BILINGUAL READING · 第11章
信用、犯罪与复杂系统
CHAPTER 11 MORALITY AND CRIME IN THE “NATURAL ECONOMY” OF THE INFORMATION AGE
桌面端中英并列;手机端用按钮在同一节、同一阅读位置切换语言。带酒红色标记的部分与现实核验相关。
导读 本章论证
- 国家控制减弱的过渡期可能同时出现犯罪、欺诈和秩序碎片化。
- 当司法救济昂贵或无效时,长期声誉、信任圈和可验证履约能力会变得更有价值。
- 大型中央控制系统可能遭遇复杂度上升和边际收益递减,但“成本上升”并不能单独证明其必然崩溃。
- 信任圈的论证包含一个张力:密码学能保护外部访问,却不能自动阻止内部人员欺诈;因此技术验证与长期声誉需要同时存在。
- “全网数字排斥”虽然能提高违约成本,也可能产生纠错困难、身份歧视和永久惩罚,需要与隐私和申诉机制共同讨论。
01开篇Opening
腐败现象,远比人们以前想象的要普遍和广泛。腐败的证据随处可见,主要在发展中国家,在工业国家中也日益高发。……包括国家总统和部长在内,著名的政治人物都被指控腐败。……在某种程度上,这代表了国家的私有化,但它并不像通常所说的私有化,即把国家权力转移到市场上,而是转移给了政府官员和官僚系统。 —— 维托·坦吉(Vito Tanzi)
我们认为,随着现代民族国家的解体,当代的野蛮人会越来越多地在幕后行使实权。像继承了前苏联衣钵的俄罗斯黑手党、其他种族犯罪团伙、前苏联党政组织中的头面人物、毒枭以及叛逆的秘密机构,都会逐渐地制定自己的法律。他们其实已经在这么做了,而且远远超出常人理解的程度;当代野蛮人已经渗透到了民族国家的形体之中,只是没有明显地改变它的表象。他们是一群微寄生虫,以这个垂死的系统为食。他们在更小的范围内使用国家级的技术手段,并且像战争中的国家一样残暴、不择手段;其日益增长的影响力和权力,是政治萎缩后果的一部分。微处理技术,降低了有效使用和控制暴力的必要的团队规模。随着这场技术革命的深入,掠夺性暴力会越来越发生在中央控制之外的边缘地区。遏制暴力的方式,也将从依赖于权力的大小,转移到更加依靠效率的手段。
在这场世界剧变的大戏中,民族国家内部隐蔽的犯罪活动与激增的腐败现象,将会成为重要的辅助剧情。你可能会看到一部隐秘又险恶版的恐怖片《天外魔花》1。在大多数民族国家陷入明显的崩溃之前,它们将被当代的野蛮人所控制。而就像上世纪 50 年代这部著名的B 级片里所演的,野蛮人往往会精心地伪装自己。所以,未来的豆荚人不是来自太空的外星人,而是来自各种背景的罪犯,他们会担任官方职位的同时,还至少会部分地效忠于宪法以外的某种秩序。
一个时代将尽时,通常都是腐败严重的时期。旧制度的约束被瓦解,社会风气也随之消散,一种新环境应运而生。而在这种环境里,身居高位的人会把公共事务与私人犯罪结合起来。
遗憾的是,你无法通过常规的信息渠道,来准确、及时地了解民族国家的衰败程度。曾经掩盖了罗马帝国消亡的那种“持续的虚构”,也许是大型政治实体衰败时的典型特征。现在它正在掩饰和掩盖民族国家的崩溃。出于种种原因,你不能总是依靠新闻媒体告诉你真相。很多人在某种意义上都是保守的,因为他们代表着过去。有些人则被不适应时代的社会主义和民族国家的意识形态所蒙蔽。
有些人因为具体的原因不敢揭露腐败,眼看着它在一个腐朽的系统里越滚越大。其中一些人是单纯地缺乏做这种事的勇气,另外一些是担心自己的工作,或者害怕因发声而遭到报复。当然,也没有理由认为,相比意大利修路承包商,记者和编辑更不容易搞腐败。那些热衷于报道各种新闻的重要信息机构,其实远不像人们想象的那样,具有可靠的信息来源。其中很多人都有着其他的动机,包括为一个摇摇欲坠的系统进行鼓吹;他们会把这些动机放在为你提供真实的信息之前。
他们看到的很少,说出来的更少。
“Corruption… is far more widespread and universal than previously thought. Evidence of it is everywhere, in developing countries and, with growing frequency, in industrial countries.… Prominent political figures, including presidents of countries and ministers, have been accused of corruption.… In a way this represents a privatization of the state in which its power is not shifted to the market, as privatization normally implies, but to government officials and bureaucrats.”1 —VITO TANZI
We believe that as the modern nation-state decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise real power behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiyas that pick the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will increasingly be laws unto themselves. They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nation-state without greatly changing its appearances. They are microparasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power is part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.
The surge of covert criminal activity and corruption within nation-states will form an important subplot as the world changes. What you will see could be a covert and sinister version of a bad movie, Invasion of the Body Snatchers. Before most nation-states visibly collapse they will be dominated by latter-day barbarians. As often as not, as in the famous B-movie from the 1950s, they will be barbarians in disguise. The Pod People of the future, however, will not be aliens from space but criminals of various affiliations who fill official positions while owing at least partial allegiance outside the constitutional order.
The end of an era is usually a period of intense corruption. As the bonds of the old system dissolve, the social ethos dissolves with it, creating an environment in which people in high places may combine public purposes with private criminal activity.
Unfortunately, you will not be able to depend upon normal information channels to give you an accurate and timely understanding of the decay of the nation-state. “Persistent make-believe” of the kind that disguised the fall of the Roman Empire is probably a typical feature of the decomposition of large political entities. It now disguises and masks the collapse of the nation-state. For a variety of reasons, the news media cannot always be depended upon to tell you the truth. Many are conservative in the sense that they represent the party of the past. Some are blinded by anachronistic ideological commitments to socialism and the nation-state. Some will be afraid for more tangible reasons to reveal the corruption that is likely to loom ever larger in a decaying system. Some will lack physical courage that might be required for such a task. Others will fear for their jobs or be shy of other retribution for speaking up. And, of course, there is no reason to suspect that reporters and editors are any less prone to corrupt consideration than building inspectors or Italian paving contractors. To a larger extent than you might expect, important organs of information that appear to be keen to report anything and everything may prove to be less dependable information sources than is commonly supposed. Many will have other motivations, including shoring up support for a faltering system, that they will place ahead of honestly informing you. They will see little and explain less.
02超越现实BEYOND REALITY
随着虚拟现实和电脑游戏技术的不断进步,你甚至可以在夜间新闻报道中,订购一份你想听的虚拟新闻。想在新闻中看到自己获得了奥运会十项全能冠军吗?没问题。它将是明天的新闻头条。你可以在你的电视或电脑上,看到任何自己想看的新闻故事,无论真的假的,比 NBC 或 BBC 现在所做的一切都要逼真。
我们正在快速进入一个由人类智慧创造的新世界,在这里,信息将完全摆脱现实的束缚。当然,这也会极大地影响你接受到的信息的质量和性质。在一个人造现实的世界里,所有信息都是即时传送的,准确的判断和区分真假的能力,将更加重要。
由于科技放大的缘故,真假之间的区别将普遍变得模糊。但与我们目前的环境相比,变化程度会比很多人想象的要小。之所以这么说,是我们看到了信息革命的结果大都是解放性的。
技术已经在超越地理距离和政治统治。政府可以设置壁垒来阻碍贸易,但它们很难阻止信息的传输。在香港的任何一家餐厅,几乎每一位顾客都可以通过手机与全世界联系在一起。1991 年 8 月,强硬派在莫斯科发动了政变,但他们无法关停叶利钦的通讯,因为他有手机。
As artificial reality and computer game technologies continue to improve, you’ll even be able to order a nightly news report that simulates the news you would like to hear. Want to watch a report showing yourself as the winner of the decathlon at the Olympics? No problem. It could be tomorrow’s lead story. You’ll see any story you wish, true or false, unfold on your television/computer with greater verisimilitude than anything that NBC or the BBC can now muster.
We are rapidly moving to a world where information will be as completely liberated from the bounds of reality as human ingenuity can make it. Certainly, this will have tremendous implications for the quality and character of the information you receive. In a world of artificial reality and instantaneous transmission of everything everywhere, integrity of judgment and the ability to distinguish the true from the false will be even more important.
But this will be less of a change from our current circumstances than many people would imagine. The distinctions between true and false are commonly blurred for reasons that have been amplified by technology. We say this recognizing that many of the consequences of the Information Revolution have been liberating.
Technology has already begun to transcend geographic proximity and political domination. Governments can erect barriers to hinder the trade in goods, but they can do much less to halt the transmission of information. Almost every diner at any restaurant in Hong Kong is connected by cellular phone to the whole globe. The hard-line coup plotters in Moscow in August 1991 could not shut down Yeltsin’s communications because he had cellular phones.
03更多信息,更少理解More Information, Less Understanding
当信息传递的壁垒被打破,信息将越来越多,这当然是好事。但这有什么意义,很多人会为此感到困惑。现代技术,不仅有助于把信息从政治控制和时空障碍中解放出来,它也会提高老式判断力的价值。那种洞察力——能够从堆积如山的事实和幻象中,分辨出什么是重要的和真实的,其价值与日俱增。主要基于三个原因:
现在可获得的信息是海量的,简明扼要就很重要。而简明会导致缩略。缩略会漏掉很多不熟悉的内容。当你有大量的事实要消化,有很多的电话要回复的时候,你自然希望每个相应的信息都尽量简洁。但不幸的是,简略的信息会导致糟糕的理解。更深层、更丰富的历史纹理,往往会被 25 秒的新闻片段给编辑掉,或者在 CNN 上被误传。传播一个已被广泛理解的主题的衍生信息,比探索一种新的理解范式要容易得多。你可以很轻松地报道一场棒球或板球比赛的结果,但要解释棒球或板球的玩法、规则及意义,就没那么简单了。
日新月异的技术发展,正在破坏社会和经济组织的大政治基础。如此一来,关于世界运行的普遍的理解范式,或隐藏的理论,比过去更容易过时。这增加了全面概览的重要性,而降低了个别“事实”的价值;因为这些事实,任何会使用信息搜索系统的人都能轻易获得。
生活中日益严重的部落化和边缘化,对对话乃至思维都产生了抑制。很多人因此养成了一种习惯,对他们所掌握的事实中明显包含的结论避而不谈。最近一项伪装成民意调查的心理学研究表明,个别职业群体的成员,几乎是全体一致地拒绝接受,任何表明他们的收入将会减少的结论,无论该结论背后的逻辑多么严密。鉴于专业化程度的增加,为大多数专业化职业群体所提供的大部分解释信息,都是为了迎合群体本身的利益。而对于那些可能不文明、无利可图或政治不正确的观点,他们往往不感兴趣。这是一种普遍的趋势,其中最好的例子,莫过于蛊惑投资股市前景一片光明的信息。这些信息基本都是由经纪公司炮制出来的,而很少有经纪公司会告诉你,股票或股市被高估了。他们的收入就来自于交易佣金,而这取决于大多数的客户是否准备买卖。总之,你很少能听到独立的、反面的声音。
由于种种原因,信息时代尚未成为理解时代。相反,公共讨论的严谨性会急剧下降。现代人所能知道的东西,是过去任何时候的祖先都望尘莫及的。但是,几乎没有什么公共的声音来评估事件的意义,指出什么是真的,什么是假的。这就是为什么我们一直饶有兴致地观察着,媒体对报道美国政府高层耸人听闻的腐败事迹兴趣淡薄,特别是美国媒体。
在本书当中,我们要解决的一个核心主题是,不断变化的技术和其他“大政治”因素会如何改写“自然经济”理论。“自然经济”基于达尔文式的“自然状态”;在这种状态下,结果由自然力量决定,所以有时候是不公平的。在“自然经济”中,有一个重要的行为链,就是生物学家所说的“干扰竞争”2。
As the barriers to transmission of information have fallen, there has been more of it, which is good. But there has also been more confusion about what it means. The modern technology that helps liberate information from political controls and impediments of time and place also tends to raise the value of old-fashioned judgment. The kind of insight that helps discern what is important and true from the mountain of facts and fantasies is growing in value almost daily. This is true for at least three reasons:
1. The very glut of information now available puts a premium on brevity. Brevity leads to abbreviation. Abbreviation leaves out what is unfamiliar. When you have many facts to digest and lots of phone calls to return, the natural desire is to make each information-processing event as concise as possible. Unfortunately, abbreviated information often provides a poor foundation for understanding. The deeper and richer textures of history are precisely the parts that tend to be edited out in the twenty-five-second soundbites and misconstrued on CNN. It is much easier to convey a message that is a variation on an already understood theme than it is to explore a new paradigm of understanding. You can report a baseball or a cricket score much more easily than you can explain how baseball or cricket is played and what it means.
2. Rapidly changing technology is undermining the megapolitical basis of social and economic organization. As a consequence, broad paradigmatic understanding, or unspoken theories about the way the world works, are being antiquated more quickly than in the past. This increases the importance of the broad overview and diminishes the value of individual “facts” of the kind that are readily available to almost anyone with an information retrieval system.
3. The growing tribalization and marginalization of life have had a stunting effect on discourse, and even on thinking. Many people have consequently gotten into the habit of shying away from conclusions that are obviously implied by the facts at their disposal. A recent psychological study disguised as a public opinion poll showed that members of individual occupational groups were almost uniformly unwilling to accept any conclusion that implied a loss of income for them, no matter how airtight the logic supporting it. Given increased specialization, most of the interpretive information about most specialized occupational groups is designed to cater to the interests of the groups themselves. They have little interest in views that might be impolite, unprofitable, or politically incorrect. There is no better example of this general tendency than the broad drumbeat of views implying bright prospects for investing in the stock market. Most of that information is generated by brokerage firms, few of which will tell you that stocks are overvalued. Their income is derived from transaction business that depends on the majority of customers being ready to buy. Independent, contrary voices are seldom heard.
For these and other reasons, the Age of Information has not yet become the Age of Understanding. To the contrary, there has been a sharp drop-off in the rigor of public discourse. The world now could know more than at any time in the past. But there is almost no public voice left to assess the meaning of events and say what is true. This is why we have been fascinated to see the tepid interest, particularly in the U.S. media, in reporting hints of sensational corruption at high levels of the U.S. government.
A central theme we have wrestled with in this book is how changing technology and other “megapolitical” factors alter the “natural economy.” The “natural economy” is the Darwinian “state of nature” where outcomes are determined, sometimes unfairly, by physical force. In the “natural economy,” an important strand of behavior is what biologists call “interference competition.”
04干扰竞争Interference Competition
“干扰竞争的参与者”,就像杰克·赫舒拉发所说的,“会直接攻击或阻碍对手,来获得并保持对资源的控制。”无论我们是多么地希望,人类的行为会遵循法律规则和“其他被强制执行的社会游戏规则”(“政治经济学”的说法);但有充分的证据表明,许多人只在有利于自己的时候才会“按照规则行事”。冲突问题的权威赫舒拉发是这么说的,“犯罪、战争和政治的持续存在告诉我们,现实中的人类事务,在很大程度上仍然受制于自然经济的潜在压力。”换句话说,经济结果只是部分地像教科书中所描述的,由经济理性人和平守法的行为所决定;这些人尊重产权,“不会直接拿走不属于他们的东西。”而实际上,经济成果也是由冲突造就的,包括公开的暴力。经济学家赫舒拉发指出,“即使在法律和政府的约束之下,理性的、自利的个人获取资源的手段,也会在合法与非法之间取得一个平衡——一方面是生产和交换,另一方面是盗窃、欺诈和勒索。”
“Interference competitors,” as Jack Hirshleifer put it, “gain and maintain control over resources by directly fighting off or hampering their rivals.…”2 However much we may wish that human behavior were always subject to the rule of law and “other socially enforced rules of the game” (“political economy”), there is ample evidence that many people “play by the rules” only when it suits them. Hirshleifer, an authority on conflict, put it this way: “[T]he persistence of crime, war and politics teaches us that actual human affairs still remain largely subject to the underlying pressures of natural economy.”3
In other words, economic outcomes are determined only partly by the peaceful and law-abiding behavior of the Homo economicus described in textbooks, who honor property rights “and will not simply take what does not belong to them.”4 Actual outcomes are also shaped by conflict, including overt violence. As economist Hirshleifer points out, “Even under law and government, the rational, self-interested individual will strike a balance between lawful and unlawful means of acquiring resources—between production and exchange on the one hand and theft, fraud and extortion on the other.”5
05信息时代的抢劫MUGGING IN THE INFORMATION AGE
关于暴力、犯罪和政治,米歇尔·加芬克尔和斯特吉奥斯·斯卡帕达斯(Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas),出版了一本非常有价值的书籍《冲突与侵占的政治经济学》(The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation),书中就谈到了这一点:“个人和团体可以从事生产并由此而创造财富,也可以夺取他人创造的财富。”他们援引了一个现代版干涉竞争的故事,最早由《经济学人》杂志报道出来:“说有一个美国商人,最近来到莫斯科开设办事处,在他住的旅馆里遇到五个人。这些人戴着金表,拿着手枪和他公司净资产的打印材料;他们索要他公司未来收益的 7%。美国商人坐第一班飞机回了纽约,那里的歹徒还没这么老练。”这个信息时代的抢劫故事,要更多地归功于新技术的进步,而不单是俄罗斯黑帮通过互联网,就可以获得受害者的财务资料和信用报告这么简单。
Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas explore this in a useful book on violence, crime, and politics, The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation: “Individuals and groups can either produce and thus create wealth or seize the wealth created by others.”6 They quote a tale of modern interference competition originally reported by the Economist: “An American businessman, recently arrived in Moscow to open an office, was met at his hotel by five men with gold watches, pistols and a print-out of his firm’s net worth. They demanded 7% of future earnings. He took the first flight to New York, where muggers are less sophisticated.”7
This tale of mugging in the Information Age owes more to new technology than the simple fact that thugs in Russia now have access to financial profiles and credit reports on their victims through the Internet.
06军事力量的决定性下降Falling Decisiveness of Military Power
无论是福是祸,大规模的军事力量不再具有决定性的作用。信息技术从根本上削弱了民族国家,在这个不守规矩的世界里,强行施加权威的能力。如果像伏尔泰说的那样,上帝曾经“站在阵营更强大的一边”;那么,随着暴力能够获得巨大回报的日子一天天消失,上帝的支持也会越来越小。所以,我们将会看到相反的情况。有更多的证据表明,暴力的回报率正越来越低,这强烈地预示着,像民族国家这样的大型集团,无法再说服人们接受,其巨额的管理成本是合理的。
中央权力定于一尊的能力的下降,最明显的证据就是恐怖主义的兴起。90 年代中期在美国发生的引人注目的爆炸事件表明,即使是世界上的超级军事强国,也不能免于被攻击。
暴力回报率下降的另一个重要表现,是黑帮主义和有组织犯罪及其必然后果——裙带关系和政治腐败——在世界范围内的增长。它们反映出一种普遍的非道德化的氛围,在这种氛围中,国家可以进行强制,但不提供保护。那么,随着国家对暴力垄断的逐渐耗尽,新的竞争者会进入到这个领域,例如在莫斯科向美国商人征收私税的黑帮分子。
小型团体、部落、黑社会、帮派、流氓、民兵,甚至是单独的个人,都获得了越来越多的军事效能。在下一个千年的“自然经济”环境中,他们能行使的实权将远远超过 20 世纪。采用微芯片的武器,已经使暴力的平衡向防守的方向偏移,决定性的侵略不再有利可图,因此也就不太可能再发生。例如,像“毒刺”导弹这样的智能武器,就把富裕的大国以前部署的昂贵的空中力量,相对于贫穷小国的优势给有效地抵消了。
For good and for ill, by making large-scale military power less decisive, information technology has radically reduced the capacity of the nation-state to impose its authority in an unruly world. If once, as Voltaire said, God was “on the side of bigger battalions,” there appears to be less divine support with every day that passes for generating large returns to violence. Instead, we see the opposite—more evidence of diminishing returns to violence—which strongly implies that large conglomerations like the nation-state will no longer justify their huge overhead costs.
