有一些可信度。在有形产品的生产和销售中,概念资本的关键性不如在信息时代的产出中那么明显,因为后者显然是需要大量脑力的。所以,认为企业家以某种方式攫取了员工创造的信息产品的价值,这种说法就不太合理了。如果产品的价值明显是通过脑力劳动创造的,如消费类的软件,但却被认为是实际创作它的技术人员以外的他人的产品,那就很荒谬了。马克思主义者和社会主义者,在 19 世纪和 20 世纪的大部分时间里,都认为是工人创造了所有的价值,事实却远非如此;现在的问题恰好相反,一个日益明显的就业趋势就是摆脱无技能的劳动者。

这也引发了人们普遍的担忧,那就是无技能劳动者是否还能为经济发展做出任何贡献。

因此,要求收入再分配的理由也从“剥削论”转为了“歧视论”。因为“剥削”假设的是低收入者具有生产能力,而“歧视”则不然。低技能者之所以未能发展出更高价值的技能,是因为他们受到了“歧视”。

这种歧视也成为了一种合理合法的依据,用来强加非最佳雇用标准及其他标准,更准确地说,就是向落后群体重新分配收入。例如,在美国以种族为基础的成绩与能力的规范化测试,使黑人在客观分数较低的情况下,可以获得比白人和亚裔更多的机会。通过这种及其他手段,政府迫使雇主以较高的工资,雇用更多黑人和其他官方指定的“受害者”群体。任何不遵守规则的雇主都面临着代价高昂的法律诉讼,其中涉及巨额的惩罚性赔偿。

指定受害者的目的,不是为了在工业社会的重要亚群体中培养偏执的迫害妄想症,也不是为了削弱反作用价值观的传播,而是为了减轻破产国家对收入再分配的财政压力。灌输迫害的妄想,只是一个不幸的副作用。讽刺的是对“歧视”现象关注的激增,恰好发生在技术革命的初期;而技术革命却必然会使真正的、任意性歧视,比以往大幅减少。因为在互联网上,没有人知道或在乎一款新软件的开发者是黑人还是白人,男的还是女的,同性恋还是素食主义的侏儒。

虽然现实中的歧视压迫感在未来一定会减轻,但这不一定能减弱要求“补偿金”的压力,要求弥补各种有的没的不公平待遇。每个社会,不管它的客观情况怎么样都会制造出各种合理化收入再分配的理由。这些理由,有的微妙有的荒诞;从圣经中“爱邻如己”的劝诫,到黑魔法的召唤。巫术、女巫和邪恶之眼,是宗教情感的反面,是税务局或国税局的精神写照。当人们不能被爱感动去资助穷人时,穷人自己也想看到他们被恐惧所驱动。制造恐惧有各种形式。有时候是赤裸裸的敲诈,刀子架在喉咙上,枪口对着脑门。其他时候是通过伪装的或虚幻的威胁。近代早期的“女巫”,大多数都是寡妇或者贫困的未婚女性,这并不是巧合。她们用诅咒恐吓邻居,借此索求财物,往往都可以得逞。很显然,付钱的人绝不只是因为迷信;邪恶之眼的恶意可不是迷信,而是事实。即使是一个可怜的女人,她也可以放走别人家的牛,或者放火烧掉别人的房子。从这个意义上说,近代早期的巫术审判并不完全像看起来的那么荒唐。虽然惩罚很残酷,而且毫无疑问有很多无辜的人,因为邻居在麦角碱中毒的幻觉下受到了牵连;但是对女巫的起诉,可以理解为对敲诈勒索的一种间接控诉。

我们预计,随着信息时代的展开,以分享(敲诈)成就奖励为动机的敲诈勒索会重新出现。那些对以往的歧视感到委屈的群体,不会仅仅因为他们的要求变得不合理或更难实现,就很快放弃受害者的身份,这个身份对他们具有明显的价值。

他们会继续坚持自己的诉求,直到当地社会环境的发展,使他们确信再也得不到回报了。非裔美国人和非裔加拿大人中间反社会行为的增长就说明了这一点。它说明了,在黑人的愤怒与对这一问题的根源进行现实评估之间,很难达到平衡。难以评估黑人的问题在多大程度上,是由自身反社会行为造成的。黑人的愤怒还在不断上升,即使他们的生活方式已经因此而日益紊乱。非婚生育飙升,教育程度下降,越来越多的黑人青年卷入犯罪活动,以致于在监狱里的黑人男性比在大学里的还要多。

这些违背情理的结果可能产生了暂时的效果,即在工业主义的黄昏时期,通过提高对整个社会的敲诈威胁增加了资源向下层社会的流动。但这种效果转瞬即逝。

为了符合生产规范,福利国家降低了对表现不佳者的挑战,消除了竞争的积极意义,从而制造出大批技能低下、头脑偏执、适应能力差的群体,整个社会就是一个火药桶。民族国家的死亡和大规模收入再分配的消失,无疑会导致这些悲惨灵魂中的一些变态,对任何比他们生活更好的人发起攻击。因此我们有理由相信,随着信息时代的展开社会和平将受到威胁,尤其是在北美与西欧的多民族飞地。

我们永远不会放下武器,直到下议院通过一项方案,取缔所有伤害共同利益的机械,并废除绞死破框者的方案。但是我们……我们不会再请愿了,请愿没有用,我们必须战斗。 —— 救世军将军内德·卢德 签名 书记员。救世军万岁。阿门。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

In our judgment, the opposite is happening today. Information technology is raising earnings opportunities for the skilled and undermining institutions that operate at a large scale, including the nation-state.

This points to another irony of the Information Age—namely, the schizoid and fundamentally obstructionist attitude of critics of the free market toward the rise and fall of industrial jobs. In the early stages of industrialism, they were choked up about the supposed evil of industrial jobs, which lured landless peasants away from “the world we have lost.” To hear the critics tell it, the advent of factory jobs was an unprecedented evil and “exploitation” of the working class. But now it appears that the only thing worse than the advent of factory jobs is their disappearance. The great-grandchildren of those who wailed about the introduction of factory jobs are now wailing about the shortage of factory jobs that offer high pay for low-skilled work.

The one coherent thread that runs through these complaints is a steadfast resistance to technological innovation and market change. In the early stages of the factory system, this resistance led to violence. It may again.

