BILINGUAL READING · 第10章
大众民主的黄昏
CHAPTER 10 THE TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY
桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。
导读 本章论证
- 原书认为大众民主建立在地域选区和工业时代动员逻辑之上。
- 当个人能够迁移并选择服务时,政府可能转向“竞争性领土俱乐部”。
- 该预测带有鲜明的市场自由主义立场,需要与民主的问责、公共品和权利保障功能一起评估。
- “进入、退出与发声”构成本章的制度比较框架:原书偏好以迁移和重新签约表达选择,低估了退出成本、信息不对称和弱势群体缺乏迁移能力的问题。
- 租赁主权、特许自由区和专有管理被视为竞争性治理原型,但其现实合法性、问责与权利保障必须逐案核验。
01开篇Opening
民主理论是当今民族国家进行道德说教的世界语,是把所有国家真正联合起来的语言,是现代世界里公开的伪善辞令,但它其实是一种价值可疑的货币——只有十足的蠢货才会完全相信它的表面价值,这么说一点也没有夸张。 —— 约翰·邓恩(John Dunn)
众所周知,在政府的历史上,民主是一段相对罕见且短暂的时期。古今中外,凡是民主制占上风的时代,它的成功都仰赖于那些加强了军事力量和群众重要性的大政治条件。在《武器系统与政治稳定性》(Weapons Systems and Political Stability)一书中,历史学家卡罗尔·奎格利(Carroll Quigley)探讨了这些条件,它们包括:
廉价且广泛分散的武器装备。当购买有用武器的成本较低时,民主制度往往会蓬勃发展。
武器可以被业余人士有效地使用。当任何人不需要长时间的训练就可以正确地使用武器时,民主制生存的可能会更大。
步兵在作战中占据着数量上的军事优势。奎格利指出,“步兵占优势的时期,政治权力在社会中更加分散,民主制度更有机会胜出。”
这几点很难说是对民主生存条件的全面指南。如果按照这些条件,民主就不会在 20 世纪末成为一种优胜的制度。在工业时代的末期,武器可以说比以往任何时候都昂贵。而且很多最高效的武器,绝对需要专业人士才能有效地使用。此外美国及其盟友与伊拉克之间的海湾战争已经证明了大型的步兵队伍是多么的脆弱,即使是窝在战壕和挖好的防御工事里。那么,在这些条件下为什么在20 世纪行将结束的时候,民主制看上去依然很繁荣呢?
“Democratic theory is the moral Esperanto of the present nation-state system, the language in which all Nations are truly United, the public cant of the modern world, a dubious currency indeed—and one which only a complete imbecile would be likely to take quite at its face value, quite literally.”1 —JOHN DUNN
It is no secret that democracy has been relatively rare and, fleeting in the history of governments. In those times, ancient and modem, where democracy has prevailed, it has depended for its success upon megapolitical conditions that reinforced the military power and importance of the masses. Historian Carroll Quigley explored these characteristics in Weapons Systems and Political Stability.2 They have included:
1. Cheap and widely dispersed weaponry. Democracy tends to flourish when the cost to purchase useful weapons is low.
2. Weapons that can be used effectively by amateurs. Democracy is more likely when anyone can use effective weapons without extended training.
3. A military advantage for a large number of participants on foot in battle. As Quigley points out, “[P]eriods of infantry dominance have been periods in which political power has been more widely dispersed within the community and democracy has had a better chance to prevail.”3
This is hardly a comprehensive catalogue of the conditions under which democracy can exist. If it were, democracy would not have become a triumpliant system at the end of the twentieth century. Weapons were arguably more expensive in the twilight of the industrial era than ever. And many of the most effective weapons definitely required specialists to be used effectively. Furthermore, the Gulf War between the United States, its allies, and Iraq proved how vulnerable large contingents of infantry are, even when nestled in trenches and dug-in fortifications. So why has democracy appeared to flourish under these conditions as the twentieth century winds down?
02民主制,共产主义的孪生兄弟?DEMOCRACY, THE FRATERNAL TWIN OF COMMUNISM?
在第五章中,我们提出了一个充满悖论的解释,即民主制度是共产主义的孪生兄弟,它的繁荣昌盛是因为它有利于国家横行无阻地控制社会资源。从工业时代的“常识”来看,这个结论可能很愚蠢。我们并不否认,在工业社会的条件下民主制与共产主义是截然对立的。但从大政治的角度,特别是从信息时代的有利位置来看,这两种制度的共同点比你所能猜测的还要多。
在武器装备极其昂贵的情况下,民主成为了国家最大限度控制资源的决策机制。与国家社会主义一样,民主制度提供了巨额的资金,可以资助庞大的军事机构。但与国家社会主义不同的是,民主福利国家掌握了更多的资源。这就可以说明一些问题,因为国家社会主义或共产主义制度,几乎把控了一切有价值的资产。
冷静地看,民主之所以比国家社会主义制度更优越,因为它是国家富裕的秘诀。
我们在前面解释过,民主可以为军队提供更多的资金,因为民主与私有制和资本主义的生产力相适应。国家社会主义的理论前提是国家拥有一切。相比之下,民主福利国家在一开始不会提太多的要求。它们假装允许私有制——尽管是一种不确定的私有制,从而利用优越的激励机制来提高产出。西方的民主政府不是一开始就横加干涉,而是允许个人拥有财产,积累财富。只有在财富被创造出来之后,民主民族国家才会出面征税,拿走其中的一大部分。
这个“大”字要大写。例如在 1996 年,美国最高等级的联邦终身税率,相当于每赚 1 美元就要缴出 73 美分。对于通过分红获得收入的公司股东来说,税率相当于每美元缴出 83 美分。而对于任何想把财产留给孙子女的人来说,联邦税率则相当于每美元缴出 93 美分。如果把各州和地方税也算进去,各级民主政府没收了在美国赚到的每一美元中的绝大部分。占到所有收入 3/4 甚至 9/10 的掠夺性税率,使得民主国家和社会主义国家成为了事实上的同伙。当然,这两种制度不是一回事,但关系非常密切。
民主国家之所以存活得更久,因为它更加灵活,而且相比莫斯科或东柏林,它能征收到的资源量更加惊人。
We offered a paradoxical explanation in Chapter 5, namely that democracy flourished as a fraternal twin of Communism precisely because it facilitated unimpeded control of resources by the state. This conclusion may seem silly to the Manchichaean “common sense” of the industrial era. We do not deny that within the terms of industrial society, democratic systems and Communism were stark opposites. But seen from a megapolitical perspective, as they may more likely be seen from the vantage of the Information Age, the two systems had more in common than, you would have been led to suspect.
In a setting where weaponry was grotesquely expensive, democracy became the decision mechanism that maximized control of resources by the state. Like state socialism, democratic systems made available huge sums to fund a massive military establishment. The difference was that the democratic welfare state placed even greater resources in the hands of the state than could the state socialist systems. That is saying something, because the state socialist or Communist systems laid claim to practically every asset worth having.
Seen dispassionately, democracy was superior to state socialism as a recipe for enriching the state. As we explained earlier, democracy made substantially more money available to the military because democracy was compatible with private ownership and capitalist productivity.
The state socialist system was predicated upon the doctrine that the state owned everything. The democratic welfare state, by contrast, made more limited initial claims. It pretended to allow private ownership, although of a contingent kind, and thereby harnessed superior incentives to mobilize output. Instead of mismanaging everything from the start, democratic governments in the West allowed individuals to own property and accumulate wealth. Only after the wealth had been created did the democratic nation-states step in to tax a large fraction of it away.
The word “Large” should be capitalized. For example, in 1996 the lifetime federal tax rate at the highest brackets in the United States stood at seventy-three cents on the dollar. For owners of corporations, who received their income through dividends, the rate was eighty-three cents on the dollar. And for anyone who sought to leave or give wealth to grandchildren, the federal tax rate was ninety-three cents on the dollar. When state and local taxes are considered as well, democratic government at all levels confiscates the lion’s share of each dollar earned in the United States. Predatory tax rates made the democratic state a de facto partner with a three-quarters to nine-tenths share in earnings. This was not the same thing as state socialism, to be sure. But it was a close relation.
The democratic state survived longer because it was more flexible and collected more prodigious quantities of resources compared to those available in Moscow or East Berlin.
03效率低下,反而更成功“Inefficiency, Where It Counted”
民主作为强大政府的决策机制,它的大政治优势曾被我们称之为“效率低下的优势”。与共产主义相比,福利国家的系统效率确实要高得多。但与殖民地时期的香港——一块真正自由放任的飞地——相比,福利国家的效率就差多了。香港的增长速度非常惊人,而它的优越性恰恰在于:快速增长带来的好处,其中 85%进入了香港居民的腰包,而不是香港政府的。
当然,香港从来不是一个民主国家。事实上,它正是我们希望在信息时代看到的那种能够蓬勃发展的管辖区模型。在工业时代,香港没必要成为一个民主国家,它不必为了养一支强大的军队而去征收资源,惹得人民怨声载道。香港可以从外部获得保护,所以它能够维持真正的自由经济。
正因为民主具有搜刮资源的能力,它才在工业时代的大政治条件下占据了主导地位。大众民主与工业主义是相伴而生携手并进的。正如阿尔文·托夫勒所言,大众民主“是大众生产、大众分配、大众消费、大众教育、大众媒体、大众娱乐及其他一切在政治上的表现。”如今,信息技术正在取代大规模生产;预期大众民主即将进入黄昏是合乎逻辑的。大众民主在工业时代获胜的关键性大政治需求,已经消失了。因此,大众民主步其孪生兄弟——共产主义的后尘,只是时间问题。
We have described the megapolitical advantages of democracy as a decision rule for a powerful government as “inefficiency, where it counted.” Compared to Communism, the welfare state was indeed a far more efficient system. But compared to a genuine laissez-faire enclave like colonial Hong Kong, the welfare state was inefficient. Growth rates in Hong Kong were fabulous, but their superiority lay precisely in the fact that the resident of Hong Kong, not the government, was able to pocket 85 percent of the benefits of faster growth.
Hong Kong, of course, was never a democracy. Indeed, it is a mental model of the kind of jurisdiction that we expect to see flourish in the Information Age. In the Industrial Age, Hong Kong had no need to be a democracy, as it was spared the unpleasant necessity of gathering resources to support a formidable military establishment. Hong Kong was defended from the outside, so it could afford to maintain a really free economy.
It was precisely the capacity to rake in resources that made democracy supreme during the megapolitical conditions of the Industrial Age. Mass democracy went hand in hand with industrialism. As Alvin Toffler has said, mass democracy “is the political expression of mass production, mass distribution, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass entertainment, and all the rest.”4
Now that information technology is displacing mass production, it is logical to expect the twilight of mass democracy. The crucial megapolitical imperative that made mass democracy triumph during the Industrial Age has disappeared. It is therefore only a matter of time until mass democracy goes the way of its fraternal twin, Communism.
04大众民主与信息时代不兼容Mass Democracy Incompatible with the Information Age
稍加思考就会发现,信息时代的技术在本质上不是一种大众技术。在军事层面,就像我们所说的,它释放了“智能武器”和“信息战争”的潜能,其中的“逻辑炸弹”可以破坏中央指挥控制系统。信息技术明确指出,武器的完善方向是只能由专业人士操作;不仅如此,它还降低了战争的决定作用,相对提高了防守的地位。微技术使个人也可以大幅提高自己的军事力量,大规模步兵编队的重要性则被削弱了。在兰德公司给国防部长的报告中写道:“互联网不仅可能遭到国家的破坏,也可能受到非国家行为者的攻击,甚至包括分散的团体或个人。”更重要的是它意味着庞大的集权式系统所固有的规模不经济性,将在网络战中彻底被暴露。
用兰德公司专家的话说,“信息技术使地理距离变得无关紧要。美国大陆上遥远的目标,和战区内的目标一样容易受到攻击。”在过去,居住在美国这样的超级大国的境内就等于安全得到了保障;而在信息时代,集结力量的逻辑要被翻转了。皮奥利亚1虽然远离战争前线,但它也不再是安全的,可能受到所有潜在敌人的网络攻击。居住在超级大国境内,就相当于把自己放在了靶心。所以,各地方与其联合在一起不如分解开来,反而会更加安全。总之,网络战的出现会使中央控制指挥系统更加脆弱,但同时加强了分布式系统的竞争活力。
这种变化所激发的反馈机制,将加速权力分解的进程。兰德公司的专家认为,为了降低在民族国家后期发展起来的指挥控制系统面对网络攻击的脆弱性,政府将不得不增加“对新的软件加密技术的利用”。这会使一些主要的私营部门的系统更不容易遭到破坏;同时加速硬加密技术向商业组织的传播,有助于它们摆脱国家的控制。这也将促进权力的下放和分解。就像我们前面所说的,它将进一步推动资源向网络空间转移,而那里是政治的鞭长莫及之地。
最终这意味着大众民主的结束,尤其是它的主要表现形式,即代议制恶政(misgovernment),不管是国会型的还是议会型的。
A moment’s reflection shows that the technology of the Information Age is not inherently a mass technology. In military terms, as we have indicated, it opens the potential for “smart weapons” and “Information War,” in which “logic bombs” could sabotage centralized command and control systems. Not only does information technology clearly point toward the perfection of weapons operated by specialists; it also reduces the decisiveness of warfare, improving the relative position of the defense. Microtechnology makes possible dramatic gains in the military power of individuals, while reducing the importance of massed infantry formations. As the Rand Corporation reported to the secretary of defense: “Interconnected networks may be subject to attack and disruption not just by states but also by nonstate actors, including dispersed groups and even individuals.”5 What is more, this implies that cyberwar will realize the potential diseconomies to scale inherent in mass, centralized systems.
In the words of the Rand experts, “Information-based techniques render geographical distance irrelevant; targets in the continental United States are just as vulnerable as in-theatre targets.”6 Whereas there used to be safety implied in residence within the boundaries of large, superpower nation-states like the United States, in the Information Age the logic of aggregating power could be reversed. Peoria may be far from any potential military front, but it will no longer be safe from cyberattack by almost any potential antagonist. Residing within the borders of a superpower will mean putting yourself within the bull’s-eye. Instead of federating, locales may make themselves more secure by disaggregating. The advent of cyberwar will increase the vulnerability of centralized command-and-control systems, while increasing the competitive viability of dispersed systems.
The feedback mechanisms this will stimulate could accelerate the devolutionary process. As the Rand experts suggest, in order to lessen the vulnerability to cyberattack of the command-and-control systems that have evolved during the late stages of the nation-state, governments will be obliged to increase “the exploitation of new software encryption techniques.” This will make these mainly private-sector systems far less vulnerable to sabotage, while accelerating the commercial dispersion of hard encryption, which will help free them from state domination. This, too, will give impetus to devolution. As we argued earlier, it will further propel the dispersion of resources into cyberspace, where they will be beyond the reach of politics.
Ultimately, this means the end of mass democracy, especially in its predominant form, representative misgovernment, either of the congressional or parliamentary type.