The most obvious evidence of the declining decisiveness of centralized power is the rise of terrorism. High-profile bombings in the United States in the mid-nineties show that even the world’s military superpower is not immune from attack.
Another important manifestation of falling returns to violence is the worldwide growth of gangsterism and organized crime, along with its corollary, political cronyism and corruption. They reflect a generally amoral atmosphere in which the state can coerce but not protect. As its monopoly of violence frays, new competitors edge into the scene, like the bully-boys who tried to impose their own private taxes on the American businessman in Moscow.
Small groups, tribes, triads, gangs, gangsters, mafias, militias, and even solitary individuals have gained increasing military effectiveness. They will exercise far more real power in the “natural economy” of the next millennium than they did in the twentieth century. Weapons that employ microchips have tended to shift the balance of power toward the defense, making decisive aggression less profitable and therefore less likely. Smart weapons, like Stinger missiles, for example, effectively neutralize much of the advantage that large, wealthy states formerly enjoyed in deploying expensive air power to attack poorer, smaller groups.
07未来的信息战争Information War Ahead
“信息战争”的可能性,已经映入眼帘;虽然它被广泛讨论,但却少有人理解。
信息战也表明暴力的回报率越来越低。“逻辑炸弹”可以瘫痪掉空中交通管制系统、铁路调配机制、发电机和配电网络、供水和污水处理系统和电话继电器,甚至军方自己的通信系统都会失效或被破坏。随着人类社会越来越依赖于计算机的控制,“逻辑炸弹”的破坏力,一点不亚于物理爆炸。
而与传统炸弹不同,“逻辑炸弹”可以被远程引爆;而且不仅是敌方政府,自由职业的程序员团体,甚至是有天赋的个人黑客,都可以引爆它。请注意,一名阿根廷少年就因多次入侵五角大楼的计算机,而于 1996 年被捕。虽然到目前为止,黑客们还很少以破坏性的方式篡改计算机控制系统,但这并不是因为有真正有效的方式,可以阻止他们。
当信息战真正打响的时候,参战的对手可能不只是政府。像微软这样的公司,进行信息战的能力,肯定比世界上 90%的民族国家都要强。
Looming ahead is the widely discussed but little-understood possibility of “Information War.” It also points to diminishing returns to violence. “Logic bombs” could disable or sabotage air-traffic control systems, rail-switching mechanisms, power generators and distribution networks, water and sewage systems, telephone relays, even the military’s own communications. As societies become more dependent upon computerized controls, “logic bombs” could do almost as much damage as physical explosions.
Unlike conventional bombs, “logic bombs” could be detonated remotely, not just by hostile governments but by groups of free-lance computer programmers, and even talented individual hackers. Note that an Argentine teenager was arrested in 1996 for repeatedly hacking into Pentagon computers. While to date hackers have not tended to tamper with computer-controlled systems in destructive ways, this is not because there are truly effective ways of stopping them.
When the age of Information War finally arrives, it is unlikely that its antagonists will only be governments. A company like Microsoft certainly has a greater ability to conduct Information War than 90 percent of the world’s nation-states.
08主权个人的时代The Age of the Sovereign Individual
这也是我们将本书命名为《主权个人》的部分原因。随着战争规模的缩小,防御和保护也可以小规模地进行。因此,它们会逐渐成为私人物品而不是公共物品,将由私人承包商基于营利的目的来提供。这一点在北美的警务私有化中已经很明显。在美国,“安保”(security guard)是增长较快的职业之一。根据预测,到 2005 年,私人安保人员的数量预计将比 1990 年增加 24% 到 40%。
警务私有化已经是一个明显的趋势。不过,就像盎格鲁-爱尔兰人、哈米什·麦克雷(Hamish McRae)所指出的,这不可能是政府深思熟虑后决定的结果。
他在《2020 年的世界》(The World in 2020)中写道:没有一个政府做出过具体的决定,要退出部分警务工作;事实上,也没有一个政府退出,是私人部门在进入。部分原因是人们认为警察服务的失败,部分是由于其他的社会变化;总之,私人安保公司逐渐接手了很多保护工作,如针对办公大楼或购物中心内的普通平民。洛杉矶的门禁社区显示,在某种程度上,人们甚至在向中世纪的城市概念迈进;在那里,市民生活在由警卫巡逻的城墙后面,只有通过被把守的大门才能够进入。 我们认为,20 世纪政府的几乎所有职能,将迎来全面的私有化,警务工作只是一个前奏。因为信息技术削弱了政府投射权力以及为大规模组织提供物理安全的能力;而且,在“自然经济”中,每家企业的最优规模都在下降。
为了应对这一技术变革,需要大量的投资需求(或机会),把中心化的脆弱系统,重新设计为分布式系统。如果不解决大规模的脆弱性,相应的系统将面临灾难性的后果。即使不进行设计,迟早有一天,大型官僚机构和公司所提供的产品与服务,也会自动成为高度竞争的市场,通过一种分布式的、分散的网络来管理,而不是由一个“总部”来控制。
拥有一个总部的公司是脆弱的,因为它可能被官方纠察队包围,或者被恐怖分子所破坏。就像《连线》杂志主编凯文·凯利在《失控》中所写的,公司最终将成为没有实体地点的“虚拟公司”,“同时在许多地方运营”。凯利看到,技术已经改变了生产过程,再把它置于集中控制之下已经没有必要;“在工业革命的大部分时间里,真正的财富都是通过把所有工序集中在一个厂房下创造出来的。规模越大,效率越高。”现在不是了。凯利预见到,未来的汽车,即“新贵”汽车,可能只需要十几个人,通过一家虚拟公司合作设计出来,然后就可以投入生产。
在未来,规模过大不仅会适得其反,而且还很危险。大型企业总是会成为更诱人的猎取目标。地下经济从业者都知道,避税的秘诀之一就是避免被发现;相比那些总部位于摩天大楼、招牌闪亮的老牌公司,这对小型的“虚拟公司”要容易得多;前者肯定更容易受到“带着金表、手枪和公司资产打印材料的人”的注意。
这些黑帮分子会像在俄罗斯一样,在全球各地征收打着自己品牌的私人税收。各种规模的企业都可能遭到有组织犯罪团伙的敲诈和勒索。
敲诈勒索者的定义,就是制造威胁,然后收钱减少威胁的人。按照这个标准,政府所提供的保护,基本上都可以算作敲诈勒索。 —— 查尔斯·蒂利
This is part of the reason why we have entitled this book The Sovereign Individual. As the scale of warfare falls, defense and protection will be mounted at a smaller scale. Therefore, they will increasingly be private rather than public goods, provided on a for-profit basis by private contractors. This is already evident in the privatization of policing in North America. One of the more rapidly growing occupations in the United States is the “security guard.” Projections indicate that the number of private security guards will increase 24 percent to 40 percent above 1990 levels by the year 2005.8
The privatization of policing is already a well-defined trend. Yet as Anglo-Irish guru Hamish McRae points out, this is hardly the result of any deliberate decision of government. He writes in The World in 2020:
No government has made a specific decision to move out of some policing tasks, nor indeed, have any moved out; the private sector has moved in. Partly as a result of the perceived failures of the police, partly as a result of other changes in society, private security firms have gradually been taking over much of the job of protecting ordinary civilians in their offices or shopping centres. As the gated communities of Los Angeles show, people are even moving some way back towards the medieval concept of a city, where the citizens live behind town walls patrolled by guards, and where access is possible only at controlled gates.9
We believe that this is only a foretaste of more comprehensive privatization of almost every function undertaken by governments in the twentieth century. Because information technology has undermined the capacity of centralized authority to project power and provide physical security for systems that operate at a large scale, the optimal size of almost every enterprise in the “natural economy” is falling.
To respond to this technological change will entail a massive investment requirement (read opportunity) to redesign vulnerable systems with distributed rather than concentrated capabilities. If vulnerabilities of large scale are not removed, the systems that retain them will be subject to catastrophic failure.
Sooner or later, by default if not by design, services and products provided by large bureaucratic agencies and corporations will devolve into highly competitive markets, managed not from a “headquarters” but through a distributed, decentralized network.
The corporation with a headquarters that can be surrounded by pickets or sabotaged by terrorists will be vulnerable until it ultimately becomes a “virtual corporation” without a location, “dwelling in many places concurrently,” as Kevin Kelly, executive editor of Wired magazine writes in Out Of Control.10 Kelly understands that technology has changed the imperative to bring production processes under centralized control. “For most of the industrial revolution, serious wealth was made by bringing processes under one roof. Bigger was more efficient.” Now it isn’t.
Kelly foresees the possibility that an automobile of the future, the Upstart Car, could be designed and brought to production by as few as a dozen people collaborating in a virtual corporation.
In the future, excessive scale could be not only counterproductive but dangerous. Larger enterprises make more tempting targets. As practitioners of the underground economy demonstrate, one of the secrets of avoiding taxation is to avoid detection. This will be much easier for small-scale, “virtual corporations” than old-line corporations operating out of a skyscraper headquarters with their names in lights. They are bound to be more vulnerable to the attentions of “men with gold watches, pistols and a printout of the firm’s net worth,” the gangsters who will impose their own private brand of taxation in other parts of the globe as they do in Russia. Enterprises on all scales will be vulnerable to criminal shakedowns and impositions from organized criminal gangs.
“[C]onsider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments’ provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering.”11 —CHARLES TILLY
09自然界讨厌垄断Nature Hates Monopolies
随着“大部队”(bigger battalions)对暴力的垄断被打破,可以预见,首先会出现的后果就是有组织犯罪的日益猖獗。毕竟,有组织犯罪团体,是各民族国家进行暴力掠夺的主要竞争者。这么说可能有点不礼貌,但政治学家查尔斯·蒂利提醒我们,不要忘记,政府本身——“具有合法性优势的典型保护网”——就堪称是最大的有组织犯罪集团。
如果你对这个世界一无所知,只知道有一个重要的垄断组织正在瓦解,那么你可以做出的一个最简单、最确定的预测是,最接近它的竞争对手将获得最大的利益。因此,贩毒集团、黑帮、黑手党和各种类型的黑社会,在世界各地泛滥,并非巧合。
As the monopoly on violence enjoyed by the “bigger battalions” breaks down, one of the first results to be expected is increasing prosperity for organized crime. Organized crime, after all, provides the main competition to nation-states in employing violence for predatory purposes. Although it is impolite to say so, it should not be forgotten, as political scientist Charles Tilly reminds us, that governments themselves— “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy—qualify as our largest examples of organized crime.”12
If you knew nothing else about the world other than the fact that an important monopoly was breaking down, one of the simplest and surest predictions you could make is that its nearest competitors would stand to benefit most. It is therefore not a coincidence that drug cartels, gangs, mafias, and triads of various sorts are proliferating around the world.
10权力系统Sistema del Potere
从俄罗斯到日本再到美国,有组织犯罪在经济运行中的重要性,远远超过经济教科书上的描述。西西里人称之为“sistema del potere”,即“权力系统”的有组织犯罪,将对经济的运行发挥越来越重要的决定作用。欧洲警察的官方报告说,包括俄罗斯和意大利黑手党在内的国际犯罪集团,在资助近年来蹂躏了巴尔干地区的种族灭绝战争中,发挥了“主导作用”。
在全球其他地区最近的内战和叛乱中,毒贩的资助也起了关键的作用。西班牙加他罗尼亚的国家警察缉毒队队长胡里奥·费尔南德斯说:“从 1986 年到 1988年,西班牙 80%的海洛因是由泰米尔猛虎组织的游击队,与住在巴塞罗那或马德里的巴基斯坦人合作贩运过来的。当我们逮捕这些人并摧毁该网络之后,取而代之的是来自土耳其的库尔德人,他们在接下来的两年里完全主导了这个网络。”问题是,每当新的内战或叛乱发生时,那些穷困潦倒的战斗人员,都可能会通过贩毒和清洗毒资来资助他们的军事活动。
From Russia to Japan to the United States, organized crime is a far more important factor in the operation of economies than economic textbooks would prepare you to believe. What the Sicilians call the “sistema del potere,” the “system of power,” of organized crime has an increasingly important role to play in determining how economies function.
European police officials report that international crime syndicates, including Russian and Italian mafias, played “a dominant role” in financing the genocidal wars that have racked the Balkans in recent years.
Drug traffickers have also played a key role in financing recent civil wars and insurgencies in other parts of the globe. Julio Fernandez, chief of the Spanish national police drug squad in Catalonia, says, “From 1986 to 1988, 80 percent of the heroin in Spain was carried here by Tamil Tiger guerrillas working with Pakistani residents in Barcelona or Madrid. As soon as we destroyed that network with arrests, it was replaced with Kurds from Turkey, who completely dominated it for the next two years.”13 Chances are, whenever a new civil war or insurgency gets under way, the desperately poor combatants will finance their military effort by delivering drugs and laundering drug money.
11由毒品资助的折扣Drug-Financed Discounting
有组织犯罪集团的活动,对毒品以外的其他商品价格造成了下行压力。在微观层面上,犯罪集团是利用犯罪企业搞到的赃物,来补贴表面上合法的企业。他们可以用低于成本的价格销售普通商品,以此来清洗毒品利润或其他非法资金,从而压低了合法竞争者的价格,导致很多破产。
Organized criminal syndicate activities have placed downward pressures on prices of commodities other than drugs. At the micro level, crime syndicates subsidize apparently legitimate businesses from the spoils of criminal enterprise. They can launder drug profits and other illicit funds by selling ordinary goods below cost, thus undercutting the prices of their clean competitors and putting many out of business.
12山口组与通货紧缩Yakuza Deflation
势力强大的日本黑帮山口组,在 1980 年代末的日本房地产泡沫中,扮演了很关键的角色。尽管九万名山口组成员每年的总收入在 101.9 亿美元(官方估计)到713.5 亿美元(夏藤高津教授的估计)之间;但导致日本银行破产的大量无法收回的贷款中,很大一部分都贷给了由山口组支持的交易。这导致的一个后果就是日本经济的通货紧缩——日本人习惯称之为“价格破坏”。
In Japan, the powerful Yakuza gangs played a key role in Japan’s hyperactive real estate bubble of the late 1980s. In spite of the fact that ninety thousand Yakuza make somewhere between $10.19 billion (official estimate) and $71.35 billion (estimate of Professor Takatsugu Nato) annually, a high proportion of the uncollectible loans that have threatened the solvency of Japan’s banks were made to Yakuza-backed deals.14 The deflation pressures—“price destruction,” as the Japanese call it—that have characterized Japan’s economy are a consequence.
13熟视无睹A Blind Eye
叶利钦自己承认,俄罗斯的黑帮已经与“商业组织、行政机构、内务部门、城市当局等”融合到了一起。黑帮与警察融合后就获得了犯罪豁免权,所以,他们可以公然地暴力强征私人税收。权威人士指出,现在俄罗斯的企业,每 5 家有 4家都要交纳保护费。“根据一些报道,俄罗斯当地的小企业要向勒索者交纳 30%到 50%的利润,而不是向美国商人索要的 7%那么微薄。”在 1993 年,俄罗斯发生了 355,500 起被官方认定为“敲诈勒索”的罪行,其中包括“30,000 起有预谋的杀人案”,大部分都是黑帮团队对商人的暗杀。据前内政部长维克多·叶林将军说,“主要都是因为商业和金融领域的冲突,买凶杀人。”而政府当局往往都“熟视无睹”。
经济学家詹卢卡·菲奥伦蒂尼(Gianluca Fiorentini)和萨姆·佩尔茨曼(Sam Peltzman),在《有组织犯罪的经济学》(Economics of Organized Crime)中写道,犯罪组织“通过对胁迫和腐败的控制”,在经济生活中扮演着关键的角色。从理论上讲,这种影响有时候也是正面,因为它制约了监管,并可能激励政府改善其公共服务。一个强大的黑手党,可以“制约政府当局的垄断程度”。当境内存在实力强大的有组织犯罪集团时,政府只能勉为其难地接纳黑帮反对的政策。
Russia’s mafiyas, as Yeltsin himself has admitted, have merged with “commercial structures, administrative agencies, interior ministry bodies, city authorities…”15 Because of the immunity the mafiyas have achieved by merging with police, they are able to enforce collection of their private taxes through blatant violence. Authoritative sources indicate that four of five Russian businesses now pay protection money. “According to some reports, local small businesses in Russia have to pay 30 to 50 percent of their profits to racketeers, not just the meager 7 percent demanded from the American businessman.”16
In 1993 there were 355,500 crimes in Russia officially designated as examples of “racketeering,” including almost “30,000 premeditated murders,” mostly gangland assassinations of businessmen. According to a former interior minister, General Viktor Yerin, “The bulk were contract killings, because of conflicts in the sphere of commercial and financial activity.” In most cases, authorities turned “a blind eye.”
Criminal organizations “through their control over coercion and corruption,” as economists Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman write in The Economics of Organized Crime, play a key role in the economy.17 In theory, this influence can sometimes be beneficial because it constrains regulation and may encourage governments to improve their delivery of public goods. The presence of a powerful mafia “constrains the monopolistic role of government authorities.”18 Governments in territories with powerful organized crime groups can only with great difficulty entertain policies that the mafias oppose.
14官匪勾结Collusion
事实上,需要看到的是,大多数政府都很少直接对抗黑帮,虽然黑帮是它们在有组织强制方面的主要竞争对手。从严格的经济学角度看,这一点也不奇怪。公共行政部门的当选者所能成就的最有利可图的措施,就是与有组织犯罪集团达成“合谋协议”。菲奥伦蒂尼和佩尔茨曼指出,“有证据表明,在大量的协议中,犯罪组织确保对候选人团伙的政治支持,而后者则通过在公共采购和公共服务方面的便利或进行补贴来回报。”与好莱坞电影给人的印象相反,渗透和欺诈政府,现在是西西里黑手党及其他犯罪组织的重点工作之一。“大多数学者认为,到目前为止,西西里黑手党最大的业务,恰恰是侵占不同来源的公共开支,以及针对地方、国家和欧共体的补贴项目的欺诈。”
In fact, it is notable how infrequently most governments are willing to directly confront the mafias that are their main competitors in the use of organized coercion. In strictly economic terms, this is not surprising. The most profitable arrangement that “the elected members of the public administration” can strike is a “collusive agreement” with organized crime. Fiorentini and Peltzman note that “there has been evidence of large-scale agreements where organized crime ensures political support for groups of candidates, while the latter repay the favour through a favourable management of public procurements and the provision of public services or subsidies.”19
Contrary to the impression conveyed by Hollywood, penetrating and defrauding governments now appears to be one of the main focuses of criminal organizations like the Sicilian mafia. “Most scholars think that by now the greatest business of the Sicilian mafia is precisely that of appropriating the different sources of public expenditures and of organizing frauds against the local, national and European Community schemes of subsidization.”20
15毒枭共和国Narco Republics
在《大清算》一书中,我们提出过警示,世界上很多国家的政府都被毒枭彻底腐蚀了。墨西哥就是一个无可争议的例子。前墨西哥联邦副总检察长爱德华多·瓦莱·埃斯皮诺萨在辞职声明中,把墨西哥的制度说得一清二楚。“任何人设计的政治项目,如果不让毒贩头目或者他们的金主分一杯羹的话,都是不可能的。如果你坚持要做,你就会死。”瓦莱表示,收受贿赂使墨西哥警察局长的收入无比丰厚,以致于有人为了得到录用,最高支付 200 万美元去贿选。即使经过严格的盈亏核算,买通一个地方警察职位也是一笔超值的投资。贩毒集团甚至会向级别很低的墨西哥官员行贿,因为这可以使他们的犯罪行为被免于起诉。
哥伦比亚是另外一个政府高层被毒枭控制的国家。美国政府最近撤销了哥伦比亚总统埃内斯托·桑佩尔的签证,因为他在明知的情况下接受毒贩的政治献金,为其提供好处。
As we warned in The Great Reckoning, many governments in the world are thoroughly corrupted by drug lords. Mexico is an indisputable example. Former Mexican federal deputy attorney general Eduardo Valle Espinosa put the Mexican system in perspective in his resignation statement: “Nobody can outline a political project in which the heads of drug trafficking and their financiers are not included. Because if you do, you die.” Valle indicated that bribes make serving as a Mexican police chief so lucrative that candidates pay up to $2 million just to get hired. In a strict profit-and-loss accounting, buying a local police office can be a lucrative investment. Drug cartels are willing to pay fortunes to even low-ranking Mexican officials because the money buys them immunity from prosecution for their crimes.