And not because capitalists are “exploiting the workers.” The advent of the computer as a paradigm technology revealed the absurdity of that claim. It might have been half-credible for the inattentive to suppose that a barely literate auto worker had somehow been “exploited” in the production of an automobile by owners who conceived and financed the businesses that employed workers. The crucial role of conceptual capital in the production and marketing of tangible products was less obvious than it is in the output of the Information Age, which clearly involves mental work. Therefore, the plausibility of the assumption that entrepreneurs had somehow seized the value of information products actually created by workers was much diminished. Where the value was clearly created through mental work, as in the production of consumer software, it was little short of preposterous to suppose that it was actually the product of anyone other than the skilled persons who conceived it. In fact, far from assuming that the workers created all value, as Marxists and socialists did through most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the obvious and growing trend away from unskilled employment gave rise to a spreading worry about quite the opposite problem—whether unskilled laborers still had any economic contribution to make.104

Hence the migration of the rationale for income redistribution away from “exploitation,” which assumed a productive competence for those with low incomes, to “discrimination,” which did not. “Discrimination,” however, was alleged to account for the failure of those with low skills to develop more valuable ones.

This discrimination was also said to justify imposition of nonoptimal hiring criteria and other standards for opening “opportunity,” or, more precisely, redistributing income to the lagging groups. In the United States, for example, race-based norming of achievement and aptitude tests allowed blacks to outscore white and Asian applicants while registering lower objective scores. Through this method and others, governments obliged employers to hire more blacks and other officially “victimized” groups at higher wages than might otherwise have been the case. Anyone who failed to comply faced costly court actions, including lawsuits involving large punitive damages.

The point of designating victims was not to incubate paranoid delusions of persecution and grievance among important subgroups of industrial society, or to subsidize the spread of counterproductive values. It was to relieve the bankrupt state of the fiscal pressures of redistributing income. Inculcating delusions of persecution was merely an unfortunate side effect. Ironically, the surge in concern about “discrimination” coincided with the early stages of a technological revolution that is bound to make actual arbitrary discrimination far less of a problem than it has ever been before. No one on the Internet knows or cares whether the author of a new software program is black, white, male, female, homosexual, or a vegetarian dwarf.

While the reality of discrimination is bound to be less oppressive in the future, that will not necessarily relieve the pressure for “reparations” to compensate various real or imagined wrongs. Every society, whatever its objective circumstances, gives rise to one or more rationalizations for income redistribution. They range from the subtle to the absurd, from the biblical injunction to love your neighbor as yourself, to the invocations of black magic. Sorcery, witchcraft, and the evil eye are the flip side of religious feeling, the spiritual equivalent of the Inland Revenue or the IRS. When people cannot be moved by love to subsidize the poor, the poor themselves will try to see that they are moved by fear. Sometimes this takes the form of an outright shakedown, a knife to the throat, a gun to the head. At other times, the threat is disguised or fanciful. It is no coincidence that most of the “witches” of the early modern period were widows or unmarried women with few resources. They terrorized their neighbors with curses that not infrequently moved those neighbors to pay up. It is by no means obvious that those who did so were only the superstitious. The malevolent intent of the evil eye was not a superstition but a fact. Even a poor woman could loose cattle or set someone’s house ablaze. In that sense, the witchcraft trials of the early modem period were not altogether so preposterous as they seem. While the punishments were cruel and no doubt many innocents suffered from the hallucinations of neighbors under the influence of ergot poisoning, the prosecution of witches can be understood as an indirect way of prosecuting extortion.

We expect a return of extortion motivated by a desire to share in the rewards of achievement as the Information Age unfolds. Groups that feel aggrieved over past discrimination are unlikely to quickly relinquish their apparently valuable status as victims simply because their claims on society become less justified or harder to enforce. They will continue to press their claims until evidence in the local environment leaves no doubt that they will no longer be rewarded.

The growth of sociopathic behavior among Afro-Americans and Afro-Canadians tells you that. It says that there is little balance between black anger and a realistic appraisal of the extent to which black problems are self-inflicted consequences of antisocial behavior. Black anger has risen, even as black lifestyles have grown more dysfunctional. Out-of-wedlock births have soared. Educational attainment has fallen. Growing percentages of young blacks are implicated in criminal activities, to the point where there are now more black men in penitentiaries than in colleges.

These perverse results may have had the temporary effect of increasing the flow of resources to underclass communities during the twilight of industrialism by raising the shakedown threat against society as a whole. But the effect could be only temporary. By eliminating the beneficial impact of competition in challenging underachievers to conform to productive norms, the welfare state has helped to create legions of dysfunctional, paranoid, and poorly acculturated people, the social equivalent of a powder keg. The death of the nation-state and the disappearance of income redistribution on a large scale will no doubt lead some among the more psychopathic of these unhappy souls to strike out against anyone who appears more prosperous than they. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that social peace will be in jeopardy as the Information Age unfolds, especially in North America and in multiethnic enclaves in Western Europe.

“We will never lay down Arms [till] The House of Commons passes an Act to put down all Machinery hurtful to Commonality, and repeal that to hang Frame Breakers. But We. We petition no more—that won’t do—fighting must. “Signed by the General of the Army of Redressers Ned Ludd Clerk “Redressers for ever, Amen”105

51新卢德分子Neo-Luddites

中文译本

鉴于 19 世纪初反技术暴乱的历史经验,以及欧洲和北美长期以来的集体暴力传统;接下来如果看到新卢德派对信息技术和使用该技术的人发起攻击,应该没有人会感到惊讶。前面提到的卢德派是集中活动在英国西约克郡的纺织工人,在 1811-12 年,他们发起了一场恐怖运动,针对自动裁切机及使用该机器的工厂主。卢德分子把脸抹成黑色,在西约克郡横行肆虐,焚烧工厂,杀害勇于利用新技术的工厂主。大部分的暴力事件都出自“裁缝”之手;在此之前,他们的工作是挥舞重达 50 磅的巨大剪刀,是毛布生产中的关键一环。但是裁缝的所有工作,就是用“起绒草使棉絮起绒,用剪子裁断布匹”;正如罗伯特·里德(Robert Reid)在《失落之地》(Land of Lost Content)——关于卢德运动始末最好、最全面的著作——一书中所言,“(这些工作)太简单了,不得不进行机械化。”这种机械化的裁切机,达芬奇就曾经勾画出了设计图;但是,他的构思却被搁置了几个世纪。最后直到 1787 年,有人重新发明了一种类似达芬奇的装置在英国投入生产。里德指出,“这项技术的所有组成部分都早已广为人知,但令人惊讶的是它竟然没有在更早的时候被引入。……工业革命带来的新设备,使用起来不需要什么力气和技术,于是很多岗位都被妇女和小孩抢走了,工资一开始都很低。其中一台新机器,即使由相对不熟练的工人操作,他在 18 个小时内完成的工作量,一个熟练的裁缝用手剪要干上 88 个小时。”需要注意到是,那些抨击机械化的工人在反对新技术方面是很有讲究的。他们只攻击那些取代自己工作岗位和降低对熟练劳动力需求的技术。有一位名叫威廉·库克的企业家,在西约克郡引进了地毯编织机,就没有引发任何暴力事件。