05代议失范的大政治学THE MEGAPOLITICS OF MISREPRESENTATION
当大政治条件发生重大变化时,比如现在,政府的组织形式也必然随之改变。事实上代议形式的政府历来是原始权力分配的产物。这一点从一件事就可以看出来,那就是:代议制的代表是以地域为基础选出来的,而不是通过其他方式。
仔细想一想。原则上,立法机构的成员可以根据任意的人口划分来选举,并且具有同等的代表性。议会或国会的选区可以用生日,或者按字母顺序来划分选区。1 月 1 日出生的人可以根据一份候选人名单投票,1 月 2 日出生的根据另外一份。或者,名字以“Aa”至“Af”开头的人针对一份名单投票,以“Ag”开头的针对另一份。以此类推。
但是现在没有这种制度,有这么几个原因。第一个也是最充分的原因是,在 18世纪这样的制度安排在技术上是不可行的。但更重要的是,以生日或字母顺序划分选区无法反映选票在当时应该体现的原始权力的分配,甚至一点关联都没有。有共同的生日或者名字的前几个字母,这样的人群在过去和现在都很难组织成任何牢固的权力基础。
When megapolitical conditions change in a big way, as they are changing now, the organization of government inevitably changes as well. In fact, the form of representative government has traditionally been an artifact of the distribution of raw power. This is shown by the very fact that representatives are chosen on a geographic basis, rather than in some other way.
Think about it. In principle, a legislature would be just as representative if its members were chosen according to any arbitrary division of the population. Parliamentary ridings or congressional districts could be based on birthdays, or even alphabetical constituencies. Everyone born on January 1 could vote from one list of candidates. Those born on January 2 from another. Or every person whose name began with “Aa” to “AT” could choose among one list of candidates. Those whose names began with “Ag” would chose among another. And so on.
No such system exists now for several reasons. A first and sufficient reason is that it was technologically impractical in the eighteenth century. But even more important is the fact that birthday or alphabetical constituencies would not have reflected or even approximated the distribution of raw power that the vote had to manifest at that time. Persons who shared no more than birthdays or the first few letters of their names in common would have been and still would be extremely hard to organize into any coherent power base.
06为什么地理区域更重要?Why Do Geographic Cross Sections Count More?
投票确实是作为军事竞赛的替代物而出现的。它今天也是,只是以一种更隐晦的方式出现。这种竞赛可以按照地理界线进行组织,更罕见的有按照亲属关系或宗教界线,但它没办法按照生日或名字的首字母来组织。它也无法按职业类别来组织,除非职业被限定在世代相传的行会里,如印度那种种姓制度;或者像爱荷华州的农民那样联系在一起。
当前代议制的全部重点在于,它代表和调动的是地理上的利益,而非其他方面的。历史上,军事成功关键就是控制领土。而所有的军事威胁也都是在当地形成的。
代议制的目的,就是为这种权力的表达提供一种不同的竞技场。代议制的方式会不可避免地倾向于促进地方的既得利益。地域选区的安排会使代表们以国家所有居民的共同利益为代价,去为特殊群体谋福利。
The vote really did begin as a proxy for a military contest. And so it remains, if only in a veiled way. Such contests can be organized along geographic lines, and more rarely, along kinship or religious lines. They cannot be organized on the basis of birthdays or first initials. Nor can they be organized effectively according to occupations, except where occupations are confined within hereditary guilds, like the castes in India, or cluster locally the way farmers do in Iowa.
The whole point of current formulas of representation is that they mobilize interests that are vested geographically, rather than along some other dimension. Historically, the key to military success was to control territory. All military threats have formed locally. Representative systems are geared to provide a different venue for the expression of that power. The fact that they inevitably tend to promote local vested interests is an artifact of the formula of representation. Geographic constituencies induce representatives to target favors for special groups at the expense of the common interests that all residents of a country share.
07未来的新可能New Possibilities Ahead
根据公共选择经济学家的分析,选举结构或计票方式的微小变化就会给选举结果造成巨大且可预测的改变。正因为如此,今天认真研究政治的学生也必须认真地研究宪法。也是出于这种考虑,我们决定超越宪法的范畴,把目光投向由具体环境中普遍存在的大政治条件所决定的终极元宪法。
技术的变革,已经打破了把投票局限在地域选区内的基础。在十八和十九世纪,当现代的代议制出现时,几乎所有的通讯手段都是地方性的。大多数人从生到死都在他们出生地的几英里范围内活动,他们全部的商业和通信也都发生在当地。而今天,在全世界都可以即时通讯。和五千英里以外的人做生意,和跟邻居做生意差不多。经济正在越来越彻底地超越地理的限制。社会的流动性不断在增强。
信息时代的财富也是如此。计算机程序不是钢铁厂,它不会很容易就被地方的政治势力所挟持。当立法者决定征税或监管业主时,钢铁厂是没办法移动的。而计算机程序通过调制解调器,能以光速传输到世界任何地方;业主只需收拾下他的手提电脑,就可以坐飞机离开。这种变革,也会破坏地域选区的大政治基础。
根据我们的分析,所有的代议制民主都面临一大共同难题,那就是地域选区的安排必然会过度代表工业企业的既得利益。“失败者或被遗弃者”是完美的选民,他们在地理上很集中,在政治上有需求。工业民主的历史已经证明了这一点。即使在 20 世纪 30 年代工业时期的高潮阶段,来自新兴产业的“赢家”在立法审议中的代表也长期不足。政客们更愿意代表现有的、成熟的竞争者,而不是未来的新企业或新企业的潜在客户。这可能是代议制政府的一个天然特性。
就像曼库尔·奥尔森(Mancur Olson)在《国家的兴衰》(The Rise and Decline of Nations)一书中的论述,寿命长的产业会发展出有效的“分配联盟”,为政治利益进行游说和争夺。
但是涉及到信息时代的经济时,这个问题就会无限放大。因为在信息经济中,更有创造力的参与者在地理上是很分散的。他们不可能像苏格兰的鲑鱼渔民或萨斯喀彻温省的麦农一样,大规模地集中在某地,为立法者所关注。实际上,信息经济中许多有影响力的人物,甚至不是最大的管辖区的公民。因此,他们在代议制民主国家的立法审议中几乎没有发言权。有一个很有说服力的例子:美国的数学博士们为了阻止外国数学家在美国工作,曾做出很多不光彩的干涉活动;他们向国会提出排外主义的提案,阻止雇主择优录取,很容易就得到了听信。工业时代遗留下来的地域代表权已经过时了;它毫不理会那些为经济做出重大贡献,但不是选民的外国数学家或其他任何人。
为什么人们会相信民主体制的合法性?回到这个问题,和解释人们为什么会相信特定的宗教教条一样难。因为和宗教信仰一样,人们对民主制度的理解程度、怀疑和信仰的程度,在整个社会的不同层面及历史的不同时期,都有很大的不同。 —— 胡安·林茨(Juan J. Linz)
还没有人开始以系统性的方式去思考,技术变革对破坏工业主义和改变收入分配将产生的后果。如果信息经济中的收入差距大到惊人,那么民主就只会沦为一种披着合法外衣的寄生主义。也很少有人注意到,工业政府的一些制度与后工业社会的大政治条件之间隐含着不兼容性。然而,无论人们是否能够看清这些矛盾,随着世界各地政府失败的案例与日俱增,它的后果会越来越显眼。现代时期出现的政府制度,反应了一个或多个世纪前的大政治条件。它们在农业社会向城市工业社会的转型中幸存了下来。但信息时代需要新的代表机制,避免工业政府那种长期的功能失调,甚至出现苏联式的崩溃。
可以预见,随着政治承诺不能兑现,政府信用和制度支持被耗尽,很多国家都会出现政府破产的危机。最终必将会出现新的制度形式,它可以在新的技术条件下维护个人自由,同时使人们的共同利益得以表达和生存。
所有这一切,都指向我们在 20 世纪所熟知的大众民主的终结。现在的问题是拿什么来替代它。如果大众民主的唯一替代品就是独裁——在这种制度下,人们对自己的命运毫无发言权;那么很多人可能会受到诱惑,加入到新卢德派去“反抗未来”。
As analysis by Public Choice economists has shown, apparently minor shifts in the way an election is structured, or the way the vote is calculated, have large and predictable consequences in altering the outcome.7 This is why serious students of politics today have to be serious students of constitutions. And it is one of the considerations that led us to look beyond constitutions to the ultimate metaconstitution as determined by the prevailing megapolitical factors of a given environment.
Technological change has already swept away some of the foundations for confining the vote to geographic constituencies. When modern representative systems emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, almost all communications were local. Most people lived and died within a few miles of where they were born, and the whole of their commerce and communication was conducted locally. Today there is instantaneous communication worldwide. You can do business with someone five thousand miles away almost as easily as with a neighbor. To an increasing extent, the economy is transcending geographic limitations. Society is far more mobile.
And so is wealth in the Information Age. Unlike a steel mill, a computer program cannot easily be held hostage to the local political process. A steel mill can scarcely be moved when legislators determine to tax it or regulate its owners. A computer program can be transmitted by modem at the speed of light anywhere in the world. The owner can pack his 486 laptop computer and fly away. This, too, undermines the megapolitical foundations of geographic constituencies.
A major difficulty that all representative democratic systems share in light of our analysis is that their geographic constituencies are bound to overrepresent the vested interests of industrial-era enterprises. The “losers” or “left-behinds” are perfect constituents, geographically concentrated and politically needy. The history of industrial democracy confirms this. “Winners” from new industries were chronically underrepresented in legislative deliberations even in the high tide of the Industrial Age in the 1930s.8 The tendency of politicians to represent the existing, established competitors, not the new enterprises that might come into being or the potential customers of new enterprises, is probably an inherent feature of representative government. As Mancur Olson argued in The Rise and Decline of Nations, long-lived industries tend to develop more effective “distributional coalitions” to lobby and struggle over political booty.9
This problem is magnified immeasurably when it comes to the economy of the Information Age. The more creative participants in the new economy are geographically distributed. Therefore, they are unlikely to form a sufficient concentration to gain the attention of legislators, the way that salmon fishers in Scotland or wheat farmers in Saskatchewan do. Indeed, many of the dynamic personalities of the new economy are unlikely to be citizens of even the most encompassing jurisdiction. Thus they will have little “voice” in the legislative deliberations of representative democracies. As a telling example, consider the disreputable efforts of American math Ph.D.s to block foreign mathematicians from taking jobs in the United States.10 Their xenophobic representations to Congress to block employers from hiring on the basis of merit are all too likely to be heeded. The antiquated geographic representation left over from the Industrial Age takes no heed of the foreign mathematicians, or any other crucial contributors to prosperity who are not voters.
“Why do people believe in the legitimacy of democratic institutions? Answering that question is almost as difficult as explaining why people believe in particular religious dogmas, for as is the case with religious beliefs, the degree of understanding, of skepticism and faith, varies widely across the society and over time.”11 —JUAN J. LINZ
Few have begun to think in a concerted way about the consequences of technological change in undermining industrialism and altering income distributions. Obviously, democracy is not likely to be much more than a recipe for legalized parasitism if incomes diverge as widely as they may in the information economy. Fewer still have noticed the implied incompatibility between some of the institutions of industrial government and the megapolitics of postindustrial society. Whether these contradictions are explicitly acknowledged or not, however, their consequences will become increasingly obvious as examples of political failure compound around the world. Institutions of government that emerged in the modern period reflect the megapolitical conditions of one or more centuries ago. They survived the transition from agrarian society to urban industrialism. But the Information Age may require new mechanisms of representation to avoid chronic dysfunction and even Soviet-style collapse.
You can expect to see crises of misgovernment in many countries as political promises are deflated and governments run out of credit and institutional support. Ultimately, new institutional forms will have to emerge that are capable of preserving freedom in the new technological conditions, while at the same time giving expression and life to the common interests that individuals share.
All this points to the end of mass democracy as we have known it in the twentieth century. The question is, What will take its place? If the only alternative to mass democracy were dictatorship in which the individual has no say in his destiny, then one might be tempted to join the neo-Luddites’ “revolt against the future.”