Colombia is another country where the top rungs of government are dominated by drug lords. The U.S. authorities have recently revoked the U.S. visa of Colombian president Ernesto Samper on grounds that he knowingly received political contributions from drug dealers in exchange for favors.
16五十步笑百步Pot Calls the Kettle Black
任何人如果在 1990 年代关注过,我们《战略投资》的通讯报道的话,都会立刻意识到,克林顿政府对桑佩尔的姿态颇具讽刺意味。因为有可靠的证据表明,桑佩尔被指控的行为,美国总统比尔·克林顿都做过,而且更严重。如果你不相信我们的话,那么有两本做过深入研究的书籍,双方的作者持相对的政治立场,书中都用丰富的细节强调了克林顿不堪的背景。
罗杰·莫里斯(Roger Morris),总体上持左翼观点,他曾是尼克松政府的国家安全官员,也是迪安·艾奇逊(Dean Acheson)、林登·约翰逊(Lyndon Johnson)总统和沃尔特·蒙代尔(Walter Mondale)的高级助手。莫里斯拥有哈佛大学博士学位。他的《权力的伙伴》一书,详细描述了克林顿肮脏的过去,相比之下,桑佩尔简直就是一个童子军。
莫里斯讲述了克林顿在阿肯色州温泉市的童年,他自幼失父,当地是赌博、卖淫和有组织犯罪的中心,他的大部分家人都与这些活动有一定的联系。他的继叔雷蒙德·克林顿,一直被比尔·克林顿视为是“父亲的形象”,据说他是迪克西黑手党的“教父”级人物。
莫里斯指称,比尔·克林顿入职了中情局,在牛津大学的学生时代,他一直在监视反越战的活动家。在莫里斯看来,克林顿在担任州长期间,一直是中情局的资产,为中情局在阿肯色州以梅纳市为中心,进行的毒品和枪支走私活动提供便利。
莫里斯似乎是把中情局作为一个整体,来控诉其贩毒行为,而没有考虑克林顿也是该腐败机构的一份子;而在我们看来,后者的可能性更大。但不管是哪种情况,都表明了美国政府重要的秘密情报机构,直接或间接地参与了大规模的有组织贩毒活动。如果中情局还不是有组织犯罪的附属机构,那么它已经很危险地接近于这个角色了。
Anyone who has followed the reports in our newsletter, Strategic Investment, during the 1990s will immediately recognize the irony in the Clinton administration’s posturing about Samper. There is credible evidence that U.S. President Bill Clinton has done everything Samper is accused of, and worse. Even if you would not take our word for it, Clinton’s background is highlighted in gaudy detail in two well-researched books by authors on opposite sides of the political divide.
Roger Morris, who takes a generally left-wing perspective, was a national security official in the Nixon administration, as well as a senior aide to Dean Acheson, President Lyndon Johnson, and Walter Mondale. Morris has a doctorate from Harvard University. His book, Partners in Power, details a sordid past for Clinton that makes Samper seem like a Boy Scout.
Morris recounts Clinton’s fatherless childhood in Hot Springs, Arkansas, a center of gambling, prostitution, and organized crime to which most of his family had some connection. Clinton’s step-uncle, Raymond Clinton, to whom Bill Clinton referred as a “father figure,” was reputedly a leading “Godfather” figure in the Dixie mafia.
Morris alleges that Bill Clinton became a CIA recruit and spent his student days at Oxford monitoring anti-Vietnam War activists. As Morris sees things, Clinton remained a CIA asset through his period as governor, facilitating a CIA drug- and gun-running operation centered in Mena, Arkansas. Morris seems to indict the CIA as a whole for drug trafficking, rather than entertaining the possibility that Clinton threw in with a corrupt faction of the agency, which seems more probable to us. Either interpretation, however, still suggests that the main covert intelligence agency of the U.S. government either directly or indirectly participates in organized drug running on a large scale. If the CIA is not an adjunct of organized crime, it is tripping dangerously close to being so.21
172.5亿分之一的概率One Chance in 250,000,000
尽管如此,《权力的伙伴》中包含的细节,会让每个研究现代美国政治腐败的学生感兴趣。不过,莫里斯的矛头也不是全部指向比尔·克林顿,还有他的妻子。
例如,关于希拉里进行商品交易的这段描述,希拉里的操作堪称神奇。“在 1995 年,奥本大学和北佛罗里达大学的经济学家们,利用所有的交易记录以及华尔街日报的市场数据,对第一夫人的交易进行了复杂的计算机模型统计,结果发表在《经济与统计杂志》上。根据他们的计算,希拉里·罗德姆进行合法交易的概率,不到 2.5 亿分之一。”在克林顿任州长期间,阿肯色州的贩毒和洗钱活动蓬勃发展;莫里斯收集了大量详细的罪证。“经由航班贩运带来的毒品和资金规模巨大,使得阿肯色州小小的梅纳市,在 20 世纪 80 年代,成为了世界麻醉品交易中心之一……”莫里斯引用一位亲信的证词说,克林顿“他知道”。
克林顿不仅知道可卡因走私,而且告诉州警察 L.D.布朗——克林顿的前保镖,克林顿帮他在中情局获得一个职位,毒品走私不是中情局的行动。“哦,不,”克林顿说,“那是拉萨特的生意。”丹·拉萨特,已被判刑的可卡因经销商,是克林顿的主要政治金主之一,此人从阿肯色州的生意中赚取了数百万美元;据说他曾把 30 万美元现金装在牛皮纸袋里,送给了当时的肯塔基州州长约翰·布朗。据莫里斯说,拉萨特“并不只是另外一个需要克林顿恭敬相待的大捐赠者,他们的关系非常亲近,克林顿定期到他的经纪公司拜访,并随时会到拉萨特的豪宅里私下会面。”莫里斯记述说,经常带克林顿去豪宅的拉萨特的司机,“是一个判过刑的杀人犯,身上带着枪,而且人人都知道他兼职贩毒。”总之,根据莫里斯的描述,美国总统与毒贩之间的关系,似乎比他所指称的,哥伦比亚总统埃内斯托·桑佩尔和卡利集团3之间的关系还要好。
哇!鲍勃讲了一些连希拉里都不会说的比尔·克林顿的事。 —— P. J. O’Rourke
埃米特·小泰勒尔(R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr.),是《美国旁观者》杂志的主编,并非莫里斯那样的左派自由主义者。但在他的《少年克林顿》一书中,也包含了莫里斯引用到的诸多细节,把克林顿描述为一个腐败的政客,与毒品交易和其他犯罪活动密切相关。事实上,《少年克林顿》的序言中,就引述了克林顿前保镖 L. D.布朗的话,布朗提出一个耸人听闻的指控,说克林顿是暗杀小组的同谋,这个组织是为了解决掉那些梅纳毒品交易的证人。
布朗更具体地指证说,1986 年 6 月 18 日,他本人被派往墨西哥的巴亚尔塔港,随身携带着一支比利时制造的 F.A.L 轻型自动步枪。布朗在旅行中化名为迈克尔·约翰逊,他的任务是杀掉特里·里德(Terry Reed)。
里德,你们可能还记得,《妥协:克林顿、布什和中情局》(Compromised: Clinton, Bush and the CIA)一书的作者之一,在 1994 年引起了公众的注意。《妥协》一书的论点是,中情局“已经拉拢了总统”,它的“黑暗的活动,就像癌症一样,已经转移到了政府机关”。更具体地说,里德与他的合著者指称,克林顿和布什都被拉下了水,参与了阿肯色州的非法活动,包括贩毒。
布朗没有按照指示杀死里德。他们设法活了下来,并至少讲出了他们的部分故事;相比当时及后来与克林顿有关的人,他们要幸运得多。想想已经去世的杰里·帕克斯,他在 1992 年为克林顿·戈尔的总部提供安保,在 1993 年 9 月的一次黑帮式暗杀中被枪杀。据伦敦的《星期日电讯报》报道,帕克斯的遗孀独家披露,是已故的文森特·福斯特(Vincent Foster)雇用了帕克斯,让他监视比尔·克林顿。
整个故事可谓曲折离奇,几近荒诞。
福斯特为什么要编制一份对克林顿不利的信息档案,谁也不知道。(他自己说是为了希拉里。)但不管怎么样,这都证明了官方对福斯特的描述是虚伪的,说什么他是一个天真的乡下孩子,被华盛顿无情的政治所震惊,最后在绝望中自杀了。随着每一点新的发现,这个荒诞的故事都变得更加荒诞。
Nonetheless, Partners in Power contains details that would interest any student of the corruption of modern American politics. And by no means, however, are all of Morris’s fingers pointed at Bill Clinton. His wife comes in for some critical attention as well. For example, consider this excerpt from Morris’s account of Hillary Clinton’s miraculous commodity trading: “In 1995 economists at Auburn and North Florida Universities ran a sophisticated computer statistical model of the First Lady’s trades for publication in the Journal of Economics and Statistics, using all the available records as well as market data from the Wall Street Journal. The probability of Hillary Rodham’s having made her trades legitimately, they calculated, was less than one in 250,000,000.”22
Morris musters many incriminating details about the drug-running and money-laundering operation that prospered in Arkansas under Clinton. “By the sheer magnitude of the drugs and money its flights generated, tiny Mena, Arkansas, became in the 1980s one of the world centers of the narcotics trade…”23 Morris quotes an intimate as testifying about Clinton that “He knew.”
Clinton not only knew of the cocaine smuggling but told state trooper L. D. Brown, a former bodyguard whom Clinton helped to land a position with the CIA, that the drug running was not a CIA operation. “ ‘Oh, no,’ Clinton said, ‘That’s Lasater’s deal.’ ”24
Dan Lasater, convicted cocaine distributor, was one of Clinton’s major financial supporters, a man who made millions from Arkansas state business and once reportedly gave $300,000 in cash in a brown paper bag to then Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown. According to Morris, Lasater “was never merely another big donor to be paid special deference, but an extraordinary intimate whom Clinton visited regularly at his brokerage and who came to the mansion whenever he pleased.”25 Morris recounts that Lasater’s driver, who frequently brought him to the mansion, was “a convicted murderer who carried a gun and was widely known to deal drugs on the side.”26 According to Morris’s account, the President of the United States appears to have been on warmer terms with a drug dealer than the relationship alleged between Colombian president Ernesto Samper and the Cali cartel.
“Whew! Bob says things about Bill Clinton that even Hillary wouldn’t say.” —P. J. O’ROURKE
R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., editor-in-chief of The American Spectator, is not a left liberal like Morris. But his account Boy Clinton contains many of the same details cited by Morris in painting a portrait of Clinton as a corrupt politician, intimately linked to drug dealing and other crimes. Indeed, the Prologue to Boy Clinton quotes L. D. Brown, Clinton’s former bodyguard, making the sensational allegation that Clinton was complicit in death-squad activity designed to eliminate witnesses who were knowledgeable about drug dealing at Mena.
Specifically, Brown testifies that he was personally dispatched to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, on June 18, 1986, with a Belgian-made F.A.L. light automatic rifle. Traveling under the alias Michael Johnson, Brown was to have shot and killed Terry Reed.
Reed, as you may remember, came to public attention in 1994 as the coauthor of Compromised: Clinton, Bush and the CIA. The thesis of Compromised is that the CIA has “co-opted the presidency,” and that its “black operations, like a cancer have metastasized the organs of government.” More specifically, Reed and his coauthor claim that both Clinton and Bush were deeply compromised by involvement in illegal activities in Arkansas, including drug trafficking.
Brown did not kill Reed, as instructed. He and Reed managed to survive to tell at least part of their tales, which makes them luckier than others who were involved with Clinton, then and later. Consider the late Jerry Parks, who provided security for the Clinton-Gore headquarters in 1992 and was shot dead, in a gangland-style assassination, in September 1993. In another bizarre twist to a twisted tale, London’s Sunday Telegraph has revealed, on the basis of exclusive information provided by Parks’s widow, that Parks was hired to spy on Bill Clinton by the late Vincent Foster.
Why Foster wanted to compile a dossier of compromising information on Clinton is anyone’s guess. (He said he was doing it for Hillary.) But in any event it belies the official depiction of Foster as a naïve country boy, so shocked by the ruthless ways of Washington that he killed himself in despair. That never-plausible story becomes less plausible with each new revelation.27
18黑帮的总统The Mob’s President
虽然证据明确证实,美国总统与有组织犯罪和犯罪分子联系紧密,污点重重,但全世界都回避这个棘手的结论。莫里斯引用了一位前美国检察官的话,他曾负责追踪有组织犯罪团伙及其利益链条。他声称,克林顿在 1984 年当选州长的选举,“是黑帮分子真正开始介入阿肯色州政治的一场选举。他们是些斗狗、赛马的年轻人,看到好东西就会下手……他们超越了这里的老迪克西黑手党,相比之下,后者就是小玩闹。东岸和西岸的犯罪资金,跟合法的公司一样,都注意到了在这里发展的可能性。”显然,其他有类似想法的人,也一直在关注克林顿犯罪的可能性。
在《读者文摘》早前发表的一篇文章之后,《纽约》杂志继续报道说,“总统在工会中的主要盟友,都与美国最肮脏、最黑道的一些工会关系紧密。”其中特别令人感兴趣的,是克林顿与亚瑟·科亚的关系。科亚是克林顿的“首要筹款人之一”,他是国际劳动联盟北美地区的主席,该组织是“劳工史上最张扬的腐败工会之一”。
很明显,克林顿领导下的司法部与科亚达成了某种合作,《纽约》杂志称之为“奇怪的慷慨交易”,这使得科亚“虽然面临司法部提出的证据确凿的指控,即他是有组织犯罪分子的长期同谋,但仍然能够保住工作”。
无论特里·里德关于“中情局已经把总统职位收编了”的说法是否正确,但对于一个有权进行“黑色行动”的秘密组织内的个人来说,显然会受到极大的诱惑,放纵于赫舒拉发教授所说的理性选择,即采用“非法手段去获取资源”。
鉴于技术变革正在削弱大规模军事力量的决定性作用,接下来,人们应该会看到腐败现象的激增,如果有组织犯罪集团没有直接接管政府的话。我们同意赫舒拉发的一个观点,即“政治经济学的制度永远不可能完美到完全取代……自然经济的基本现实”。
维托·坦吉睿智地指出,政治腐败“代表了国家的私有化,而这种私有化,并不像通常的私有化那样,把权力转移到市场上,而是转移到了政府官员和官僚系统中”。事实上,克林顿领导下的联邦调查局和其他警务部门,就是这样。“法治”正在变成克林顿和他的亲信们想要的样子。
目前,似乎还没什么证据表明,这些腐败关系的细节会对选民产生任何影响,即使它们在被大众媒体报道和讨论。相反的是,对于美国总统涉嫌参与贩毒、洗钱及其他更恶劣的罪行,好像没什么人关注。
这让人想起已故的沃尔特·李普曼(Walter Lippmann)的忧虑,即选民缺乏看透他所说的“虚构人格”(fictitious personalities)的洞察力。他认为,选民被“奉承和谄媚所误导,然后被卑鄙的虚伪所背叛。这种虚伪告诉他们,他们可以用手中的选票来决定,什么是真,什么是假;什么是对,什么是错。”李普曼察觉到,“宪政秩序的崩溃”,可能导致“西方走向急剧的灾难性衰落……在短短的时间内,我们已经严重堕落。……我们所看到的已不能称之为衰败——尽管旧的架构在大面积瓦解——而是历史性的灾难”。
问题在于,政治判断预期说是对现实世界的反应,不如说是普通公众对超出他们直接认知之外的现象,所构建的一种伪现实的反应。但如果你被别人的认知限制所支配,那就是你的错。即使你不在乎文森特·福斯特是否被谋杀,以及他的谋杀是否被美国政府所掩盖,包括警察部门的高层和相关的官员,甚至包括现任的特别检察官肯尼斯·斯塔尔,即使你对这一切都无所谓,你也可能要考虑了解一下,有组织犯罪集团和白宫之间更广泛的关系模式。
从长远来看,最高层的政治腐败,会使传统上对民主之可能性的赞美成为无稽之谈;传统认为,民主是处理公共问题的审慎之道。在信息时代,政府的规模和权势都不重要,重要的是它的诚实。政府在以往所提供的大部分服务,在下一个千年肯定会下放到私人市场。从世界各地的证据来看,长期依靠一个腐败的系统和腐败的领导人,来保障你的家庭和投资安全,其可行性是非常值得怀疑的。
正如莫里斯所言:“克林顿夫妇不仅仅是个表象,而是在更大层面上,象征着两党制度在世纪末走进了死胡同。”维托·坦吉在他关于腐败的文章中指出,“遏制腐败的唯一方式,就是大幅缩减公共干预的规模。”而信息革命正是如此,它将极大地“缩减公共干预的规模”,并在此基础之上,为道德和诚实的重生带来希望。信息革命对于道德还将产生另外一个重要的影响:当网络商务和虚拟公司都用牢不可破的加密技术进行交流,它们会变得更加脆弱。因为这使得组织内部的窃贼,或者虚拟组织,变得更加难以被发现;被偷走的钱,或者被出卖的商业机密、专利或其他有价值的经济资产,几乎不可能被追回。
犯罪是可以收到回报的,很多人觉得,通过非法的掠夺来补充合法的生产活动,是值得尝试的。与过去两个世纪的大部分时间里,西方社会普遍存在的情况不同,罪犯并不是在社会上毫无地位的边缘人。当犯罪有所回报的时候,你会看到一个层级更高的罪犯群体,因为犯罪很少会遭到什么社会公愤。例如,西西里的黑手党,以及许多以高价雇佣当地劳动力的毒贩,在他们的地盘上都颇受群众的支持和尊重。
While the world as a whole draws back from the disturbing conclusion that the President of the United States is tainted by close association with organized crime and criminals, that is what the evidence suggests. Morris quotes a former U.S. Attorney who tracked organized crime figures and their interests. He claims that Clinton’s election as governor in 1984 “was the election when the mob really came into Arkansas politics, the dog-track and racetrack boys, the payoff people who saw a good thing… it went beyond our old Dixie Mafia, which was penny-ante by comparison. This was eastern and West Coast crime money that noticed the possibilities just like the legitimate corporations did.”28
Apparently, others of like mind have continued to notice the possibilities with Clinton. New York magazine, following an earlier piece in Reader’s Digest, reports that “the president’s key allies in the trade-union movement are also men affiliated with what to all appearances are some of the dirtiest, most mobbed-up unions in America.”29 Of particular interest is Clinton’s close relationship with Arthur Coia. Coia, who is one of Clinton’s “prime fund raisers,” is president of the Laborers International Union of North America, “one of the most flamboyantly corrupt unions in labor history.”30
Apparently, the Justice Department under Mr. Clinton struck what New York describes as a “weirdly generous deal” with Coia “to keep his job in the face of compelling charges from that very same Justice Department that he is a long-time associate of organized-crime figures.”31
Whether or not Terry Reed’s thesis is correct that “the CIA has co-opted the presidency,” there is obviously a strong temptation for individuals within a covert organization authorized to undertake “black operations” to indulge in Professor Hirshleifer’s rational choice of employing “unlawful means of acquiring resources.”