没有人企图烧毁库克的工厂,或砸烂他的机器,更没有人想要谋杀他。罗伯特·里德在他的“卢德分子骚乱史”中解释到,库克的新技术之所以没有激起任何反对情绪,因为地毯是一种“在那之前山谷中没有人专门生产的产品。”里德继续说道:“由于库克引入了一种新产品,它不基于任何传统的做法,并且创造了就业机会,所以他的工厂得以蓬勃发展。”这个例子对未来的发展极具启发意义。它指出来,在下一个千年,有头脑的企业家应该首先在欠缺生产任何产品或服务传统的地区开展削减劳动力的自动化经营。

以史为鉴,可想而知在新千年最初的几十年里,最暴力的恐怖分子不是无家可归的穷人,而是流离失所的工人,他们以前享受着中产阶级的收入和地位。1812年的卢德运动就是如此,其中大部分的卢德分子不是贫困的无产阶级,而是熟练的工匠,他们习惯了赚取比普通人高五倍甚至更多的收入。放到今天,他们的同类可能是被淘汰的工厂工人。然而不幸的是,在仔细查阅了大多数经合组织国家的人口统计数据后,我们发现有更多的地区可以被列为潜在的暴力发生地。

全世界的民族国家,将想方设法对抗网络经济和利用它积累财富的主权个人。愤怒的民族主义情绪将席卷全球;其中一部分是对新科技的反对,类似工业革命时期英国的卢德运动和其他反技术的动乱。对这个问题,我们应该慎之又慎,因为它可能是新千年治理方式演变的关键。在未来的剧变中,核心的一大挑战是任何在暴力升级的情况下维持秩序,或者说怎么逃避暴力的冲击。与信息时代息息相关的公司和个人,包括硅谷,甚至包括为新技术提供动力的电力供应商,都必须对自由职业者、新卢德派的恐怖主义保持特别的警惕。

不幸的是,随着人们对收入下降的失望和对成就者的不满与日俱增,像“独行炸弹客”这样的疯子可能会刺激很多人进行模仿。我们估计,未来的大部分暴力事件都会涉及到爆炸。正如《纽约时报》所报道的,美国国内的恐怖主义活动在20 世纪 90 年代急剧上升。“在过去的五年里它们增加了 50%以上;在过去的十年里,增加了几乎三倍。爆炸性犯罪活动与未遂事件,从 1985 年的 1,103 起上升到 1994 年的 3,163 起。在小城镇和郊区,以及在市中心的街头帮派中,普通人变身炸弹客的现象在不断蔓延。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Given past experience of antitechnological rebellion in the early nineteenth century and the long tradition of collective violence in both Europe and North America, no one should be surprised to see a neo-Luddite attack upon information technology and those who use it. The Luddites, referred to earlier, were cloth workers concentrated in West Yorkshire, England, who launched a terrorist campaign against automated cropping machines and the factory owners who adopted them in 1811-12.106 With blackened faces, the Luddites raged through West Yorkshire, burning factories and murdering factory owners who dared to adopt the new technology. Most of the violence was the work of “croppers,” highly skilled artisans whose labor in wielding gigantic scissors weighing up to fifty pounds was previously a crucial part of the production of woolen cloth. But the finishing work that the croppers performed, “raising the nap by teasels and cropping the cloth by shears,” was, as Robert Reid, author of the best and most comprehensive discussion of the Luddite rising, Land of Lost Content: The Luddite Revolt 1812, observed, “too simple not to be mechanized.”107 The design of one such mechanized cropping machine had been sketched out by Leonardo da Vinci. Yet Leonardo’s design for automatic cropping languished for centuries. Finally, by 1787, a device like Leonardo’s was reinvented and brought into production in England. As Reid notes, “so long had all the constituent parts of the technology been known that the surprise is that it had not been introduced earlier.… The new equipment of the Industrial Revolution required so little strength and skill to use that many job openings were taken by women and young children, initially at low wages. One of these new machines, even operated by the relatively unskilled, could now crop in eighteen hours what a skilled cropper using hand shears took eighty-eight hours to do.”108

Note that the workers who railed at mechanization were quite discriminating in their opposition to new technology. They only attacked and fought those technologies that displaced their own jobs or reduced the demand for skilled labor. When an entrepreneur named William Cooke introduced carpet-weaving machinery into the West Yorkshire district, this sparked no violence whatever. No attempts were made to burn Cooke’s mill, or destroy his machinery, much less murder him. As Robert Reid explains in his history of the Luddite uprisings, Cooke’s new technology excited no opposition because carpets were a product “in which no one in the valley had until then specialized.”109 Reid continues, “Because Cooke introduced a new product and created employment founded on no traditional practices whatever, his mill flourished.…”110 This is an example with important application for the future. It suggests that thinking entrepreneurs in the next millennium will first introduce dramatic labor-saving automation in regions without a tradition of producing whatever product or service is in question.

If the past is a guide, the most violent of the terrorists of the early decades of the new millennium will not be homeless paupers but displaced workers who formerly enjoyed middle-class incomes and status. This was certainly the case in the Luddite uprising of 1812, in which the bulk of the Luddites were not an impoverished proletariat but skilled artisans who were accustomed to earning incomes five times or more greater than those of an average worker. The equivalent group today would probably be displaced factory workers. Unfortunately, scanning the demographics of most OECD countries, one finds more areas than not that could be highlighted as potential sites of violent reaction.

The world’s nation-states will seek to counteract the cybereconomy and Sovereign Individuals who are able to take advantage of it to accumulate wealth. A furious nationalist reaction will sweep the world. Part and parcel of it will be an antitechonological reaction equivalent to the Luddite and other antitechnology rebellions in Britain during the Industrial Revolution. This should be considered closely, because it could be a key to the evolution of governance in the new millennium. One of the crucial challenges of the great transformation ahead will be maintaining order in the face of escalating violence, or alternatively escaping its brunt. Individuals and firms that are particularly associated with the advent of the Information Age, including those in Silicon Valley, and even the suppliers of electricity required to power the new technology, will have to maintain a special diligence against free-lance, neo-Luddite terrorism.