08新制度New Institutions
令人欣慰的是,抛弃大众民主不等于只能选择独裁。信息技术提供了新的选择。人们无需在“大众生产、大众消费、大众教育、大众媒体、大众娱乐及其他一切”的约束下进行集体选择;信息技术可以使消费者真正地定制主权服务。这是很有可能的,因为大规模运作不再是必要的。所以,我们相信信息时代会出现新的治理形式,就像农业革命和工业革命都催生出了各自独特的社会组织形式一样。
这种新制度可能是什么?要理解这一点,请忘掉你在名不副实的政治学教科书中读到的一切。信息时代的治理制度,将突破传统的思维界限。朝着这种新制度发展的历史进程已经开启。它们是对一种尚未被充分利用的资产——主权利益——的重组,现在还只是鲜为人知的临时排演。世界上的民族国家已经被各地的独立运动和分解权力的强大力量搞得惊恐不安,他们不仅严密监视着这一切,而且已经联合起来,形成了垄断联盟,全力以赴地加强边界稳定。虽然在 20 世纪 90 年代,世界上新独立的国家数量有所增加,但那主要出于两个事件,即前苏联和前南斯拉夫的多民族共产主义独裁政权的解体。值得注意的是,包括美国在内的其他先进的民族国家都在操纵着,尽最大可能去延长苏联的存在;而很少有政府支持南斯拉夫的解体。前南斯拉夫各共和国的独立,直到独立主义者通过军事斗争夺取了实际的控制权以后,才开始得到承认。世界大国们很乐意看到,手无寸铁或武装薄弱的独立主义者,被他们的塞族2折磨者所屠杀。即使是在遥远东方的中国,一个强大的民族国家,在维护南斯拉夫的残余方面并没有直接的利益,也极力反对被科索沃压迫的阿尔巴尼亚人实现民族自决。不过讽刺的是,这种坚守边界的狂热,并不能真正预防,反而更有可能导致主权被分解。全世界脆弱的民族国家,对公开的独立运动和政治瓦解行为强烈抵制,使曾被公认的主权成为了一种有价值的超验资本,可以被拥有它的国家自愿分割或租赁。
厄加勒斯弯特许自由区就是一个例子,它包括西非海岸的普林西比岛 50 平方公里的土地;该自由区说明了一个国家可以自愿分割出部分主权,用来打造免税的、私有的管辖区。虽然该部分领土仍然处于圣多美和普林西比民主共和国境内,但它的管理完全是私营的。那里的治理是根据 WADCO 公司所管理的合同进行的;WADCO 即西非发展有限公司,是一家注册在南非的私营企业。该自由区的书面语言是英语,而不是圣多美的官方语言——葡萄牙语。通行的货币也不是圣多美毫无价值的本地货币——多布拉,而是全球硬通货——美元。它的安全防卫不是由圣多美和普林西比民主共和国的警察提供的,而是由 WADCO 公司雇佣的私人安保。圣多美的商法不适用于该区的商业交易,所有的商业争端,都必须根据巴黎国际商会的规则,通过国际仲裁来解决,圣多美的法院没有管辖权。除了部分受到严格管制及细微方面的例外,圣多美的税收政策及其他官方垄断在这里都不适用。例如,电信管制在自由区内被自动解除。在支付租金并遵守其他特许条款的前提下,WADCO 有权自动地、重复地续租这一私有的分散型主权管辖区。第一次续租时间为 2047 年,每次为期 50 年。
WADCO 在圣多美和普林西比所实现的成功,必然会被其他管辖区的很多人所效仿。杰昆·阿吉雷(Joaquin Aguirre)是 21 世纪发展的真正先驱之一,他在东玻利维亚的阿吉雷中央港湾(Central Aguirre Portuaria)打造了一个类似的私人主权区。阿吉雷是一位千万富翁、小说家和发明家,他是联合国的共同创始人,也是玻利维亚共和国的前参议员,在许多方面都堪称开拓者。在帮助建立联合国的半个世纪之后,阿吉雷现在又成为了 21 世纪主权个人的原型。他创建的“自由区”免除了玻利维亚大部分的税收、关税和监管措施,为新形式的私有化城邦指明了方向;在信息时代,越来越多的成功者将朝着这一目标迈进。它也有力地表明,在阿吉雷发起的自由贸易区所带来的经济繁荣下,那种常被大政府辩护者讴歌的大众生活,其生活质量同样会显著提高。随着时间发展,全世界事实上的城邦国家会不断涌现。作为个人,如果你在经济上实现了足够程度的独立,那么你就会像阿吉雷一样,获得终极的独立。如果其他商业化的分散型主权,不能为你提供舒适的栖息地,你可以建立自己的专属小国,像中世纪所有公爵那样享有独立地位。因此,未来你不必再与煽动家和政治掮客反复周旋,防止自己的资产被大众民主的鼓噪者夺走并瓜分;你可以建立自己的私人领地,实行私人治理。
从大众民主到个人自治的终极形式——主权个人,是一场彻底的阶段性变革。它不需要从根本上改变大众舆论,也不需要幻灭的选民发起奇迹般的投票,废除掉大众民主制度。这场革命现在就可以开始;而事实上,它也已经开始了,以不为人知的方式,通过把主权出租为免税区、“自由区”和自由港。到时机成熟,主权将被不断分割直到完全分裂,达到无法再进一步分割的程度,不然所产生的利益将不足以覆盖移交的成本。基于摩尔定律,以及吉尔德的推论,即带宽将每年增加三倍;现在来看没有任何依据可以预测,权力分解的趋势会提前结束。
相反,我们预计,虽然目前致力于维护大众民主的民族国家,其力量看上去还坚固无比,但它们很快将分裂成数以万计的碎片;未来的治理系统会更多地让人想起中世纪,而不是工业时代。
到那个时候,即使还残存一些国家保留着大众民主,它们的政策也将发生重大的改变,以便适应元宪政的现实要求。民主的忠实拥趸威廉·基赫(William Keech),在《政治经济学:民主的代价》(Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy)一书中写道:“人们学会了要求他们觉得自己能得到的东西,而如果他们觉得不喜欢自己想要的和已经得到的,他们也会改变主意。”换句话说,在 20 世纪的末尾大众民主连同代议制政府制度,虽然还大行其道,但这可能是一个“卖出的信号”。即使在它们自己设定的条件下,这样的决策机制也难以确保能经受住时间的考验。如果你把目光投到政治之外,你会发现几乎没有任何的高管、行政人员、教练或其他专业的领导者,是通过民主选举产生的。恰恰相反,最成功的领导者,通常是业主通过选拔机制雇佣的;在这个过程中,那些拥有最大利害关系的人,在决定结果方面也拥有完全不平等的且不成比例的发言权。如果民主选举真的是一种优越的方法,能够选出有能力的领导,那么你应该会看到,它是一种普遍适用的决策机制。然而,它基本上局限于政治领域。简而言之,依据目前的证据,假设主权服务的不良供应是被占据主导地位的民主决策所阻碍,比假设相反的情况更加合理。即认为是受到了公司和商业组织的影响,因为它们是由业主任命的行政人员管理的,而不是通过举手表决。
到 21 世纪中期,当主权分散的自营管辖区大量激增,很可能会有力地证明专有管理(proprietary administrative)的优势。选民们会看到,自己在大众民主的束缚下其实一直在受苦。因此,就像基赫教授所指出的,他们将会认识到由雇员控制的政府所带来的好处远低于其成本。醒悟之后,他们会走上改革之路。即使是欧洲和北美的选民,虽然现在看起来强烈地反对革新,最终他们会投票使自己的选区更适合专有管理。多数人甚至可能乐于抛开这场政治闹剧,转而支持政府的专有管理;这将为缔结和执行合同创造最佳的环境。
只要政府以及它惯用的配套设施还存在,它就能以全新的方式被组织起来。在末日到来前的某个时候,在某个管辖区的某个地方,某些人会意识到计算机技术的潜力,利用其实现真正的代议制政府。庞大的竞选开支以及长时间的政治选举,都是饱受怨言的;这些问题本可在极短时间内解决。代表也未必必须经由选举产生,完全可以通过随机分类挑选出来,这些代表的才能与观点,在概率上更有可能与广大民众的水平相一致。
这不过是古希腊抽签选拔制度的现代版本。在权威历史著作《希腊和罗马的投票与选举》(Greek and Roman Voting and Elections)中,斯塔夫利(E. S. Staveley)详细阐述了,希腊的许多职位,从地方法官到执政官,都是抽签产生的,而不是选举。尽管机会的随机性比较机械,有一定的局限,但通过使用抽奖机(allotment machine),或雅典人所说的“cleroterion”,他们很巧妙地实现了想要的效果。
抽奖机是用“一系列的黑球和白球”作为随机计数器,用它们来决定哪些人可以进入候选职位的抽签范围,并且“决定议会中各派系轮流执掌市政厅的顺序”。这个想法的经典来源,可能使它更加可信。但其实它的主要吸引力在于它可以避免政治游戏中自我选择的弊端。从统计学上看,它能够保证在公共事务中出现更少的律师和自大狂。
通过这种方法,立法机构将由真正的代表所组成。他们不是因为追逐权力而被召集到了一起,毕竟他们被再次选中的机会微乎其微;所以他们可以自由地处理政府事务,理性地分析问题,并制定出合理的政策。
Happily, however, dictatorship is not the sole alternative to mass democracy. Information technology facilitates choice. Instead of collective choice within the constrained setting of “mass production, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass entertainment, and all the rest,” information technology will facilitate genuine, consumer choice of customized sovereignty services. This will be possible because operating at a mass scale will no longer be imperative. We believe that the technology of the Information Age will give rise to new forms of governance—just as the Agricultural Revolution and, later, the industrial era brought forth their own distinctive forms of social organization.
What might such new institutions be? To understand, forget anything you read in misnamed “political science” texts. The new institutions of governance for the Information Age will trespass the boundaries of conventional thinking. The progress toward such institutions of the new age has already begun. They are little-recognized improvisations for restructuring underutilized assets, the benefits of sovereignty. The world’s nation-states, anxiously looking over their shoulders at secession movements and the powerful forces of devolution, have clubbed together to form the strongest border-fixing cartel that they can possibly enforce. While the number of new states in the world has increased in the 1990s, this happened mainly in two clusters, thanks to the collapse of multiethnic Communist dictatorships in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It is notable that other leading nation-states, including the United States, maneuvered to preserve the Soviet Union for as long as possible. And few governments welcomed the breakup of Yugoslavia. The independence of the former Yugoslav republics was recognized only after secessionists had wrested control that they could enforce through their own military efforts. The leading powers were content to see unarmed or poorly armed separatists slaughtered by their Serb tormentors. Even faraway China, a powerful nation-state with no direct interest in preserving the rump of Yugoslavia, vigorously opposed efforts to achieve self-determination for oppressed ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Ironically, this border-fixing fetish is more likely to dictate the path of devolution to fragmented sovereignty than to actually forestall devolution. The fierce resistance of vulnerable nation-states across the globe to overt secession and political disaggregation makes recognized sovereignty a valuable form of transcendental capital that can be voluntarily fragmented and sublet by the states possessing it.
An example of how sovereignty can be voluntarily fragmented to create essentially private, tax-free jurisdiction is the Agulhas Bay Concession Free Zone, comprising fifty square kilometers of the island of Principe off the coast of West Africa. Although the territory remains within the borders of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe, the administration of the zone is privatized. Governance there is determined according to contract administered by WADCO, the West African Development Corporation Ltd., a private company chartered in South Africa. The language of record in the zone is not the official Tomean tongue, Portuguese, but English. The currency of record is not the Tomean local Monopoly money, the dobra, but the globe’s money, the U.S. dollar. Security is provided not by police forces of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe, but by private police employed by WADCO. São Tomean commercial law is inapplicable to commercial dealings within the zone, and São Tomean courts have no jurisdiction. All disputes must be settled by transnational arbitration, under the Paris ICC rules. With a few tightly regulated and trivial exceptions, São Tomean taxes do not apply within the zone, nor do official monopolies. Telecommunications, for example, are automatically deregulated within the zone. Subject to the payment of rent and adherence to other terms of the concession, WADCO is entitled to automatically and repetitively renew its lease on private, fragmented sovereignty for terms of fifty years, from the first renewal date, 2047.
What-WADCO has achieved in São Tomé and Principe can and will be matched by others in many different jurisdictions. One of the true pioneers of twenty-first-century development, Joaquin Aguirre has created a similar zone of private sovereignty in the Central Aguirre Portuaria, in eastern Bolivia. Aguirre, a multimillionaire, novelist, and inventor, a cofounder of the United Nations, and a former Senator of the Bolivian Republic, is a pioneer many times over. Half a century after he helped to found the United Nations, Aguirre is now a prototype for the Sovereign Individual of the twenty-first century. His Zona Franca, which is free of most Bolivian taxes, duties, and regulatory impositions, points the way toward the new form of privatized city-state which will increasingly be achieved by successful individuals in the Information Age. It also demonstrates conclusively that the lives of the masses, so often eulogized by the apologists of big government, can be dramatically improved by the economic development catalyzed by free trade zones such as that launched by Señor Aguirre. As time passes, the number of de facto city states in the world will multiply significantly. Indeed, if you achieve sufficient financial independence as an individual, you will be able to achieve ultimate independence, like Joaquin Aguirre. In the event that no one else’s piece of fragmented, commercialized sovereignty offers you a comfortable home base, you can launch your own proprietary ministate, as independent as any dukedom of the Middle Ages. Instead of playing tug-of-war with demagogues and political hacks to keep your assets from being wrested away and divided among the many clamoring hands of mass democracy, you will be able to establish your own private realm of governance.
The dramatic phase change from mass democracy to the ultimate form of self-government, individual sovereignty, need not involve a radical shift in public opinion, nor a miraculous vote, by disenchanted electors opting to scrap mass democracy. Such a revolution can begin, indeed, already has begun, invisibly, with the leasing of sovereign territory for use as tax-free zones, “Zona Francas,” and free ports. In due course, sovereignty will fragment repeatedly until it is so completely fissured that dividing it further would not yield a value sufficient to offset the transaction costs of devolution. Given Moore’s Law and Gilder’s Corollary, that bandwidth triples each year, there is no basis at present to foresee any early end to the devolutionary trend. To the contrary, we anticipate that the apparently solid power of nation-states currently devoted to mass democracy will splinter in tens of thousands of fragments into a system more reminiscent of the medieval period than the modern industrial age.
In due course, even nation-states that retain rump institutions of mass democracy will experience a significant shift in policies to accommodate the new metaconstitutional realities. As William Keech, a faithful advocate of democracy, argues in Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy: “People learn to want what they see they can get, but they can also change their minds if they see that they do not like what they wanted and what they got.”12 In other words, the fact that mass democracy with conventional institutions of representative government is hailed everywhere as the twentieth century draws to an end could be a “sell signal.” It by no means assures that such decision rules will stand the test of time, even in their own terms. Remember, when you look outside politics, there is scarcely any evidence of executives, administrators, coaches, or other professional leaders being selected democratically. To the contrary, the most successful leaders are routinely hired by proprietors through selection processes in which those with the greatest interests at stake have an unequal and disproportionately greater say in determining the outcome. If democratic selection were truly a superior method to identify competent leaders, you would expect to see it as a universal decision rule. Instead, it is confined almost solely to the political realm. In short, it is more reasonable on current evidence to assume that the provision of sovereignty services is hobbled by the dominance of democratic decision-making than it is to assume the opposite, namely, that corporate and business organizations suffer, because they are run by executives installed by proprietors rather than according to a show of hands.
By the middle of the twenty-first century it is likely that the proliferation of proprietary jurisdictions of fragmented sovereignty will have conclusively demonstrated the advantages of proprietary administration. Voters will see that they suffer for being saddled with mass democracy. Therefore, as Professor Keech suggests, they will come to see that the benefits derived from employee control of government are outweighed by its costs. They will migrate toward reform. Even electorates in Europe and North America that now seem so strongly committed against reform could eventually vote to make their regions more accommodating to proprietary governance. Majorities may willingly, even gladly abandon the farce of politics in favor of proprietary management of government which actually aims toward achieving the optimum setting for concluding and enforcing contracts.
To the extent that government with its familiar accoutrements survives at all, it may be informed in entirely new ways. Somewhere, in some jurisdiction, sometime before the crack of doom, someone will realize the potential that computer technology offers to make possible truly representative government. The supposed problem of excessive campaign expenditures and the undoubted annoyance of chronic political campaigning could be resolved in an instant. Rather than being elected, representatives could be selected by sortition entirely at random, with a high statistical probability that their talents and views would match those of the population at large.
This would be merely a modern version of the ancient Greek system of selection by lot. As E. S. Staveley details in his authoritative history, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections, numerous positions in Athens, from the magistrates to the archons, were selected by sortition as a substitute for elections. This was cleverly accomplished, in spite of mechanical limitations on the randomization of chances, through use of an allotment machine, “or, as it was called by the Athenians, the cleroterion.”13
A series of black and white beans were used as random counters to determine who would be selected to fill various offices, as well as “to determine the order in which the tribal sections in the Council were to take their turns as prytaneis.”14 The classic provenance of this idea may give it an extra measure of credibility. But its main appeal is precisely that it would avoid the drawbacks of self-selection in politics. It would statistically assure that fewer lawyers and egomaniacs engrossed the public’s business.
Legislatures could be composed of true representatives. Since they would not be brought together by the pursuit of power, and would have a negligible chance of being selected again by sortition in any event, they would be free to conduct the affairs of government and formulate policy on the basis of a rational analysis of the issues.