Given the technological change that is reducing the decisiveness of massed military power in the world, one should perhaps expect to see increasing corruption, if not outright takeover of governments by organized criminal enterprises.
Hirshleifer argues, and we agree, that “the institutions of political economy can never be so perfect as to entirely displace… the underlying realities of natural economy.”32 Power is devolving in the “natural economy.” This implies far-reaching shifts in the internal margins of power in society.
Political corruption, as Vito Tanzi shrewdly notes, “represents a privatization of the state in which its power is not shifted to the market, as privatization normally implies, but to government officials and bureaucrats.”33 In effect, this has happened to the FBI and other police agencies under Clinton. The “rule of law” is becoming whatever Clinton and his cronies want it to be.
As of now, there seems little evidence that details of these corrupt connections will carry any weight with voters, even if they were taken up and discussed in the mass media. To the contrary. There seems to be little concern about hints that the President of the United States is complicit in drug running, money laundering, and worse.
This brings to mind the late Walter Lippmann’s fear that voters lacked the perception to see through what he called fictitious personalities. He thought that voters “are ill-served by flattery and adulation. And they are betrayed by the servile hypocrisy which tells them that what is true and what is false, what is right and what is wrong, can be determined by their votes.”34
Lippmann perceived a “breakdown in the constitutional order” that could be “the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of Western society.… We have fallen far in a short span of time.… What we have seen is not only decay—though much of the old structure is dissolving—but something which can be called an historic catastrophe.”35
The problem is that political judgments seem less a response to the real world than to a pseudoreality that the general public has constructed about phenomena beyond their direct knowledge.36 But it is a mistake for you to be governed by the limits of what others see. Even if you do not give a twig whether Vincent Foster was murdered, and his murder covered up by the top police agencies and responsible officials of the U.S. government, including even the current special prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, you might want to consider evidence of the broader pattern of ties between organized criminal enterprise and the White House.
In the long run, political corruption at the highest levels makes nonsense of conventional celebration of the possibilities of democracy for the deliberate mastery of public problems. In the Information Age it will be much less important that government be large and powerful than that it be honest. Most of the services that governments historically provided are destined to devolve into the private market in the next millennium. But it is doubtful on the evidence from around the world whether you can long depend upon a corrupted system with corrupt leaders for the security of your family and investments.
As Morris says, “[T]he Clintons are not merely symptomatic, but emblematic of the larger bipartisan system at its end-of-century dead end.”37
Vito Tanzi, in his essay on corruption, shows that “the only way to deter corruption is to reduce significantly the scale of public intervention.”38 The Information Revolution will significantly reduce “the scale of public intervention” and on that basis holds out hope for a rebirth of morality and honesty. The other obvious implication of the Information Revolution for morality is an increased vulnerability that comes with the possibility of cybercommerce and virtual corporations communicating with unbreakable encryption. Internal thieves within an organization, even a virtual organization, will be more difficult to detect and it will be all but impossible to recover money that is stolen or received covertly for selling trade secrets, patents, or other valuable economic assets.
Crime pays, and many find it attractive to supplement lawful, productive pursuits with unlawful, predatory ones. Unlike the usual situation that prevailed in Western societies through most of the past two centuries, criminals are not merely misfits, without social standing. When crime pays, you tend to get a better class of criminal because little social odium attaches to crime. The Sicilian Mafia, for example, along with many drug dealers who employ local labor at inflated rates, command respect and popular support on their home turf.
19道德秩序及其敌人THE MORAL ORDER AND ITS ENEMIES
所有强大的社会都具有坚实的道德基础。关于经济发展史的所有研究都表明,道德和经济之间有着紧密的联系。成功的国家和群体之所以成功,部分原因在于它们的道德观,普遍鼓励自力更生、勤奋工作、注重家庭和社会责任、高储蓄、为人诚实等经济美德。社会中的亚群体尤其是这样。犹太人,特别是信教的犹太人,新英格兰的清教徒,十八、十九世纪英国经商的贵格会教徒,或者现代美国的摩门教教徒,他们的商业成功都显示出,具有强大道德支撑的文化,所能带来的经济效益。
以贵格会4为例。贵格会成员在商业上非常成功,特别是作为银行家,原因有很多。他们给自己设定了尽可能高的信任标准。他们虽然不会发誓,但认为每一项商业承诺都像誓言一样具有约束力。对他们来说,“言出必行”(my word is my bond)是一个绝对的原则。他们信奉平静、体面又节俭的生活方式。而出于宗教责任,他们不会把钱用于虚荣的世俗消费上。他们避免参与争吵,认为战争永远是罪恶的。作为商人,他们觉得负有提供公平价值的道德义务,通过以适当的价格保持高质量的服务,他们建立了良好的声誉。对他们而言,仅仅遵循“买者自慎”(caveat emptor)的原则还远远不够。在大多数商人遵循高价格、高利润的贸易理论的时代,贵格会成员的道德观,使他们自然而然地采取了低利润、高周转率的策略。就像亨利·福特后来所展现出来,这种策略可能更加赚钱。他们之所以采用这样的经商原则,因为他们觉得不能欺骗客户,是事实证明这也是扩大业务的最佳途径。
经实践检验,贵格会的人是值得信赖的生意伙伴,所以他们的回头客越来越多,双方实现了共赢。贵格会以履行义务为荣,他们是一个储蓄率很高的社群,所以,经营银行业有天然的优势;而贵格会的成员资格本身就是一种商业资产,更激发了贵格教徒的信心。
不幸的是,这种商业优势可能会被其成功所反噬。国家有一个发展的周期,这构成了 18 世纪亚当·弗格森(Ferguson)社会学的理论基础,即从贫穷开始勤奋工作,然后到富裕,到奢侈,再到颓废,最终衰落。古罗马人自己也回顾过共和国时期的美德,当时帝国正在建立,并为后来人们的奢侈和懒惰痛恨不已,认为这是导致帝国衰落的主要原因。繁荣富裕对勤劳节俭的美德的侵蚀,速度可能是惊人的。现在的德国人,仍然是一个能力和效率都很出众的民族,但他们已经不像1945 年在战败的废墟上重建国家时那么努力了。在两代人的时间里,德国人从一穷二白中长时间地工作并白手起家,变成了只需工作很短的时间,就可以获得地球上最高的工资和最好的福利。
1995 年 10 月,16 个德国雇主协会签署了《彼得堡宣言》。宣言中充满了抱怨,但是理由充分;它反映了德国工业士气的下降:德国的税收负担在 1995 年达到了历史最高水平,特别是由于团结附加费和护理报销费。德国的公司税总额超过了 60%以上,远远高于 35%至 40%的国际同类水平。公共部门的惯例,如晋升的监管、终身制的工作和高额的养老金,必须被自由市场的择优晋升和补偿规则所取代。德国是世界上劳动力成本最高的国家,工资政策必须考虑减轻企业的成本,以此来降低失业率……工资增长应该根据竞争力和生产力来衡量……。工会的行为必须改变。每年一次的运动、呼吁、工人动员、威胁和警告式罢工,是很有害的。 德国人,特别是年轻人和富裕的继承者,已经丧失了勤劳工作的优良传统,这引起了德国社会包括科尔总理的普遍焦虑。
大众汽车公司现在的劳动合同,给每个汽车工人的工资,都是世界上最高的,还要加上福利税,换来的是每周 28 个小时的工作,即四天,每天 7 个小时。战后的德国现在已经是一个大规模的就业输出国。在 19 世纪中叶,英国被认为是世界上效率最高的工业国家;100 年之后,它们的这个声誉肯定已经易主了。而繁荣的循环总是会破坏辛勤工作和适度期待的美德,这些美德往往存在于工业成功发展的早期阶段。国家无法延续其早期的社会美德,就像个人很容易因为成功而变得懒惰又贪婪。
毋庸置疑,全球性投资将会奖励勤劳的美德,并惩罚那些贪婪和懒惰的人。这是理所应当的。事实上,你可以说,稳健的投资必须建立在道德以及纯粹的财务评估之上。18 世纪的英国人认购贵格会银行的资本,可能获得了很好的收益。在19 世纪,贵格会教徒投资于巧克力企业,因为他们觉得可可比酒精更健康;这大概也是对的。但对弗莱公司(Fry)或吉百利公司(Cadbury)的投资,肯定是很好的投资。投资者应该避开颓废期。即使德国仍在欧洲市场上保持着强势地位,而且工业技能很高,但高昂的劳动力成本和极短的工作时间,已经降低了德国未来的潜力。
社会道德与经济成功密不可分。但是,什么因素有助于维持或倾向于破坏社会道德呢?20 世纪上半叶伟大的历史哲学家阿诺德·汤因比,提出了挑战与回应的理论。社会因挑战而焕发出活力,并能发展出人们甚至不知道自己拥有的美德。
一直以来,人类都知道,困难时期会比繁荣时期激发出更健康的反应,确实如此。
在我们个人的生活中,每个人都努力想让自己生活得舒服一些,希望住在漂亮的房子里,有一份自己喜欢的工作,银行里有足够的钱,等等。为实现这些目标而进行奋斗是有意义的。我们上学,参加培训,在生意场和职场上打拼,都是为了梦想成真。
而有很多人,在功成名就之后,却陷入到了困境之中。也许是,苦斗好过成就。
本世纪初,伟大的瑞士心理学家卡尔·荣格收治了一位美国商人。这个商人在年轻的时候就充满雄心壮志。他努力工作建立了自己的企业,并在 40 岁之前赚到了足够的钱,可以退休。他娶了一个年轻美丽的女人,买了一所漂亮的房子,组建了新的家庭。他的生意非常成功,在 40 岁,他确实卖掉企业退休了,成为了一个富有而独立的人,无忧无虑。一开始,他确实享受自由的生活,终于能够做他想做的事情。他带着家人去欧洲旅行,参观美术馆等等。但渐渐地,这些兴趣和自由感,都开始变得苍白。他开始回想那段不自由的日子,那时候他全身心地扑在工作上,有很多生意上的烦恼,但那时候他很快乐。这一切让他陷入了抑郁症,最后由他的妻子带着他来找荣格看病。荣格做了诊断,认为问题其实在于他的创造力失去了出口,那些能量转向了他自身,正在摧毁他。这个诊断可能是对的,但没能治愈他。这位商人始终未能从他的精神崩溃中恢复。
对我们人类来说,重要的是奋斗而不是成就,我们是为行动而生的,而成就可能会让人大失所望。雄心壮志总是会催人奋进,不管是为了什么目的,而奋斗的过程也往往比结果更令人享受,即使最终得偿所愿。当然,对大部分人来说,目标都无法完全实现。我们没有挣到那么多钱,没能住上梦想中的房子,我们不得不满足有缺憾的生活。
有一种社会意识,在 19 世纪通过不同的方式得到了强化,它认为美德是动态的,美德在于努力而不在于结果。阿瑟·休·克拉夫(Arthur Hugh Clough)有一首著名的诗歌,在第二次世界大战的生死斗争中,给许多人带来了安慰。值得注意的是,交战国的自杀率在二战中均有所下降;也许,战争的挣扎也比无所事事的压抑要好。
不要说奋斗终是徒劳,辛劳和创伤白费无功, 敌人尚未力竭,更未被打倒,事物一切照旧,依然毫无变动。 倘若希望是虚妄,恐慌则是骗徒,你可看见远处的硝烟弥漫? 即便在此刻,战友们也在将逃敌驱逐, 若非你拖后腿,早已将敌军阵地攻占。 疲惫的波浪徒然拍打海滩, 仿佛再努力也无法向前一寸, 可是就在附近的河口与港湾, 大海的满潮已经无声涌进。 每当白昼来到世间,光芒不仅仅射进东窗, 在正面,太阳攀援多么迟缓, 但向西看吧,遍地洒满霞光!
这种积极的竞争,依然触动着现代人的感官。而很多人确实就过着这样的生活方式,在不断的奋斗中,抓住恶劣环境中的潜在机会。我们生活在一个充满竞争的世界里,而且大多数并不想从中退缩。当然,也有人属于沉思性的精神气质,那是非常少见的。
美国最伟大的哲学家威廉·詹姆士(William James),1891 年在耶鲁大学的哲学俱乐部的讲话中,对上述的动态道德观,提出了一种类似的 19 世纪的观点:在人的道德生活中,最深层的区别,在于人究竟处于轻松还是紧张的精神状态。当处于轻松的状态时,对眼前病痛的畏惧就会统治着我们的思虑。相反,紧张的状态会使我们对当前的折磨无动于衷,一心想着实现更大的理想。紧张情绪的潜能在每个人身上沉睡,但有些人更加难以唤醒。它需要更加狂野的激情予以刺激,需要巨大的恐惧、爱和愤慨;或者一些更高程度的忠诚,如正义、真理和自由的深刻呐喊。
强烈的解脱是打开视野的必需,如果所有的山峰都被推倒,所有的山谷都被填平,这样的世界并非理想的居住之地。这也是为什么那种激烈的情绪,在一个孤独的哲学家身上可能会永远沉睡不醒。因为他的各种理想,仅为自己所知,那只能算是他的偏好,而且其价值限于同一个维度;他可以随意地在头脑中摆弄,或快或慢。
同样,这也是为什么,在一个没有上帝只剩下人类的世界里,我们对道德的呼唤,远没有激发出它最大的能量。当然,即使在这样一个世界里,生活也是一首真正的道德交响曲;但它只在几个可怜的八度空间内演奏着,无限的价值尺度未能被打开。 威廉·詹姆士认为,动态的道德可以延伸到宗教领域,它的重点在于做而不是存在,在于行动而非畏缩。关于竞争与生存的道德,在亚当·斯密(1776 年)、托马斯·马尔萨斯(1798 年)和查尔斯·达尔文(1859 年)的作品中,都做了强有力的拓展。这是主导着当今世界经济秩序的道德律,对它的中心思想需要认真地审视。
达尔文主义的主导思想是:物竞天择、适者生存,自然选择的过程塑造了物种的特性。在动物中,这个过程是随机突变的结果;现在的人知道这属于基因遗传,而达尔文本人则只能猜测。但是,人类社会的生存取决于以人类智慧为基础的文化选择。文化改变人类社会,就像基因改变其他物种一样。所以,我们的社会可能会变化得很快;它不用像随机的基因突变那样,要经过很多代的演化。人类发展出了文化选择,取代了动物界的自然选择;在人类历史中的某些阶段,有些文化发展出了新的技术,使它们在创造财富和集结力量方面享有了决定性的优势。
新技术的文化优势,往往是决定性的,如铁器时代的人胜过青铜时代的人,电子时代的人胜过机械时代的人。亚当·斯密也许不是第一个把国家福利归结于个人行动的经济学家,但他说得最简洁、最令人信服:每个人都在不断地努力,为他所掌握的各种资本找到最有利的用途。的确,他考虑只是自己的利益,而不是社会的利益;但他对自身利益的计算,自然而然地,或者说必然地,会促使他选择对社会整体最有利的工作。 托马斯·马尔萨斯,是人口学研究的奠基人,他看到亚当·斯密的观点不仅适用于国家经济的发展,而且可以应用到人类人口的生存问题。马尔萨斯以提出以下主张而闻名,他认为“人口在不受控制的情况下,会以几何比率增长,而生存的资源则按算术比率增长。稍微对数字有所了解的人,都会发现,第一种增长的力量相比第二种是多么的惊人。”马尔萨斯甚至早于达尔文看到,同样的原理也适用于整个自然界:在动物和植物王国中,大自然极其慷慨大方地到处撒播生命的种子;但在给予培育种子所必需的营养和空间方面,它却一直比较吝啬。我们这个地球上的生命种子,如果得到充足的营养和空间,经过几千年的繁殖,就会挤满几百个地球。然而,必然性,这一强硬又无处不在的自然法则,把它们限制在了规定的范围内。 到 18 世纪末,即使是在亚当·斯密和马尔萨斯的时代,人们已经理解到,世界是以动态的方式在发展和演变——实际上它一直都是如此。人类作为众多物种中的一类,由于无限的生殖能力与有限的食物种植能力不相匹配,而不得不进行竞争。人类社会的生存,和动物的生存一样,取决于对环境的适应。因此,动态的道德观,重点关注的是如何克服适应的问题。这种道德的最好体现,是那些能够调整自身行为去抓住机会,并利用社会中的现有资源获得最大竞争优势的个体。
马尔萨斯还意识到,亚当·斯密的思想已经改变了世界。他写道,他关于人口的论点并不是全新的:“它所基于的原则,部分由大卫·休谟解释过,部分由亚当·斯密博士解释过。”他还看到,持续不断的生存竞争是一个道德问题,而不仅仅是实践问题。在他 1798 年的“论文”中,最后一段是这样写的:世界上存在着邪恶,不是为了使人悲观绝望,而是为了刺激活动。我们不应当忍耐和屈服于邪恶,而应尽力避免作恶。竭尽全力消除自己身上以及能力所及范围内的邪恶,不仅是每一个人的利益所在,也是每个人的义务。每个人愈是尽力地履行这个义务,他努力的方向就越正确,收获的成果也越丰厚;他就越有可能改善和提高自己的精神,从而更全面地实现造物主的意志。 在达尔文划时代的著作《物种起源》(1859 年首次出版)中,从第三章的内容概要可以看出,他对上述观念之重要性的认识。他把这重要的一章命名为“生存斗争”,副标题为:“生存斗争的广义用法——按几何比率的增长——归化的动物和植物的迅速增长——抑制增长的性质——斗争的普遍性——气候的影响——个体数量的保护——一切动植物在自然界中的复杂关系——同物种的个体间和变体间的斗争最为剧烈,同属的物种间的斗争也很激烈——有机体与有机体间的关系是一切关系中最重要的”自 1776 年(亚当·斯密)以来,显然人们可以认识到,优化国家财富的最佳途径,是允许个人在自由竞争条件下最大化自己的资本回报。自 1798 年(马尔萨斯)以来,显然人们可以认识到,人口的相对生存,取决于整个社会是否在政治和经济上足够成功,能够养活人口,并保护其不会因传染病或战争而大量减少。