A lunatic like the Unabomber is unfortunately likely to stimulate brigades of imitators as frustration with falling incomes and resentment against achievement mount. We suspect much of the violence to come will involve bombings. As reported in the New York Times, domestic terrorism across the United States soared during the 1990s. “They increased by more than 50 percent in the last five years, and have nearly tripled over the last decade. The number of criminal explosions and attempts went from 1,103 in 1985 to 3,163 in 1994.…[I]n small towns and suburban neighborhoods, as well [as] among inner-city street gangs, there has been a proliferation of a sort of garden variety bomber.”111

52防卫将私有化Defense Becomes a Private Good

中文译本

尽管民族国家征收着惩罚性的税收,作为保护服务的代价,但在今后的日子里,它们不可能提供有效的保护。信息时代的新技术,意味着暴力规模的下降,这也使得大规模军事组织的作用大大降低。这不仅意味着它们在战争中的决定性会下降,还意味着国家切实保护公民的能力也会减弱;而且,美国作为世界超级大国的霸权,在下个世纪将不如英国在 19 世纪的霸权那么好使。因为在第一次世界大战之前,以相对较低的成本,就可以强有力地把权力从核心区域向周边推进。在 21 世纪,大国对生命和财产安全构成的威胁,必然会随着暴力回报的下降而减小。暴力回报率的下降预示着,有能力大规模使用军事力量的民族国家或帝国,不可能在信息时代生存或形成。

在未来,要获得充分的防御,对财务上的要求会下降,在这种情况下把保护服务看作是一种私人用品是很有道理的。毕竟,安全威胁的规模越来越小,也可以更多地由商业化的保安力量去解决,如通过围墙、栅栏和安全边界等方式,把麻烦制造者隔绝在外。此外,富有的个人或公司也可以聘请安保人员,来应对信息时代可能出现的大部分威胁。在边境地区,军事威胁规模的缩小可能增加无政府状态的危险,或者说在单一领土内出现暴力竞争的场面。但它也会促使各管辖区在竞争的基础上提供保护服务。这也意味着,各管辖区在保护、护照、领事及司法服务方面的竞争会更加激烈。

当然从长远来看,主权个人可能将会凭借非政府文件旅行,例如由私人机构或亲和团体签发的、类似信用证一样的证照。假设在网络空间出现一个团体,一个商业共和国,像中世纪的汉萨同盟那样组织起来,促进各管辖区之间私人条约与合同的谈判,并为其成员提供保护,这绝不是痴人说梦。想象一下未来会出现一种特殊的护照,由主权个人的联盟颁发,持有人受该联盟的保护。

不过,即使出现了这样的证件,它也只是摆脱民族国家及其豢养的官僚时代的临时产物。在近代以前,边境的界定都是很松散的,通过边境一般都不需要护照。虽然中世纪的边境有时候需要安全通行证,但它们通常是由被访问国的当局签发的,而不是旅行者的国籍国。那时候比护照更重要的是介绍信和信用证,它们有助于旅行者找到住所并进行商业谈判。这一天会再次到来。最终,有身份的人出去旅行将无需携带任何文件;他们可以通过声纹系统或视网膜扫描识别自己的身份,这是一种万无一失的生物识别。

简而言之,我们预计,在下个世纪的上半叶,人类世界将迎来真正的主权私有化。

伴随着一些可以预见的条件变化,强制性领域将被压缩到逻辑上的最低限度。不过,对于下一个千年的世俗裁判者和反动派来说,把曾经“神圣”的国籍身份放到市场之上作为一种通过成本效益核算的交易进行买卖,既令人愤怒又充满威胁。

在本书中,我们认为要打赢一场信息战争,不再需要一个民族国家,由计算机程序员部署大量的“机器人”或数字仆人就可以。比尔·盖茨已经具备比大多数民族国家更强的能力,可以引爆全球脆弱系统中的逻辑炸弹。在信息战争的时代,任何一家软件公司,甚至山达基教会,它们所能造成的威胁比在联合国拥有席位的大多数国家累积起来的还要大。

从逻辑上看,民族国家权力的丧失,是低成本、先进计算能力出现的必然结果。微处理技术既减少暴力的回报,并首次为政府在工业时期垄断的保护服务创造了一个竞争性的市场。

在主权商业化的新世界里,人们将可以选择他们的管辖区,就像现在选择保险公司或宗教一样。任何的管辖区如果不能提供适当的服务组合——不管服务的内容是什么,都将面临破产和清算,就像无能的企业或失败的宗教团体一样。因此,竞争会调动各地管辖区的积极性,使其更加经济高效地提供优质的服务。各管辖区在提供公共产品方面进行竞争,它所产生的影响和我们在生活中其他方面观察到的很类似。通常而言,竞争都会提高顾客的满意度。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Notwithstanding the penal taxes imposed by nation-states as a price of protection, they are unlikely to provide it effectively in the years to come. The falling scale of violence implied by the new information technology makes the provision of a massive military establishment far less useful. This implies not only a declining decisiveness in warfare, meaning that states will be less able to actually protect citizens, it also implies that the apparent extraterritorial hegemony of the United States as the world’s superpower will be less effective in the next century than the hegemony of Great Britain was in the nineteenth century. Until the onset of World War I, power could be effectively and decisively projected from the core to the periphery at relatively low cost. In the twenty-first century, the threats that major powers pose to the safety of life and property will necessarily diminish with the return to violence. Falling returns to violence suggest that nation-states or empires capable of exercising military power on a large scale are unlikely to survive or come into being in the Information Age.

As the fiscal requirement for provision of an adequate defense falls, it will become ever more credible to treat protection services as if they were private goods. After all, security threats on a diminished scale will be increasingly defensible by security forces of the kind that can be engaged commercially, such as by employing walls, fences, and security perimeters to screen out troublemakers. Further, a wealthy individual or firm may be able to afford to hire protection against most threats that would be likely to arise in the Information Age. At the margin, the diminished scale of military threats will increase the danger of anarchy, or competitive violence within a single territory. But it will also intensify competition among jurisdictions in the provision of protection on competitive terms. This will mean intensified shopping among jurisdictions for protection services, passport and consular services, and the provision of justice.

In the long run, of course, Sovereign Individuals will probably be able to travel on nongovernmental documents, issued like letters of credit by private agencies and affinity groups. It is not farfetched to suppose that a group will emerge as a kind of merchant republic of cyberspace, organized like the medieval Hanseatic League, to facilitate negotiation of private treaties and contracts among jurisdictions as well as to provide protection for its members. Imagine a special passport issued by the League of Sovereign Individuals, identifying the holder as a person under the protection of the league.