09正直的委员会Straight Commission
今天的政客们,一心只想优化自己的选票,基本没有动力去连贯一致地分析问题。因此,与企业家、公司高管和运动教练相比,他们在实际解决问题方面的表现乏善可陈,一点也不足为奇;因为企业家他们是根据业绩表现获得报酬的。按业绩给立法者支付报酬,可能不会使每个当选者都像李光耀那样有效率。但是,根据领导者业绩表现支付报酬,只是李光耀“弹性工资”计划的一个逻辑延伸;该计划在新加坡非常成功,它规定根据新加坡经济的实际增长情况向政府雇员支付薪酬。所以,我们相信,如果将立法和行政人员的薪酬与一些客观的绩效标准(如税后人均收入的增长)相挂钩,他们的表现肯定会大不一样。根据业绩付酬,可能会使他们的表现提高一千倍。
能够提高人们实际税后收入的政策,对社会整体是大有裨益的。所以,如果总理和总统们的政策能够带来收益,为什么不能奖励他们其中的一小部分呢?这部分奖金可以通过一种微小的税收来获得。通过这样的制度安排,整个社会可能就不会面临像尼克松和克林顿这样具有特殊政治才能的野心家所制造的威胁了。
他们给他带来了金银和衣物,但这位‘基督’把这些东西都分给了穷人。当有人献上礼物时,他和他的女伴会匍匐在地,祈祷致谢;但随后他又起身,命令众人向他敬拜。后来,他组织了一支武装队伍,带领他们穿越乡村,拦截和抢劫路上遇到的旅行者。但他的野心不是为了发大财,而是要受人崇拜。他把所有的战利品都送给了那些一无所有的人,我们估计,应该也包括他的追随者。 —— 诺曼·科恩(Norman Cohn)
Today, politicians bent on optimizing votes have little incentive to analyze problems coherently. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that their records in actually solving problems are so pathetic as compared to entrepreneurs, business executives, and coaches of sports teams, who are rewarded according to performance. Performance-based compensation for legislators would not make everyone chosen at random as effective as Lee Kuan Yew. But paying leaders on the basis of their performance is just a logical extension of Lee’s successful “Flexiwage” program in Singapore, which pays government employees on the basis of the real growth of the Singapore economy. There is every reason to believe that performance would be greatly enhanced if the pay of legislators and executives were keyed to some objective measure of performance, such as the growth of after-tax per capita income. Pay them on the basis of performance, and the chance that they would perform would increase a thousandfold.
The gain to society from policies that improve real income net of taxes could be huge. Why not pay prime ministers and presidents even a tiny share of the gain that their policies promote? The funding for such payments could be collected by a small, unobtrusive tax. Such an arrangement would free society from the threat it now faces from ambitious men with specialized political talent like Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton.
“They brought him gold, silver and clothing; but the ‘Christ’ distributed all these things to the poor. When gifts were offered he and his female companion would prostrate themselves and offer up prayers; but then rising to his feet, he would order the assembly to worship him. Later, he organized an armed band, which he led through the countryside, waylaying and robbing travellers they met on the way. But here too his ambition was not to become rich but to be worshipped. He distributed all the booty to those who had nothing—including, one may assume, his own followers.”15 —NORMAN COHN
10弥赛亚式的人物Messianic Personalities
人们很少注意到,选举政治会诱使不正常的、大救星式的人物进入权力的中心。即使在民主制度出现之前的农业社会,这种人也是存在的,而且通常都会对社会秩序产生严重的威胁。回顾一下布列塔尼的基督尤多·德·斯泰尔、8 世纪的阿德尔伯特、11 世纪的埃昂、安特卫普的坦切姆、梅尔基奥尔·霍夫曼、贝伦特·罗斯曼及其同道的生涯,有几个特点非常突出。他们的施政才能越是立竿见影,造成的危害就越大。由于当时的国家还没有建立大规模的强制体系,这些早期的原始政客(protopolitician)经常自发地进行抢劫和掠夺,以便获得现金分发给他们贫穷的追随者。
Too little attention has been paid to the fact that electoral politics lures disordered, messianic personalities into positions of power. Such persons existed, and often posed serious threats to social order even in agrarian societies before the emergence of democratic political systems. Reviewing the careers of Eudo de Stell, the Breton Christ, Adelbert in the eighth century, Eon in the eleventh, Tanchelm of Antwerp, Melchior Hoffman, and Bernt Rothmann and their ilk, several points stand out. The more immediately obvious their political talents seem to be, the greater the damage they appear to have inflicted. Because the state was not yet engaged in organizing widespread systematic coercion, these early protopoliticians frequently took it upon themselves to rob and loot in order to obtain cash to distribute to their followers among the poor.
11原始政客的行动Protopoliticians in action
他们的滑稽故事,给人的感觉就是生错了时代的人才,就像在篮球被发明之前,遇到有七英尺高的人在操场上跑来跑去。今天,因为有了 NBA,身材畸高的可以靠运球和扣篮赚到几百万美元。如果篮球运动消失了,他们就只能回缩到社会的夹缝里,大多情况下只能作为马戏团的景点,或者玩玩杂耍来生存。在现代政治被发明之前,有煽动力的人被吸引到了农业世界里最接近政治的地方巡回布道。他们在人群中大声疾呼,像政治家一样,向任何愿意追随他们的人夸下海口,承诺带给他们更好的生活。过去和现在一样,穷人是最主要的煽动目标。诺曼·科恩在他关于千禧年信徒运动的卓著《千禧年的追求》(The Pursuit of the Millennium)中,记述了在投票政治诞生之前众多弥赛亚(救世主)式领袖的职业生涯。从他的描述中可以很容易看出,这些人的个性类型,与现代时期的魅力政治家如出一辙:
领袖——像法老和其他诸多“神王”——具有一个理想父亲的所有属性:他睿智无比,他公正无偏,他保护弱小。但另一方面,他也是一个儿子,他的任务是改造世界,他是要建立新天新地的弥赛亚;他可以对自己说,“看,我使万物更新。”既是父亲又是儿子,这种人物都是巨人,是超人,是全能的。在人们的想象中,他们具有无穷的超自然力量,像光一样发射出来……。此外,身披着这种神圣的光辉,宣扬末世论的领袖,更具有创造奇迹的独特能力。他麾下的军队可以攻无不克战无不胜,他的存在可以使土地里五谷丰登,他统治的时代完美又和谐,是腐败的旧世界闻所未闻的。
当然,这种形象是一种纯粹的幻象,可以说它与背后的人的真实本质和能力都没有关系,不管这些人是曾经存在的或是未来可能存在的。但是,这种形象可以投射到一个活生生的人身上,而想要接受这种投射的人也从不缺乏,他们热切渴望成为无懈可击、制造奇迹的救世主。……而他们之所以能够得道飞升,秘诀不在于他们的出身,也不在于他们的教育,而在于个性。对于这些穷人的弥赛亚,当代人通常认为他们具有出众的口才、指挥才能和个人魅力。总之,这些人给人的印象是,他们中间可能有人自知是冒牌货,但大多数都真的把自己看成是神的化身。而这种全心全意的信念,很容易为那些最渴望获得救世主的大众所接受。 那些未来的千禧年救世主,实则常常使中世纪社会陷入动荡与不安;这段对他们的描述简明扼要,令人赞叹,但它还不能完全体现出科恩权威大作的味道。在阅读整部作品时,从这些预言家的滑稽行为中,我们清楚地辨认出现代煽动者的熟悉特征:雄辩的口才、个人的磁性、弥赛亚式的自命不凡,以及反复出现的渴望作为救世主被穷人崇拜的欲望。
对于这些冒牌货,中世纪的处理方式与 20 世纪末民主政治的做法大不相同。在中世纪,这些人基本上都会被处死,而在 20 世纪末现代民主政治为他们提供了一个公开的渠道,使之可以合法地取得民族国家的权力。
把地球上最大、最致命的组织的控制权,通过人气竞赛的方式,经常性地交到煽动力十足的赢家手中,这样一种制度从长远来看必然会使人们遭受痛苦。
The stories of their antics give one the impression of talents out of time, like reading about seven-foot men running up and down a court before the invention of basketball. Today, thanks to the NBA, freakishly tall men are making millions dribbling and dunking. If basketball disappeared, they would recede again into the crevices of society, probably appearing mostly as circus attractions and in sideshows.
Demagogues before politics was invented were drawn to the nearest approximation of politics the agrarian world had to offer: itinerant preaching. They harangued crowds and, like politicians, eloquently promised a better life to those who would follow them. Then as now, the poor were the chief targets of demagogues. Norman Cohn’s great history of millenarian movements, The Pursuit of the Millennium, recounts the careers of numerous messianic leaders before polling. It is easy to recognize in his descriptions the strong similarities in personality type with the charismatic politician of the modern period.
[T]he leader has—like pharaoh and many another “divine king”—all the attributes of an ideal father: he is perfectly wise, he is perfectly just, he protects the weak. But on the other hand, he is also the son whose task is to transform the world, the Messiah who is to establish a new heaven and a new earth and who can say of himself: “Behold, I make all things new!” And both as father and as son this figure is colossal, superhuman, omnipotent. He is credited with such abundance of supernatural powers that it is imagined as streaming forth as light.… Moreover being thus filled with this divine spirit the eschatological leader possesses unique miracle-working powers. His armies will be invariably and triumphantly victorious, his presence will make the earth yield prodigious crops, his reign will be an age of such perfect harmony as the old, corrupt world has never known. This image was of course a purely phantasic one, in the sense that it bore no relation to the real nature and capacity of any human being who ever existed or ever could exist. It was nevertheless an image which could be projected on to a living man; and there were always men about who were more than willing to accept such a projection, who in fact passionately desired to be seen as infallible, wonder-working saviours.… And the secret of the ascendancy which they exercised never lay in their birth nor to any great extent in their education, but always in their personalities. Contemporary accounts of these messiahs of the poor commonly stress their eloquence, their commanding bearing and their personal magnetism. Above all one gets the impression that even if some of these men may perhaps have been conscious impostors, most of them really saw themselves as incarnate gods.… And this total conviction would communicate itself easily enough to the multitudes whose deepest desire was precisely for an eschatological saviour.16
While this passage is marvelously concise in describing the would-be millenarian saviors who frequently unsettled medieval society, it cannot give the full flavor of Cohn’s magisterial survey. One cannot read the whole work without recognizing in the antics of these prophetae the familiar characteristics of the modern demagogue: the eloquence, “the personal magneticism,” the “messianic pretensions,” and the recurring desire to be worshiped as tribune of the poor.
The main difference that one discerns between the reception of medieval society to these impostors and that afforded by democracy at the end of the twentieth century is that in the Middle Ages such persons were normally executed, whereas, at the end of the twentieth century, modern democratic politics provides them with an open channel by which to legitimately seize power in the nation-state.
A system that routinely submits control over the largest, most deadly enterprises on earth to the winner of popularity contests between charismatic demagogues is bound to suffer for it in the long run.
12付费给领导,以获得更好的表现Pay Leaders to Do a Good Job
如上所述,一个组织要想获得优秀的领导力,有一个很简单也更优越的方法,就是雇佣制。这是在竞争性经济中广泛使用且普遍成功的方式。合理的选拔程序,加上建设性的奖励机制,对业绩良好的领导者进行奖励,就可以使有能力的人成为政府的掌舵者。这种方法还能调动新型人才;在传统模式下,这些人通常不会对政治和治理问题感兴趣。
如果根据实际取得的社会成果来支付报酬,就能吸引到世界上最具才华的行政人员,来管理岌岌可危的政府。在每一个先进的西方国家,一个领导人如果能够明显提高公民的实际收入,按理说他的薪酬应该远高于迈克尔·艾斯纳3。在一个更美好的世界里,每一位成功的政府首脑都会是千万富翁。
As suggested above, it would be easy to stipulate a superior method for securing talented leadership for an organization: hiring it. This is the method most widely and successfully used in competitive economies. A rational selection process, combined with a constructive incentive structure to reward positive leadership, would bring able people to the helm of government. It would also mobilize new types of talent who otherwise would not normally take an interest in the problems of governance.
The most talented executives in the world could be attracted to run faltering governments if they could be paid on the basis of results they actually achieve for society. A leader who could significantly boost real income in any leading Western nation could justly be paid far more than Michael Eisner. In a better world, every successful head of government would be a multimillionaire.
13电子公决Electronic Plebiscites
另外一种可以明显解决代议制弊端的方法是电子公决。全体公民通过防篡改程序抽签,选出来有代表性的一部分人,对立法提案直接进行投票。有了计算机技术,电子公投已经不是问题。电子投票可以很容易地与抽签结合在一起,缩小对特定问题的投票人数。总之,从原则上讲,对于未来的选民来说,了解政治问题的难度要远远小于揣摩政客以及评价他们的施政观点,更不要说预测政客上任后会做什么。这一点尤其困难,因为政客及其幕僚越来越擅于包装和操纵他们在公众面前的形象。
Another obvious alternative to representative misgovernment would be electronic plebiscites whereby citizens, perhaps a representative fraction selected by tamper-proof sortition, could cast their ballots directly on legislative proposals. Computer technology allows decisions to be determined, with electronic plebiscites. Plebiscites could be easily combined with allotment to narrow the numbers voting on specific issues. In any event, in principle, it is far less challenging for would-be voters to understand political issues than to attempt to fathom politicians and evaluate these politicians’ evaluations of the same issues, much less know what those politicians would actually do upon assuming office. This is particularly difficult in that politicians and their handlers are becoming increasingly proficient at packaging and manipulating the images they present to the public.
14商业化的主权COMMERCIALIZED SOVEREIGNTY
我们期望看到有新的东西出现,来取代政治。虽然我们上面所谈到的每一种方法,都可以被尝试,也能取得一些成效;但是,我们想要的不是政治改革或改进,而是政治将沦为一种过时的东西,被普遍地抛弃。这并不是说我们想看到独裁统治,相反我们期待看到创业型的政府,即主权的商业化。
不同于独裁,甚至也不同于民主,商业化的主权不会阻止人们选择的自由。它将为每个人提供更大的表达空间。而对于有能力利用其优势的人来说,商业化主权提供的决策与自决的空间,比以往任何形式的社会组织都要大。
We expect to see something new emerge to replace politics. While any of the possibilities we canvass above might be tried with some advantage, our expectation is not that politics will be reformed or improved, but that it will be antiquated and, in most respects, abandoned. By this we do not mean to say that we expect to see dictatorship, but rather entrepreneurial government —the commercialization of sovereignty.
Unlike dictatorship, or even democracy, commercialized sovereignty will not foreclose choice. It will afford every individual greater scope for expressing his views. And for those with the talent to take advantage of it, commercialized sovereignty will permit more practical scope for decision-making and self-determination than any form of social organization that has heretofore existed.
15定制政府Customized Government
为避免这听起来像是千禧运动,提醒大家不要忘了微技术,它带来的小型化和对权力的分解。微技术有利于定制化而不是大规模的生产。现在你去商店买蓝色牛仔裤,可以根据你的尺寸定制,裁切版型,然后发到半个世界之外的工厂缝制。等到新的制度发展成熟,能够最终适应信息时代的大政治条件时,你将可以像选购牛仔裤一样,去定制符合你个人需求和品位的管理服务。
阿尔文·托夫勒(Alvin Toffler)曾批评过信息技术可以使公民变成顾客的观点。托夫勒说,“这种模式太狭隘了。不管我们是否喜欢,外面都有一个宗教和情感的世界,不能简单地人与人之间的关系归结为契约关系。”我们认为这个说法是错误的。出于前文探讨过的原因,我们同意把“民族主义的情感世界”简化为“契约关系”是很难的,但这并不等于不可能,更不等于说契约关系不好。毕竟,民族主义中如果能少一点非理性的狂热就可以挽救千千万万的生命。
Lest this sound millenarian, consider that microtechnology miniaturizes and disaggregates. It facilitates customization rather than mass production. You can now go into a store and purchase blue jeans that will be cut from a pattern customized to your measurements and sewn up half a world away. When new institutions at last evolve to fit the new megapolitical realities of the Information Age, you will be able to obtain governance at least as well customized to meet your personal needs and tastes as blue jeans.