自 1859 年(达尔文)以来,显然人们可以认识到,在人类、动物和植物的世界里,整个生命的戏剧就是一场持续不断的生存斗争,其中最大的对手,是彼此最接近的物种或文化。这种斗争需要一种动态的道德观,它不仅是在邪恶来临被动地做出反应,而是要积极主动地防御邪恶。
这些思想的力量是如此强大,自从它们被提出之后,就没有人不会为其所震动,进而去思考人类的本质或道德的问题。卡尔·马克思和查尔斯·达尔文一样相信生存斗争,但他认为这是一场不同社会阶级之间的斗争,而阶级本身是由经济力量所形成的。阿道夫·希特勒也相信为生存而奋斗,这个理念可以说贯穿他政治生涯的始终;但他认为,这场斗争是不同种族之间的斗争。马克思、列宁、斯大林、毛泽东和希特勒,都可以称为社会达尔文主义者,因为他们把生存斗争,即希特勒所说的“我的奋斗”,看作是政治的核心问题。马克思主义者把社会阶级当成独立的物种,纳粹党人则以同样的眼光看待种族。
然而,这并不是马尔萨斯所设想的动态道德,而是动态不道德。马克思主义和纳粹主义希望解决同一个问题,即生存斗争的问题,但他们的方式是通过破坏竞争。
他们侵略外国;他们不断制造冲突,在争夺社会权力的不同阶级之间,或在互相视对方为剥削者的不同种族之间(常见的就是反犹者对犹太人的指控),或针对被认为很危险的下层阶级(白人对黑人的恐惧)。第二次世界大战,是阿道夫·希特勒试图摧毁潜在的竞争者,特别是斯拉夫人和犹太人,来确保德国人的生存优势,但以失败而告终。一个有意思的悖论是,历史证明,战争的失败比纳粹的胜利,对德国人更加有利。
破坏性的“干涉”竞争,可以被合作竞争所替代。合作竞争是亚当·斯密的核心思想,也是马尔萨斯和威廉·詹姆斯的核心思想。破坏性竞争的典型是征服者。
他摧毁竞争对手,夺取他们的资产,可能还会接管他们的国家,甚至奴役他们的人民。而合作竞争的典型是商人。让顾客对交易感到满意,是商人的利益所在;因为只有这样,顾客才会回来做更多的交易。顾客的繁荣富裕,也符合商人的利益;因为只有这样的顾客,才有钱继续进行交易。征服意味着摧毁对方,商业意味着满足对方。在现代的技术环境中,征服已成为异常危险的政治策略,所以,商业是解决生存问题的唯一合理的途径。
亚当·斯密的另外一个核心观点——对他来说并不新鲜,即职能的专业化,进一步强化了商业中相互依存的关系。在《国富论》的开篇,就有一段著名的论述,斯密指出,“劳动生产力的最大提高,以及在运用劳动时所体现出来的更高的熟练程度、技巧和判断力,似乎都是分工的结果。”他举例说,“以这种方式,制造大头针的重要业务,可以被分为 18 道不同的工序。在有些工厂,这 18 种不同的操作由 18 个不同的工人来负责。”职能的专业化程度越高,制造业的效率就越高;但很显然,这种经济是高度相互依存的。它要获得成功,就必须是合作性的。
因此,一种成功的社会道德应该具备某些特性。它必须是强大的——软弱的道德无力发挥作用。它必须有助于生存斗争,但应该是合作性而非破坏性的;希特勒具有强烈的生存道德,但它的破坏性摧毁了整个社会。它必须是动态的,能够匹配现代技术乃至整个社会制度的动态变化。它必须有利于经济发展;列宁主义体系中的平均主义与专制主义的大杂烩,根本就行不通。当然,这些并不是一种社会道德应有的全部特征。它还应有一个更宏大的目标,就是使整个社会成为一个良好的生活环境,并把人们联系在一起。此外,道德本身应该能够适应变化并生存下去,一种脆弱的道德可能在一代人中间被接受,到下一代就被抛弃掉。一种传统的道德又可能会过于僵化,无法适应社会结构的不断变动。而另一方面,纯粹相对主义的道德体系则根本算不上道德,因为它无法明确指导人们该如何行事。
我们可以先把所有的社会道德放到一个背景中去考察。一个强大的共同体,即使是虚拟的共同体,都有赖于其道德被广泛接受。人类社会中最成功的历史时期,往往是集体道德被充分认同的时期。这样的道德不仅能发挥具体的功能,如减少犯罪、稳定家庭与社会;它还能赋予公民以目标感和方向感。从历史来看,这样的道德共识,似乎取决于有一种占主导地位的宗教。无论是罗马帝国早期的国教;还是犹太教,它一直是四散分离的犹太人的生存线索;或者是包含社会规则的伊斯兰教;以及中世纪的天主教,新英格兰地区早期的新教等等。一个民族,一种道德,一种宗教,这三种观念相互依存,并相互加强。
在这样的道德社会中,公民个人可以在社会支持的架构内,努力去实现人生目标。
诚然,道德律可能有些武断,或至少在外人看来是武断的。正统的犹太人失去了吃猪肉或贝壳的自由,并且不能在安息日工作。虔诚的天主教徒不能使用人工避孕药,更不要说堕胎了。穆斯林不能饮酒。儒家的信徒要为父亲服丧很长一段时间,这很不方便——甚至孔子也觉得,服丧仪式被夸大了。然而,这些信仰体系中的每个人都认为,遵循这些守则,只是为一个共享的、一致的社会秩序所付出的小小代价;有了这种秩序,每个人都有一个安定的位置。一个犹太人完全可以说,遵守安息日只是有一点点不便,但对律法和家庭都有好处。一个宽容的社会,拥有共同的道德,是约翰·洛克和早期自由主义哲学家所追求的理想。他们根本不相信,任何一个社会,可以在没有规则的情况下正常运转;但他们认为,规则应该服从于最好的理性,而且人们只能被强迫接受基本的规则。他们的确承认,强制执行社会道德是不可避免的,特别是在保护生命或财产安全方面;因为在他们看来,没有不能保证安全,任何社会都无法生存。而对于不影响他人福祉的个人选择,他们持几乎绝对宽容的态度。儒家人要为父亲服丧 40 天,住在隔壁的可能是犹太人,他要遵守安息日;但是他们互不打扰,也不会强迫对方遵守自己的宗教习俗。
在基本的事务上遵循社会道德,而在个人决定上则给予宽容,通过这种把二者结合在一起的理论学说,人们实际上得到了,一套必须强加给所有公民的核心道德标准,以及公民作为个人或社会亚群体成员所自愿接受的道德标准。一个本笃会的修士宣誓要坚守贫穷、贞洁与服从时,他是作为一个亚群体的成员,对自我的要求。他不是要求所有的天主教徒,更不是所有的同胞,都要发同样的誓言,或遵守同样的规则。他会服从修道院院长的命令,但根本不期望外人有任何的关注。
所以,对于社会道德中可以自行选择的部分,不需要做普遍的要求;而核心的道德的确应该是共享的。不接受核心道德的人会损害社会,也损害到自己。在极端的情况下,一个充斥着激情杀人的强盗社会,就像罗马帝国灭亡后的欧洲大部分地区一样,谁也无法过上安稳的生活,强盗自己也不行,他们更容易受到其他杀人犯的威胁。在今天的美国,一些城市的中心就是这样。无政府状态绝不是理想的社会;没有法律维护秩序,就没有安全。
当我们审视那些敌视社会道德的力量时,需要意识到,人类社会的核心道德,在大多数现代宗教体系中是大概一致的。在基督教的《旧约》或犹太教的《摩西五经》中,十诫中的两条,可以说在任何宗教中都是被普遍认同的。即“不可杀人”和“不可偷窃”。甚至不止于此。几乎所有严肃的不可知论者,也都会把谋杀和偷窃视为禁忌,并认为社会有权惩罚做出这两种行为的人,因为这是对生命和财产的终极威胁。他们可能会对特定犯罪行为的惩罚尺度是否适当产生分歧,但不会争论社会是否有权进行惩罚。
约翰·洛克的原话就是这个意思。每个人都享有“生命、自由和财产”的权利。
1776 年,托马斯·杰斐逊又增加了一句,即“追求幸福的权利”。这一句非常精彩,也是非常良好的愿望。但相比之下,“生命、自由和财产”更接地气。社会存在绝对依赖于生命权和财产权。而历史表明,只有在拥有自由的情况下,这些权利才能得到保护。如果国家无所不能,那么它就会像在侵略战争中一样,成为生命强大的敌人;它也会对个人财产造成巨大的威胁,因为它会从社会财富中攫取过分的比例,用于自己无谓的挥霍浪费。
然而,在那些最先进的国家,攻击核心道德的部分力量,恰恰来自于赋予了这些国家技术优势的现代化力量。美国是世界领先的技术强国。在 20 世纪 60 年代初以前,许多人,包括大部分美国人,都把美国视为其他国家的道德榜样。现在,很少有人再表达这种观点了,即使是那些为祖国感到骄傲的美国人。像全世界人一样,一个人不可能在听了 O.J.辛普森的审判之后,还把美国看成是最初那个单纯的美德共和国。
如果回顾一下旧日美国身上的标签,它们反映的其实是一个边境社会的发展需求;即使是在大城市,它也受公民态度的熏染。边疆是民主发生的地方;在那里,人们觉得自己是平等。早期的美国人还抛弃了欧洲的等级制度。即使是作为囚犯从英国运来的契约劳工,等到契约到期,他们就成为了独立的商人、农民或自由劳工,在社会上确立了自己的地位。工资比欧洲高,生活必需品的成本很低,尽管进口的制成品比较贵。在边疆,人们彼此之间互相依赖,虽然生活艰苦,但以欧洲的标准看,还是很不错的。新移民可能从波士顿和纽约的贫民窟起步,从低工资的工作干起,一般很快就走出去了,一代又一代的人,获得了繁荣和富裕的生活。南北战争后,黑人开始把自己看做是另一个移民群体,他们中很多人都认同美国的价值观和生活目标。由此,黑人中间阶级也发展起来了。
这种志向抱负,得益于边疆生活的实际经验,以及新教和天主教教会的影响,而不断加强,形成了美国人的爱国主义。他们相信自己生活在上帝的国家,这是一种在民主理想和基督教信仰导引下,所形成的独一无二的观念,美国也成为了世界上第一个也是最成功的一个民主国家。这幅熟悉的图景体现在我们所有人,或几乎所有人对亚伯拉罕·林肯的印象之中;尽管在南部还有一些美国人,把林肯看成是为了阻止自由州脱离他们不再信任的联邦,而发动了第一场现代战争的恐怖人物。
即便如此,林肯留给世人的形象,嶙峋、朴实、诚恳、雄辩,仍然是最伟岸的美国人的形象,而且基本上是一个道德的标杆。现在还有很多美国人能够感受到,新国度的民主活力与欧洲疲惫的等级制度间强烈的对比。不过,在今天的洛杉矶、纽约、伦敦或华盛顿,外国人很难认识到这种充满能量的贤能社会的理想;而在广大的郊区或农村地区,还能找到它的痕迹,以及更多的存在。美国清教徒的道德伦理,及其所有重要的历史,在雪线以北地区保存得最好,而创业精神的推动力则传播到了更广泛的地方。
美国人看到,大城市的衰败,已经成为犯罪,特别是毒品交易的温床,是公共道德下降最严重的表现。大多数美国人也认识到,在几种不同的道德文化之间存在冲突,它们都在争着扩大自己的主张和权威。政治正确的文化,排挤掉许多支撑旧文化的道德原则,虽然不是全部。政治正确咄咄逼人,强调在历史上占据主导地位的白人男性文化,认为其剥削了其他群体的价值和权利;同时,它也拒绝接受这种文化,虽然这是美国的创始文化。
20 世纪上半叶由男性所主导的文化,是以核心家庭的生存为中心。这从历史发展上,给予了丈夫-父亲在家庭中至少是名义上的支配地位,尽管实际上家庭往往是由妻子-母亲在管理,名义上的主人通常是温顺地接受。这也使男老板在职场上获得了主导地位,这种地位如今受到女权运动的挑战,但还没有被逆转。家庭的利益,以及基督教的历史教诲,使堕胎被非法化。过去的道德认为,堕胎是非法杀人,是绝对禁止的。传统道德的坚持者仍然持这样的观念;而新道德的支持者则持相反的观点。以前,堕胎问题通常由各州自行处理,而在“罗伊诉韦德”(Roe v. Wade)一案中,最高法院将堕胎的宪法性权利,置于在隐私权的基础之上,而隐私权本身与宪法或修正案中的任何条款都相去甚远。
法律上认为,妇女的隐私权包括要孩子或不要孩子的权利,不管对胎儿可能造成什么后果。最高法院不认为胎儿享有任何宪法权力,20 世纪后期的胎儿与 19 世纪上半叶的奴隶一样,是宪法外的实体。“生命、自由及追求幸福的权利”并不适用于奴隶,罗伊诉韦德案的大法官,也没有把《独立宣言》的规则适用于胎儿。
关于堕胎的争论,是新旧道德冲突的极端例子;不过在其他领域,旧的社会组织及道德也受到新道德的挑战,同样存在显著的冲突。在新教和天主教中,传统的基督教道德都非常强调性的角色。不允许进行婚前或婚外的性行为,男性之间不能发生生殖器关系。女同性恋没有被特别强调,因为社会基本不承认它的存在。
当维多利亚女王第一次被告知此事时,她坚决拒绝相信女人之间会发生这样的事。政治正确是所谓的受压迫群体的道德。同性恋者声称他们的生活方式与其他人是平等的,并挑战传统反对他们发生性行为。“恐同症”被认为是一种令人发指的歧视,和种族歧视一样。新的道德观认为,批评同性恋与批评黑人、犹太人或妇女一样,是不可接受的。
与此同时,其他诸多的性禁忌都遭到了侵蚀,或干脆被废除了。在 1960 年代,出现了自由恋爱的浪潮,部分原因是女性避孕药明显安全了很多,但也受到了情绪药物和流行音乐的推动。这导致了越来越多的非婚同居。到 20 世纪 90 年代,在比美国普遍保守的英国,人们认为爱德华王子和他女朋友在白金汉宫睡觉是很正常的,就像 20 世纪 60 年代的学生在宿舍一起睡觉一样,是一种虽未婚但稳定的亲密关系。女王伊丽莎白二世作为英国教会的领袖,纵容自己最小的儿子胡作非为,但很少人觉得这有什么奇怪的,而她三个更大的孩子的婚姻都已经破裂。
少数抱怨的人,还被认为是无可救药的落伍者和假正经。不过,仍有许多人认为旧的道德观念是可取的,尽管他们自己不遵循,也不真切期望他们的孩子从很小的年龄就遵循。
政治正确运动也有它清教徒的一面。因为它是从妇女的利益出发,而妇女被认为是最大的受压迫群体,所以它对男性的性行为有一定的敌意,包括攻击性的和过去被认为是无害的形式。一些妇女认为,所有的男人天生就是强奸犯;对强奸的自然恐惧就被夸大到对男性的普遍谴责。另一些人则集中在性骚扰问题上,这种抱怨是真实的——很多男人的性举止特别粗俗;但对一些很微不足道的行为的抱怨,就显得有点可笑了。仅仅是眼神,没有说任何话,更不要说身体接触,都可能被指控为性骚扰。所以,新的道德观可能审查性非常强。白人可能被指控有种族歧视,不是因为他们真的有歧视,而是因为他们是白人。男人可能被指控为性骚扰,因为他们的表情显示,他们觉得一个女人很有吸引力;而在上一代人看来,这是一种恭维而非侮辱。
政治正确派和基督教原教旨主义者,互相猛烈地攻击,然而在现代世界里,他们其实颇为相似。尽管他们的道德教义不同,但他们都认为自己的教义具有权威性,是普适的。事实上,他们存在同样的缺陷,都是一种夸大的、自大的道德主义,缺乏深度,缺乏历史感,也缺乏宽容。两者都被职责为类似 17 世纪的清教主义;或类似于英格兰的奥利弗·克伦威尔(Oliver Cromwell)——他差点移民到新英格兰,一个自大的道德家;或类似于塞勒姆(Salem)的猎巫者。无论是教条化的妇女运动,还是圣经地带5保守的传教士,都不能说他们缺乏道德,只能说他们做得有些过头和僵化。这些道德的核心好像已经成为了一块石头。这种道德的动脉硬化对社会道德共识的破坏,并不亚于它们所反对的“怎样都行”的无政府主义。
这是对道德力量的扭曲,是粗暴的自以为是。法利赛主义,和人类的历史一样古老,认为自己的美德独一无二,对耶稣基督尤其反感。而一种新兴的对道德的腐蚀,则认为道德选择纯粹是个人喜好,和选衣服一样,是个人的私事。这种信念认为根本不存在任何共同的道德。它把古典的自由学说带到了一个新的阶段,把“追求幸福”从约翰·洛克的本意以及 1776 年杰斐逊对它的诠释,变成了一种不计后果的享乐主义。
“追求幸福”一语出自约翰·洛克的《人类理解论》(1691 年出版)。其中写道:“对智性的最高完善,就在于认真地追求真正的、踏实的幸福;所以,关照我们自身,不要把想象的幸福误认为真正的幸福,是自由的必要基础。”他接着说:“每个人所认为的幸福并不相同……心灵和味觉一样,有不同的喜好……。
人们的选择可能会各有不同,但都是对的;假设他们像一群可怜的昆虫,其中有些可能是蜜蜂,喜欢鲜花与它的香甜,有些可能是甲虫,则喜欢其他的食物。”此外,他还论述了,宁要恶习不要美德,“显然是错误的判断”。他特别看重宗教观点,但也认为“这里的恶人要更坏”。他认为,“道德如果是建立在真正的基础之上,就必然会决定所有愿意遵循它的人们的选择。”相比那些强求一视同仁、行为统一的专制道德体系,毫无疑问,洛克的自由学说给人们的选择偏好提供了更大的空间。不过,很快,经典自由学说就认识到了集体道德要求的必要性,包括尊重他人,特别是他们的生命,及依法和平地享有的财产所有权。集体道德的普遍腐蚀威胁着自由,这既有直接的一面,如它导入了无政府主义的因素;也有间接的一面,如它鼓动了社会中最独裁的力量。我们可以把公共道德的历史,看成是无序与独裁之间的循环;现代的专制性道德,包括女权主义和原教旨主义,都是对 60 年代享乐主义的周期性反应。
对于下个世纪的新世界,我们已经描述了它的一些属性。它将主要由两种力量所塑造,一是技术的变革,它正在开放亚洲的经济;二是新的全球电子通讯系统,它会使人们对当地政府的依赖逐渐降低。新技术将取代或已经取代了众多中等技能的劳动者——如流水线工人、办公室文员,以及越来越多的中层管理者。但是,稀缺的技能将得到特别的回报,一个由高技能人才组成的国际认知精英群体将会出现,新的通信技术会为他们的技能打开最广阔的市场。和大部分精英一样,认知精英也会有点高高在上,相当傲慢,认为可以制定自己的标准。所以,他们会与社会比较疏远。
在下个世纪的上半叶,大量财富会从旧的西方转移到新的东方。政治上的失败——中国依然是一个政治落后的国家——可能会推迟这种财富和战略力量的转移,但决不可能阻止。这一趋势无可逆转。
这一财富大转移,必然会给北半球白人主导的国家带来最大的压力,即欧洲和北美地区的先进国家,目前大约有 7.5 亿人口。直到最近,日本才成为唯一一个达到欧美生活水平的亚洲非白人国家,尽管在新西兰、澳大利亚和非洲南部的白人中也有欧洲人种。即使在 1990 年,先进工业国家的总人口也只占世界 50 亿人口的 15%左右。世界财富的分配状态是 15%的富人,85%的穷人,和 100 年前先进工业社会的收入分布非常像。经过一段加速的进程,到 2050 年,世界的总人口可能达到 70 亿,先进经济体的人口预计会有 30 亿;或财富的分配比例是 40%的富人,60%的穷人。到下个世纪末,这个数字可能会翻转,即达到 60%的富人和 40%的穷人,而贫穷人口主要集中在非洲地区。国与国之间会朝着财富更平等的方向发展,但在国家内部,很可能会更加地不平等。能够高效利用人才和资本的人,相比那些只具有中等技能或较少资本者,将享有决定性的优势。未来的财富高度流动。先进国家的穷人,不可能再像 20 世纪那样吃大户,依靠政府大规模地向富人征税;这么做的国家会在激烈的竞争中倒下。
当然,如果不发生世界大战,世界经济的总生产力会继续提高,也许每年平均提高 3%。如果是这样的话,那么,全球经济总产值将每 25 年翻一番;到 2050 年,总产值将是现在的 4 倍以上,到 2100 年,将达到现在的 16-20 倍。即使 2100年的世界人口增加到 80 亿,也会使那时的人均 GDP 达到现在的 10 倍。这样的财富增长,除了照顾新兴工业社会的崛起,以及认知精英每年的数百万美元收入,仍然可以为其他先进的劳动力,提供一个体面的并不断提高的生活标准。但未来的情况与 20 世纪会有很大的不同。从全球范围来看,穷国的收入会比富国的增长更快;从国家范围来看,富人的收入增长,将比中低收入者要快得多;就像20 世纪 90 年代的美国。在下个世纪,我们将见证一个世界超级阶级的诞生,也许由 5 亿超级富豪组成,其中 1 亿人的富有程度足以成为主权个人。
这个过程会导致一个不可避免的结果:社会的同质性将大大降低;民族国家将被削弱,甚至完全崩溃;认知精英将更多地认为自己是世界公民。在全球范围内从事同样职能工作的人,已经在发展一种文化;在这种文化中,相比在旧式民族国家中的同胞,他们与世界各地的同行之间更加亲近。一个伦敦的投资银行家去到首尔,可能比在格拉斯哥更有家的感觉;一个华盛顿的公务员在波恩,可能比在华盛顿当地的黑人区更自在。我们应该可以看到,这个过程对道德价值观产生的分裂效应。个人的道德部分是由教育所决定的,主要来自于他的童年;部分是由生活经验所塑造的。认知精英的教育和经验都是世界性的,这往往会使他们与当地的社区脱离开来。
当我们迈向下一个世纪,在不断壮大的认知精英群体中,会有很大一部分人几乎没从家庭中接受过宗教或道德教育。精英中间最常见的宗教是一种不可知论的人文主义。很多这样的家庭会因为离婚、再婚及第三次婚姻而严重分裂。好莱坞的婚姻模式虽然在美国不具有普遍性,但欧美认知精英的离婚率都很高,平均可能达到三分之一或更高。父母离异的孩子很少接受基本的宗教教育,他们也会意识到父母、继父母、继兄弟姐妹间的道德观念各有不同。如果把这个群体的基础道德教育和爱尔兰或波兰村庄里的相比较,显然农民的教育提供了更强的宗教训练。一个无神、无根、有钱的精英是不可能幸福的,也不会得到爱。
下个世纪在经济上占据主导地位的这群人,他们基础道德教育的不足,很可能将被他们的生活经验所强化。这些人会接受某种高等技术教育的训练,以适应他们在未来电子世界中作为领导者的新角色。但是,对于历史上作为人类社会行为框架的道德课程,他们从中学习的不过皮毛。按照孔子、佛陀或柏拉图(公元前 500年)、圣保罗(公元 50 年)或穆罕默德(公元 600 年)的标准,他们属于道德文盲。他们被灌输的是经济效率,资源利用、金钱追求等理念,没有谦逊或自我牺牲的美德,贞洁就更不要提了。基本上,他们中的大部分是作为异教徒长大的,其价值观更接近于罗马共和国晚期的价值观,而不是基督教的。而且,这些价值观还是高度个人化的,不是共通的。我们前面论述过,只有当真正的道德价值被广泛认同时,一个社会才能强大起来。所以,先进国家已经步入了这样的境地:很多人持有着微弱或有限的道德价值观,而其他人则以强烈的非理性价值观作为补充,整个社会共同持有的价值观念非常稀薄。不过,毫无疑问的是,我们前面所说的“竞争性领土俱乐部”,会对其居民实行严格的道德标准。
贫富之间的财富差距,本身在历史上并没有导致宗教价值观的根本差异。在一个传统强大、稳定且坚实的社会中,陡峭的等级结构——“富人在自己的城堡里,穷人在他的门口”,可能会掩盖贯穿其等级制度的价值观,但这取决于富人和穷人之间集体感情的强度,以及社会传统的强度。而这两者现在都不复存在了,而且社区的感觉和传统都被正在发生的经济和技术革命给削弱了。大众和少数人的生活正变得越来越疏远。技术革命的实现,往往意味着打破旧的方式方法。在所有的领域,都是激进的人获得胜利;而以传统方式思考的人则拉在了后面,实际上他们已经退出了比赛。我们的政治可能是由传统的思想者所领导的,如比尔·克林顿、赫尔穆特·科尔、约翰·梅杰;而我们最成功的企业则是由激进者领导的,他们对新的技术世界有着敏锐的理解,其中的典型就是比尔·盖茨。传统思维会因为无法应对变化的速度和力量,而一败涂地。
然而,道德并非如此。以形成于约公元前 1000 年的摩西经典为例,如果我们要从中寻找科学的话,那收获不多。《创世纪》中关于创世的描述,可能包含了一个神学真理——上帝创造了宇宙和人类,但它并没有对物理结构的实际发展做出科学的解释。但是,如果我们学习摩西的道德观,即十诫,那就有很多值得借鉴的地方。尊重父母,忠于婚姻,是维护家庭生活的最好方式;家庭生活是培养道德健康的孩子的最好方式。偷盗对窃贼和失主都有损害,也不利于工作和储蓄。社会秩序有赖于证人不做假见证。杀人是错误的,等等。