Such a document, if it comes into existence, will be only a temporary artifact of the transition away from the nation-state and the bureaucratic age it fostered. Before the modern period, passports were generally unnecessary to pass frontiers, which were loosely defined in most cases. While letters of safe conduct were sometimes employed in medieval frontier societies, they were normally issued by the authorities whose realm was to be visited, rather than the jurisdiction from which the traveler originated. More important than a passport were letters of introduction and credit, which allowed a traveler to find lodging and negotiate business. That day will come again. Ultimately, persons of substance will be able to travel without documents at all. They will be able to identify themselves on a foolproof biometric basis through voice-recognition systems or retinal scanning that recognizes them uniquely.

In short, we expect that sometime in the first half of the next century the world will experience the genuine privatization of sovereignty. This will accompany conditions that could be expected to shrivel the realm of compulsion to its logical minimum. Yet to the secular inquisitors and reactionaries of the next millennium, the placing of the once “sacred” attributes of nationality onto a market footing to be bought and sold as a matter of cost-benefit calculation will be both infuriating and threatening.

We argue in this book that it will no longer take a nation-state to fight an Information War. Such wars could be undertaken by computer programmers deploying large numbers of “bots” or digital servants. Bill Gates already possesses a greater capacity to detonate logic bombs in vulnerable systems globally than most of the world’s nation-states. In the age of the Information War, any software company, or even the Church of Scientology, would be a more formidable antagonist than the accumulated threat posed by the majority of the states with seats in the United Nations.

This loss of power by nation-states is a logical consequence of the advent of low-cost, advanced computational capacity. Microprocessing both reduces returns to violence and creates for the first time a competitive market for the protection services for which governments charged monopoly prices in the industrial period.

In the new world of commercialized sovereignty, people will choose their jurisdictions, much as many now choose their insurance carriers or their religions.V Jurisdictions that fail to provide a suitable mix of services, whatever those may be, will face bankruptcy and liquidation, just as incompetent commercial enterprises or failed religious congregations do. Competition will therefore mobilize the efforts of local jurisdictions to improve their capacity to provide services economically and effectively. In this respect, competition between jurisdictions in providing public goods will have a similar impact to that observed in other sectors of life. Competition usually improves customer satisfaction.

53竞争与无政府状态COMPETITION AND ANARCHY

中文译本

需要牢记的一点是,我们所预期的管辖区之间的竞争,不是发生在同一地区内暴力组织之间的竞争。如前所述,暴力组织之间的竞争往往会使暴力在生活中无处不在,从而破坏了经济发展的机会。正如莱恩所指出的:当与敌对的暴力集团相竞争或在领土内建立垄断时,暴力的运用显然具有很强的规模优势。

一个从经济层面对政府进行分析的基本事实是:使用暴力、控制暴力的行业是一种天然垄断,至少在土地方面是这样。在一个管辖区的领土范围内所提供的服务,垄断者都可以用更廉价的方式生产出来。可以肯定的是,在某些历史时期在同一块领土上,会有不同的暴力组织竞相要求人们支付保护费,例如三十年战争时期22的德国。但这一状况,比同一地区内电话系统间的竞争更加不经济。莱恩的评论在两个方面具有参考价值。首先,我们同意他的一般性结论,即主权国家倾向于在领土内实行垄断,因为这可以使它们提供更便宜、更有效的保护服务。第二个有意思的方面是,莱恩用过时的电话服务的垄断进行了比较。当然现在我们都知道,电话系统不一定是垄断的。这就给我们的分析提供了一个警示。

人们普遍认为,在具体的领土范围之内无政府状态是行不通的;但技术条件的变化,可能会在某种程度上,使这个一般性的结论变得过时。比如说,在一个不受强制的领域内,当网络资产发展到很大的规模,那么保护服务的定价就更少是一个“需求”问题,而更多是一个市场谈判问题。

不过,我们在此所指的与一般的无政府状态不同;我们指的是各管辖区之间互相竞争,而每个管辖区在自己的领土内则垄断着暴力。我们认为,这些管辖区会以符合成本效益分析的方式,尽可能提供最大价值的保护服务,以吸引其“客户”。

另外,毫无疑问的是,在信息时代保护服务的供应情况会更加模糊,私营的治安和防卫服务会比我们在过去所看到的要完备得多。而且,我们所设想的竞争,与多家保护机构在同一地域内争夺不同客户所导致的冲突不同,后者是真正的无政府状态。

尽管如此,随着主权数量的增加,以及个人在积累了足够多的资源之后,承担更多主权者的职能,这必然意味着世界上无政府状态的范围会扩大。主权国家彼此之间一直处于无政府状态;也从来没有一个世界性的政府,来规范各个主权国家的行为,无论是部落国家、民族国家还是帝国。就像杰克·赫舒拉发所写的那样,“从原始部落到现代民族国家,所有的关系在内部都由某种形式的法律来管理;而它们之间的外部关系,则基本上还是无政府状态。”当世界上的主权实体越来越多,不可避免会有更多的关系涉及到不止一个管辖区,无政府状态必然会增强。

需要注意的是,无政府状态或缺乏压倒性的权力进行争端仲裁,并不等同于完全混乱,或无规则、无组织。赫舒拉发指出无政府状态是可以分解的,“部落间或国家间的系统,也有其可分析的规律性和系统性模式。”换句话说,就像数学中的“混沌”,其实包含着复杂而高度有序的组织形式;同样,无政府状态也不是完全无序或结构不清。

赫舒拉发分析了一系列无政府状态的现象。除了主权国家之间的关系外,还包括禁酒时代的芝加哥帮派斗争,以及“加州淘金热中矿工与强占者23之间的对抗。”请注意,在 1849 年淘金热爆发时加州已经是美国的一部分,但金矿区的状态还是被恰当地描述为了无政府状态。赫舒拉发指出,(因为)“官方的法律机构无能为力。”他认为,尽管缺乏有效的执法保护,但山区营地的地形条件,加上矿工为打击强占者而进行的紧密组织,使得外来者很难夺取金矿。换句话说,在一定的条件下,即使处于无政府状态,有价值的财产也能得到有效保护。

问题是,赫舒拉发基于达尔文“自然经济”理论对自发秩序的动态分析,对信息时代的经济发展是否有指导意义。我们觉得是有的。虽然我们并不认为会出现普遍的无政府状态,也不会到处都是金矿区那样的环境条件,但我们预计在整个世界体系中无政府关系的数量会增加。基于这种预期,赫舒拉发的论点是有启发意义的;他认为,在一定条件下“两个或多个处于无政府状态的竞争者”,可以“在平衡的状态下,从社会可用资源中分获供各自生存的份额。”他还特别探讨了,无政府状态在什么时候容易“崩溃”,沦落为暴政或等级统治;当无政府主义的各方被一个压倒性的权威所征服时,就会发生这种情况。