Alvin Toffler, of all people, has criticized the idea that information technology could make citizens into customers. Toffler says, wrongly we believe, “That is far too narrow of a model. Whether we like it or not, there is a world of religion and feeling out there that cannot be simply reduced to contractual relationships.”17 For reasons we explored earlier, we would agree that it will be difficult to “reduce the world of nationalist feeling” to “contractual relationships.” But to say that is not to argue that it is impossible, much less that it would be a bad arrangement. A little less irrational gusto in nationalism could save millions of lives.
16进入、退出与发声“Entry, Exit” and “Voice”
当然,主权商业化是一个陌生的概念,显然连阿尔文·托夫勒都不熟悉。但是,它的中心思想——经济的表现形式,是生活在 20 世纪末的人们耳熟能详的。在任何稍微有点自由度的经济体中,消费者都可以通过购买服务和产品,来直接表达自己的欲望;或者是通过不购买、不消费。当你对某一产品或某一服务感到不满时,你可以选择“退出”来表达你的意见。换句话说,你可以把你的业务转移到其他地方。
在前面的章节中,我们分析了由于信息技术的发展,很快你就可以在网络空间创造财富,并且完全不受民族国家的掠夺。这将会形成一种事实上的元宪政要求,也就是说政府在要你支付账单之前,必须真正地提供令你满意的服务。为什么呢?因为在这里,你缴纳所得税实际上是自愿的,就像这套理论原本所设想的那样。
Of course, the commercialization of sovereignty is an unfamiliar concept, apparently even to Alvin Toffler. But its central idea—the economic mode of expression—is commonplace in the lives of people living at the end of the twentieth century. In any marginally free economy, consumers can act to express their desires directly by purchasing services and products. Or by withdrawing their custom. When you become dissatisfied with one version of a product or a provider of a service, you can directly express your dissatisfaction by means of “exit.” In other words, you can shift your business elsewhere.
In the previous chapters, we analyzed how the advance of information technology will soon make it feasible for you to create assets in cyberspace that will be all but immune from predatory invasion by nation-states. This will create a de facto metaconstitutional requirement that governments actually provide you with satisfactory service before you pay their bills. Why? Because income taxation will become almost as voluntary in fact as it is supposed to be in theory.
17避免“冗长的政治渠道”Avoiding “Cumbrous Political Channels”
如果信息技术如期所愿地发展下去,它将确保政府真正地被客户所控制。作为客户,你会有丰富的选择,一开始是数百种,然后可能数千种;你可以与民族国家签订私人税收协议,或者完全逃离民族国家,去到新兴的小型主权管辖区,这样可以直接降低你的保护成本。进入和逃离或者说退出这些合约,就是你作为客户的经济表达。用你的脚和钱来投票,有一个很大的好处,那就是它能带来你想要的结果。
你作为客户,有选择“进入”和“退出”的自由,相比之下,民主政治的表达方式是怎样的呢?如果有人对某种产品或服务感到不满,特别是对政府提供的或受政府严格监管的,他可以给美国总统写信,或与当地议员及其他相应的民选官员会面,来“发声”表达自己的意见。这种请愿方式有时候会有效果,但不一定,通常都会失败。如果不能成功,想通过自己的“声音”进行变革的人,可以组织示威游行,或在报纸上刊登整版的广告,甚至自己直接参加竞选。
政治的表达模式确实给人提供了一个发声与演讲的渠道。但它的弊端是,你很少能通过自己的行动获得满意的结果,或改善自己的处境。面对政府提供的劣质产品和服务,你不得不继续买单,直到你能说服整个政治进程同意你的要求,做出改变。
在西方国家,现在几乎是在所有国家,要达到你的目的,意味着必须确保达到民主制度要求的多数支持。这个需要多数人参与的门槛,对你想要实现的相对直接且理性的目标施加了巨大的交易成本。
米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)在《资本主义与自由》(Capitalism and Freedom)一书中,为了推进他的教育代金券的建议,指出了经济表达相对于政治表达的优点:家长可以把孩子从一所学校退学,然后送到另外一所,以此来直接表达对学校的意见;(有了这种券)他们可选择的程度就比现在大得多。现在他们基本上只能通过改变居住地,来表达自己的不满;其他的手段就只有繁琐的政治渠道。 阿尔伯特·赫希曼以政治党派人士的身份发言,他对弗里德曼倾向于“以退出‘直接’表达自己对某组织不满的方式”表示有异议。当然,一个在经济学方面训练不足的人,可能会天真地认为表达自己意见的直接方式,就是把它说出来。
是通过市场机制,如作为客户给予或撤回支持;还是通过“繁琐的政治渠道”来表达意见?哪一种更直接、更有效,这是一个复杂而有争议的问题。不同的人会以不同的方式给出自己的答案。对于那些在政治表达中主要以他人利益为代价为自己谋利的人来说,转用经济表达方式所能得到的利益,可能确实比给政客写信所能实现的要惨淡得多。
In effect, if information technology evolves as it may, it will assure that governments are actually controlled by their customers. As a customer, you will first have hundreds, then thousands of options to reduce your protection costs directly by contracting a private tax treaty with a nation-state or by defecting from nation-states altogether to emerging minisovereignties. These contract “entry” and defection or “exit” options are economic expressions of your desires as a customer. Voting with your feet and your money has the great advantage that it leads to results that you desire.
How do your “entry” and “exit” options as a customer compare with the political mode of expression in democracy? Persons who become dissatisfied with some product or service, especially one provided by or heavily regulated by the government, can give “voice” to their views by writing letters to the president in the United States, or seeking a meeting with their member of Parliament or another appropriate elected official elsewhere. Sometimes, such love letters work. But not always. Not usually. Failing success, at first, persons seeking to employ their “voice” for change can then organize a demonstration, take out a full-page advertisement in a newspaper, or even seek elective office themselves.
The political mode of expression does provide a channel for articulate statements and oratory. But it entails the drawback that you can seldom obtain satisfaction or improve your position by your own action. When faced with a substandard product or service of government, you are obliged to continue paying for it until you can, persuade the whole political process to accede to your request for a change.
In Western countries, and now in practically the entire earth, this has come to mean the necessity of securing majority support of a democratic political system. The requirement to involve a majority imposes massive transaction costs between you and achieving what in all likelihood is a relatively straightforward and rational goal.
Milton Friedman discussed the merits of the economic, as opposed to the political, mode of expression in advancing his proposal for school vouchers in Capitalism and Freedom:
Parents could express their views about schools directly, by withdrawing their children from one school and sending them to another, to a much greater extent than is now possible. In general they can now take this step only by changing their place of residence. For the rest, they can express their views only though cumbrous political channels.18
Albert O. Hirschman, speaking as a partisan of politics, took exception to Friedman’s preference for “exit as the ‘direct’ way of expressing one’s unfavorable views of an organization. A person less well trained in economics might naively suggest that the direct way of expressing one’s views is to express them!”19
Whether it is more direct or effective to express your opinions through market mechanisms, such as providing or withdrawing your support as a customer, or through “cumbrous political channels” is a complex and contentious question. Different persons will answer it in different ways. For those whose primary engagement with political expression is to demand benefits at the expense of others, shifting to the economic mode of expression may indeed seem a dismal substitute to writing to a politician and demanding more.
18经济表达与“互惠社会”Economic Expression and “Reciprocal Sociality”
对于那些想与伙伴展开“互惠”,而非“胁迫”或寄生型关系的人来说,利用经济型表达方式能以更短的时间、更少的麻烦、更低的成本,获得更大的满足。
尽管有赫斯菲尔德教授,这一点也很容易证明。任何一套经济表达方式,包括进入、合同执行和退出,只要让众多的人参与决策,就会沦为政治型的“声音”表达。可以做一个实验来证明。你所需要的就是找几百个人,这些人觉得自己生活中的政治还不够多。在一年的时间里,不要让他们把自己的可支配收入分散地用到数千次的购买中,而是把这些大量的经济决定转换为少数的政治决定。
首先,所有人同意把他们的可支配收入集中起来,然后放弃以个人为单位的购买行为。也就是说,以后不再是个人拥有数千美元进行数千次的个人消费;而是每个人将获得一张或几张选票,这取决于集体的职位数量。在任何时候,你都不能直接花钱去买你想要的东西;而只能在少数的几次选举中,使用你的一票或几票选出代表,由他们来决定如何使用那一大笔集体财产。然后,你和其他人一起,来分享买来的东西,而且只能分享执政委员会以多数人的名义批准购买的东西。
这是不是有点像一个“繁琐的政治渠道”了?这还不算。这种模式确实蕴含了人们在国家政治层面所看到的,有关演讲和说服方面的所有可能。但还有大部分是挫败的可能。
例如,如果你喜欢吃新鲜的西兰花,而这个群体在食物口味上的分布很平均,那你就麻烦了。你所在的小组中,可能有部分或大部分人,宁愿用食品补贴去买更多的红肉,而不是新鲜的蔬菜。为了阻止食堂委员会把整个年度的蔬菜预算都挥霍在豌豆罐头和玉米上,你可能要站出来“发声”,表达自己的观点。你也许会提请小组成员注意,与红肉中的饱和脂肪及胆固醇相比,摄入更多的维生素和植物营养素是更加有益健康的。
当然,在这种政治模型中,究竟你如何让人理解这一点或你的任何观点是一个很大的难题,就像倡议任何政治计划或参与竞选一样。你可以发表演讲,当然这需要你把群体中的大部分人聚集在一起,让他们愿意听你讲,然后你还要说服他们。你可以印刷传单,如果你参与的政治游戏允许这种“竞选支出”的话;你还可以写信。但这两种方法都需要其他的参与者有足够的识字能力。
它描绘出这样一个社会,其中的绝大多数美国人,并不知道他们不具备在这个日新月异的技术社会和国际市场上谋生所需的技能。 —— 理查德·莱利,美国教育部,《美国成年人的教育程度》
For those who intend to engage their fellows in “reciprocal” rather than “coercive” or parasitic sociality, the economic mode of expression opens the prospect of achieving far greater satisfaction at a lower cost in time and trouble. Professor Hirschfield notwithstanding, this is easily demonstrated.
Any set of economic expressions, comprising entry, on-going contracts, and exits, could be converted into an expression of political “voice” simply by involving multitudes of people in the decision-making. Try it as an experiment. All you would require to test it are a few hundred people who feel there is not enough politics in their lives. Instead of spending their disposable income in thousands of discrete purchases over a year’s time, they would convert this multitude of economic decisions into a handful of political ones.
To start, all would agree to pool their disposable income and thereafter forgo purchases on an individual basis. Instead of thousands of dollars to spend individually in thousands of ways, everyone would get one vote or perhaps a few votes depending upon the number of offices to be filled. Rather than spending money directly to obtain what you want at any time you wished, you would spend your vote or votes on the handful of occasions when elections were held to select representatives who would then decide how the now gigantic collective purse would be spent.
You, along with the others, would then share in the consumption of those items, and only those items that the ruling committee approved in the name of the majority.
Does that seem like a “cumbrous political channel” for expression yet? Just wait. This model holds all the potential for oratory and persuasion that one finds in politics at the national level. And most of the potential for frustration.
For example, if you like fresh broccoli, and the group has an ordinary distribution of tastes in food, you are in trouble. Chances are that some or most of the others in your group would prefer to spend more of the common food allowance on red meat than on fresh vegetables. To prevent the canteen committee from going to a warehouse store and squandering the whole annual vegetable budget on canned peas and corn, you might have to step forward and give “voice” to your views. You could draw the group’s attention to the relative merits of ingesting more vitamins and phytonutrients like sulforaphane in broccoli, as compared to more saturated fats and cholesterol from red meat.
Just exactly how you make this or any point understood, of course, would be as much of a puzzle in this constructed political model as it is to advocates of any political cause or candidacy. You could give a speech, but that, of course, requires that a good fraction of the group whom you need to persuade is already assembled somewhere and prepared to listen. You could print up flyers, provided that such a “campaign expenditure” were permitted by the house rules of your political game. You could write letters. But both of these options depend upon the other participants being literate enough to read.
“It paints a picture, of a society in which the vast majority of Americans do not know that they do not have the skill they need to earn a living in our increasingly technological society and international marketplace.” —RICHARD RILEY, U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, IN “ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA”
19九千万老年痴呆症患者?Ninety Million Alzheimer’s Patients?
在你的这个政治模拟演习中,如果参与者恰好都是美国人,那你很难得到任何有说服力的信息,特别是这些人跟美国选民的整体素质相似的话。世界上最强大的民族国家的公民,文化程度很低者的比例惊人;在有史以来对美国成年人素质进行的最彻底的调查中,很无奈地证实了这一点。这项名为“美国成人识字率”的研究表明,为任何的政治辩论找到一个识字的听众,都绝非易事。很大一部分美国人,可能占到 15 岁以上的大多数,都缺乏评估观点及作出判断的基本技能。
另外,根据美国教育部的数据,9000 万美国人不会写信,看不懂公共汽车时刻表,甚至不会用计算器做加减法。如果说有 9000 万美国人有程度不同的老年痴呆症,大概也就是这个样子。其中有 3000 万可以被认为非常无能,连回答问题的能力都不具备。
所以,在你的政治实验中,如果你关于健康的论点不能扭转局势,那你可以向动物权利活动家求助。也许你可以请他们到食堂委员会抗议你的对手,或者在有影响力的成员家里大肆宣扬杀牛的罪恶。这个例子还可以无限地延伸下去,可能远远超过理性人所能容忍的限度。它清楚地表明了:(1)任何进入或退出的经济型表达,都可以通过集体决定,而转变成一种政治型的声音表达;(2)集体决策,虽然欢迎参与者进行辩论,但它冗长又累赘,而且很难实现合理的结果。
这些都已为历史的经验所证明。要发动必要的人力和物力去改变一个民主国家的政治进程,难如登天。所以,重申一下,这很可能就是几个世纪以来,民主福利国家能够在与其他政府组织形式的竞争中幸存下来,并在工业时代末期占据主导地位的原因。民主作为一种政治制度之所以成功,正式因为它的运作模式,使客户难以控制政府或限制国家对资源的攫取。
然而,在信息时代国家对你个人事务的无限参与,不再具备军事上的优势,聪明的人会找到更好的方式,来获得政府提供的少数真正有价值的服务。如前所述,现行的权力将会从无力支撑它们的集体机制中承包出去。我们期待看到效率战胜大规模的权力。尼尔·芒罗曾简明扼要地指出:“美国的经济将越来越多地由计算机化的信息驱动,而不再是人力或大规模的生产,它将在这个拥有 500台电视频道的世界里赢得战争。计算机化的信息存在于赛博空间——一个由计算机网络、通信卫星、调制解调器、数据库和公共互联网不停复制所创造出来的时空新维度。”在这样的世界里组织大规模的军队意义甚微。效率将前所未有地重要。我们在第 6 章及其他章节讨论过,由于微技术开辟了一个全新的保护维度,个人能够在任何单独政府暴力垄断的领土范围之外,创造并保护自己的资产,这是人类文明史中的第一次。这些资产基本上只受个人的支配。因此,对你和其他主权个人来说,“用脚退票”,退出主要的民族国家,与一个边缘民族国家或小的新型主权签订私人保护合约,是完全合理的;这样一来,你只需支付具有商业效益的最低金额,而不是你的大部分资产。简单来说,你可能会因为 5000 万的差额而搬到百慕大。
If your group in this model political exercise happened to be Americans, you would be hard-pressed to get any persuasive message to sink in, particularly if the members of the group were similar to the U.S. electorate as a whole. The perception that disproportionally large numbers of citizens of the world’s most powerful nation-state are underachievers has been bleakly confirmed by the most thorough survey ever undertaken of the competence of American adults. The study, “Adult Literacy in America,” shows that finding a literate audience for any political argument is by no means easy. A large fraction, perhaps a majority of Americans over the age of fifteen, lack basic skills essential to evaluating ideas and formulating judgments. According to the U.S. Education Department, 90 million Americans cannot write a letter, fathom a bus schedule, or even do addition and subtraction on a calculator. This is about what you would expect if 90 million Americans were progressing through various stages of Alzheimer’s Disease. Thirty million were judged so incompetent that they could not even respond to questions.