在科学方面,三千年的发展彻底改变了人类的知识内容;而在道德上,我们其实可能倒退了。一般的心理医生给病人提供的,关于如何生活的道德建议,可能还不如普通的犹太人,在摩西时期从老师那里得到的好。当然,基督教依然存在,但对世界上的大多数人来说,它只是以往自身的一个苍白幽灵。没什么人还怀有早期时代的信仰,甚至社会还不那么复杂时的信仰;没有人会在公园大道上寻找圣徒。
对传统的破坏是科学进步的必要条件。如果我们至今都还相信,是太阳绕着地球转,那我们就不可能发明出卫星通信。事实上,我们所认为的科学,本身只是一系列的假设,是不完美的解释,注定要被其他的解释所取代,更强大的解释,但依然是不完美的。然而,对传统的破坏给人类的道德秩序带来了灾难。
孔子教导说,我们应该行为适度6。他还教导我们要尊重师长,待人如己。这些教诲已经有 2500 年的历史了。作为一种传统,它影响了中国有文字记载的所有历史;但对于许多现代中国人来说,儒家思想是一种过时的传统,他们不注重节制,尊重权力而不是师长,当然也不会以自己希望被对待的方式去对待别人。随着传统的沦丧,社会将失去其道德共识中的全部表述。中国的实力虽然不断增强,但与西藏相比,却是一个道德落后的国家,虽然西藏人贫穷且受到压迫。在我们看来,良好的社会道德具有某些特征。它应该以动态而非静态的方式,促进社会与个人的生存。它应该鼓励宽容,避免自以为是。它应该是宗教性的,而不仅是不可知论的。它不应该假装可以解决科学事实的问题。它既不应该是无政府主义的,也不应该是独裁主义的。它应该得到广泛的认同和深切持守。这样的社会道德,对于家庭,对于把孩子培养成独立、负责任的成年人,都至关重要。
它提供另一个良好社会的着力点。
我们发现,所有这样的道德,都会为商业与同理之情所生成的相互依存逻辑所支持,但却会因为肤浅的科学主义的攻击、超阶级和亚阶级间的疏离、已丧失根基的旧式地域经济,而受到威胁。对于这些趋势,人们也许会做出反应。必须认识到,在下个世纪,它们对社会的危害会非常大。
随着以赛亚·柏林所说的“西方历史上最恐怖的世纪”随风而逝,社会结构的巨人主义时代也进入了尾声。20 世纪最后的日子,注定是一个规模缩减、权力下放、机构重组的时期。这将是社会恐龙7困在沥青坑里的时代;也是一个清道夫的时代。鸟儿将衔走恐龙的骨头。政府、企业和工会将不得不违背自己的意志进行调整,去适应微技术渗透下所确立的元宪政的新环境。微技术已经深刻地改变了行使暴力的边界。当今世界的变化,也已远远超出了我们通常的理解,超出 CNN 和报纸所告诉我们的。而它的变化方向,恰恰是对大政治条件的研究所指明的。先是在《血流成河》中,然后在《大清算》中,我们都论述过,当技术或其他决定暴力行使边界的因素发生改变时,社会的特征必然会随之改变。一切附着于人类互动方式的东西,包括我们的道德和看待世界的常识,都将随之改变。一段道德的松懈期过去了,也表明一个时代结束了;在此之后,我们会看到更严厉的道德的觉醒,它会提出更严格的标准,以满足一个竞争性主权世界的更高要求。
可以预见新道德会有几个特点。首先,它会强调生产力的重要性,强调创造收入者保留收入的正确性。由此可以推出另外一点,它将强调投资效率的重要性。信息时代的道德观会为效率而喝彩,会承认把资源用于最高价值的用途是一种优点。换句话说,信息时代的道德将是市场的道德。而正如詹姆斯·贝内特(James Bennett)所言,信息时代的道德也是一种信任的道德。网络经济是一个高信任度的社区。在这样的环境中,因为有牢不可破的加密技术,贪污犯或小偷可以把犯罪所得安全地转移和存储,而且无法被追回;所以,为了避免损失,人们从一开始就会有强烈的动机,避免与不诚实的人做生意。就像前面所举的贵格会的例子,诚信的声誉是在网络经济中的重要资产。由于网络空间的匿名性,这种声誉不一定直接指向某个已知的个人,但它能够通过识别加密密钥而得到可靠的验证。如果加密方式或加密身份的验证被不法之徒或其他人所破坏,其可能引发的连锁性后果将令人望而生畏;这一点就足以使人们强烈排斥雇佣任何缺乏可信度的人。贝内特设想了“赛博绅士俱乐部”(A Gentleman’s Club of Cyberspace),这是一块被保护的领域,需要有强安全的措施才能参与,“可能会使用声纹等生物特征进行识别和验证。业主要担保参与者的身份,在一定程度上保证他们的可信度,并承担相应的责任,以此来实现一个‘赛博空间的绅士俱乐部’(当然现在也欢迎女士)。相比一般的网络空间,在这样的地方,人们可以更加安全更有信心地进行交易。因此,在 21 世纪,人们可能会看到,在任何一个维多利亚人都想象不到的环境中,社会对信用和品格的重视将回归到维多利亚时代的程度。”网络空间保护区也可以提供降低风险的担保,类似于香槟区伯爵为往返香槟集市的商人,而提供的超地域保护担保。即其他的管辖区会“赔偿行旅商人在通过特定贵族所辖领土时可能遭受的任何损失”。
当时的“集市守卫”,原本是由伯爵认命的官员,为集市上的商人提供安全保护和“正义法庭”。最终他们演变成了更独立的实体,有专门的印章,对合同进行公证并强制执行,并有权“禁止任何被发现不支付债务或不履行合同的商人参加未来的交易会。这显然是一个很严厉的惩罚,所以很少有人会冒险犯禁,被剥夺未来赚钱的机会。不过,除此之外,守卫们还可以没收违约债务人的货物,并为债权人的利益而将其出售。”当替代性市场的数量增加时,作为执行合同手段的排斥机制就没那么重要了。但随着现在信息技术的出现,在社会进入下一个主权分散的阶段时,对欺骗者和违约者的排斥,可能再次成为一种强有力的执行机制。计算机的联动验证,可以使信用和欺诈信息不可伪造,从而对网络空间提供警戒。从互联网的尺度看,整个世界会变成一个极小的社区,骗子和小偷将承受更大的压力。
未来的道德观除了重视收入和效率,并重新强调品质和信用的重要性,它可能还会着力突出暴力的邪恶,特别是绑架和勒索;因为这两种“要挟”个人的手段,会变得越来越猖獗;否则就很难从个人手里夺走资源。
还有一个因素,也会提高道德的标准,那就是特权和收入再分配的结束。对于那些被社会落下的人,当他们的获救希望主要来自于私人和慈善机构时,在自愿给予慈善救助的人看来,接受者在道德上应该是值得帮助的,这一点相比 20 世纪时更加重要。
补贴、意外之财和火热的经济前景,削弱了节制与留存的紧迫性。民主、再分配和经济发展的咒语,提高了人们的期望值和生育率,促进了人口增长,进而导致经济和环境的螺旋式下降更加迅猛。 —— 弗吉尼亚·阿伯内西(VIRGINIA ABERNETHY)
在某些方面,新的信息世界能够更好地鼓励人们以严肃的态度处理道德问题。收入再分配的承诺,在美国、加拿大和西欧地区,满足了不幸者和失败者的期望,在国际社会上也产生了不利的影响。有充分的证据表明,外国的援助和干预,原本旨在解决落后经济体的饥荒,并提高当地的生活水平,但往往是刺激人口增长的主要因素,使之超出了受援助地区的承受能力。第二次世界大战以来,全球人口的惊人增长,以及对森林、土壤和水资源的破坏,都可以归因到全球范围内的干预。原本,在当地人口与其供养所需的资源之间,通过负反馈机制保持着平衡,而这种干预使得该机制失灵了。
当然,那些生活在资源匮乏、增长乏力或毫无希望的环境下的人们,会非常高兴,因为他们得到了保证,贫乏的乡村生活就要结束了。他们热切地接受着国际援助工作者、和平队志愿者、当地革命者,以及冷战期间不同意识形态的竞争者所传递的乐观信息,告诉他们,明天的日子会更美好。而这恰恰是一个错误的信息。
不同文化间的收入再分配,会产生一个重要的后果,它使那些生活在非工业文明中、持有非工业价值观的人,获得了虚假的竞争力。国际援助、抗击饥荒和疾病的救援工作以及技术干预,愚弄了很多人,使他们相信自己的生活前景已极大地改善,所以没必要更新自己的价值观,或费力改善自己的行为。
国家间的收入再分配,不仅促使世界人口不可持续地激增,并以重要的方式助长了文化相对主义,而且,对于文化在影响人们创造当地经济繁荣中所扮演的关键角色,造成了普遍的困惑。今天,大多数人都认为,文化更多是一种品味问题,而不是行为指南的来源;这些指南既可能误导人,也会启发人。我们太热衷于相信所有的文化都是平等的,而对于认识适得其反的文化的弊端,则非常迟钝。本世纪在世界的很多地方,在补贴和干预的温室中培育出来的混合文化,更是如此。
就像美国城市中心区的犯罪亚文化一样,它们保留了一些来自于早期经济发展阶段的零碎文化片段,而这些片段将与信息时代的行为价值观结合到一起。
因此,信息革命不仅会释放出天才精神,也会释放出天惩精神8。在未来的一个千年里,二者之间将进行前所未有的较量。
工业社会向信息社会的转变,必将令人心潮澎湃,叹为观止。从经济生活的一个阶段过渡到另一个阶段,总是要经历一场革命。我们认为,相比农业革命和工业革命,信息革命的影响可能是最深远的,它将更彻底地颠覆和重组人们的生活。而它的影响力,你很快就将感受到。请系好安全带。
译注:《天外魔花》(Invasion of the Body Snatchers)是根据杰克·芬尼小说改编的经典科幻惊悚作品,常被用来隐喻社会同质化与身份异化。
Interference Competition,或译为互涉竞争。
译注:卡利集团是哥伦比亚最重要的贩毒集团之一,曾长期主导全球可卡因贸易。
译注:贵格会(Quakers)是兴起于近代英国的基督教团体,以朴素生活、诚实守信和反战立场著称。
美国中西部及南部有强烈基督教信仰的地区。
他把黄金分割 Golden mean 称为中庸之道 chumyum,至少 17 世纪的学者是这么翻译的。
此处指大机构。
Nemesis 报应。
All strong societies have a strong moral basis. Any study of the history of economic development shows the close relationship between moral and economic factors. Countries and groups that achieve successful development do so partly because they have an ethic that encourages the economic virtues of self-reliance, hard work, family and social responsibility, high savings, and honesty. This is also true of social subgroups. The business success of Jews, particularly of religious Jews, of the Puritans in New England, of the Quakers in British business in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or of the Mormons in modern America, all show the economic benefits that result from cultures with a strong moral framework.
One can take the Quakers as an example. The Quakers became successful businesswise, and were particularly successful as bankers, for a number of reasons. They set themselves the highest possible standard of trustworthiness. They would not swear oaths, but regarded every business commitment as being as binding as an oath. “My word is my bond” was for them an absolute principle. They believed in a quiet style of living, decent but frugal. As a religious duty, they avoided spending money on the vanities of this world. They avoided quarrels, and thought war was always sinful. They thought that the businessman had a moral obligation to give fair value, and as merchants they developed a reputation for maintaining high quality with moderate prices. “Caveat emptor”—let the buyer beware—was not good enough for them. In an age when most merchants followed a high-price, high-margin theory of trade, the Quaker morality led them naturally to a low-margin, high-turnover policy. As Henry Ford later showed, this can be potentially far more profitable. They followed this business policy because they thought it their duty not to cheat their customer, but it turned out to be the best way to expand their businesses. The Quakers proved good people to do business with, so their customers came back; there were profits on both sides. As a high-saving community, which honored its obligations, the Quakers had an advantage as bankers, and membership in the Quakers was itself a business asset which inspired confidence.
Unfortunately such business advantages can be eroded by the very success they produce. Countries go through a cycle, which formed the basis of Adam Ferguson’s sociological theory in the eighteenth century, from poverty and hard work, to riches, to luxury, to decadence, and on to decline. The ancient Romans themselves looked back to the virtues of the Republican period, when the Empire was being built, and deplored the luxury and laziness that they regarded as the cause of their decline. This erosion of the industrious virtues by prosperity can happen surprisingly quickly. The Germans are still a capable and efficient people, but they are not working anything like as hard as they did when they were rebuilding their country after the rain of defeat in 1945. In two generations, they have gone from working long hours, almost with their bare hands, in conditions of acute poverty, to working short hours for the highest pay and the most expensive welfare on earth.
In October 1995, the Petersburg Declaration was signed by sixteen German associations of employers. It is a catalogue of well-justified complaints, which reflect the decline in Germany’s industrial morale.
Germany’s tax burden reached record highs in 1995, particularly due to the solidarity surcharge and payments for nursing care insurance. With total corporate taxation amounting to more than 60 per cent, Germany is far above the comparative international level of 35 to 40 per cent. Public sector habits such as regulated promotions, jobs for life and higher pension payments have to be replaced by the free market rules of meritocratic promotion and compensation.… Due to the fact that Germany has the highest labour costs in the world, wage policies have to contribute to the reduction of unemployment by alleviating the costs for enterprises.… Wage increases should be measured according to competitiveness and productivity.… The behaviour of the unions has to change. The yearly ritual of campaigns, demands, workers’ mobilization, threats, and warning strikes is damaging.
This anxiety that the Germans, particularly the young and the heirs of prosperity, have lost the habit of work is shared by Chancellor Kohl.
The existing Volkswagen labor contract gives the highest pay for any car workers on earth, to which welfare taxes have to be added, in return for a 28-hour week—four days of seven hours each. Postwar Germany is now a massive exporter of jobs. The British were regarded in the middle of the nineteenth century as the most efficient industrial nation, a reputation they had certainly lost a hundred years later. The cycle of prosperity undoubtedly undermines virtues of hard work and modest expectations, which exist at the early stages of successful industrial development. Nations are not able to retain their early virtues, just as individuals can become greedy and lazy with too easy a success.
Global investment undoubtedly rewards these industrious virtues and penalizes those who become greedy and lazy, as it should. Indeed, one could say that sound investment has to be based on a moral as well as a purely financial assessment. The Englishman in the eighteenth century who subscribed to the capital of a Quaker bank was likely to do very well. In the nineteenth century, the Quakers invested in chocolate businesses, since they thought that cocoa was healthier than alcohol. It probably is. Yet an investment in Fry’s or Cadbury’s was certainly a good investment. Investors should be concerned to avoid the periods of decadence. Even if Germany retains a strong position in the European market, and high industrial skills, high labor costs and short working hours have already reduced Germany’s future potential.