在信息时代弄清楚这些问题,比在工业时代更加重要。对无政府状态进行更细微的区分,在近几个世纪也不如在新千年中那么重要。部分原因在于,现代时期的暴力回报率是不断上升的。这意味着,集结越来越多的军事力量——像民族国家在过去几个世纪所做的那样,往往会赢得决定性的战争。根据定义,决定性战争就是将资源控制权的多方竞争者,归置到一个更强大权力机构的统治之下,从而制伏了无政府状态。另一方面,与军事技术中防御优势的下降相对应,战斗的决定性作用也在下降,这有助于无政府状态保持动态的平衡。因此,信息技术的强大冲击,会使军事行动的决定性作用降低,从而使小国之间的无政府状态更加稳定,不容易被大国所征服所取代。战争的决定性的降低,也意味着战争将会减少;对信息时代的世界来说,这是一个令人鼓舞的推论。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

It is important to bear in mind that the competition between, jurisdictions that we anticipate is not mainly competition among organizations employing violence in the same territory. As indicated earlier, competitive organizations using violence tend to increase the penetration of violence in life, reducing economic opportunity. As Lane put it,

In the use of violence there were obviously great advantages of scale when competing with rival violence-using enterprises or establishing a territorial monopoly. This fact is basic for the economic analysis of one aspect of government: the violence-using, violence-controlling industry was a natural monopoly, at least on land. Within territorial limits the service it rendered could be produced much more cheaply by a monopoly. To be sure, there have been times when violence-using enterprises competed in demanding payments for protection in almost the same territory, for example, during the Thirty Years’ War in Germany. But such a situation was even more uneconomic than would be competition in the same territories between rival telephone systems.112

Lane’s comment is informative in two respects. Firstly, we agree with his general conclusion that sovereignties will tend to exercise territorial monopolies because doing so will allow them to offer cheaper and more effective protection services. The second interesting aspect of Lane’s comment is his dated comparison with monopoly telephone service. Obviously, we now know that telephone systems need not be monopolies. This introduces a caution into the analysis. Changes in technological conditions may to some extent obviate the general conclusion that anarchy within territorial limits is nonviable. For example, if cyberassets grow to large scale in a realm that puts them outside the reach of compulsion, the pricing of protection services may be much less a matter of “demand” and more a matter of market negotiation.

Nonetheless, what we refer to here is something different from generalized anarchy—namely, competition among jurisdictions, each enjoying a monopoly of violence in its own territory. We see such jurisdictions competing to offer the greatest value possible in the cost-effective provision of protection services that appeal to their “customers.” Admittedly, there will no doubt be greater ambiguities in the provision of protection services in the Information Age, with more complete private provision of policing and defense services than we have been accustomed to seeing before. Yet the competition we envision is different from a clash of multiple protection agencies battling on a large scale to provide service to different customers in the same territory, which is anarchy.

Be that as it may, the multiplication of sovereignties, with individuals assuming more of the role of sovereigns in cases when they accumulate sufficient resources, inevitably implies that there will be an increase in the scope for anarchy in the world. The relations between sovereignties are always anarchic. There is not and never has been a world government regulating the behavior of individual sovereignties, whether ministates, nation-states, or empires. As Jack Hirshleifer writes, “[W]hile associations ranging from primitive tribes to modern nation-states are all governed internally by some form of law, their external relations with one another remain mainly anarchic.”113 When there are more sovereign entities in the world, inevitably more relations transpire in more than one jurisdiction and are therefore anarchic.

It is important to note that anarchy, or the lack of an overwhelming power to arbitrate disputes, is not synonymous with total chaos or the absence of form or organization. Hirshleifer notes that anarchy can be analyzed: “intertribal or international systems also have their regularities and systematic analyzable patterns.”114 In other words, just as “chaos” in mathematics can entail an intricate and highly ordered form of organization, so “anarchy” is not entirely formless or disordered.

Hirshleifer analyzes a number of anarchic settings. These include, in addition to relations among sovereignties, gang warfare in Prohibition-era Chicago and “miners versus claim jumpers in the California gold rush.” Note that even though California was part of the United States by the onset of the gold rush in 1849, conditions in the goldfields were properly described as anarchy. As Hirshleifer notes, “[T]he official organs of law were impotent.”115 He argues that topographical conditions in the mountainous camps, plus effective vigilante organization by miners to combat claim jumpers, made it difficult for gangs of outsiders to seize gold mines, in spite of the lack of effective law enforcement. In other words, under certain conditions, valuable property can be effectively protected even under anarchy.

The question is whether Hirshleifer’s theoretical analysis of the dynamics of the spontaneous order of the Darwinian “natural economy” is of any relevance to the economy of the Information Age. We suspect it is. While we do not anticipate generalized anarchy, or goldfield conditions everywhere, we do anticipate an increase in the number of anarchic relations in the world system. In light of this expectation, Hirshleifer’s argument about conditions under which “two or more anarchic contestants” can “retain viable shares of the socially available resources in equilibrium” is suggestive.116 In particular, he explores when anarchy is prone to “break down” into tyranny or dominance hierarchies, which happens when the anarchic parties can be subdued by an overwhelming authority.

These issues may be more important to understand in the Information Age than they were in the Industrial Age. Part of the reason that the finer distinctions about the dynamics of anarchy were less crucial in recent centuries than they may be in the new millennium is precisely because the returns to violence were rising through the modern period. This meant that massing larger and larger military forces, as nation-states did in recent centuries, tended to make for decisive warfare. Decisive warfare, almost by definition, subdues anarchy by placing contestants for the control of resources under the domination of a more powerful authority. On the other hand, declining decisiveness in battle, which corresponds to the superiority of the defense in military technology, contributes to the dynamic stability of anarchy. Therefore, the apparent impact of information technology in reducing the decisiveness of military action should make the anarchy between minisovereignties more stable and less prone to be replaced through conquest by a large government. Less decisiveness in battle also implies less fighting, which is an encouraging deduction for the world in the Information Age.