So if your health message did not turn the tide, which is otherwise finding its own level, then you could call for help from animal rights activists. Perhaps you could get them to picket your opponents in the canteen committee or make a fuss about the evil of killing cows at the homes of influential members.
This example could be extended indefinitely, which is probably far longer than the patience of rational people would permit. It clearly demonstrates that (1) any economic expression of entry or exit can be converted into a political expression of voice by making it a collective decision; and (2) that collective decisions, in spite of the invitation they offer to eloquence, are, indeed, cumbrous and often intractable.
This is exactly what experience has shown. It is far from easy to mobilize the effort required to change the course of a democracy. To reiterate, that may well be the reason that democratic welfare states survived centuries of competition with alternative methods of government to predominate at the end of the industrial era. Democracy succeeded as a political system precisely because its operation made it difficult for customers to control the government or limit the state’s claims on resources.
However, since an unlimited partnership by the state in your affairs will no longer convey a military advantage in the Information Age, ingenious people will find superior ways to obtain the few valuable services that governments actually provide. As spelled out earlier, it is likely that actual power will be contracted out from collective mechanisms that no longer pay their way. We expect to see efficiency predominate over massed power. As Neil Munro succinctly put it, “[I]t is computerized information, not manpower or mass production that increasingly drives the U.S. economy and that will win wars in a world wired for 500 TV channels. The computerized information exists in cyberspace—the new dimension created by endless reproduction of computer networks, satellites, modems, databases and the public Internet.”20
Massed armies will mean little in such a world. Efficiency will mean more than ever before. Because microtechnology creates a new dimension in protection, as we explored in Chapter 6 and elsewhere, individuals for the first time in human existence will be able to create and protect assets that lie entirely outside the realm of any individual government’s territorial monopoly on violence. These assets, therefore, will be highly susceptible to individual control. It will be perfectly reasonable for you and significant numbers of other future Sovereign Individuals to “vote with your feet” in opting out of leading nation-states to contract for protection of your assets and your person with an outlying nation-state or a new minisovereignty that will only charge a commercially tolerable amount, rather than the greater part of your net worth. In short, you would probably accept $50 million to move to Bermuda.
20先退出,后签约Exit First, Contract Later
在早期阶段,能够刺激主权商业化发展的,只能是来自于用退出表达自己经济利益的个人。这种选择在美国是最难的,但也是最有价值的。比尔·克林顿总统与共和党国会,强加给资本家的“柏林墙”,不仅与《独立宣言》相抵触,因为宣言主张个人有权抛弃掠夺性政府的统治;而且它也与美国民族主义者在 1960 年代的口号相矛盾,当时他们自信满满地叫喊着“要么爱她,要么离开她”。离境税是对那些选择离开的人征收惩罚性的税收,以此来强迫忠诚。然而,这种报复性的立法只会让人联想到罗马帝国落幕时期,对携财产逃离者实施的惩罚;它也可能在无意之中为其后的信息时代制定更合理的政策,设定了一个参照的框架。
等到某个时间点,当大量有能力的人选择离开,并在海外积累了足够多的财富,美国及其他高税率国家的政府为了提升自身的吸引力,将允许公民或绿卡持有者通过支付离境税来免除以后所有的税负,但并不要求他们真的离开。毕竟,从经济上讲把效益高的人留在境内创造价值,比放他们去到其他条件更好的管辖区,更符合主权国家的利益。换句话说,离境税可以成为一次性买断税负的模式。
征收离境税的政府,根据类似于瑞士和其他地方目前提供的私人条约的条件,接受那些已退出的人重新回来居住,可以获得更多的利益。美国或其他国家的政府如果采取这种举措,那将是一种优化收入的理性姿态。
终究而言,对保护服务的竞争会迫使税率下降,并将征收条件调整到更文明的标准。未来的主权个人将不再受制于立法机构颁布的税收制度,而是将通过谈判达成私人条约,实现可接受的、定制化的一揽子服务政策。
The early stimulus to commercialization of sovereignty will have to come from persons expressing themselves economically by exit. This option will be most difficult in the United States, where it will also be most valuable. The “Berlin Wall” for capitalists imposed by President Bill Clinton and the Republican Congress contradicts the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims the right of individuals to renounce the dominion of predatory governments. It also undoes the slogan so confidently expressed by American nationalists in the 1960s, “Love it or leave it.” By imposing penal taxes on those who leave, the exit tax is meant to compel loyalty. Yet this vindictive legislation, reminiscent of the penalties imposed on fleeing property owners in the last days of the Roman Empire, may inadvertently set the framework for a more rational policy later in the Information Age.
At some point, when enough able persons have left and compounded sufficiently large fortunes offshore, it will become appealing to U.S. authorities, and those of other high-tax countries to allow citizens or green card holders to buy their way out of future tax liabilities by paying an exit tax but not requiring that they actually exit. After all, it is economically in the interest of any sovereignty that economically productive persons remain within its territory and create value rather than departing to a more welcoming jurisdiction. In other words, the exit tax could become the model for a lump-sum buyout. The government imposing an exit tax would realize far higher benefits by allowing those exiting to resume residence under terms of a private treaty like those currently available in Switzerland and elsewhere.
Such moves on the part of the United States or other governments would be rational income-optimizing gestures. Eventually, competition in protection services will force down tax rates and adjust the terms of taxation to more civilized standards. Rather than depending upon legislatures to enact acceptable tax regimes, Sovereign Individuals in the future will be able to negotiate acceptable, customized policy packages by private treaty.
21真正的信奉者被冒犯OFFENDING THE TRUE BELIEVERS
当然,我们完全不认为上述的大部分做法会很快受到普遍的欢迎。个人的去国家化,以及它所意味的主权商业化会触犯到 20 世纪政治陈规的真正信徒。和已故的克里斯托弗·拉什一样,这些人觉得政治的萎缩会对大多数人的福祉造成威胁。在他们看来,复兴工业时代的政治,加强收入再分配可以解决信息技术的竞争压力给很多人带来的痛苦。
小迪昂(E. J. Dionne, Jr.)是《华盛顿邮报》的政治记者。和拉什一样,他也在回味、留恋着政治。他为一种呼吁社会民主平权的激情运动在发声;在未来的几十年里这种运动会制造出更大的声响,因为信息时代的大政治现实,会更强烈地破坏现代世界遗留下来的体制。迪昂认为,20 世纪富裕地区的生活水平和物质条件的普遍改善,主要是由于民主政治,而不是技术或经济的发展。他发出的信号是,未来的希望在于扩大政治对信息技术的主导权:美国及整个民主世界的当务之急,是重新开始民主改革,它是工业时代获得成功的政治引擎。
信息技术本身并不能构建一个成功的社会,就好像只靠工业主义,世界也并不会变得更好。……即使最非凡的技术突破和最精妙的网络应用,也不能使我们免于社会崩溃、犯罪丛生或公义泯灭。只有政治,即人类自我组织的艺术,才可以处理这些问题。 迪昂和其他像他这样的人并不明白,20 世纪的社会之所以特别有利于系统性的强制,这其中的条件并不是由任何人类机构所选择的。“人类自我组织的艺术”这种说法在现代之前无人理解。社会过于复杂,没办法完全确认为是有意识自我组织的努力结果。现代时期的民族国家是自发出现的,它是工业技术提高了暴力回报率的偶然的副产品。而今天,信息技术正在减少暴力的回报。这就会使政治变得过时,无论人们多么希望它能在下一个千年延续下去,也挽留不住。
它们4的存在不限于昨日和今日,而是永久的;它们从哪里来的,没有人知道。 —— 索菲克勒斯《安提戈涅》
Of course, we do not contend for a moment that much of this will be popular any time soon. The denationalization of the individual and the commercialization of sovereignty it implies will offend remaining true believers in the clichés of twentieth-century politics. Like the late Christopher Lasch, they see the atrophy of politics as a threat to the well-being of a majority of the population. In their view, a revival of industrial-era politics, with its commitment to redistribute, income, could be a solution to the distresses so many feel with the competitive pressures brought to bear by information technology.
E. J. Dionne, Jr., is a political reporter for the Washington Post. Like Lasch, he harks back, nostalgically, to politics. He also speaks for a social democratic leveling impulse that is bound to find louder voice in the decades to come as the new megapolitical realities of the Information Age more decisively undermine institutions left over from the modern world. Dionne sees the material improvements in living standards that were widely shared within rich jurisdictions in the twentieth century as owing mainly to democratic politics rather than to technological or economic development. His message is that hope for the future requires extending the dominion of politics over the technologies of the Information Age:
The overriding need in the United States and throughout the democratic world is for a new engagement with democratic reform, the political engine that made the industrial era as successful as it was. The technologies of the information age will not on their own construct a successful society, any more than industrialism left to itself would have made the world better.… Even the most extraordinary breakthroughs in technology and the most ingenious applications of the Internet will not save us from social breakdown, crime or injustice. Only politics, which is the art of how we organize ourselves, can even begin to take on such tasks.”21
Dionne and others like him fail to understand that the conditions that made twentieth-century life particularly conducive to systematic compulsion were not chosen by any human agency. The “art of how we organize ourselves” is a statement that would not have been intelligible prior to the modern period. Societies are too complex to be rightly considered the fruit of any willful effort of conscious self-organization. The nation-states of the modern period emerged spontaneously as a coincidental by-product of industrial technology that raised returns to violence. Now information technology is reducing the returns to violence. This makes politics anachronistic and irretrievable, no matter how earnestly people might wish to preserve it into the next millennium.
“Not of to-day nor yesterday, the same Throughout all time they live; and whence they came None knoweth.” —SOPHOCLES, Antigone
22他们不再像以前那样制定法律了“THEY DON’T MAKE THEM LIKE THEY USED TO”
对“制定法律”的强烈渴望,好像是 20 世纪政治常识的一部分,但这绝不是人类全部文化中的普遍现象。如果它在未来消失,那也只是一个周期中的一段;这个周期在几个世纪的时间里,不断地盈亏涨落。例如,早期的希腊人及其他地方的人认为法律是无法人为制定的。用哲学家卡西尔(Ernst Cassirer)的话说,希腊人认为“‘不成文的法律’,即正义的法律,在时间上是没有源头的”。像其他前政治时期的民族一样,他们认为,没有人可以改进自然的、“几何的”正义法律,这些法律不是由任何人类力量所创造。
他们不相信有“立法者”。正如卡西尔所说:“我们要通过理性思考来寻找道德行为的标准;正是理性,也只有理性,才能赋予它们权威。”从这个意义上说,任何试图通过立法行为,把法律强加给社会的做法,就如同企图用立法改写几何。
The fervent desire to “make laws,” which seems so much a part of the “common sense” of twentieth-century politics, is by no means universal to all cultures. Its disappearance in the future could be seen as part of a cycle that has waxed and waned with the centuries. For example, early Greeks, among others, believed that laws could not be made. In the words of philosopher Ernst Cassirer, the Greeks believed “the ‘unwritten laws,’ the laws of justice, have no beginning in time.”22 Like other prepolitical peoples, they felt that no one could improve upon the natural, “geometrical” laws of justice that had not been created by any human power.
They did not believe in a “lawgiver.” As Cassirer put it, “It is by rational thought that we are to find the standards of moral conduct, and it is reason, and reason alone, that can give them their authority.” In this sense, any attempt to impose laws upon society through legislation would be like trying to alter geometry by legislation.
23立法是一种亵渎Legislation as Sacrilege
在中世纪的大部分时间里,类似的对“立法”的抵触情绪也普遍存在,只是原因非常不同。约翰· 莫拉尔(John B. Morrall)写道:“对德国人来说,法律自古就有。”它是对部落中个体成员的“权利保障”。国王和议会还没有制定新法律的想法。从中世纪早期的观念来看,这种想法不仅是多余的,而且是半亵渎的。因为法律和王权一样,拥有神圣不可侵犯的地位。相反,国王和议员们认为自己只是在解释和澄清已有的完整法律体系的真正含义。
日耳曼人的习惯,给中世纪的人们传递了一种永远无法磨灭的理念,即使在现实中并没有据此而实践。这种理念就是,良好的法律可以被重新发现或重新表述,但永不会被重新制定。 在经历了 20 世纪的过度立法之后,这种古老的态度看起来有些奇怪。现在,希望把国家的强制力用于私人目的,特别是收入再分配,几乎成为了人类的第二天性。
For very different reasons, a similar resistance to “lawmaking” prevailed through much of the medieval period. As John B. Morrall writes, “[F]or the Germans, law was something which had existed from time immemorial.” It was “a guarantee of the rights” of individual members of the tribe.23 Kings and councils
had as yet no intention of creating new law. Such an intention would have been, from the point of view of these early medieval times, not only superfluous… but even semi-blasphemous, for law, like kingship, possessed its own sacrosanct aura. Instead, king and councillors thought of themselves as merely explaining or clarifying the true meaning of the already existing and complete body of law. Germanic custom handed on to the medieval mind an idea which it was never able to forget, even when in practice it behaved otherwise. This idea was that good laws were rediscovered or restated but never remade.24
After the excesses of twentieth-century legislation, there is something quaint about that ancient attitude. The desire to put the coercive power of the state to work for private ends, particularly the redistribution of income, became almost second nature.