Social morality and economic success are insolubly linked. But what factors help to maintain, or tend to undermine, the social morality? Arnold Toynbee, the great philosophic historian of the first half of the twentieth century, formulated the theory of the challenge and response. Societies are invigorated by challenges, and develop virtue they did not even know they possessed.
There has always been a human recognition that hard times may develop, and normally do develop, healthier responses than those of periods of prosperity. In our individual lives, we all try to make ourselves comfortable, we hope to live in a house that we enjoy, have a job that we like, have enough money in the bank, and so on. The struggle to achieve these objectives is a rewarding one. We study at school, we train ourselves, we work hard at our business or profession, with these objectives in mind.
In far too many people the achievement of these objectives creates something of a trap. The struggle is better than the achievement. The great Swiss psychologist Carl Jung had an American businessman as his patient early in this century. The businessman had these very ambitions as a young man. He had worked to establish his own business, and to make enough money to retire by the age of forty. He married a young and attractive woman, he bought a beautiful home, he had a young family, his business was highly successful, and by the age of forty he had indeed been able to sell out and retire, a rich and independent man with nothing apparently to worry about. At first he enjoyed his freedom, was able to do things he had long promised himself. He took his family to Europe. They visited art galleries and so on. Gradually these interests, and his sense of freedom itself, began to pale. He started to look back at the time when he was not free, when he was working all hours at his business and had all the usual business worries, as the happy period of his life. He fell into a depression, which led his wife to bring him to Jung as a patient. Jung diagnosed him, in effect, as having no outlet for his creative energy, which had turned in on him, and was destroying him. The diagnosis may well have been correct, but it did not lead to a cure. The businessman never recovered from his nervous breakdown.
For human beings it is the struggle rather than the achievement that matters; we are made for action, and the achievement can prove to be a great disappointment. The ambition, whatever it may be, sets the struggle in motion, but the struggle is more enjoyable than its own result, even when the objective is fully achieved. And, of course, for most people, the objectives can be achieved only partially. Most of us do not have as much money as we would like, and do not live in our dream house. We have to settle for something less.
This sense that virtue is dynamic, that it consists in the effort rather than the result, developed strongly in the nineteenth century, and in different ways. There is a well-known poem by Arthur Hugh Clough that brought comfort to many people in the life-and-death struggle of the Second World War. It is worth noting that suicide rates in the warring countries fell in the Second World War; even the struggle of war can be better than the depression of inactivity.
Say not, the struggle nought availeth, The labour and the wounds are vain, The enemy faints not, nor faileth, And as things have been they remain. If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars; It may be, in yon smoke concealed, Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers, And, but for you, possess the field. For while the tired waves, vainly breaking, Seem here no painful inch to gain, Far back, through creeks and inlets making, Comes silent, flooding in, the main. And not by eastern windows only, When daylight comes, comes in the light, In front, the sun climbs slow, how slowly, But westward, look, the land is bright.
This active competition still appeals to the modern sensibility. Indeed, it is how many modern men and women lead their lives, in a continuous struggle to seize the opportunities of a potentially hostile environment. We all live in a competitive world, and most of us do not wish to contract out of it. There is, of course, the contemplative spiritual temperament, but it is quite rare.
A similar nineteenth-century perception of this dynamic morality was developed by William James, the greatest of American philosophers, in an address to the Yale Philosophical Club in 1891:
The deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the difference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. When in the easy-going mood the shrinking from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained. The capacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man but it has more difficulty in some than others in waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, loves and indignation; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like justice, truth, and freedom. Strong relief is a necessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains are brought down and all the valleys are exalted is no congenial place for its habitation. This is why in a solitary thinker this mood might slumber on forever without waking. His various ideals, known to him to be mere preferences of his own, are too nearly of the same denominational value: he can play fast or loose with them at will. This too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuine ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up.
William James believed that the dynamic morality, which consists in doing rather than being, in acting rather than refraining from action, can be extended into the religious sphere. There is also a powerful development of the morality of competition and survival in the work of Adam Smith (1776), Thomas Malthus (1798), and Charles Darwin (1859). As this is the dominant moral doctrine of the present world economic order, its central theme needs careful consideration.
The dominant idea of Darwinism is that species survive through adaptation to their environment, and that this process of natural selection shapes the characteristics of the species. In animals the process is the result of random mutations, which are now known to belong to a genetic process Darwin himself could only guess at. The survival of human societies depends, however, on cultural choices that are based on human intelligence. Culture changes human society as genes change other species. Change can therefore take place much faster in our societies. It does not have to work through many generations as it does when it depends on random genetic mutations. In place of the natural selection in animals, human beings have developed cultural selection, with some cultures, at some stage of human history, developing new technologies that gave them a decisive advantage in wealth creation or mustering power. The cultural edge of new technologies, such as Iron Age man had over Bronze Age man, or electronic man has over mechanical man, are decisive. Adam Smith may not have been the first writer on economic matters to reduce the welfare of nations to the action of individuals, but he put it most succinctly and with the greatest authority:
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.
Thomas Malthus, the founder of population studies, saw that the Adam Smith argument could be applied not only to the development of the economy of nations but also to the survival of human populations. He is well known for his proposition that “Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.”
Malthus even saw, long before Darwin, that the same principle applied throughout nature:
Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand. She has been comparatively, sparing in the room, and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this spot of earth, with ample food, and ample room to expand in, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds.
The way the world develops, even at this stage of Adam Smith and Malthus, had already come to be understood by the end of the eighteenth century as dynamic, which it had always been in fact. The human species, itself one among many, is forced to compete by the mismatch between its unlimited capacity for generation and its limited ability to grow food. The survival of human societies, as of animal species, depends on successful adaptation to the environment. A dynamic morality is therefore concerned with overcoming the problems of adaptation. This is best achieved by individuals who adapt their own actions to the opportunities of the environment, and therefore employ resources available in the society to the greatest advantage.
Malthus already saw that Adam Smith’s ideas had changed the world, and he wrote that his new argument about population was not new: “The principles on which it depends have been explained in part by Hume and in part by Dr. Adam Smith.” He also saw that this constant competition for survival was a moral, not merely a practical, matter. The last paragraph of the 1798 “Essay” reads:
Evil exists in the world, not to create despair, but activities. We are not patiently to submit to it, but to exert ourselves to avoid it. It is not only the interest, but the duty of every individual, to use his utmost efforts to remove evil from himself, and from as large a circle as he can influence; and the more he exercises himself in this duty, the more wisely he directs his efforts, and the more successful these efforts are; the more he will probably improve and exalt his own mind, and the more completely does he appear to fulfil the will of his Creator.
Perhaps one can illustrate Darwin’s sense of the importance of this argument from his summary of the contents of Chapter 3 of his epoch-making book, On the Origin of Species, first published in 1859. He called this crucial chapter “Struggle for Existence.” The subject headlines are: “Bears on Natural Selection—The term used in a wide sense—Geometrical powers of increase—Rapid increase of naturalized animals and plants—Nature of the checks to increase—Competition universal—Effects of climate—Protection from the number of individuals—Complex relations of all animals and plants throughout nature—Struggle for life most severe between individuals and varieties of the same species; often severe between species of the same genus—The relation of organism to organism the most important of all relations.”
Since 1776, it has been evident that the best way to optimize the wealth, of nations is to allow individuals to optimize their own return on capital in conditions of free competition. Since 1798, it has been evident that the relative survival of populations depended on societies having sufficient economic and political success to be able to feed themselves, protect themselves from infectious diseases, and protect their populations in war. Since 1859, it has been evident that the whole drama of life, in the human, the animal, or the vegetable kingdom, consists of a continuous struggle for survival, in which those species or cultures that are nearest to each other may be the greatest rivals. This struggle requires a dynamic morality, which actively wards off evil and does not merely respond to it when it happens.
These ideas have been so powerful that it has been impossible for anyone to think about the nature of humanity, or the problems of morality, since the time in which they were developed, without responding to them. Karl Marx believed in the struggle for survival just as much as Charles Darwin, but he believed it was a war between social classes, themselves formed by economic forces. Adolf Hitler believed in the struggle for survival, and saw his own political career almost exclusively in those terms. But he believed that the struggle was one between different races. Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Hitler can all be called social Darwinists, in that they saw the struggle for survival, “Mein Kampf” as Hitler called it, as the central political issue. The Marxists saw social classes as though they were separate species; the Nazis saw races in the same light.
This, however, makes not a dynamic morality, such as Malthus envisaged, but a dynamic immorality. Both Marxism and Nazism wished to solve the same problem, the problem of the struggle for survival, but by destroying competition. They invaded foreign territories, they promoted conflict between different classes who competed for social power, or different races who were seen either as economic exploiters (the normal charge made against Jews by anti-Semites) or as a dangerous underclass (the fear held of blacks by their white enemies). The Second World War was an attempt by Adolf Hitler, which failed, to secure an advantage in survival terms of the German people, by destroying potential competition, particularly Slavs and Jews. By an interesting paradox, defeat in war proved more advantageous to Germany than the victory of the Nazis could ever have been.
The alternative to destructive “interference” competition is collaborative competition, and collaborative competition is the central idea of Adam Smith, and also of Malthus and of William James. The archetype of destructive competition is the conqueror. He destroys his competitors in order to seize their assets, which may include taking over their countries and may involve the enslavement of their peoples. The archetype of collaborative competition is the merchant. It is in the interest of the merchant that the customer should be satisfied with the transaction, because only a satisfied customer comes back for more trade. It is also in the interest of the merchant that the customer should be prosperous, because a prosperous customer has the money to go on buying. Conquest implies the destruction of the other party; commerce implies the satisfaction of the other party. As modern technology has made conquest an extraordinarily dangerous policy, commerce has become the only rational approach to the problems of survival.
This interdependence is strengthened by another central idea of Adam Smith—not new with him—which is the specialization of function. The Wealth of Nations starts with a celebrated passage in which Adam Smith observes that “the greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.” He points out that “the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands.” The more complete the specialization of function, the more efficient the manufacture is likely to be, but obviously such an economy is highly interdependent. If it is to be successful, it has to be collaborative.
A successful social morality must therefore have certain characteristics. It must be strong—a weak morality will be vulnerable and ineffective. It must contribute to the struggle for survival, but in ways that are collaborative rather than murderous. Hitler had a strong morality of survival, but its destructive quality nearly destroyed his own society. It must be dynamic, to match the dynamic changes of modern technology, and indeed of all modern social systems. It must be economically efficient. The mixture of egalitarian and authoritarian ideas in the Leninist system simply did not work. Yet these are not all the characteristics that such a social morality might be expected to possess. It has a broader purpose of making the society a good one to live in, and of binding people together. Also, moralities have to adapt and survive; a brittle morality may be acceptable in our generation only to be rejected in the next. A traditional social morality may be too inflexible to adapt to successive changes in social structure. On the other hand a purely relativist system is not a morality at all; it gives no clear signals on how to behave.
We can first of all put all social morality inside a context. A strong community, even a virtual community, depends upon the morality being widely accepted. The most successful periods in the history of societies tend to be those in which the collective morality is fully shared. Such a morality not only performs specific functions such as reducing crime, and helping to support family and social structures, but gives citizens a sense of purpose and direction. Such a consensus on morality historically seems to depend on there being a dominant religion, whether that is a state religion of the early Roman Empire; the religion of the Jews, which has been the thread of survival for a dispersed people; the Islamic religion with its social rules; the Catholicism of the Middle Ages; or the Protestantism of early New England. The three ideas of a people, a morality, and a religion depend upon one another, and each tends to reinforce the others.
In such a moral society, the individual citizen is able to work toward personal objectives inside a framework of social support. Admittedly the moral laws may be somewhat arbitrary, or at least may appear arbitrary to outsiders. The Orthodox Jew loses the freedom to eat pork or shellfish, or to work on the Sabbath. The loyal Catholic may lose the freedom to use artificial contraceptives, let alone to have an abortion. The Moslem may lose the freedom to drink alcohol. The pious Confucian may have the inconveniently long period of mourning for his reverend father—even Confucius himself warned that mourning rituals could be exaggerated. Yet the adherent to each of these systems of belief regards these observations as a small price to pay for a shared and coherent sense of world order, in which the individual has a settled place. An Orthodox Jew could well argue that the observance of the Sabbath is a small price to pay for the benefits of the Law or the strength of the Jewish family. A shared morality in a tolerant society was the ideal of John Locke and of early philosophers of liberty. They did not at all believe that a society, of any kind, can be maintained without rules, but they thought that the rules ought to be subject to the best of reason, and that people should be coerced to accept only the essential rules. They did recognize that coercion was inevitable in social morality, particularly in the protection of life or of property, because they considered that no society can survive if there is no security. They applied an almost absolute tolerance to variations in personal choices that did not affect the welfare of others. The Confucian, mourning his father for forty days, could live next door to the Jew, honoring the Sabbath, without either disturbing the other, or wanting to coerce him into following his own religious practices.
From this combined doctrine of social morality in essential matters and tolerance in personal decisions, one actually gets a core moral standard that has to be imposed on all citizens and a voluntary ethic that citizens accept as individuals or as members of subgroups in society. When a Benedictine monk takes vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, he does so as a member of such a subgroup. He does not call on all Catholics, let alone on all his fellow citizens, to take the same vows, or to observe the same rules. He will be obedient to the orders of his abbot, but he does not expect anyone outside his abbey to pay any attention to them. The adherence to these optional parts of social morality does not need to be universal, but the core morality does have to be shared, and people who will not accept the core morality damage society as well as themselves. In the extreme example, a society overrun with robbers who do not hesitate to murder, as large parts of Europe were after the fall of the Roman Empire, offers nobody a satisfactory life, not even the robbers themselves; they are always particularly threatened by other murderers. This is equally true of some inner-city areas of the United States today. Anarchy is not the ideal society, because without the enforcement of law there is no human security.
When one looks at the forces that are hostile to the morality of society, one needs to consider this core morality, which is broadly similar in most modern religious belief systems. Two, at least, of the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, for Christians, or the Torah, for Jews, can be regarded as universal for anything one could recognize as a religion: “Thou shalt not kill” and “Thou shalt not steal.” One can even go beyond that. Almost all serious agnostics would regard both murder and theft—the ultimate threat to life and the ultimate threat to property—as forbidden, and would accept that society has the right to punish people who kill or rob. They might disagree about the appropriate punishment for a particular crime, but not about the right of society to punish as such.
The original phrase of John Locke has it precisely. Everyone has a right to “life, liberty and estate.” In 1776 Thomas Jefferson added another of John Locke’s phrases, “the pursuit of happiness.” That makes a very fine phrase, and a very fine aspiration, but “life, liberty and estate” is more down to earth than “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Society depends absolutely on the right to life and the right to property. In practice history shows that these rights can be protected only when there is liberty. If the state is all-powerful, then the state becomes the great enemy of life, as in wars of aggression, and of individual property, by taking an inordinate share of the national wealth for its own often undesirable and always wasteful purposes.
The core morality is, however, under attack in the most advanced nations, partly by the very forces of modernity that give these nations their technical edge. The United States is the world’s leading technological power. Many people, including most Americans, would have regarded the United States as a moral example to the rest of the world at any time up to the early 1960s. Now that view is seldom expressed, even by Americans who are proud of their country. One could not listen, as the world did, to the O.J. Simpson trial and regard the United States as the simple virtuous Republic it began by being.
If one looks back at the labels of the old America, they reflected the needs of a frontier society, which colored the attitudes of its citizens even in the big cities. Frontiers are democratic places. People feel themselves to be equal, and the early Americans threw off the class hierarchies of Europe. Even indentured laborers, sent over from England as prisoners, established themselves as independent tradesmen, farmers, or free laborers once their indenture period was over. Wages were higher than in Europe, and the cost of essentials was low, though imported manufactures were expensive. On the frontier itself people depended very much on one another, but the living, if hard, was a good one by European standards. Immigrants might start as low wage earners in the slums of Boston and New York, but they usually escaped from the slums quite soon, and generation after generation found prosperity. After the Civil War, the blacks saw themselves as though they were another immigrant group, and many of them shared these American values and objectives. From these the black middle class developed.
This aspiration, strengthened by the actual experience of the frontier, and by the influence of the churches, both Protestant and Catholic, framed the patriotism of Americans. They believed that they lived in God’s own country, a notion uniquely guided by democratic ideals and Christian faith, the first and most successful of the world’s democracies. The picture is familiar enough; it is personified in the image we all, or almost all, have of Abraham Lincoln, though one can still find some Americans in the South who see Lincoln as the man who unleashed the horrors of the first modern war to prevent free states from leaving a Union they no longer trusted.
Nevertheless, the image of Lincoln, craggy, simple, honest, and eloquent, is still the supreme American image, and it is essentially a moral one. Many Americans still feel the vivid original contrast between the democratic energy of the new country and the tired hierarchies of Europe. This ideal of an essentially dynamic meritocracy is hard for the foreigner to recognize in present-day Los Angeles, New York, Houston, or Washington, even though its traces, and something more than traces, can still be found in the great suburban belts or in the rural areas. The American Puritan ethic, with all its historic importance, survives best north of the snowline, but the entrepreneurial dynamism is more widespread.
Americans would point to the decay of the big cities, which have become breeding grounds for crime, especially the narco-business, as the worst symptom of the decline of a communal sense of morality. Most Americans also recognize that there is a clash of several different moral cultures, all competing in their claims and their authority. The “politically correct” culture rejects many, but not all, of the moral principles that upheld the old culture. It aggressively emphasizes the role and the rights of groups who are seen as having been historically exploited by a dominant white male culture, and rejects that culture, despite its being the founding culture of the United States.
The dominant male culture of the first half of the twentieth century centered on the survival of the nuclear family. This historically gave the husband-father at least a nominal dominance in the home, though in practice the home was often run by the wife-mother with the often meek acceptance of the nominal master. It gave the male boss a real dominance in the workplace, a dominance that the feminist movement has so far challenged but not reversed. The interest of the family, and historic Christian teaching, outlawed abortion. The old morality thought abortion was unlawful killing, was never allowable, and the adherents of the traditional morality still think that. Adherents of the new morality think the opposite. In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court based the constitutional right to abortion, which had hitherto been regarded as a question for the individual states, on the doctrine of a right to privacy, itself remote from any language actually to be found in the Constitution or its amendments.
A woman’s privacy was held to include the right to have or not to have children, whatever the consequences to the embryo might be. The Supreme Court did not regard the embryo as enjoying any constitutional rights—embryos being the same extraconstitutional entities in the late twentieth century that slaves had been in the first half of the nineteenth. “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” did not apply to slaves, and the language of the Declaration of Independence was not applied to embryos by the justices in Roe v. Wade.
The abortion debate is the extreme example of the conflict between the old and new morality, though there are equally remarkable conflicts in other areas where the old social organization with its morality has been challenged by the new. Traditional Christian morality, in Protestant and Catholic churches alike, laid great emphasis on sexual roles: No heterosexual intercourse outside or before marriage. No genital homosexual relationships. Lesbianism was less emphasized, because society hardly recognized its existence. When Queen Victoria was first told of it, she stoutly refused to believe that such things happened between women. Political correctness is the morality of supposedly oppressed groups. The homosexuals claimed an equal validity for their lifestyle, and challenged the traditional opposition to their sexual conduct. “Homophobia” was regarded as being itself an outrageous form of prejudice, like racial discrimination. To be critical of gays is regarded by the new morality as being as unacceptable as being critical of blacks, Jews, or women.