54可行性Viability

中文译本

无政府状态得以维持的另外一个重要条件,是生存能力,或者说有充足的收入。

缺乏足够收入以维持生活的个人,有可能会(1)为了夺取生活资源而投入主要的精力去斗争,或(2)向另外一个竞争者屈服,以换取食物和生存所需。在 1000 年时的革命过程中,封建主义的兴起就引发了类似的情况。我们估计,在西方国家中,以前依赖于国家转移支付的低收入者未来会越来越多地以侍从的身份附属于有钱人。尽管如此,在霍布斯式的混战(或所有人对所有的战争)中,部分竞争者无法生存的单一事实并不能说明什么。就像赫舒拉发所言:“在无政府的状态下,仅仅是低收入的事实,……本身并不能表明接下来会发生什么。”

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Another important condition for anarchy to be sustained is viability or income adequacy. Individuals who lack a sufficient income to sustain life are likely either to (1) devote a great deal of effort to fighting in order to seize enough resources to survive, or (2) capitulate to another contestant in exchange for food and sustenance. Something similar to this occured with the rise of feudalism during the transformation of the year 1000. We expect increasing numbers of low-income persons in Western countries who previously would have depended upon transfer payments from the state to affiliate with wealthy households as retainers. Nonetheless, the mere fact of inviability by some contenders in a Hobbesian melee (or war of all against all) is inconclusive. As Hirshleifer says, “[T]he mere fact of low income under anarchy,… of itself provides no clear indication as to what is likely to happen next.”117

55资产的特性The Character of Assets

中文译本

无政府状态可持续的另外一个有趣的条件是,资源的“可预测性和可防御性”。

在赫舒拉发的分析中,“无政府状态是一种社会制度安排,竞争者在其中为了控制和捍卫耐用资源(durable resource)而斗争。”他定义的耐用资源包括“土地和可移动的资本财物”。在信息时代,数字资源可能被认为是可预测的,但它们不属于赫舒拉发所认定的“领土性”或无政府状态下的“耐用资源”。事实上,如果数字货币能以光速在地球上的任何地方转移,那么征服网络银行所在的领土就是浪费时间。想要压制主权个人的民族国家,必须同时夺取世界上所有的银行避风港和数据避风港。即便如此,只要加密货币设计得当,民族国家也只能破坏或摧毁某些数字货币,而无法夺取它们。

所以,可以得出一个结论,在即将到来的信息时代,对于富人而言最可预测的也最脆弱的资产,可能是他们的肉身,也就是他们的生命。这也是为什么我们会担心,在未来几十年会发生卢德式的恐怖主义活动;其中一些活动,可能还会受到民族国家雇佣的煽动者的暗中怂恿。

不过,从长远来看,我们不认为主要的民族国家能够成功压制主权个人。首先,现有的国家,特别是资本匮乏的国家会发现,相比保持与北大西洋民族国家的团结,以及维护“国际”体系的神圣性,为主权个人提供庇护会得到更多的好处。破产的、高税负的福利国家,想把“它们的公民”和“它们的财产”留在“它们的国家”内,这个动机和理由,对其他数百个分散的主权来说,并不足以令人信服和遵从。

我们要说,尽管世界上有数以千计的多国组织,旨在制约各个主权国家的行为;而且毫无疑问,其中一些组织是很有影响力的,比如欧盟和世界银行。但请记住,那些欢迎主权个人的国家,会从他们的加入中获得巨大的利益。即使像美国这样顽固的24强国,在当前的趋势下,也必须大力防止出现不受政府控制的网络经济;而且说到底,它也不希望把全世界那些在银行有存款、但不想成为美国人的居民排斥在国门外。这一点尤其关键,因为购物是现在旅行者的主要兴致所在。所以,最终,虽然会晚于其他国家,但迫于竞争压力,美国或其部分地区将加入到主权商业化的行列。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Still another interesting condition for the sustainability of anarchy is that resources be “predictable and defendable.” In Hirshleifer’s analysis, “[A]narchy is a social arrangement in which contenders struggle to conquer and defend durable resources.”118 He defines “durable resources” to include “land territories or movable capital goods.”119 In the Information Age, digital resources may prove to be predictable, but they will not be “durable resources” of the kind that Hirshleifer identifies with territoriality and anarchy. Indeed, if digital money can be transferred anywhere on the planet at the speed of light, conquest of the territory in which a cyberbank is incorporated may be a waste of time. Nation-states wishing to suppress Sovereign Individuals would have to seize simultaneously both the world’s banking havens and its data havens. Even then, if encrypted systems are designed properly, nation-states would merely be able to sabotage or destroy certain sums of digital money, not seize it.

The conclusion is that the most predictable and vulnerable assets of the rich in the coming Information Age may be their physical persons—in other words, their lives. Which is why we fear Luddite-style terrorism in the coming decades, some of it perhaps covertly encouraged by agents provocateurs in the employ of nation-states.

Over the long term, however, we doubt that the leading nation-states will succeed in suppressing Sovereign Individuals. For one tiling, existing states, especially in capital-poor regions, will find that they have more to gain by harboring Sovereign Individuals than by maintaining solidarity with the North Atlantic nation-states and upholding the sanctity of the “international” system. The fact that bankrupt, high-tax welfare states want to keep “their citizens” and “their capital” in “their country” will not be a compelling motive to be observed by hundreds of fragmenting sovereignties elsewhere.

We say this, notwithstanding the fact that there are thousands of multinational organizations designed to condition the behavior of the world’s various sovereignties. There can be little doubt that some of these organizations, like the European Union and the World Bank, are influential. But remember that the jurisdictions that make Sovereign Individuals welcome stand to benefit significantly from their presence. Even a pigheaded power like the United States, which is bound by current trends to work vigorously to prevent the emergence of a cybereconomy outside the control of the U.S. government, will ultimately not wish to exclude those residents of the globe with positive bank balances who do not wish to be Americans. This is especially likely inasmuch as shopping is now a major fascination of travelers. Ultimately, although well after others, the United States, or fragments thereof, will join in the commercialization of sovereignty because of competitive pressures.