24哀悼Regrets
因此,在政治最后的日子里总是会出现一些悲伤的歌曲,这一点也不意外。不仅因为它们反映出大多数思想家对大政治必然性的盲视;也很少有政治记者像迪昂那样愿意接受政治明显的萎缩和消亡,因为那可能会使他们重回犯罪的行当。
在中世纪末的时候,支持复兴骑士精神的呼声就很高。可以看一下《Ii Libro del Cortegiano》即《廷臣论》这本书,由巴尔达萨雷·卡斯蒂廖内伯爵(Baldassare Castiglione)写于 1514 年,1528 年在威尼斯由阿尔杜斯出版。
卡斯蒂廖内渴望骑士美德的回归,这一点深入人心。但对于一种已经无效的生活方式,无论人们多么渴望也无法将其挽回;在 16 世纪不会,在 21 世纪也不会。
我们在解释大政治理论时曾经论述过,当今世界变革的最重要力量是来自于技术的驱动,而不是大众的意见。如果我们的大政治理论站得住脚,那么现代社会——以公民身份的概念以及围绕国家而组织的政治制度为特征,之所以能够取代封建制度以及围绕个人誓言与忠诚组织起来的骑士精神,原因不在人们的想法,而是新技术带来了成本和收益的变化。骑士精神的消亡,并不是因为卡斯蒂廖内或者其他人,没能说服对其有控制力的正义的民众,在国家事务中不能没有荣誉和道德。恰恰相反,卡斯蒂廖内的《廷臣论》对主教提出了批评,也对他同时代的尼科洛·马基雅维利在其《君主论》中称赞的行为进行了抨击。但那又怎么样呢?最终,马基雅维利赢得了更多的读者,这不是因为他在《君主论》中的观点更加雄辩,而是因为他的建议更适合现代的大政治条件。
20 世纪杰出的哲学家恩斯特·卡西尔(Ernst Cassirer),在讨论“马基雅维利的道德问题”时说道:该书以完全超然的态度,讲述了获得及维持政治权力的方式和方法。而关于如何善用权力,书中只词未提。从当下来看,没有人会怀疑政治生活中充满了恶行、背叛和重罪。但在马基雅维利之前,没有一个思想家剖析过这些罪行的艺术。很多人在做,但没有人教过。马基雅维利乐于成为传授手腕、背叛与残忍艺术的老师,是一件闻所未闻的事。 简而言之,《君主论》是一部激进的著作,它贡献了一个近代的政治秘诀,即有野心的统治者可以不惜以他人为代价来推动其事业的成功。事实证明,马基雅维利所推崇的行为非常匹配权力时代的政治特性。但是,被现代政治家视为精明的政治手腕,两面三刀的艺术,相比前几个世纪成长起来的骑士文化,是令人愤慨和难以接受的。
如我们此前所述,骑士精神的美德强调对誓言的极度忠诚。在一个以个人服侍换取保护的社会里,这是一种必需。封建社会赖以生存的交易方式,并不会自发地在人们中间重复出现,使他们可以在被胁迫的条件下,自由地确定自己的最大利益所在。因此,作为骑士精神基础的封建主义承诺,必须充满强烈的荣誉感。
在这种情况下,没有什么比马基雅维利的建议更具颠覆性的了;他认为在任何时候,君主都应该毫不犹豫地撒谎、欺骗与窃取,只要这么做于他有利。
在 20 世纪即将结束的时候,马基雅维利的论点依然在被研究,因为它对于理解现代政治,以及分析 20 世纪各种罪行与暴政具有重要的意义。相比之下,卡斯蒂廖内的作品早已被遗忘。也许只有少数读文学的研究生,和一些礼仪史的鉴赏家会花一年的时间把《廷臣论》从头到尾读一遍。
在未来几十年后的某个时候,信息时代的大政治条件将会使《君主论》过时。主权个人需要新的成功秘诀,这个秘诀会高度强调正直的品性,因为它对于在国家控制之外运行资源至关重要。可以预测的是,小迪昂及其他还活着的社会民主党人看到这个建议会很不高兴。
Little wonder, then, that there are sad songs for politics in its last days. They are entirely predictable. And not only because they reflect the blindness of most thinkers to the imperatives of megapolitics. Few political reporters, like Dionne, are prepared to accept the apparent atrophy and demise of politics, when doing so might put them back on the crime beat. At the end of the Middle Ages, voices were raised in support of reviving chivalry. Consider II Libro del Cortegiano, or The Book of the Courtier, written by Count Baldassare Castiglione in 1514, and published at Venice in 1528 by Aldus.
Castiglione’s longing for a return to virtues of chivalry was deeply felt, but longing for a defunct way of life could not bring it back in the sixteenth century. Nor will it in the twenty-first century.
As we have attempted to convey in explaining our theory of megapolitics, technological imperatives, not popular opinion, are the most important sources of change in today’s world. If our theory of megapolitics is valid, the reason the modem age, with its concept of citizenship and politics organized around the state, supplanted the feudal system and chivalry organized around personal oaths and relationships was not a matter of ideas, but shifts in costs and benefits arising from new technology. Chivalry did not the because Castiglione or others failed to convince a disinterested populace who had any control over the matter that there was no need for honor or morality in the affairs of state. To the contrary, Castiglione’s Courtier is critical of princes and the kind of behavior his contemporary, Niccolo Machiavelli, commended in his II Principe, or The Prince. But so what? Machiavelli ultimately reached a larger audience with his book, not because his argument in The Prince was more eloquent but because his advice better suited the megapolitical conditions of the modern age.
As the distinguished twentieth-century philosopher Ernst Cassirer said in discussing “The Moral Problem in Machiavelli,”
The book describes, with complete indifference, the ways and means by which political power is to be acquired and maintained. About the right use of this power it does not say a word.… No one had ever doubted that political life, as matters stand, is full of crimes, treacheries and felonies. But no thinker before Machiavelli had undertaken to teach the art of these crimes. These things were done, but they were not taught. That Machiavelli promised to become a teacher in the art of craft, perfidy, and cruelty was a thing unheard of.25
In short, The Prince was a radical work that spelled out a modern recipe whereby an aspiring ruler could succeed in advancing his career at any cost to others. Machiavelli endorsed conduct that proved well suited to the nature of politics in an age of power. But the art of the double-cross, which was a shrewd policy for politicians in the modern era, was outrageous and subversive in terms of the culture of chivalry that had grown up in previous centuries.
As we explored earlier, the virtues of chivalry included an emphasis on extreme fidelity to oaths. This was a necessity in a society where protection was organized in exchange for personal services. The bargains upon which feudal society rested were not such that they would have reemerged spontaneously among people free to determine where their best interests lay under conditions of duress. Therefore, feudal commitments that were the basis of chivalry had to be shorn up with a strong sense of honor. In that context, little could have been more subversive than Machiavelli’s suggestion that the Prince should not hesitate to lie, cheat, and steal when so doing served his interests.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, Machiavelli’s arguments were still being examined for their importance in understanding modern politics and various twentieth-century crimes and tyrannies. Castiglione’s work, by contrast, is all but forgotten. In a year’s time, II Libro del Cortegiano may be read from cover to cover by a handful of literature students at the graduate level and a few connoisseurs of the history of manners.
Sometime within the next few decades, the new megapolitics of the Information Age will antiquate The Prince. The Sovereign Individual will require a new recipe for success, one which will highly emphasize honor and rectitude in deploying resources outside the grip of the state. We can predict that such advice will not be read with pleasure by E. J. Dionne, Jr., and the other living social democrats.
25由客户制定政策Policy Set by Customers
在转型初期尤其是这样,这时的大部分管辖区仍然需要制定政策,其倡议者还能获得大多数人的普遍同意。其后,随着民主的消退和主权服务的市场深化,制约“政策”的市场条件会为更多人所理解。
我们现在所认知的“政治”领导力,都是在民族国家的概念框架内,未来它会变得越来越类似企业家精神,政治的意涵会越来越少。在这种情况下,一个管辖区在组装政策方案时,可行的选择范围会被有效收窄;就好像一个企业家在设计一家顶级的酒店或其他产品及服务时,他必须考虑到客户愿意为什么东西而买单。例如,很少有度假酒店会设置这样的经营条件,即要求客户做苦力来修理甚至出资添置经营设施。即使是一家由雇员拥有或控制的酒店——就像典型的现代民主国家,想强迫顾客接受这样的要求,也是不可能的,特别是有了更好的住宿选择后。如果客户都愿意打高尔夫,而不愿在烈日下从事繁重的体力劳动,那么至少在这个问题上,想在市场上任意强加什么要求是行不通的。在这样的条件下,目前的“政治”问题会退居为企业性质的判断,因为分散的管辖区都在努力去寻求,什么样的政策组合能够真正吸引到大量客户。
This will be especially true early in the transition, when most jurisdictions will still be lumbered with the necessity of formulating policies whose advocates can attract popular assent from a majority of the population. Later, as democracy fades away and the market for sovereignty services deepens, the market conditions that constrain “policy” will become more broadly understood.
What we now think of as “political” leadership, which is always conceived in terms of a nation-state, will become increasingly entrepreneurial rather than political in nature. In these conditions, the viable range of choice in putting together a “policy” regime for a jurisdiction will be effectively narrowed in the same way that the range of options open to entrepreneurs in designing a first-class resort hotel or any similar product or service is defined by what people will pay for. A resort hotel, for example, would seldom attempt to operate on terms that required guests to perform hard labor to repair and extend its facilities. Even a resort hotel owned or controlled by its employees, like the typical modern democracy, would try in vain to force customers to comply with such demands, especially after better accommodations became available. If the customers would rather play golf than do heavy labor in the hot sun, then on that question, at least, the market offers little scope for imposing arbitrary alternatives. In such conditions, presently “political” issues will recede into entrepreneurial judgments, as fragmented jurisdictions seek to discover which policy bundles will attract a viable cross-section of customers.
26政治的萎缩The Atrophy of Politics
当人们理解了这一点,他们的态度会发生巨大的变化。那些处于权力分解过程中的管辖区居民不会再指望 20 世纪的政治政策,从它冗长的政治辩论所开出的愿望清单中进行选择。另外,在信息时代人们赚取收入的能力比工业时代更加倾斜,各管辖区会更愿意去满足那些最具商业价值的客户;而这些客户对开展业务的地点又具有最大的选择权。
有鉴于此,对于一个管辖区而言,它最理想的商业政策,能否吸引到焦点群体中的“中位选民”,可能没有我们通常所认为的那么重要。
总之,主权的商业化会促进客户对政府的控制,而非客户的意见将变得无关紧要,或不那么重要。就像吃巨无霸的人对鹅肝的批评,根本不会影响到三星级法国餐厅(如巴黎的 L’Arpege)的成功一样。
As this becomes understood, there will be a sea change in attitudes. Populations in devolving jurisdictions will no longer expect to select from the same range of wish-fulfilling policy options that engrossed political debate in the twentieth century. With income-earning capacity more highly skewed than in the industrial era, jurisdictions will tend to cater to the needs of those customers whose business is most valuable and who have the greatest choice of where to bestow it.
Under such conditions, it may matter much less than we are accustomed to assume whether or not policies that are commercially optimal for a jurisdiction would appeal to the “median, voter” in a focus group.
In short, the commercialization of sovereignty will facilitate the control of governments by their customers. This will tend to make the opinions of noncustomers irrelevant, or less relevant, just as the opinions of Big Mac eaters about foie gras are irrelevant to the success of three-star French restaurants, like L’Arpège in Paris.
27对民主的背叛“THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY”
和已故的克里斯托弗·拉什一样,信息技术的反对者不仅会抱怨它破坏了工作,还会攻击它背叛了民主,因为它使个人可以把资产置于政治强制力之外。也正因为此,新千年的反动派会发现信息技术对金融隐私的保护特别具有威胁性;他们对所得税和资本税的征收前景会感到不安,因为这些税收将真的取决于纳税人的“自愿遵守”。他们会支持使用一些新奇甚至激烈的手段,来榨取任何看上去富有者的资源,比如“推定税”或把富人当成勒索对象,近乎公开索取赎金。
Like the late Christopher Lasch, objectors will not only complain that information technology destroys jobs; they will also complain that it negates democracy because it allows individuals to place their resources outside the reach of political compulsion. For this reason, the reactionaries of the new millennium will find the financial privacy facilitated by information technology especially threatening. They will recoil from the prospect that income and capital taxation would truly depend upon “voluntary compliance.” They will support novel and even drastic means of squeezing resources out of anyone who appears to be prosperous, such as “presumptive taxation” and holding of wealthy persons to outright ransom.
28共同财产Community Property
在我们写作的时候,未来的蛛丝马迹已接近浮出水面。已有早期的证据表明,政府对国际市场的控制力在消失;那些认为个人理当成为民族国家资产的人,也走向了末路。他们希望向政府施加压力,要把国家的公民当做资产,而不是客户。这些反动派认为所有人的收入都应该视为全社会的收入,也就是说,应该由国家来支配。
我们讨论过拉什在《精英的反叛与民主的背叛》中提出的观点,这不是唯一一篇为民族国家鼓吹的檄文。哈佛大学的政治理论家迈克尔·桑德尔(Michael Sandel),在《民主的不满》一书中认为,“如果政治无法制约全球的经济力量,那么今天的民主是不可能生存的;因为没有这种控制,企业将控制一切,人们投谁的票根本不重要。”换句话说,国家必须保留它在个人身上的寄生权力,以此确保政治结果与市场结果相背离。否则,靠集体决策去强行制造违背市场结果的安排,也就失去了意义。在我们看来,桑德尔的哀叹和拉什的一样,也只是对了一半。我们承认,如果政府缺乏强迫个人按照政客的要求去行使的权力,民主的重要性将大大丧失。这一点显而易见。而事实上,19 世纪和 20 世纪的民主注定要消失。但桑德尔没有看到,市场力战胜强制力的真正的重要性。他认为民族国家崩溃后,“企业的统治”将是一种伴生的危险,这显然是不合时宜的。
企业很难统治未来的全球经济市场。正如我们前面所说,企业是否还会以人们熟悉的现代形式继续存在,都远非显而易见。在信息时代引发的大政治革命中,企业也必然会被改变。我们在前面谈论过,微处理技术将改变“信息成本”,而这些成本决定着企业的“合同关系”(nexus of contracts)。
正如经济学家迈克尔·詹森(Michael C. Jensen)和威廉·麦克林(William H. Meckling)所指出的,公司只是一种法律形式,它为“个人之间一系列的契约关系提供了一个纽带。”用经济学家路易斯·普特曼(Louis Putterman)和兰德尔·克罗斯纳(Randall S. Kroszner)的话说,企业能否继续存活,更不用说作为“不受市场力量影响的官僚指导系统”而“进行统治”,这本身就取决于“市场力量的完备性及市场力量穿透到企业内部关系的能力”。
我们在前面论述过,随着市场力量日益渗透到迄今还属于“企业的内部关系”中去,企业能否生存下去是很值得怀疑的。因为,通过信息技术依靠价格机制和竞价市场来完成相应的工作任务,而不是把这些工作内化到一个正式的组织中,会获得更大的经济回报。所以,企业会趋向于解体。随着信息技术越来越多地使生产自动化,它将消除企业存在的部分理由,如雇佣和激励管理人员来监督工人。
Hints of what is to come are near the surface as we write. Early evidence that the capacity of governments to control international markets is slipping away offends those who believe that individuals are, by right, assets of nation-states. They want to enforce their ability to treat the citizens of a country as assets, not as customers. The reactionaries believe that all income should be considered revenues of the community, meaning that it should be at the disposal of the state.26
We have already discussed arguments advanced by Lasch in Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. But his is not the only diatribe in support of the nation-state. Harvard University political theorist Michael Sandel argues in Democracy’s Discontent that “Democracy today is not possible without a politics that can control global economic forces, because without such control it won’t matter who people vote for, the corporations will rule.”27 In other words, the state must retain its parasitic power over individuals, in order to assure that political outcomes can diverge from market outcomes. Otherwise collective decisions to compel diseconomic outcomes would be meaningless.