At the same time other sexual taboos were being eroded or abolished. In the 1960s there was a new wave of free love, partly based on the apparent security of the female contraceptive pill, but also promoted by mood-changing drugs and pop music. It led to an increasing amount of nonmarital cohabitation. By the 1990s it was thought absolutely normal in Britain, a rather more old-fashioned society than most of the United States, for Prince Edward to sleep with his girlfriend at Buckingham Palace, in the same stable but unmarried intimacy that students were sleeping with each other in their 1960s lodgings. Few people thought it odd that Queen Elizabeth II, the head of the Church of England, condoned her youngest son’s conduct, her three elder children’s marriages having already broken down. Those few who complained were regarded as hopelessly out of date and priggish. Yet there were still many people who regarded the old morality as preferable, even if they did not practice it themselves, or seriously expect their children to do so, beyond a fairly early age.
The politically correct movement has had its own puritanical side. Because it sprang from the perceived interests of women, seen as the largest of the oppressed groups, it had a certain hostility to male sexuality, both in aggressive and in what would previously have been regarded as harmless forms. Some women took the view that all men were by nature rapists, and the natural horror at rape was exaggerated into a general denunciation of the male gender. Others concentrated on sexual harassment, a real grievance—many men have very crude sexual manners—which became ludicrous in some trivial cases. Sexual harassment was even alleged in mere looks, without any word being uttered, let alone physical contact. As a result the new morality could be very censorious. White people could be accused of racial prejudices, not because they were prejudiced but because they were white. Men could be accused of sexual harassment because their expressions showed that they found a woman attractive, something that in an earlier generation had been regarded as a compliment rather than an insult.
The politically correct and the fundamentalist Christian groups are bitterly critical of each other, yet in the modern world they look rather alike. They both assume the authority of a particular moral doctrine as though it were universal, even though their moral doctrines are different. Both indeed can be criticized for the same defect, for an exaggerated and overconfident moralism, lacking in depth, in historic sense, or in tolerance. Both are attacked for their supposed resemblance to seventeenth-century Puritanism, to the self-confident moralists like Oliver Cromwell in England—he nearly emigrated to New England—or the Salem witch hunters. Neither the women’s movement, in its more dogmatic form, nor the conservative preachers of the Bible belt can be accused of any lack of morality, but of its overdevelopment and rigidity. The heart of these moralities sometimes seems to have turned to stone. This sort of hardening of the moral arteries is as damaging to the consensual morality of society as the “anything goes” anarchy against which it protests.
It is a distortion of moral forces, a coarsening into self-righteousness. Pharisaism, the conviction that one is uniquely virtuous, is as old as humankind, and was particularly offensive to Jesus Christ. The erosion of morality, the belief that ethical choices are purely a matter of private preference, as much a matter for the individual as the choice of clothes, is a more recent phenomenon. This belief reflects the absence of any shared morality at all. It takes to a quite new stage the classical doctrine of liberty, and turns “the pursuit of happiness” from what John Locke originally meant by the phrase, and Jefferson understood by it in 1776, into a hedonism that is reckless of consequences.
The phrase “the pursuit of happiness” is taken from John Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding (1691): “the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful pursuit of true and solid happiness, so the care of ourselves that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty.” He does go on to say that “everyone does not place his happiness in the same thing.… the mind has a different relish as well as the palate.… Men may choose different things, yet all choose right, supposing them only like a company of poor insects, whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their sweetness, others beetles delighted with other kinds of viands.” Yet he goes on to argue that to prefer vice to virtue is “manifestly a wrong judgement.” He puts particular weight on the religious argument, but considers also that “wicked men have the worse part here.” He believes that “morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in anyone who will consider.”
The Lockean doctrine of liberty undoubtedly gives a wider range to human preferences than more authoritarian moral systems that seek to treat all people alike, and impose uniformity of conduct. Yet soon the classic doctrine of liberty recognizes the need for collective moral imperatives, including respect for other people in society, particularly their lives and the peaceful ownership of their possessions under the law. A general erosion of the collective morality threatens liberty, both directly, in that it introduces an element of anarchy, and indirectly, by encouraging the most authoritarian forces of society. We can see the history of public morality as a cycle between disorder and authoritarianism; the modern authoritarian moralities, both feminism and fundamentalism, have emerged as a cyclical response to the hedonism of the 1960s.
We have already described some of the attributes of the new world of the next century. It will be shaped by two main forces, the shift of technology that is opening up the economies of Asia and the new global electronic communications that are making the citizen progressively less dependent on his or her local government. The new technology will replace, or has already replaced, many of the middle human skills—the production line worker, the office clerk, now increasingly the middle manager. But it has rewarded the rarer skills, creating an international cognitive elite of highly skilled people for whom the new communications open up the widest possible market for their skills. Like most elites, the cognitive elite tend to be a bit above themselves, are rather arrogant, and think they can set their own standards. They are alienated from society as a result.
During the first half of the next century there will be a massive transfer of wealth from the Old West to the New East. Political failures—and China is still a politically backward country—may delay this transfer of wealth and strategic power, but are most unlikely to prevent it. They cannot reverse it.
This process of the shift in wealth would in any case put the greatest possible pressure on the white-dominated countries of the Northern Hemisphere, on Europe and North America. At present about 750 million people, belong to the advanced countries of this area; until very recently Japan was the only Asian, nonwhite country to have reached the Euro-American standard of living, though there were ethnically European populations in New Zealand, in Australia, and in the white population of southern Africa. Even in 1990, the total population of the advanced industrial countries was only about 15 percent of the world population of 5 billion. The shape of the distribution of the world’s wealth was 15 percent rich, 85 percent poor, very like the income distribution in advanced industrial societies a hundred years ago. By 2050, in an accelerating process, the expectation is that the advanced economies will include about 3 billion people out of a world population that may have risen to 7 billion, or a wealth distribution of 40 percent rich, 60 percent poor. By the end of the century these figures could well be reversed, and the distribution could be 60 percent rich and 40 percent poor, with poverty particularly concentrated in Africa. The shift between nations will be toward a greater equality of wealth, but inside nations it will probably be toward greater inequality. The efficient users of talent and capital will have a decisive advantage over those with moderate skills or little capital. This wealth will be highly mobile. The poor in the advanced world will not be able to tax the rich on the twentieth-century scale; those countries that try to do so will fall back in an intensely competitive race.
Of course, the total productivity of the world economy will continue to rise, perhaps by an average of 3 percent over the whole world, if there are no world wars. If that proves correct, the total world product will double every twenty-five years, making it more than four times as large as it is now by 2050, and sixteen to twenty times as large by 2100. Even if the world population has increased to 8 billion by 2100, that will give the world GDP per head by the end of the century ten times its present level. Such an increase in wealth can take care of the rise in the new industrial societies, and the multimillion-dollar incomes of the cognitive elite, and still provides a decent and rising standard of living for the rest of the advanced workforce. But the differentials will be very different from those of the twentieth century. In world terms the poor nations will see their incomes grow much faster than those of the rich nations; in national terms, the incomes of the rich, as in the America of the 1990s, will grow much faster than middle or low incomes. In the next century we shall witness the creation of a world superclass, perhaps of 500 million very rich people, with 100 million being rich enough to emerge as Sovereign Individuals.
This process will have an inevitable consequence. Societies will become much less homogeneous; the nation-state will become weaker, or crumble altogether; the cognitive elite will see itself as cosmopolitan. Already people who work in the same global functions are developing a culture that is much closer to that of their fellow workers in other parts of the world than to their fellow citizens in the old nation-states. A London investment banker will probably feel more at home in Seoul than he will in Glasgow; a Washington civil servant may feel more at home in Bonn than in black areas of Washington itself. We can already see the splintering effect that this process has on moral values. The morality of the individual is partly framed by education, by what the individual has been taught as a child; it is also partly framed by experience of life. Both the education and the experiences of the cognitive elite will be cosmopolitan, and will tend to divorce people from their local communities.
As we move toward the next century, a high proportion of people in the growing cognitive elite have been given little religious or moral education in the family. The commonest religion of the elite is an agnostic humanism. Many such families are themselves split by divorce, remarriage, and subsequent third marriages. The marriage pattern in Hollywood is not universal in the United States, but the cognitive elite in Euro-America has a high divorce rate, probably averaging a third or more. The children of these divorced parents seldom have a basic religious education, and are aware of the variations of moral attitude between parents, stepparents, and step-siblings. If one compares the initial moral education of this group with that of an Irish or Polish village, the peasant education obviously provides much the stronger religious training of the two. A godless, rootless, and rich elite is unlikely to be happy, or to be loved.
This inadequacy in the initial moral education of what will be the dominant economic group of the next century is likely to be reinforced by their life experience. These people will have the discipline of an advanced technical education, of one sort or another, to fit themselves for their new role as the leaders of the new electronic universe. But they will learn from that only some of the moral lessons that have historically been the framework for human social conduct. By the standards of Confucius, Buddha, or Plato (500 B.C.), St. Paul (A.D. 50), or Mahomet (A.D. 600), they may be moral illiterates. They will have been taught the lessons of economic efficiency, the use of resources, the pursuit of money, but not the virtues of humility or self-sacrifice, let alone chastity. Essentially most of them will have been brought up as pagans with a set of values closer to those of the late Roman Republic than to Christianity. Even these values will be highly individualistic, rather than shared. Societies, as we have argued, can only be strong if real moral values are widely shared. The advanced nations are already moving into the situation where many people will hold weak or limited moral values, others will compensate with fierce adherence to irrational values, and few values will be held in common across the whole of society. No doubt, some of the “competitive territorial clubs” that we described earlier will impose exacting moral standards for residence.
Differences in wealth have not in themselves historically produced fundamental differences in religious values. In dense and stable societies with strong traditions, a steep hierarchical structure. “the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate,” may conceal values that run through the hierarchy, but this depends upon the strength of the communal feeling of the rich and the poor, and the strength of the social traditions. Neither of these conditions exists now, and both community feeling and tradition are being weakened by the economic and technological revolution that is taking place. The lives of the many and the few are becoming more and more distant from each other. The technological revolution has been achieved by breaking away from the old ways of doing things. In every field it has been the radical who has won, and the conventional thinker who has fallen behind, who has literally fallen out of the race. Our politics may be led by conventional thinkers—Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, John Major—but our most successful businesses are led by radicals with a keen understanding of the new technological world; the archetype is Bill Gates. Conventional thinking has been discredited by its inability to deal with the rapidity and the sheer force of change.
Yet morality is not like that. If we take the science of Moses, formed about 1000 B.C., it has very little to tell us. The account of the creation in the Book of Genesis may well contain a theological truth—God made the universe and humankind—but it does not give a scientific account of the actual development of physical structures. Yet if we take the morality of Moses—the Ten Commandments—that has a great deal to tell us.
Respect for parents and faithfulness in marriage are the best ways to preserve family life; family life is the best way to bring up morally healthy children. Stealing damages the thief and the people from whom things are stolen, and is a disincentive to work and saving. Social order depends on the truth of witnesses. It is wrong to murder, and so on.
In science, three thousand years completely changed what human knowledge is; in morality, we may actually have fallen back. The average psychotherapist probably gives the patient less good moral advice on how to lead his life than the average Jew would have received from his teacher in the period of Moses. Of course, Christianity itself is still available, but it is for most of the world a pale ghost of its former self. Few people have the faith of the earlier ages, or even of the less sophisticated communities; one does not look for saints on Park Avenue.
The destruction of tradition has been a necessary condition of scientific progress. If we all still believed that the sun revolved around the earth, then we could not have developed satellite communications. Indeed what we believe to be science itself is only a series of hypotheses, imperfect explanations due to be replaced by other explanations, stronger but still imperfect. Yet the destruction of tradition has been a disaster to the moral order of the world.
Confucius taught that we should always behave with moderation (he called the Golden Mean chum yum, at least as it was translated by seventeenth-century scholars). He also taught that we should respect authority and treat others as we would wish to be treated ourselves. That teaching is twenty-five hundred years old. As a tradition it influenced China for all recorded history, but Confucianism seems an outmoded tradition to many modern Chinese, who do not value moderation, who respect force rather than authority, and certainly do not treat others as they would wish to be treated themselves. With the loss of tradition, societies can lose the whole vocabulary of their moral consensus. China, with all its advancing power, is now a morally backward country compared to Tibet, impoverished and oppressed as the Tibetans are.
A good social morality has certain characteristics. It should contribute to the survival of society and of individuals, in a dynamic rather than static way. It should include tolerance and avoid self-righteousness. It should be religious, rather than merely agnostic. It should not pretend to decide questions of scientific fact. It should be neither anarchic nor authoritarian. It should be widely shared and deeply held. Such a social morality is particularly important to the family and to the raising of children as independent and responsible adults. It provides the focus of a good society.
We find that any such morality is supported by the logic of interdependence that comes from commerce and fellow-feeling, but is threatened by the attacks of a facile scientism, by the alienation of a superclass and a subclass, by the loss of the rootedness of the old geographical economies. Perhaps there will be a reaction against these trends. They must be recognized as extremely dangerous to the societies of the next century.
As what Isaiah Berlin called “the most terrible century in Western history” winds down, the age of giantism in social structure also draws to a close. The final days of the twentieth century are destined to be a time of downsizing, devolution, and reorganization. It will be the time of the social dinosaurs trapped in the tar pit. And a time of scavengers. Birds will pick the bones of dinosaurs. Governments, corporations, and unions will be obliged to adjust against their inclinations to new metaconstitutional conditions established by the penetration of microtechnology. It has profoundly shifted the boundaries within which violence is exercised. Today’s world has already changed more than we commonly understand, more than CNN and the newspapers tell us. And it has changed in precisely the directions indicated by a study of megapolitical conditions. As we argued first in Blood in the Streets and then in The Great Reckoning, when change occurs in technology or the other factors that set the boundaries where violence is exercised, the character of society inevitably changes with them. Everything that is attached to the way humans interact, including morality and the common sense of the way we see the world, will change as well. After a period of slack morality, which is indicative of the end of an era, we will see the awakening of a sterner morality, with more exacting demands to meet the more exacting requirements of a world of competitive sovereignty.
Several features of the new morality can be foreseen. For one thing, it will emphasize the importance of productivity and the correctness of earnings being retained by those who generate them. Another corollary point will be the importance of efficiency in investment. The morality of the Information Age applauds efficiency, and recognizes the advantage of resources being dedicated to their highest-value uses. In other words, the morality of the Information Age will be the morality of the market. As James Bennett has argued, the morality of the Information Age will also be a morality of trust. The cybereconomy will be a high-trust community. In a setting where unbreakable encryption will allow an embezzler or thief to securely place the proceeds of his crimes outside the range of recovery, there will be a very strong incentive to avoid losses by not doing business with thieves and embezzlers in the first place. Just as in the example of the Quakers cited earlier, a reputation for honesty will be an important asset in the cybereconomy. In the anonymity of cyberspace, this reputation may not always apply to a known person, but it will be reliably verifiable through identification of cryptographic keys. The possibility for radiating difficulties if encryption or certification of encrypted identities becomes corrupted by gangsters or others is daunting enough that it should strongly militate against the hiring of any person whose behavior could be indicative of a lack of trustworthiness. Bennett envisions “A Gentleman’s Club of Cyberspace,” protected areas that would require heightened security measures for participation, “possibly using biometric validation such as voice-print identification. The proprietors would assume the responsibility of vouching for the identity of the participants and to some extent their trustworthiness, achieving a ‘gentleman’s club in cyberspace’ (although ladies would be welcome these days). In these areas, people could carry on transactions with greater security and confidence than in the general realm of cyberspace. Thus the twenty-first century may see a return to a Victorian-like emphasis on trustworthiness and character in an environment no Victorian could have envisioned.”
The protected areas of cyberspace may also offer guarantees to reduce risk similar to the extraterritorial guarantees of protection offered by the Counts of Champagne to protect merchants traveling to and from Champagne fairs. Other jurisdictions actually “indemnified traveling merchants against any losses they might incur while passing through the territory under the jurisdiction of the given noble.”
“Guards of the Fair,” officials originally appointed by the counts, provided security and a “tribunal of justice” for merchants at the fair. They ultimately evolved into more independent entities, with a separate seal, notarizing contracts and enforcing performance, with the power to “bar from future fairs any trader found guilty of not paying his debts or fulfilling his contracted promises. This was evidently so severe a penalty that few willingly risked this denial of opportunities for future profit. Short of that, however, the guards could seize the goods of a defaulting debtor and sell them for the benefit of his creditors.”39
Ostracism as means of enforcement of contracts declined in importance when the number of alternative markets rose. With the new information technology now available, however, ostracism of cheats and those defaulting on contracts could again be a potent enforcement mechanism with the fragmented sovereignties of the next stage of society. Computer linkages can police cyberspace with unforgeable information about credit and fraud. As the world will be in this sense particularly a small community, cheats and frauds will be discouraged.
In addition to emphasizing the morality of earnings and efficiency and placing a renewed stress on character and trustworthiness, the new morality is also likely to stress the evil of violence, particularly kidnapping and extortion, which will grow in importance as means of “shaking down” individuals whose resources will not otherwise be easy prey to crime.
Still another likely spur to sterner morality will be the end of entitlements and income redistribution. When the hope of aid for those falling behind is based primarily upon appeals to private individuals and charitable bodies, it will be more important than it has been in the twentieth century that the recipients of charity appear to be morally deserving to those voluntarily dispensing the charity.
“Subsidies, windfalls, and the prospect of economic opportunity remove the immediacy of needing to conserve. The mantras of democracy, redistribution, and economic development raise expectations and fertility rates, fostering population growth and thereby steepening a downward environmental and economic spiral.”40 —VIRGINIA ABERNETHY
In some ways the new information world will be better positioned to encourage seriousness over moral issues. The promises of income redistribution that enframed expectations among the unlucky and unsuccessful in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe have also had a perverse effect internationally. There is strong evidence suggesting that foreign aid and promises of intervention to forestall famine and increase living standards have been major factors stimulating population growth that exceeds the carrying capacities of backward economies. The startling growth of world population since World War II, with its often destructive impact on forests, soils, and water resources, can be traced to intervention on a global scale. This intervention short-circuited the negative feedback consequences that had long kept local populations in balance with the resources needed to support them.
Of course, many who lived in local environments with few resources and little or no growth were only too pleased to be assured that constraining limitations of their village life could be put aside. They eagerly adopted the optimistic message carried by international aid workers, Peace Corps volunteers, local revolutionaries, and the competing ideologues of the Cold War, who told one and all that a better day lay ahead. This was precisely the wrong message.
An important consequence of redistribution among cultures has been to make those who lived in nonindustrial civilizations and adhered to nonindustrial values artificially competitive. International aid, rescue missions to counter famine and disease, and technical intervention fooled many into believing that their life prospects had sharply improved—without the necessity on their part of updating their values or significantly altering their behavior.
International income redistribution not only encouraged an unsustainable surge in the world’s population, it contributed in important ways to cultural relativism and widespread confusion over the crucial role of culture in fitting people to prosper in their local environment. Today most people believe that cultures are more matters of taste than sources of guidance for behavior that can mislead as well as inform. We are too keen to believe that all cultures are created equal, too slow to recognize the drawbacks of counterproductive cultures. This is especially true of the hybrid cultures that have begun to emerge in the hothouse of subsidy and intervention in many parts of the world in this century. Like the criminal subculture of America’s inner cities, they retain incoherent bits and pieces of cultures appropriate to earlier stages of economic development, and combine them with values for informing behavior in the Information Age.
The Information Revolution, therefore, will not merely release the spirit of genius, it will also unleash the spirit of nemesis. Both will contest as never before in the millennium to come.
The shift from an Industrial to an Information Society is bound to be breathtaking. The transition from one stage of economic life to another has always involved a revolution. We think that the Information Revolution is likely to be the most far-reaching of all. It will reorganize life more thoroughly than either the Agricultural Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. And its impact will be felt in a fraction of the time. Fasten your seat belts.