56有需求就有供应Demand Creates Supply

中文译本

资产负债表最薄弱的民族国家,会更早更强烈地感受到这些压力。未来的“离岸”中心,将是当前民族国家中分裂的地区和飞地;如加拿大和意大利,几乎肯定会在 21 世纪的 1/4 世纪结束前解体。一个全球性市场的诞生,有助于高质量、高成本效益的管辖区的形成。和普通商业中一样,小规模的参与者更加灵活,更有能力进行竞争。所以人口稀少的管辖区,更容易打造自己的制度结构,实现高效运作。

信息精英们将通过签订合同的方式,以合理的价格寻求高质量的保护。虽然这笔费用远不足使民族国家的全体人口重新分配到明显的利益,因为它们往往有几千万到几亿人之多;但在一个人口只有几万或几十万的管辖区,这笔费用绝非微不足道。少数巨富者所带来的税收和其他经济优势,对一个人口更少而不是更多的管辖区而言,人均的获益要高得多。

在信息时代,一个人的企业在哪里注册已经不重要了,除了一些纯粹的消极意义,如某些地址意味着更多的义务;小的管辖区会发现,它们更容易打造出能获得商业成功的保护服务。所以,人口较少的管辖区,在制定对主权个人具有吸引力的财政政策方面,享有决定性的优势。

我们相信,民族国家的时代已经结束了;但这并不等于说民族主义作为一种人类的情感牵系,它的魔力会立即平息。作为一种意识形态,民族主义深深地植入了人类普遍的情感需求之中。我们都有过敬畏的经历,如第一次看到巨大的瀑布,或第一次站在大教堂的入口。我们也都有过归属感的体验,比如在家庭圣诞聚会上,或者作为某项运动中胜利团队的一员。对这两种强大的情感,人类势必要在文化上做出回应。我们被自己国家的历史文化所照亮,而它又是更大的人类文化中的一部分。因为知道自己归属于某个文化群体,我们会倍感欣慰,它使我们获得了参与感和认同感。

这些文化符号的影响,可以激发最强烈的情感效应。美国人对国旗、国歌或感恩节的联想,英国人对君主制或板球的联想,都分别会对美国人和英国人的想象力产生真实的影响,并通过重复而不断加强,然后深入到潜意识之中。这些符号会告诉我们,我们是什么样的人,并提醒我们有着什么样的民族文化。当反越战的示威者想要撼动其他美国人时,他们点燃了美国的国旗。被社会疏离的英国人为了攻击君主制,甚至会在板球场上挖洞。

这些情绪的触发点是肤浅的,但并非无足轻重。它们的背后,是我们被教导要为之流血牺牲的东西。无论大政治条件如何变化,或由此导致的体制如何变革,在那些和我们一样在 20 世纪长大的人的想象中,它们依然占据着重要的一席之地。

译注:此处原注引 IBM 相关资料。

香港比英国税率低。

相对于现在的小星球。

可称之为信息贵族。

可称之为信息贫民。

《金银岛》、《化身博士》的作者。

指推倒柏林墙。

即被砍头的罗伯斯庇尔。

罗曼诺夫家族的另一种宫廷语 言是法语。

当时的美国总统。

Otis Redding,美国灵魂乐歌手

Tina Turner,摇滚女王

译注:此处的 patriot 更接近“捍卫乡土共同体者”,并非现代民族国家语境中的“爱国者”。

译注:约翰·古腾堡(Johannes Gutenberg)是西方活字印刷术的关键推动者。

音译

In-group,或叫内群体。

译注:克里斯托弗·拉什(Christopher Lasch)是美国历史学家与社会批评家,著有《自恋主义文化》等书。

译注:此书原名为《The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy》。

即面临竞争。

译注:久加诺夫(Gennady Zyuganov)是俄罗斯共产党主要领导人之一。

即难民。

译注:三十年战争(1618—1648)是欧洲近代早期的重要大战,深刻改变了德意志地区的政治格局。

Claim Jumper,强占他人土地的人。

Pigheaded,顽固刚愎的。

ENGLISH ORIGINAL

Those pressures will be felt more vigorously early on in nation-states with the weakest balance sheets. Among the new “offshore” centers will be fragments and enclaves of current nation-states, like Canada and Italy, which will almost surely disintegrate well before the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The birth of a global market for high-quality, cost-efficient jurisdictions will help bring such jurisdictions into being. As in ordinary commerce, small-scale competitors will be more nimble and better able to compete. The thinly populated jurisdiction can more easily structure itself to operate efficiently.

The information elite will seek high-quality protection on contract for a reasonable fee. While this fee will fall well short of what would be required to redistribute a noticeable benefit to the whole populations of nation-states as they are now structured, with tens of millions to hundreds of millions of citizens, it would not be trivial in a jurisdiction with a population in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands. The tax payments and other economic advantages accruing from the presence of a small number of exceedingly rich individuals imply a far higher per capita benefit to a jurisdiction with a small rather than a huge population.

Since it will be practically immaterial where one domiciles his businesses, except in the purely negative sense that some addresses will imply higher liabilities than others, small jurisdictions will find it easier to set commercially successful terms for protection. Therefore, jurisdictions with small populations will enjoy a decided advantage in formulating a fiscal policy attractive to Sovereign Individuals.

We believe that the age of the nation-state is over, but this is not to say that the attraction of nationalism as a tug on human emotions will be immediately quieted. As an ideology, nationalism is well placed to draw upon universal emotional needs. We have all had the experience of awe, such as one might feel on first seeing a giant waterfall, or first standing at the entrance to a great cathedral. We have all had the experience of belonging, such as we might feel at a family Christmas party, or as a member of a successful team in some sport. Human culture calls for a response to both of these powerful emotions. We are illuminated by the historic culture of our own country, which is itself part of the larger culture of humanity. We are comforted by the knowledge that we belong to a cultural group, which gives us both a sense of participation and of identity.

The impact of these cultural symbols can have the strongest emotional effect. The American associations of the Flag, the National Anthem, or the family feast at Thanksgiving Day, the English associations of the monarchy or cricket—all have a real hold on the imaginations of American and English people, respectively, a hold that is reinforced by repetition and goes deep into the subconscious mind. Such symbols help to tell us what sort of people we are, and remind us of a national culture. When anti—Vietnam War demonstrators wanted to shock the rest of the United States, they burned the flag. Alienated English attack the monarchy, and have even been known to dig holes in cricket pitches.

These trigger points are superficial, but not unimportant. They are the associations we were taught to bleed for. Whatever the change in megapolitical conditions or resulting change in institutions, they will probably remain important in the imaginations of persons who came of age, as we did, in the twentieth century.

I. The close relation between skills and values and, therefore, economic success is detailed by Lawrence E. Harrison in Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

II. For contemporary evidence of this, see Bruce Bawer, “Who’s on Trial, the Heretic or the Church?” New York Times Magazine, April 7, 1996, p. 36f.

III. Cuba only imposed an income tax in 1996 as an emergency measure in response to economic depression following the end of subsidies occasioned by the collapse of Communism in Europe.

IV. The same logic, of course, applies to the son or daughter who sacrifices for those whom he takes to be his siblings but are not.

V. See Stephen J. Dubner, “Choosing My Religion,” New York Times Magazine, March 31, 1996, p. 36f.