In our view, Sandel’s lament, like that of Lasch, is no more than half right. We concede that democracy will lose much of its importance if governments lack the power to compel individuals to behave as politicians insist. This is obvious. Indeed, democracy as it has been known in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is destined to disappear. But Sandel misses the real importance of the triumph of markets over compulsion. His invocation of “corporate rule” as a danger attendant upon the collapse of the nation-state is strikingly anachronistic.
Corporations will hardly be in a position to rule the markets of the new global economy. Indeed, as we have suggested, it is far from obvious that corporations will even continue to exist in their familiar modern form. Far from it. Firms are almost bound to be transformed in the megapolitical revolution that comes with the introduction of the Information Age. As we have previously discussed, microprocessing will alter the “information costs” that help determine the “nexus of contracts” that define firms. As economists Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling suggest, corporations are merely one legal form that provides “a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”28
Whether the corporation can even survive, much less “rule” as “a domain of bureaucratic direction that is shielded from market forces,” is itself likely to be determined, in the words of economists Louis Putterman and Randall S. Kroszner, by “the completeness of market forces and the ability of market forces to penetrate intrafirm relationships.”29
As we argued earlier, it is doubtful that firms will be able to survive the increasing penetration of market forces into what have heretofore been “intrafirm relationships.” As a result, firms will tend to dissolve as information technology makes it more rewarding to rely upon the price mechanism and the auction market to undertake tasks that need doing rather than having them internalized within a formal organization. As information technology increasingly automates the production process, it will take away part of the raison d’être of the firm, the need to employ and motivate managers to monitor individual workers.
29为什么会有公司?“Why Are There Firms?”
请记住,为什么会有公司这个问题,并不像乍看之下那样微不足道。微观经济学家一般认为,价格机制是调配资源到最有价值用途的最有效手段。普特曼和克罗斯纳就注意到,这意味着像公司这样的组织,并不具备内在的“经济存在的理由”。在这个意义上,公司主要是为解决信息和交易成本而存在的人工产物,而信息技术可以大大降低这些成本。
因此,信息时代将会成为独立承保商的时代,没有“工作”,也没有长期存在的“公司”。随着技术降低了交易成本,个人不仅会摆脱政客的统治,也会阻止“公司统治”。现有企业将与全球各地的“虚拟公司”进行竞争;其激烈程度,恐怕只有少数企业能幸免于此。随着市场愈加完善,对于大多数公司机构来说,经过竞争还能活下来的就是烧高香了。
可以预期,这一切的后果,不是个人将受公司的摆布;而是恰恰相反。公司并不会比政客更有能力操控市场。个人最终将在一个真正自由的市场中,自由自主地决定自己的命运。既不受大政府的统治,也不受公司等级制度的约束。
交易成本的削弱,也将终结最近流行的“利益相关者资本主义”(stakeholder capitalism)的概念。英国工党的托尼·布莱尔和比尔·克林顿的一些幕僚,都喜欢这种概念,它的前提是国家有能力来操纵公司。社会主义已经崩溃,干预主义者在梦想对公司进行严格的监管,以更有市场效率的手段来达到共产主义的目的。这种新的再分配理论认为,管理层、股东、员工和“社区”都是公司的“利益相关者”,因为他们都从公司的长效生存中获得利益,甚至有赖于此。所以,监管应该保护管理者、员工和地方税务机关,延续他们在与企业的历史关系中形成的利益。
“利益相关者资本主义”理论,不仅在终极层面预设了国家操纵公司决策的能力;而且在基本层面上,它也预设了公司能够独立于市场竞标的价格信号,而长期生存下去。
我们相信,市场深化不仅会削弱民族国家的征税能力,也会削弱政客利用管制措施,把自己的意志任意强加给资源所有者的能力。在未来的世界里,管辖权优势会受到市场的考验,许多地方市场会向来自世界各地的竞争开放,很难指望地方“社区”会有什么办法,能把在当地受宠的企业与全球竞争隔离开来。因此,他们无法保证那些高成本的公司(例如,需要保留不必要的员工和管理人员,或者因为地方政治压力而保持无用设施的开发)能够抵消掉这些成本而继续经营下去。在工业时代,政客可以关闭市场,限制少数广受青睐的公司的进入,来保护地方的就业或达成其他目的。在未来,当人们可以在全球任何地方进行信息交易时,政府想使当地企业免受全球竞争的压力,犹如螳臂当车。
有人呼吁,构建一种以所谓的独立或志愿部门为中心的“新社会契约”,去吸收社区中失业的或被边缘化的工人。这也是行不通的。杰里米·里夫金(Jeremy Rifkin)就想象着,“在政府和第三部门之间,构建新的伙伴关系,以重建社会经济。……为穷人提供食物,提供基本的卫生保健服务,为年轻人提供教育,建设便宜的住房及保护环境。”
Remember, the question “Why are there firms?” is not as trivial as it may seem on casual observation. Microeconomics generally assumes that the price mechanism is the most effective means of coordinating resources for their most valued uses. As Putterman and Kroszner observe, this tends to imply that organizations like firms have no inherent “economic raison d’être”30 In this sense, firms are mainly artifacts of information and transaction costs, which information technologies tend to reduce drastically.
Therefore, the Information Age will tend to be the age of independent contractors without “jobs” with long-lasting “firms.” Equally, when economic success depends upon talented individuals, they may receive outsized pay and extravagant bonuses to provide their services, much as professional athletes and movie stars command huge rewards for their talents. In any event, as technology lowers transaction costs, the very process that will enable individuals to escape from domination by politicians will also prevent “rule by corporations.” Corporations will compete with “virtual corporations” from across the globe to a degree that will disturb and threaten all but a few. Most corporations as institutions will be lucky to survive intensified competition as markets become more complete.
The consequence to be expected is not that individuals will be at the mercy of corporations. To the contrary. Corporations, per se, will have no more power to rig markets than politicians. It is rather that individuals will finally be free to determine their own destinies in a truly free market, ruled neither by big governments nor corporate hierarchies.
This erosion of transaction costs will also put the lie to recently fashionable notions of “stakeholder capitalism.” Such notions, dear to Tony Blair of Britain’s Labour Party as well as some within Bill Clinton’s entourage, are predicated upon the ability of the state to manipulate the corporation. Socialism having collapsed, interventionists now dream of achieving the ends of socialism through more market-efficient means by heavily regulating the firm. This new redistributive theory holds that the management, shareholders, employees, and “community” are all “stakeholders” of firms. The argument is that they all derive benefits from long-lasting firms, and even depend upon these benefits. Therefore, regulation ought to protect the stakes that managers, employees, and local taxing authorities have in the continuation of their historic relations with the firms.
“Stakeholder capitalism” is a doctrine that ultimately presupposes not only an ability of the state to manipulate the decision-making of corporations, but even more basically presupposes the existence of corporations as long-standing organizations capable of functioning independently of price signals in the auction market.
We suspect that the deepening of markets will not only diminish the taxing capacity of the nation-state, it will also erode the capacity of politicians to impose their will arbitrarily upon the owners of resources by regulation. In a world where jurisdictional advantages will be subject to market tests, and many local markets will be opened to competition from anywhere, it is hardly to be expected that local “communities” will have many effective ways of isolating favored firms from global competitive pressures. Therefore, they will have few ways of assuring that corporations lumbered with higher costs (for example, to retain unnecessary employees and management personnel, and keep unneeded facilities open to accommodate local political pressures) will be able to offset those costs and stay in business. In the Industrial Age, politicians could close markets and restrict entry to a few favored firms to meet employment and other objectives. In the future, when information will be freely tradable anywhere on the globe, the power of governments to insulate local businesses from global competitive pressures will be minimal.
Neither is it likely that calls for a “new social contract” focused on a so-called independent or volunteer sector to absorb the time of otherwise unemployed or marginalized workers “in the community” will prove viable.31 Jeremy Rifkin imagines “a new partnership between the government and the third sector to rebuild the social economy.… Feeding the poor, providing basic health care services, educating the nation’s youth, building affordable housing and preserving the environment…”32
30公共用品的消亡The Eclipse of Public Goods
当然,支持强制措施的人会说,国家权力被削弱会导致人们无法购买或使用公共产品。这种说法其实并不成立,无论是从竞争逻辑还是其他角度来看都是如此。首先,当大部分的地域优势被技术所瓦解,不能提供基本公共产品(如法律和秩序)的管辖区,很快就会失去客户。在最极端的失败案例中,如索马里、利比里亚、卢旺达和前南斯拉夫,大批身无分文的难民会越过边界,去寻找能提供更好的法律与秩序的居住地。当然,这些极端的逃亡,或者说用脚投票的例子是出于紧急所需,与直接选购管辖区是两回事。不管哪种情况,企业都会迫使地方管辖区去满足客户的需求。
Of course, the apologists for coercion will argue that the waning of state power will lead to an inability to procure or enjoy public goods. This is unlikely, both for competitive and other reasons. For one thing, with locational advantages mostly dissipated by technology, jurisdictions that fail to provide essential public goods, such as maintenance of law and order, will rapidly lose customers. In the most extreme failures, such as those already evidenced in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, hordes of penniless refugees are likely to spill over borders seeking more satisfactory provision of law and order. But these extreme examples of desertion, or voting with one’s feet, will differ only by their urgency from straightforward jurisdictional shopping. In any event, corporations will force local jurisdictions to meet the needs of their customers.
31竞争性领土俱乐部“Competitive Territorial Clubs”
“用脚投票”由经济学家查尔斯·丁波(Charles Tiebout)于 1956 年首次提出,它已不仅仅是一种理论。正如经济学家弗雷德·弗尔德瓦里(Fred Foldvary)在《公共物品与私人社区》(Goods and Private Communities)一书中的论述:社会服务和许多公共物品必须通过政治手段来提供,这种说法并没有什么本质上的原因。弗尔德瓦里及其他人的研究,也证实了诺贝尔经济学得主罗纳德·科斯的一个定理——该定理饱受争议;科斯认为,“无需通过政府干预来解决外部性问题”,比如污染问题。企业家可以通过市场手段提供公共产品。世界各地已经有很多企业家在这么做了。弗尔德瓦里的案例研究证明,社区的私有化可以形成一种新的机制,来提供和资助公共产品与服务。
This is more than merely a theory, as articulated first by economist Charles Tiebout in 1956.33 As economist Fred Foldvary has documented in Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services, there is no essential reason that social services and many public goods must be provided by political means. Foldvary’s examples, among others, also confirm the controversial theorem of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase that “government intervention is not needed to resolve externality issues,” such as problems of pollution.34 Entrepreneurs can provide collective goods by market means. Many already do so now in real world communities. Foldvary’s case studies show how the privatization of communities can result in new mechanisms for providing and financing public goods and services.35
32通往繁荣之路The Road to Prosperity
微技术可以带来新的融资和管理手段,来提供一直被视为公共产品的物品。回过头来看,有一些所谓的公共产品,实际上是变相的私人用品。高速公路就是一个主要的例子。只要交通拥堵不严重,道路和公路就可以被视为是公共产品,尽管亚当·斯密曾提出过批评,认为它们使住在附近的人过度收益,而牺牲了偏远地区人们的利益,因为这些人被迫支付了修路费,却很少用得到。
在信息时代,区分高速公路、飞机跑道及其他基础设施,进行精准的使用定价,并在不中断交通的情况下征收包括拥堵费在内的通行费用,在技术上是完全可行的。因此,可以谨慎地对交通基础设施进行私有化,并由使用服务的人直接出资。经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼估计,如果由市场对美国的交通基础设施进行定价,可以使美国每年增加 600 - 1000 亿美元的 GDP,同时可以提高资源的利用效率,并减少污染。
此外,不要忘了,现代民族国家所做的成本最高的一件事——即收入再分配,根本不是提供公共产品,而是以公共开支提供私人用品。这里所谓的“公共开支”只是一种委婉说法,说到底仍是“以纳税人为代价”。
那么,真正的公共利益该如何解决呢,比如一支能对抗强敌入侵的军队?这样的军事力量历来都是代价不菲的。我们已经探讨过,显然,一个政府如果不能无限制地没收公民的收入和财产,就没办法为另一场像二战那样的大国冲突提供资金。
但是,这种财政上的限制所构成的威胁,并没有反动派所假设的那么大。原因很简单,不会再有第二次世界大战那样大规模的冲突了。正在解放个人的信息技术可以保证这一点。
Microtechnology itself will facilitate new means of financing and regulating the provision of goods heretofore treated as public goods. In retrospect, some of these goods will prove to have been private goods in disguise. Highways represent a key example. So long as congestion was a minor problem, roads and highways could be treated as if they were public goods, albeit subject to the criticisms leveled by Adam Smith that they disproportionally benefit those living nearby at the expense of those in remote regions who are dragooned into paying for them while enjoying few of the benefits.
In the Information Age, it will be technologically feasible to impose tolls, including congestion fees, that accurately price access to highways, runways, and other infrastructure without interrupting traffic flow. Thus the provision transportation infrastructure could be discretely privatized and financed directly by those who use the service. Economist Paul Krugman estimates that market pricing of U.S. transportation infrastructure would add from $60 billion to $100 billion annually to GDP in the United States, while improving the efficiency of resource use and reducing pollution.36
Furthermore, it is not to be forgotten that the most costly part of what modern nation-states do—redistributing income—is not the provision of a public good at all, but the provision of private goods at public expense. “Public expense” here is a euphemism for “at the expense of those who pay the taxes.”
What of a genuine public good, like the provision of a military force capable of deterring attack by a great power? Such a force has traditionally been expensive. Obviously, as we have already explored, a government that lacks an unchecked ability to confiscate the incomes and property of its citizens would be unable to finance participation in another great power conflict like World War II.
Yet this fiscal limit poses less of a threat than the reactionaries will pretend, for the simple reason that there will be no more conflicts like World War II. The very technology that is liberating individuals will see to that.
33超越政治Up from Politics
所以,与其听任政治来摆布公共服务的质量和性质,不如把“政府”转变为弗尔德瓦里所说的“竞争性领土俱乐部”,以企业化的方式来运作。我们觉得,这些“竞争性领土俱乐部”的决策机制,相比它们满足市场需求的成功表现,最终会变得无关紧要。今天的消费者在购买产品或服务的时候很少会关心销售它们的公司是独资公司、有限责任公司,还是由退休基金提名的外部董事控制的公司。
同样,我们也不认为,在信息时代理性的主权服务消费者,会计较新加坡是大众民主国家还是李光耀的独资企业。
美国伊利诺州第二大城市。
1995年7月,波黑塞族军队攻占了波黑斯雷布雷尼察联合国设立的安全区,约有7000穆斯林男子和小孩惨遭杀害。斯雷布雷尼察惨案被认为是二战后在欧洲土地上发生的最严重的一起暴行。
曾任迪士尼CEO。
译注:指上天的律法。
Instead of leaving the quality and character of such services to the mercy of politics, “governments” can be run entrepreneurially and converted into what Foldvary describes as “competitive territorial clubs.”37 We suspect that ultimately, the decision-making process by which such “competitive territorial clubs” are organized will mean much less than their success in meeting market tests of performance. Today, few consumers care when they buy a product or service whether the firm that sells it is a sole proprietorship, a limited liability company, or a corporation controlled by outside directors nominated by pension plans. Equally, we doubt that the rational consumer of sovereignty services in the Information Age will care whether Singapore is a mass democracy or a proprietorship of Lee Kwan Yew.